Athens versus Sparta
The new missions and the future of military education in Europe
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Abstract
With regard to officer socialization, Sparta represents the old model of military education, which - applied in an intraorganizational and isolated manner - focuses on military skills and an attitude of loyal service to the nation. Athens, on the other hand, stands for an open education in a broad spectrum of academically founded intellectual capabilities in the service of politics and diplomacy. Are we moving away from Sparta and on towards Athens? The article tries to answer this question by presenting a closer look at the changes in the operational and socio-political context of armed forces and by illustrating trends in the new conception of the officer education in Europe. The main conclusion is that the European way leads towards Athens without leaving Sparta behind entirely.

Introduction
Military organizations have always served several purposes, but mainly those that were closely linked to the use of collective force. In the age of the nation state, armed forces were not limited to warfare and protection of the national territory, they were also the symbolic bearers of national sovereignty and identity. This is why the professional officer was rightly defined as a manager of violence and at the same time as a servant of the state. (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1963) In most nations the training of future leading soldiers includes a socialization with patriotic values additional to warfaring skills. Traditionally, this education is not given within the framework of the general national education system, but in specific non-public institutions: the military academies. Their purpose can be classically defined as '... inculcating future officers with loyalty and commitment to the profession of arms and a willingness to serve their country on and off the battlefield'. (Franke & Heinecken, 2001: 567)

However, since the end of the Cold War the armed forces of the modern democracies have served almost exclusively other purposes than warfare, not in the national but increasingly in an inter- and multinational setting. They have been utilized primarily for what can be called interventions of a policing type, be it in classic peacekeeping and humanitarian missions or in more muscular peace restoring operations. Post-Cold War soldiers are sent off to prevent potential armed conflicts, to enforce law and restore public order, to mediate in unsolved conflicts and protect minorities in case of humanitarian catastrophes, to organize and monitor elections, find and help displaced persons and

refugees, and to reconstruct war-damaged civilian institutions and infrastructures. Soldiers have been taking on the roles of diplomats, referees, public servants, street workers, constables and policemen, but rarely have they been used as what they were originally trained and skilled for, namely as soldiers for the defence of their nations. Of around fifty operations since the end of the Gulf War in 1991 almost all were of the new non-military type[1] (Moskos, Williams & Segal, 2000: 297). These 'Military Operations Other Than War' (MOOTW) are not new in an historical sense. What is novel, however, is their dominance as a form of military action, on the one hand, and their geo-strategic and political importance, on the other.

Obviously, the traditional nation state function of the military, the waging of war in the interest of one's own nation, remains only one and maybe not even an important task of military organizations of modern democratic states. Their armed forces are becoming some kind of multi-functional organizations entrusted with a variety of state tasks. The use of collective force has statistically become an exception and only one among many tasks.

What are the consequences for the officer education of this mutation of the military organization from a warfighting instrument into a multi-functional policing tool? Is the old training system, according to which officers are trained in isolated schools that focus on the training for the brutality of war and the loyal service to the nation, a thing of the past? Is a new model for the education of tomorrow's officers needed, a model that offers more than warfare skills, that allows officers to play new roles ranging from managers of violence to politically trained advisors and diplomats to social workers? And if this is the case, is a socialization different from the standard national educational system still up to date?

While Sparta represents the old educational model that focuses on military skills and on an attitude of loyal service to the nation taking place in an intraorganizational and isolated manner, Athens stands for a an open education in a broad spectrum of academically founded intellectual capabilities in the service of politics and diplomacy (Lovell, 1979). Are we moving away from Sparta and on towards Athens? In order to answer these questions the changes in the operational and socio-political context of armed forces will be examined. Subsequently, some trends in the new conception of the officer education that can be observed in Europe will be discussed. Finally, an attempt will be made to formulate some theses about the future of the officer education. The main assertion will be that the European way leads to Athens but that Sparta will not be given up entirely.

The new operational context: the constabularization of the European armed forces

In order to understand the consequences of the military and political developments for the re-conceptualization of the officer education, the main characteristics of the new operational context and the ensuing mutations within the structures of the armed forces have to be outlined.

National armed forces are used as constabulary forces to secure international order, to de-escalate, to secure peace on behalf of a supranational power. It is therefore possible to speak – in the words of Morris Janowitz – of an increasing constabularization of the European military. (Janowitz, 1971) Almost all Europeans have reacted to this with an explicit re-definition of their armed forces that amounts to a considerable expansion of the possible range of missions. Without losing their capability for combat, military organizations are turning into instruments for the creation of international order and even 'nation-building'. The capability for a new quality of civilian-military relations is indispensable, the soldier's field of competencies is extended to include those of a policeman, social worker and diplomat.

It is possible to speak of an ongoing constabularization of the military, not only on an international but also on a national level. (Haltiner, 2000) The blurring boundaries between external and internal security accelerate this process. This change of functions of the armed forces is made visible in support missions in the areas of border control (e.g. in Austria), the fight against organized crime and terrorism (e.g. Italy, USA), the protection of diplomatic institutions, airports or strategically important civilian infrastructures in the aftermath of September 2001. (France)[2] Both requirements of the new missions, the enlarged skill spectrum of the military personnel as well as the increasing amount of troops deployed for out-of-nation duties, necessitate the use of volunteers and render the upholding of large numbers of citizen soldiers obsolete. The following criteria are characteristic of the new strategic and political context of armed forces operations. (see also Boëne et al., 2001: 30)

The dissolving link between the military and the nation, end of in-group ethics

In the 19th and 20th century the traditional logic of the national armed forces was based on a distinction between inside (nation, alliance members) and outside (potential enemy territory). The role of the armed forces was to protect and to defend the inner territory. Thus, the identification of the officers and the soldiers with national values and interests was of the utmost importance, a socialization based on those values was to guarantee the necessary motivation. This tight bond with the national territory is dissolving with the use of armed forces in international crisis stabilization. The logic of accelerated globalization also applies to military organizations. Already during the Cold

War, the system of nuclear deterrence based on the weapons monopoly of a few great powers, was no longer based on nations but on power blocs. The focus is shifting from territorial and national systems to regional and ideological criteria. (democracy, human rights, humanitarian international law, protection of minorities) The ongoing communalization of military tasks enhances the de-nationalization of the militaries. The formerly close relationship between national threat and national independence that had legitimized the mass armies has dissolved in the course of a decade. The emerging 'global soldier's' ethics and morals are faced with new demands. What such morals should look like is still being discussed in politics and in the military establishments.

Internationalization of conflicts and multinationalization of the militaries: Today, most missions of armed forces take place within an international or intercultural context, and normally with multinational troops. While in the past, at best the staffs, i.e. the highest hierarchical level of the militaries, were multinational, multinationalization has now reached troop level as well, i.e. the lower levels of hierarchy. The management of intercultural competencies has become a prerequisite for successful stabilization and peace-keeping missions.

International law: International law plays an important role in the new missions other than war. The Rules of Engagement determine the mission and the limitations in the use of force. Respect for international law is one of the most important foundations for the legitimization and evaluation of the new operations. In order to guarantee them, the military leadership is faced with completely new challenges. This requires not only knowledge of international law but also the ability to communicate it, to enforce it diplomatically where necessary.

New forms of conflict: Conventional conflicts between sovereign national states have been replaced by civilian, religious, gang or ethnic wars. They are marked by diffuse power structures, missing force monopolies and often changing boundaries between enemies and allies, by asymmetrical warfare that uses the civilian population as basic resource, by migrations and humanitarian catastrophes (Kaldor, 1999). Interventions in these bottom up-conflicts demand high competencies in almost all social roles of human behaviour.

Hypermediatization: Nowadays, military operations take place in the spotlight of the media and this in real-time (Boëne et al. 2001, p. 32). The days when the military could act without spectators are over. Operations are taking place in front of the eyes of the public – and the enemy! Public opinion – national and international – decides on the

legitimacy of an operation. The relations with the media and the ability to communicate become indispensable for successful military actions on the spot.

The impact of constabularization on the militaries

What are the consequences of the obvious constabularization, i.e. the growing use of the military for policing operations? In order to underline the differences between the old and the new military tasks and their consequences for the education of officers, the differences between military and police organizations in an ideal-typical way will be presented below (Haltiner, 2000, Geser, 1996):

Traditionally, military organizations are top-down organizations specialized in threatening with and using collective violence against foreign armed forces. In other words: they are focused on inter-social macro-violence or on 'hard power'. The use of massive macro-violence demands a high degree of coordination. The organizational rationale is therefore based on a leadership strictly structured from top to bottom with a closed chain of command organized according to the principle of centralization. The information relevant for action moves down from the top, the competence to initiate action is strongly limited at the bottom of the hierarchic structure (Feld, 1959; Lang, 1965).

The borderline case of a war is the measure of the quality of organization not only in times of war but also in times of peace. The organization in all its details is imprinted with the capacity for massive force application and the risk of macro-violence. However, meanwhile operations including violence on a large scale, have become rare. The low amount of experience feedback into the social environment is apt to lead military organizations to an overly strong inward orientation. Their structural prerequisites for permanent learning are weak (Lang, 1965: 838; Battistelli, 1991). The individual is instrumentalized and de-individualized in favour of the group, i.e. the soldier is expected to sacrifice his individual freedom and, if inevitable, his life for a collective goal. There is a net primacy of the community. Members of the collective are taken care of in an institutionalized fashion. Soldiers generally live in 'total institutions' (Goffman, 1961). Morale and cohesion as well as a high *esprit de corps* are vital ingredients for combat motivation and are part of the socialization and training. The military, while being a highly bureaucratic institution, has therefore essentially communitarian structures. This only reinforces the tendency towards inward orientation, or even 'castellation'. In classic military operations the enemy can be identified, making it easier for the soldier to show unambiguous behaviour as a player in traditional warfare. The soldier's actions are aimed at attacking and destroying an enemy, if necessary by all means. Ambiguous situations are disconcerting for the soldier and often provoke the falling back on trained,

reflexive behaviour. Military organizations are therefore, on accord of their internal nature, top-down organizations.

Police forces stabilize a certain social order. One of the means of the police is the use of 'soft power'. In order to prevent intrasocial 'micro-violence' (Geser, 1996: 70) the police may make use of controlled force while respecting at the same time the integrity of persons and goods as much as possible. The police are supposed to react to disturbances of public order in the shortest possible time span, while observing the criteria of nonpartiality and adequacy. The rules of engagement are based on bargaining and diplomacy, not on destruction (Vicaire, 2000). The diversity and the possible ambiguity of the areas of action confronts the police officer with highly diverse role expectations and demands excellent psychological, social and professional competences. He has to deal with ambiguities, which are part of his everyday surroundings. A clearly defined image of the enemy is lacking and would only be an obstacle. The quality of police work is therefore dependent on 'the quality of lower level policemen: on their moral integrity, sound judgement and personal authority as well as on various professional skills' (Geser, 1994: 1). Therefore, police organizations are, as a rule, environmentally open organizations, i.e., their close integration into a social environment provides them with relevant information for their actions and is therefore an important prerequisite for their success. The police officer at the lowest hierarchical level must have comparatively large 'on-the-spot' decisional competences and must be multifunctional. From the perspective of organization theory, police organizations are bottom-up organizations.

Apparently militaries and police organizations are unequal sisters. Therefore peace-keeping and similar policing missions are non-essential and uncomfortable missions for traditional military organizations. The basic principles of the military organization and its inner rationale are opposed to the basic principles of the police organization in many ways. Trying to accomplish 'Operations Other Than War' with an organization made for war, potentially creates a series of dilemmas. They range from the question of adequate force intensity, the adequate degree of responsibility delegation to new forms of civilian-military relations (Haltiner, 2000). This does not necessarily mean that soldiers refuse 'Operations Other Than War' or feel uneasy about them (Caforio, 2002). Nevertheless, a cross-national assessment in which officers from nine states with experiences in 'Operations Other Than War' participated makes clear that 'the new type of operations require different professional performances of the officer from those needed for traditional war operations' (Caforio, 2002: 23). Particular problems emerge from the fact that the decision making process and therefore the responsibility in the framework of peace operations has a tendency to shift to the lower levels, as is the case in

police operations. The fact that even the most junior officers see themselves pushed into a political role and have to make decisions, the consequences of which they are often unable to estimate, seems particularly stressful. Another obstacle is the insecurity that stems from the fact that the different reference groups to be dealt with in Peace Support Operations constantly call for new skills in interpreting unfamiliar situations. Moreover, making contact with the local population, with members of international organizations, with NGOs and members of other armed forces demands high diplomatic, psychological, sociological, linguistic and legal competences. The officers are confronted with forms of stress that are different from combat stress (Britt, 1995, Williams, 1995). Rules Of Engagement changing with the situation and the simultaneousness of different cultural settings demand a flexibility of behaviour that goes far beyond what is part of the traditional soldier's role. It comes as no surprise, then, that after the evaluation of their MOOTW-experience almost 70% of the officers in the above-mentioned assessment come to the conclusion 'that the functions carried out in MOOTW require more and different preparations from what was given to them' (Caforio, 2002: 153). Moreover, the vast majority of them think that a series of special training courses as preparation for MOOTWs does not suffice and that the basic education should be changed or completed by a new skill profile. The author of the assessment, tellingly entitled 'The Flexible Officer', former Italian General Giuseppe Caforio, goes one step further in his final conclusion by saying 'One notes, that it is the officers of the countries where the educational process is still of the traditional military type who report higher percentages of shortcomings in training, and, correlatively, who reveal that they encountered greater difficulties in relations with the social actors, especially in PSOs. This is tantamount to saying that a military training closer to university standards, particularly centered to behavioural sciences, seems to produce cadres who find themselves more at ease in handling the tasks proper to MOOTW' (Caforio, 2002: 153).

Change of the socio-economic context in Europe
In addition to the changed strategic context, the end of the Cold War brought about changes in socio-economic context and in civilian-military relations that have to be taken into account when thinking about a new conception of the officer education. These changes are:

Demilitarization of the Societies: In Europe an era of conscription that lasted for two hundred years is coming to an end. Mass armies are disappearing. While in the past chances were good that the majority of the male population would acquire military experience and skills, the part of the population with military experience is now becoming

minuscule. More and more people know the military only from hearsay. Europe's populations are getting increasingly demilitarized. This fact is reinforced by a change of values. In the past values such as self-discipline, subordination and obedience were considered socially desirable not only in the military but also in the family, the school, the economy and the administration. Under these circumstances military education was seen as a somewhat more severe exponent of a general educational ideal. Military education was perceived to be a form of character building and therefore of general value to society. With the individualization and the pluralization of lifestyles these values lost their importance. This change of priorities is linked to a changing social position and civilian role of the military. If in the past the forces had been considered as conveyors of national pride and cohesion they were now perceived as simply being a part of the public services, like any other state institution. With the loss of their symbolic and charismatic functions they have become increasingly subject to cost benefit and effectiveness analysis.

Ghettoization of the Military: The end of conscription and the professionalisation of the armed forces have led to a retreat to the barracks and potentially to a remilitarization of the military core. This is why there is a re-emergence of questions about the democratic control of the military (Haltiner, 2002).

Cost Savings: Since the end of the Cold War Europe's armed forces have been reduced and defence budgets cut. This calls for painful cutbacks in the armed forces not only in terms of investments but also with regard to education. Optimization is the order of the day.

Some consequences of the changed context for the future of the officer education in Europe
What, then, are the consequences of the changed operational and socio-political context for the officer education? Some scholars have argued that it would be enough to complement the curricula of the traditional officer education in order to achieve better performances in operations with a constabulary character. In particular they have in mind additional education in languages, law, psychology and similar subjects of the behavioural sciences (Boëne et al., 2001). Others plead for a basic rethinking of the officer education with regard to the completely changed role of armed forces in the social, political and strategic context. (Maniscalco, 1995, quoted by Caforio, 2001: 23) The latter view seems to be more pertinent, as it seems likely that the consequences of the presented contextual change will lead the education of military professionals away from the 'Sparta'-model, primarily oriented towards a socialization that is centered on

the development of a military mind. It will produce a more open academic education that is based on the 'Athens'-model and centered on general studies. This in fact means:

- The focus on military combat remains necessary but does by no means suffice anymore.
- An education mainly consisting of the instillation of patriotic values and practical skills as provided in classic military academies not only attracts the wrong men and women, it also misses the goal of an education that is supposed to produce competent military professionals that meet today's new exigencies.
- The competence profile of the modern officer should be based more on professional capabilities and less on merely practical skills.
- An integration of the military professional training into the national educational system with regard to a better permeability between civilian and military professional fields is necessary both from a conceptual and a financial point of view.
- The education has to meet university standards. For financial and pedagogical reasons it should therefore be provided in places where the environment is beneficial to studying and where the necessary teaching resources can be found, viz. in civilian universities.

These hypotheses and postulates can be justified as follows:

Dysfunctional Selection

The stage of life in which values are acquired is, as proven by the behavioural sciences, pre-adolescence. After this stage of life values are normally merely reinforced or weakened but do not change anymore. This means that, as a rule, values can no longer be acquired in classic military academies, they can only be reinforced at best. It has been shown, that the choice to become an officer is mainly the result of self-selection and not an effect of value building through socialization in the academies. (Bachman, Sigelman, Diamond 1987, Stevens, Rosa, Gardner 1994, Hammill, Segal & Segal, 1995) Military academies mainly appeal to persons with patriotic values and a status quo-oriented mind. In other words, they may not attract persons who would envisage a temporary occupation as an officer without holding especially conservative or patriotic values. It is very doubtful whether the military socialization in the classic military academies is able to attract the right kind of people with regard to 'flexible' officer, so much in need in the future. There are many indicators that the 'Sparta'-model of military education gives the wrong incentives when it comes to finding military professionals of a new all-rounder type.

Dysfunctional effects of the traditional officer socialization

The US American military academies are paradigmatic for military educational institutions oriented towards character building and national education. It is true that the curricula of the US academies have much in common with the mainstream higher education in America. But their primary role consists in the development of character, the inculcation of values, particularly of unique military values underpinned by moral-ethical considerations. The focus lies on the duty towards the country, discipline and education to absolute loyalty to one's own nation. The cadets are supposed to become loyal servants of their collective always willing to subordinate their own interests to those of the collective. For the academies, character development and molding seem more important than the provided education. However, the more the military loses its national frame of reference and the more 'Military Operations Other Than War' prevail, the less important this nationally focused educational component becomes. It can even become dysfunctional. In their recent study Franke & Heinecken (2001) conclude that the support of US military academy cadets for peace operations weakens in the course of their socialization, while their conservative basic attitude and warrioristic attitudes are strengthened.

There is no doubt that the willingness to make sacrifices will remain an important virtue of military professionals. But the question is if it should not rather be based on rational conviction about its necessity than on an emotional conditioning of an in-/out-group thinking. In-/out-group thinking has proved to be quite dysfunctional in international peacekeeping operations (Winslow, 1999a, 1999b).

Capabilities instead of skills

According to Samuel H.untington it is the professionalism of the modern officer that sets him apart from the noble *homme combatant* of the past (1957). In modern sociology the term professionalism is attributed to social positions concentrating key knowledge that is vital for the society. This term is normally used for doctors, lawyers, teachers and engineers, which are all professions based on an academic education and practice with high exigencies. Their goal is not only to impart knowledge but also the ability to use the acquired knowledge to structure and solve complex problems. The difference between a profession and an occupation is that the latter primarily requires formulaic application skills. A good example is the nurse who serves the doctor or the craftsman with special skills for the handling of a problem. A closer look at the curricula of the classic military academies reveals that the officer education largely consists of a kind of half-academic education at college level. Broad general knowledge is combined with military-specialist training and physical performance enhancement. Often it is not

very clear what is more important: the military-specialist training or the academic curriculum. It can be assumed that both fields are in direct competition instead of complementary when they are taught in the same institution, e.g. the military academy (Moelker, 2000).

Tight curricula with no freedom of subject choice are hardly beneficial to academic learning. Moreover, 3 to 4 years are insufficient for this double-track education. Therefore, the focus of education in academies is directed more at the transfer of formulaic procedures. Lessons learned from historic situations as well as universally applicable tactical and strategic principles that can easily be internalized therefore still represent a major part of the military curricula. In German there is a word that accurately expresses this training focused on application skills as the learning of the *Kriegshandwerk*. Such formulaic skills may not have become obsolete at all, because military actions in war and peacetime operations will continue to be characterized by much uncertainty and unforeseen situations. Mastery of basic and formulaic application knowledge may give an advantage in particular stress situations. Nevertheless, the presented necessity of a shift from combat-centered know-how to problem-solving capacities in order to enable people to act adequately in socio-political and diplomatic situations requires more than a mere completion of the traditional academy curriculum and the traditional teaching methods. It calls for a rethinking of the classic military academy approach as a whole. Instead of mere skills, officers need special intellectual capabilities that are normally acquired in academic studies. Mastery of methods and communication capabilities are more important than pure content knowledge. This is why officers should complete academic studies as they are offered at universities. The subject of these studies is rather irrelevant, even though general studies in behavioral sciences would be preferable with regard to the new missions. The primacy of methodological over content knowledge has always been characteristic for an academic education and for the so-called professions. Therefore, a real professionalisation of the officer function, as has been called for by Huntington, is still to come.

Integration into the civilian educational system
Several reasons indicate that the establishment of a true academic curriculum for the officer education is not possible at military academies. First of all, as has been explained above, the introversion and castellation in total institutions with a military character is not beneficial to the academic learning climate. Secondly, the maintenance of academic institutions next to the existing civilian universities will become too expensive and, with regard to the decreasing defense budgets of the small and mid-sized states in

Europe, less and less affordable. Thirdly, only academic studies that are recognized by civilian standards can give the necessary incentives to guarantee the recruiting of future officers on a qualitatively and quantitatively high level. The civilianizing of the studies guarantees the permeability between the military and the civilian employment market and thus puts an end to the image of the officer profession as being a one-way street. Moreover, the restructuring of academic studies taking place all over Europe according to the two-phase model of the three-year Bachelor's and the successive two-year Master's degree based on the Bologna-Declaration, brings an increase in national and international permeability of studies and universities. This represents a good chance for the military to reformulate its educational needs in a flexible manner. A form of coordination and collaboration between the military and the civilian educational establishments will therefore become inevitable.

Military education

The postulated civilianizing of the officer education poses the question of the right moment for the specific military training: prior to the academic studies, simultaneously, or subsequently. There are several possibilities that will probably lead to different solutions according to the traditions in the different countries. Furthermore, there is the question of how the different phases of an officer's career have to be reconceived and assessed in the framework of the continued educational process. It may be reasonable – as the European trend suggests – to modify the basic as well as the higher military education in the war colleges, so that it is no longer service-related but respects the 'joint' principle. This would not only make sense in terms of cost-effectiveness, but would also accommodate certain new competence profiles. Here again, the consequences of the new missions can be observed.

Conclusions

Europe's Trend from Sparta to Athens

There is no state in Western or Eastern Europe that has not put its armed forces through a fundamental reform since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, numerous states have begun to reconceive their officer education (Caforio 2000). Three models are emerging:
  - Sparta-Model: Adherence to the model of closed military academies and military universities with a reform of the education within the existing establishments.

- In-Between Model: Military education is mainly provided in military institutions, but in some partial cooperation with civilian universities. The coordination of the studies lies in the hands of the armed forces.
- Athens-Model: Combination of military and civilian education, consecutive or simultaneous, in close collaboration with civilian universities. The coordination lies in the hands of the officer candidates themselves.

The 'Sparta' model is still the dominating one in France, Great Britain and in parts of Eastern Europe. Admission to the educational establishments is based on a competitive selection system. The military and the 'civilian' education are provided simultaneously and the courses as well as the educational establishment are based on military principles. The academic formation is seen as a mere supplement to the military one, which ultimately predominates the curriculum. The inculcation of values remains an explicit part of the formation. Examples are France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Poland and the Czech Republic. In many of the academies of these countries, the in-house academization of the studies is pushed in collaboration with civilian universities and the former rigid introvertion of the military academies is decreased (Netherlands, Poland).

The in-between model can be found in Sweden, Switzerland and Italy. These countries have established contractual cooperation between the military education and the civilian universities. The officer candidates complete some parts of their studies in military and others in civilian institutions. The studies lead to an academic title that is fully recognized in the civilian educational system (Bachelor, Master), they obviously do not any longer take place in a closed and isolated institution and the academic part plays an important role. The Netherlands is implementing a Bachelor system at this very moment. They started with a pilot in early 2003. If the Netherlands succeeds in having this Bachelor accredited and make contractual agreements with universities regarding follow-up Master studies, it will have moved from the 'Sparta' model to the in-between model without separating military inculcation of values and academic training. Preconditions will be, as indicated above, accreditation and opening up to the civilian academic world.

So far, the pure 'Athens' model can only be found in Germany and Slovenia and – for some of the graduates of the basic officer education – in Switzerland. The military and the civilian education are separated chronologically and take place at different locations. The studies take place mainly in civilian universities, adhering to the freedom of teaching and research, even if they are run – as in the case of Germany – by the Ministry of Defense. Military education is considered to be completing civilian education.

To sum up: The officer education in Europe is clearly opening up and approaching civilian educational standards even though the 'Sparta' model is still predominant. It can therefore be concluded that in Europe, other than in the USA, officer education is moving away from Sparta and approaching Athens.

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Notes to Haltinger

[1] Even when serious fighting was going on, a declaration of war was mostly absent.

[2] At the same time, in a parallel development, a kind of militarization of the police seems to be emerging. Existing military police corps are expanded qualitatively and quantitatively (*Gendarmerie, Carabinieri, Guardia Civil, Bundesgrenzschutz, the Netherlands Royal Marechaussee*), and where they do not yet exist a creation of police corps organized according to military principles is taken into consideration (Switzerland). An exception are the Belgian Rijkswacht who have demilitarized and are now a part of police-forces (Easton, 2001).