

Expectations of Peacekeeping: Dutch Public Opinion about Missions in the Former Yugoslavia

J.S. VAN DER MEULEN

After the Cold War the public in the West has quickly grown accustomed to new military missions. In fact, there is ample empirical evidence of support for these missions. Research in a diversity of countries, from Spain and France to Canada and the United States, to mention just a few examples, consistently shows majorities of public opinion backing up peacekeeping efforts, in general as well as in a number of specific cases.¹

At the same time it is often understood that this kind of support is feeble and that public opinion tends to be capricious. It has become something of a conventional wisdom to argue that there is little tolerance for casualties. Allegedly the public in the West withdraws its support for new missions as soon as its own soldiers are getting killed.² The latter assertion, however, did not remain uncontested. It has been pointed out that 'public opinion can tolerate mounting casualties as long as there is real belief in the military objectives.... The public can tolerate pain; it is less forgiving of futility.'³

173

One way or the other, public opinion can be looked upon as an important, even strategic, variable in the sustainment of peace-keeping, a fortiori of peace-enforcing. Its impact on decisionmaking cannot possibly be ignored, even though the ways in which the political process reckons with public preferences is not always straightforward or transparent. The intervening role of mass-media in defining, influencing and, occasionally, mobilizing public opinion makes the picture even more complicated. Evidently, it is not always easy to assess the whereabouts of public opinion on a particular issue at any given moment. The polls themselves tend to become instruments of power, publicity and profit. All this enhances, so it seems, from a scientific as well as from a democratic viewpoint, the relevance of detached, systematic research of public opinion patterns.⁴

In this article I will describe and analyze Dutch public opinion about IFOR. Surveys conducted between December 1995 and December 1996 will give us a clear picture of reasons, risks, images and evaluations, ascribed by the public to this particular mission. Because some questions have been asked at the start of IFOR as well as at the end (and occasionally also in the middle), it will be possible to assess degrees of (dis)continuity in public opinions and perceptions.

I will concentrate on data at the aggregate level and will refrain

from tracking them down in terms of background variables, such as gender, age and political preference. No doubt the latter kind of analysis is important and interesting enough. On the one hand reasons of space and transparency have induced me to forget about background variables in this article. On the other hand, data at the aggregate level, analyzed and summarized in terms of 'majorities' versus 'minorities,' are worthwhile in their own right. If these data cover a particular issue from multiple angles, preferably over time, they can be interpreted as a kind of collective thematic map, a motivational structure defining and dominating opinions the public holds. Also, of course, in democratic debate 'majorities' and 'minorities,' in absolute or relative terms, are looked upon and used as the most crucial of categories, no matter how they can be broken down in or explained by social-demographic variables.

174

At this point it is, I think, fair and enlightening to confess how much I have been impressed by Page and Shapiro's *The Rational Public*.⁵ While the data presented in this article are a far cry from the wealth of material, spanning decades, these two authors have gathered and interpreted, some of the insights they offer do find an echo in my analysis. Basically I share their view of public opinion at the aggregate level (!) as stable and informed, not susceptible to sudden or radical change, unless there are very good reasons. It is a viewpoint which I have found fruitful in earlier studies of public opinion vis-à-vis international security and defence policy⁶ and which, as I hope to show, is being confirmed by Dutch public opinion about peacekeeping in general and about IFOR in particular. In order to illustrate the former point (about peacekeeping in general) I will start out in the next paragraph with a short overview of 'what happened before,' because IFOR was not the first mission to which the Netherlands contributed troops.

The Road to IFOR⁷

The demise of the draft can be looked upon as a significant token of new times calling for a different military. Belgium and the Netherlands have been the first two countries in continental Europe to switch to all-volunteer forces. France has decided to do likewise. No doubt more countries will follow suit.⁸ Typically, when asked to choose pro or contra conscription, in late 1989 a majority of Dutch public opinion favoured maintaining it: 50% versus 36%. Within three years, however, a complete turnover had taken place: 18% versus 70%!⁹ This near consensus, at the end of 1992, anticipated the governmental decision to abolish conscription, which became official in the spring of 1993. Though hardly the only reason for doing away with conscription, the consideration that it would be wrong to send draftees on out-of-area missions had weighed heavily. During the Gulf War, for instance, 72% of public opinion in the Netherlands took that view, while 65% said professional soldiers should be obliged to go, even if they did not like it.¹⁰

At the same time, new missions under the heading of crisis management, peacekeeping and humanitarian help, came to be looked upon as an important rationale for the military. At the end of 1993, 56% was of the opinion that either humanitarian help or worldwide crisis management constituted the most important task for the armed forces; 40% felt national and allied defence to be most important. Another question at the same moment underscored the thrust of the public mood: 72% agreed with deploying soldiers in the context of United Nations missions.¹¹ So an all-volunteer force made fit for new military missions can be said to be very much in accordance with Dutch people's preferences as these developed after the Cold War.

For the international community a severe test of the will to keep or even enforce peace posed itself through the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. As table 1 shows, public opinion in The Netherlands initially, at the end of 1993, favoured participating in the UN led mission, with a clear majority (68%). Within one and a half year, however, public support substantially declined. Evidently doubts had grown about the viability of the peacekeeping concept as it was being practised. Just before the third poll was taken (June 1995), blue helmets being taken hostage underscored the powerlessness of UNPROFOR. With the fall of Srebrenica, in the first half of July 1995, the lowest point of mission credibility was reached. In fact, at this very moment, Dutch public opinion wanted to pull out, because risks and results appeared to be totally out of balance. During the evening of July 11, in a telephonic survey on behalf of a television news programme, 57% wanted to leave.¹²

175

Table 1: Dutch Participation in Bosnia.

	<i>December 1993</i>	<i>December 1994</i>	<i>June 1995</i>	<i>August 1995</i>	<i>December 1995</i>
<i>Agree</i>	68	54	41	62	69
<i>Disagree</i>	14	26	26	13	12
<i>Undecided</i>	18	20	34	25	20

A month later, however, (see table 1), the majority in favour of Dutch participation in Bosnia had re-established itself. The formation of a Rapid Reaction Force, which included a company of Dutch marines, probably contributed to the impression that at last the international community had drawn a line in the sand. The deployment of the RRF, together with major air strikes, in the beginning of September, warranted this impression. In line with the post-Srebrenica recovery of morale, public opinion applauded Deliberate Force. A majority (56% versus 31%) even said, it was prepared to take the risk of casualties among Dutch soldiers.¹³ In fact, already at the end of 1992 the option of enforcing peace in Bosnia received majority support, notwithstanding the

realization that soldier's lives would be in harm's way. 'Should the Netherlands join a military intervention,' at that particular moment the question went, 'when almost for sure own soldiers will be killed or wounded?' Yes, 66%, answered; no, 20% replied; do not know, 14% said.¹⁴ Spanning three years these data can be looked upon to underscore a remark by Anthony Parsons about the stance of the West towards ex-Yugoslavia: 'I shall always believe that the governments concerned underestimated the steadfastness of their own electorates and that the excessive timidity was unnecessary.'¹⁵

176 This rough sketch of Dutch public opinion could be filled in with more dimensions and a lot of details regarding its post-Cold-War stance on security and defence policy in general as well as vis-à-vis the mishappenings of UNPROFOR, culminating in the Srebrenica tragedy.¹⁶ For our purposes here, however, it is sufficient for understanding the mood of the country, at the very moment the international community decided to have IFOR safeguard the Dayton Agreement. It was a foregone conclusion that the public would sustain participation. As table 1 shows, in December 1995, almost 70% did. Enforcing peace in Bosnia with violent means, if necessary, was an option 58% would justify. And again, yes, it was thought acceptable (55% versus 33%) to risk casualties among NATO soldiers, Dutch ones among them.¹⁷ All this was a logical outcome, on the one hand, of a general view of the military's new rationale, and, on the other hand of experiences in the conflict-ridden theatre of Bosnia.

Human Rights

Those same experiences can explain why at the time, i.e. in December 1995, there was quite some pessimism about lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia. Some 60% felt very or rather pessimistic, only 13% felt optimistic. Admittedly, this was a bit less gloomy than two years before. At the end of 1993 these figures were respectively 84% and 6%.¹⁸ So while the support for IFOR was firm enough, there were no big illusions about how much it could contribute to lasting peace. In April 1996, when IFOR had been deployed for some months, respondents were asked to choose the most important condition for the success of the Dayton Agreement. 'Reconciliation between groups within the population,' was mentioned by 63%; 'reconstruction of the country,' by 15%; 'presence of NATO-troops,' by 9%; 'all three equally important,' by 9%.¹⁹ Especially the latter answer category underscores the perceived hierarchy among conditions for success. This is not just looked upon as the result of adding up a number of conditions, no, it depends far and foremost on a particular one. This is important to bear in mind, when scrutinizing the public's view of IFOR, its tasks and its soldiers, in more detail.

Why bother, one might ask, if chances for success are so dim? Put somewhat more sophisticated and neutral: 'What is the main justification for the participation of Dutch troops [in IFOR]?' 'Dutch interest,' 2%; 'European security,' 24%; 'NATO obligations,' 13%; 'human rights in Bosnia,' 50%. ('No justification' and 'do not know': 11%).²⁰ See also table 5 below. It is a telling answer pattern, as much about the justification that does not count ('Dutch interest') as about the one that clearly prevails ('human rights'). Taken together the other two justifications, 'European security' and 'NATO-obligations,' count for almost 40% of the answers. This is not a percentage to be overlooked. Besides, implicitly these categories are related to national interests. A close reading of questions suggests some caution while interpreting answers. Still, the impression of a dominance of idealistic motives for participating in IFOR seems warranted. This fits in with the general priorities ascribed to nowadays armed forces, as hinted at above. Put the other way around: it is *not* primarily for reasons of classical national defence that, in the eyes of the public, troops are being deployed in Bosnia. This may seem self-evident or even trivial. In fact, it is extremely noteworthy from a historical viewpoint as well as for the sake of its implications, especially those pertaining to the crucial issue of risks and casualties. We will come back to the latter point in the next paragraph.

177

Bringing to justice those suspected of grossly violating human rights, to the point of 'ethnic cleansing' and genocide, has been part of the Dayton Agreement. The active pursuit of suspects, however, was not within the IFOR mandate.

Table 2: No Active Arrest of Suspects of War Crimes.

	<i>April 1996</i>	<i>July 1996</i>	<i>November 1996</i>
<i>Understandable</i>	49	41	44
<i>Not Understandable</i>	41	50	44
<i>Don't Know</i>	10	9	12

As table 2 suggests, public opinion in The Netherlands was not without apprehension for this task limitation. In April most people (49% versus 41%) said they could understand why IFOR did not chase Karadzic & Co. In July percentages were reversed: 50% (versus 41%) could *not* understand this policy. Eventually, in November opinions were perfectly split: 44% versus 44%.²¹ Evidently, the public was strongly ambivalent about something which from a human-rights standpoint should be done, but for other reasons was given low priority. Decisionmakers feared the effects of arrests on the fragile peace process in Bosnia, but also, in line with earlier moments during the conflict, were afraid their own constituencies would not tolerate casu-

alties. As for the latter argument, also as before, they may have been overcautious. In November when IFOR almost had completed its mission, asked whether the 'active pursuit of suspected war criminals should be part of the SFOR mandate, even if the lives of NATO-soldiers would be at risk,' 30% of Dutch public opinion said 'definitely yes,' 33% 'probably yes,' 15% 'probably no,' 9% 'definitely no,' while 13% 'did not know'.²² Of course this leaves the question open whether it would be wise to do so in view of the peace process. Right now, in the summer of 1997, during the writing of this article, decisionmakers still seem to be wrestling with both arguments, political effects and home-front morale. Arresting Bosnian-Serb top-dogs, however, at last seems to have grown into more than a remote possibility. Our prediction is that public opinion would applaud such an event, even if a number of NATO soldiers would be (fatally) harmed.

Risks

178

Given the way IFOR evolved, practically from start to finish, it comes as no surprise that a majority of the Dutch people considered the risks soldiers were running as 'acceptable.' In April, however, the moment when we came up with this question, the majority was a bit larger than in November: it dropped from 66% to 56%. The minority considering risks as 'not acceptable,' grew proportionally: from 25% to 34%.²³ IFOR did take some casualties, especially because of incidents with mines and car accidents. A number of Dutch soldiers got wounded, none of them fatally. It is possible that incidents and accidents such as these did have some impact and can help explain why more people judged risks as not acceptable. It is also possible that ongoing publicity about peacekeeping in general and about the blue helmets of UNPROFOR in particular generated some extra sensitivity about risks. In this context it is interesting to see how different kind of risks were lined up by the public - and how this question also did show some change between April and November.

Table 3: Causes of Biggest Risks.

	<i>April 1996</i>	<i>November 1996</i>
<i>Mines</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>32</i>
<i>Stress</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>Combat</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Accidents</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>Don't Know</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>11</i>

As can be seen in table 3, at both moments the ascribed sequence of risks stayed the same: mines, psychological stress, combat, accidents. 'Mines,' however, dropped from 41% to 32% as biggest risk, while

'stress' rose from 21% to 29%.²⁴ Especially this finding gives some (extra) plausibility to the speculation that debates about post-mission effects of peacekeeping (again: UNPROFOR in particular), may have had some impact. We do have a bit of additional, indirect evidence: in April 48% of public opinion thought Dutch soldiers 'hardened' enough to cope with 'extreme circumstances,' while 35% did not consider them hardened enough. In November these percentages were respectively 43% and 42%. (In both polls 'don't knows' around 16%).²⁵

Even though the degree (if not the direction) of change is rather similar in these three thematically related questions (yes or no acceptable, kind of risks, yes or no hardened enough) we should beware of over-estimating its meaning. Though significant, the difference is relatively small and its explanation cannot fail to be speculative. One way or the other, risks connected to IFOR have stayed limited, and as far the Dutch soldiers are concerned, there were hardly any accidents receiving high-profile publicity. Taking this into consideration, the least one can say is that the public does not lack in risk-awareness. Moreover, it appears to have a stock of knowledge at hand which makes sense and which, however, weighed, reflects 'realities' of this particular mission as well as of peacekeeping in general.

179

Impressions

The Dutch contingent participating in IFOR was made up of various units, stemming from army, navy, air force and military police. Relevant as frameworks of identification for the soldiers themselves, we were interested whether these in any way were significant for the public. So we confronted the interviewees with a subdivision of the Dutch troops and asked 'which unit has impressed you most?' Given the diversity of the units, from full-sized army battalions to a scattered detachment of military-police, maybe the comparison was not completely fair. Moreover, halfway 1996, the marine-company was replaced by an army mortar company. The degree of publicity units received was likewise diverse. But then again, these were 'realities.'

Table 4: Most Impressive Unit.

	<i>April 1996</i>	<i>November 1996</i>
<i>Don't Know</i>	30	24
<i>No Special Impression</i>	28	28
<i>Transport Battalion</i>	20	21
<i>Air Force Squadron</i>	8	10
<i>Company of Marines</i>	7	6
<i>Mechanized Battalion</i>	6	11
<i>Military Police</i>	2	1

Table 4 shows, as could be expected, that relatively many (23%) answered 'don't know' and even more (28%) said no unit had made a special impression. Taken together this rules out half of the public, which may tell us something about this particular mission but also about the way people in general look at military organization. For most people who did make a difference, the transport battalion stood out, and this came as a bit of a surprise to us. Our expectation was that the air force squadron and the marines would have made the most outstanding impression. On the one hand because of their traditionally pronounced profile, on the other hand because of 'impression spill-over' from Deliberate Force, right before IFOR, in which both played a part, which did not go unnoticed by national mass-media. As it was, the transport battalion impressed most people, 21%, which is almost half of those who did perceive a difference. This particular battalion had been there already from the beginning of UNPROFOR and clearly represented the typical 'humanitarian' part of peacekeeping, especially by delivering food to refugees and besieged enclaves. Our guess is that here some 'impression spill-over' did take place.

The question was asked in April and November. Basically the answer pattern stayed the same: somewhat less 'don't knows' (from 30% to 23%), a bit more people impressed by the armoured battalion (from 6% to 11%).²⁶

180

Besides the heterogeneity of national contingents, a conspicuous characteristic of IFOR, as of these missions in general, was its multinationality. We formulated a similar question as the one just dealt with: 'soldiers from which country have impressed you most?' Again, half of the interviewees said 'don't know' (31%) or 'none from any specific country.' Soldiers from the USA impressed 27%, from Great Britain 9%, from France 6%, from other countries (unnamed) 6%. Same pattern in April and November, only France and Great Britain changed places, respectively by losing and winning a few points.²⁷ Whatever else the information conveyed by a question, this kind of stability is always scientifically satisfying. It underscores that the public, at the aggregate level, does not answer questions at random or in a capricious way. Like in the paragraph before this one, answers make sense and reflect 'realities.'

From IFOR towards SFOR

Noteworthy, also in terms of stability, were the answers to the question 'how effective have NATO troops in Bosnia been so far/last year?' The question was asked three times, in April, in July and in November. On a scale from 1 (lowest effectivity) to 10 (highest effectivity) average scores respectively were: 5.8, 5.5, 5.8. The bulk of the answers were concentrated on scores 5, 6 and 7. Taken together these stood for 68%, 55% and 59% of the answers given in the three consecutive polls.²⁸

Apart from their stability, the answers are fascinating because of the degree of effectiveness ascribed to IFOR. Just below 6 does not seem particularly high. In fact it is rather meagre, barely sufficient your schoolteacher would tell you. Given the way in which IFOR fulfilled its mandate this score might look a bit unfair, maybe even *not* quite reflecting 'reality.' We should remember though (see the paragraph on human rights) that for Dutch public opinion the presence of IFOR was not by far the most important condition for lasting peace in Bosnia. Instead, reconciliation between the different groups was judged to be crucial. So while the effectivity of IFOR in terms of its own mandate may have been sufficient, of necessity its wider impact could be looked upon as limited. And of course, it did not succeed in arresting suspected war criminals. We have seen how public opinion was deeply ambivalent about the mandate on this particular point. All in all, interpreted in a broader context the evaluation of IFOR's effectiveness seems sensible and consistent enough.

Among decisionmakers, even before IFOR took off, there was the perception that a one-year deployment of troops would not be sufficient, indeed, would not be effective enough to leave Bosnian parties to themselves. Early on there was talk of a follow-on mission. In our research this issue also was taken up right away. 'Should the Netherlands contribute troops to a new mission in Bosnia?', it was asked. In April, July and November, respectively 70%, 67% and 68% gave an affirmative reaction with answer categories allowing for different kinds of 'yes,' unconditional and conditional: 'contribute any way' (36%); 'only if America participates with groundtroops' (16%), 'as long as Great Britain and France participate with ground troops' (16%); 'don't contribute' (17%); 'don't know' (15%) [Figures from November poll].²⁹ So contributing troops to SFOR, as it eventually came to be called, was a foregone conclusion for a clear majority of the Dutch. Even if the Americans would not be there on the ground, more than half of the population still would have wanted to join. If, however, the French and the British would have cancelled their participation together with the Americans, there would only have been minority sup-

Table 5: Justification for Participation in IFOR and SFOR.

	IFOR (April 1996)	SFOR (November 1996)
Human Rights	50	42
European Security	24	25
NATO Obligations	13	14
Dutch Interests	2	3
No Justification	4	6
Don't Know	7	11

port. But almost for sure in such a scenario there would not have been any SFOR at all.

As table 5 makes clear, the justification for participating in SFOR was arranged in a similar pattern as vis-à-vis IFOR. 'Human rights in Bosnia' first and foremost (42%), 'European security' second (25%), 'NATO-obligations' third (13%), 'Dutch interest' very much fourth (3%). ('No justification,' 6%, 'don't know' 11%).³⁰ Again, striking stability. We do remember of course that as far as public opinion was concerned, at last making some crucial arrests, ideally should be part of SFOR's mandate. If this becomes reality the effectiveness of SFOR may receive a higher average score than IFOR did.

Final Remarks

Opinions about IFOR have confirmed what might be called the public's dedication towards 'new' military missions. While interpreting answer patterns to a number of specific questions I have repeatedly emphasized that public opinion can be looked upon as informed and consistent, one way or the other making sense of the realities of peace-keeping in Bosnia during 1996. Dedication does not look particularly whimsical or superficial, even less so because in the end, as we have seen, the public's evaluation of what IFOR could and did accomplish is rather sober and somewhat sceptical.

In a way of course this has been a 'quiet mission,' which, unlike UNPROFOR, did not suffer major setbacks and which could fulfil most of its mandate without being frustrated, let alone humiliated, by the conflicting parties. From the outside it might look as if the mere presence of IFOR was quite enough to deter any obstruction. Evidently, this smooth implementation of the military side of the peace agreement did hardly test the public's sustainability to the utmost. Whether the latter would have been tough enough to stand major setbacks, including casualties among NATO troops, is an open question. Our research, however, suggests it would be wrong to underestimate public opinion and to presuppose it would, of necessity, be given to easy and immediate panic. For this its aggregate motivational pattern looks too wellknit.

In 1996, like before, Bosnia was not the only trouble spot in the world earmarked for peacekeeping endeavours by the international community. Especially the ongoing tragedies taking place in the heart of Africa recommended themselves for some kind of humanitarian intervention. In early summer there was serious talk about a UN mission to relief suffering in Burundi. Public opinion in the Netherlands was reluctant to contribute troops: 36% judged it to be 'desirable,' 47% said 'undesirable,' 17% did not know. In late autumn the UN deliberated about sending soldiers to Zaire. Now 52% of the Dutch public was in favour

of participating (against 34%; 14% did not know).³¹ Neither mission materialized, yet it is interesting to note the different reactions they received. These may very well be ascribed to the state of debate and decisionmaking at the very moments the two surveys were being held. In fact, the Dutch government itself seemed more hesitant in the case of Burundi in comparison with Zaire. The fact, however, that mission x does not automatically get the same support as mission y, is an indication that the dedication to specific 'new' military missions is not automatic and unconditional.

Again, in principle this dedication itself is clear and convincing enough. As I explained above (cf. The Road to IFOR), it went hand in hand with what, in fact, was a major reason for abolishing the draft. New missions call for different soldiers. As table 6 makes clear, from 1993 till 1996, principle support for non-traditional tasks has only grown. In this period the number of people viewing 'humanitarian aid' and 'worldwide crisismanagement' as the most important task for the armed forces grew from 56% to 64%; 'national and allied defence' as most important task diminished from 40% to 27%. ('Don't knows' respectively 4% and 9%).³²

Table 6: Most Important Task of the Dutch Armed Forces.

183

	1993	1996
<i>Defence of National and Allied Territory</i>	40	27
<i>Humanitarian Aid</i>	35	43
<i>Worldwide Crisis Management</i>	21	21
<i>Don't Know</i>	5	9

Of course 'humanitarian' is a seductive, vague, all-embracing word. 'Human rights,' notwithstanding its formal codifications, do not exist in any kind of pure state. As a consequence military interventions on behalf of 'humanitarian' causes, apart from natural disasters, will always be intertwined with other 'sources of social power': political, economical, ideological.³³ Recognizing this complicated context for peacekeeping and peace-enforcing may be the main challenge for public opinion in years to come. Living up to the latter's expectations, instead of using the publics supposedly 'low tolerance for casualties' as a running excuse for non-intervention, can be looked upon as the formidable challenge for decisionmakers and professional soldiers alike.³⁴

Notes

1. Philippe Manigart (ed.), *Future Roles, Missions and Structures of Armed Forces in the New World Order: the Public View*, Nova Science Publishers, 1996.
2. Cf. for instance, Harvey M. Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro, 'Casualties, Technology and America's Future Wars,' *Parameters* (Summer 1996), pp. 119-127.
3. Lawrence Freedman, as quoted by Martin Shaw in *Civil Society and Media in Global Crises. Representing Distant Violence*, London: Pinter, 1996, p. 73.
4. For a general overview of the role of public opinion about foreign policy, cf. Philip Everts, *Laat dat maar aan ons over! Democratie, buitenlands beleid en vrede*, DSWO Press, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, 1996.
5. Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public. Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences*, University of Chicago, 1992.
6. Cf. for instance Jan van der Meulen, 'Het verlangen naar de ideale oorlog,' *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1993, 4), pp. 3-8.
7. Surveys which provide the data for this article all have been carried out on behalf of *Stichting Maatschappij en Krijgsmacht* (SMK) by NIPO Amsterdam. Only in paragraph 2 some additional polls are used which have been ordered for and carried out by other parties. Almost all data have been made public before. Sources in endnotes refer to where and when. As a rule SMK-data are made public in the bi-monthly *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht*. It is relevant to give some specifics about the most important surveys for this article. All five of them, between December 1995 and December 1996, have been conducted by way of face-to-face interviews, among a select, representative samples of the Dutch population, from age 18 onwards. Roughly sample sizes were between 800 and 1000. Dates of the successive surveys: 18-20 December 1995; 9-10 April 1996; 8-10 July 1996; 4-6 November 1996; 16-18 December 1996.
8. Jan van der Meulen and Philippe Manigart, 'Zero-Draft in the Low Countries. The Final Shift to the All Volunteer Force,' *Armed Forces & Society*, Winter 1998.
9. *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1993, 1). Between December 1989 and December 1992, opinions about conscription versus all volunteer forces were polled five times.
10. *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1993, 4).
11. Both questions: *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1994,1).
12. Interestingly enough, 54% also was of the opinion that Srebrenica should have been recaptured by force. *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1995, 4).
13. Reactions to Deliberate Force were polled in a telephonic survey by Telepanel/University of Amsterdam. See *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1996,1).
14. *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1993,1).
15. Anthony Parsons, *From Cold War to Hot Peace. UN Interventions: 1947-1994*, London: Michael Joseph, 1995, pp. 242-243.
16. All surveys in relation to Srebrenica by SMK as well as by other institutes are analysed in J. van der Meulen, 'Voor en na Srebrenica: de balans van de publieke opinie,' in M.F.A. Cras and L. Wecke, *Vijftig jaar VN-vredesoperaties. Tussen nationaal belang en internationale rechtsorde*, Studiecentrum voor Vredesvraagstukken, KU Nijmegen, 1996, pp. 123-134.
17. *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1995,6).
18. *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1996,2).
19. *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1996, 3/4).

20. *ibidem*
21. *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* 1996, 3/4 and 6 respectively.
22. *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1996, 6).
23. *ibidem*
24. *ibidem*
25. Data from this question have not been published before.
26. *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1996, 6).
27. *ibidem*
28. *ibidem*
29. *ibidem*
30. *ibidem*
31. *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1996, 3/4) and *Maatschappij & Krijgsmacht* (1997, 1) respectively.
32. *ibidem*
33. This conceptualization, of course, derives from Michael Mann's majestic *Sources of Social Power. Volume I and II*, Cambridge University Press, 1986 and 1993.
34. For a more detailed argumentation of this last argument, within a broader context of evolving civil-military relations, cf. Jan van der Meulen, 'Post-Modern Societies and Future Support for Military Missions,' in: Gert de Nooy (ed.), *The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future of Western Military Strategy*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations *Clingendael/Kluwer Law International*, 1997, pp. 59-74.