Nuclear Deterrence in the Algorithmic Age
Game Theory RevisitedNuclear Deterrence in the Algorithmic Age
Game Theory RevisitedSamenvatting
Commonly used game and decision theoretic models fail to explain the empirics of deterrence. This has unjustly led many theorists to criticize the (rationality and other) assumptions underpinning of such models. No serious game theorist will contend that his theoretic model will possibly take account of all the peculiarities involved in decision making and therefore be an accurate model of such situations. Games are an aid to thinking about some of the aspects of the broader situation. Game theory models prescribe what a decision maker ought to do in a given situation, not what a decision maker actually does. To maintain nuclear strategic stability, it is of paramount importance to understand the dynamical interplay between all players involved in decision making processes with regard to nuclear strategy. History has shown some progress in understanding nuclear deterrence by the use of initial game- and decision theoretic models to alleviate the burden of human cognitive biases. Since it is highly likely that (semi-)autonomous systems will in some way participate in the future nuclear strategic landscape, combined with the fact that the nuclear deterrent decision-cycle will also be based on algorithmic analysis, rational deterrence theory is and should be an integral element of strategic thinking about nuclear deterrence. That, or it might as well be game over.
Organisatie | Ministerie van Defensie - NLDA |
Afdeling | Faculteit Militaire Wetenschappen |
Lectoraat | Krijgswetenschappen |
Gepubliceerd in | NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies : Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice Springer, Vol. 2020 |
Datum | 2020-12-04 |
Type | Boekdeel |
ISBN | 978-94-6265-419-8 |
Taal | Engels |