**EU democracy promotion in Egypt**

**Before and after the ‘Arab Spring’**

**Bachelor Thesis**

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## Executive Summary

This thesis focuses on the promotion of democracy by the European Union in Egypt with special regard to the differences before and after the so called ‘Arab Spring’. More specific, the guiding question of this thesis is in what extent the EU’s promotion of democracy in Egypt has changed after the Arab Spring.

With the ending of the Second World War the notion, on the international agenda, of democracy became an important form of governing in a country. As a results started the European Union started implement new policies that enabled the transnational promotion of democracy. During the two decades that followed a range of perceptions, instruments and measurements were implemented in order to assist in the transition to democracy. Offering help to reform the governmental situation became one of the main priorities on the European Union’s external Agenda ever since. When the so called Arab Spring erupted, it surprised both the countries in the Middle East and North Africa and the rest of the world. Since the Arab Spring, that started in late 2010, the European Union had to change its external policy as a response to the changing governmental situations.

This study explores the components of democracy and the perceptions of the promotion of democracy by the European Union are included. This thesis is primarily based on the comparison between the policies by the European Union’s policies on democracy promotion in Egypt before and after the Arab Spring. Additionally is this thesis explaining whether the European policies on democracy promotion can be seen as a political or a developmental approach. Official documents for democracy promotion by the European Union will be analyzed. Furthermore, is research, regarding EU democracy promotion, done by experts, think tanks and universities included in this work. A critical perspective is needed in order to analyze the promotion of democracy by the European Union and its differences since the Arab Spring.

This thesis illustrates that there have been significant changes in the promotion of democracy by the European Union in Egypt. Elements such as the methods, perspectives, goals and definitions have become more specific since the beginning of 2011. Furthermore with the introduction of the most recent initiative, the European Endowment for Democracy, are bureaucratic European hurdles dodged. T**his thesis also assumes that European Union’s democracy promotion is adapting its strategy every time when there is transition in Egypt.**

Keywords: **democracy promotion, developmental approach, political approach, Egypt, European Union, Arab Spring**

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## Acronyms

AA Association Agreement

AC Association Council

CSO Civil Society Organization

EC European Commission

ECSC European Coal and Steel Community

EEAS European External Action Service

EED European Endowment for Democracy

EMAA Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements

EMP Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

EOM Election Observation Mission

EP European Parliament

EU European Union

EU-Egypt AA European Union-Egypt Association Agreement

MDP MEDA Democracy Programme

MEDA MEsures S’Accompagnement

MENA Middle East and North Africa

NDP National Democratic Party

NED National Endowment for Democracy

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

PfDSP Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity

SPRING Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth

TEU Treaty of the European Union

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN United Nations

US United States

## **1. Introduction**

 Since the end of the Second World War is the discourse in international support and international relations emphasizing the fact that democracy is the most favorable political system in a country. Especially, the 1970-80s experienced an era of an increase in interest among the Western countries and international organizations in promoting the idea of governing democratically. This international interest erupted as a post-Cold War ambition. The results of the international push towards a more democratic world were seen in the early 1990s, as it experienced the ‘third wave of democratization’ (Huntington, 1993). During this wave almost 30 countries (Huntington, 1993) experienced the transition to democracy, in which the role of the European Commission (EC) was key. However, Egypt and the other Arab Countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region were excluded from this wave of democratization. Since the unification of the EU, it have sought to circulate its political system not only within its borders but also beyond.

The EU’s first sign of promoting democracy in Egypt was illustrated in the Barcelona declaration that was signed in 1995. In this declaration three prioritized areas (political, economic and social area) were introduced for the first time in history. Egypt is however experiencing an era of instability and insecurity over the last decades. Especially after the awakening of the so called ‘Arab Spring’ in the beginning of 2011, is Egypt experiencing an era of political, economic and social instability and uncertainty. Due to this wave of unrest in the neighbouring MENA region, the EU needed to react as its policies were not prepared for a phenomenon like the Arab Spring. As a result the EU revised its strategies and concluded that prior to the ‘Arab Spring’ EU democracy promotion in Egypt was not as effective as the EU hoped. The EU needed to change its policy as a response to the Arab Spring in order to keep assisting those who are calling for democracy.

This paper attempts to analyze the perceptions and intentions of the EU to promote democracy in Egypt and with special regard looking at the differences before and after the ‘Arab spring’. Its purpose is not to provide an thorough review on the several EU policies on democracy promotion, but rather outlining the differences of EU definitions and perceptions on the promotion of democracy before and after the Arab Spring in Egypt.

This thesis assumes that the operation of democracy promotion by the EU is depending on the political situation in Egypt. Whereas the Arab Spring significant influenced the EU’s external policies on democracy promotion. The underlying argument of this thesis is that the strategy of EU democracy promotion is carried out in an adaptive way.

## ****1.1 The central question: EU’s policy on democracy promotion in Egypt?****

This Thesis will be guided by the following main-question: *What is the EU’s policy on the promotion of democracy in Egypt before and after the Arab Spring?*

The central question will be underpinned by the following sub-questions:

* *What is democracy?*
* *What is democracy promotion?*
* *The political situation in Egypt prior to the Arab Spring?*
* *The political situation in Egypt after the Arab Spring?*
* *What did EU democracy promotion in Egypt entail prior to the Arab Spring?*
* *What did EU democracy promotion in Egypt entail after the Arab Spring?*
* *EU democracy promotion as a developmental or political approach?*

 The first sub-question refers to the notion of democracy. Democracy is an ancient form of government. In chapter two, both, a general and an EU definition of this form of government will be analyzed. A concrete EU definition on democracy can underpin its external policy on democracy promotion.

 The second sub-question deals with the theory on the promotion of democracy. Many theories and ideas on democracy promotion are published by manifold organizations and experts, such as universities, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and philosophers. An exact worldwide definition on democracy promotion has not yet been accepted. One of the most international noted experts on democracy promotion today, is Thomas Carothers. He argues that there exists a two-folded approach of democracy promotion (Carothers, 2009). The elements of the two-folded approach will be the benchmarks that assess the EU policies on democracy promotion in this thesis. In chapter three this theory by Carothers will be analyzed.

 The third and fourth sub-question will describe, in chapter four, the situation of the Egyptian governmental situation prior to the Arab Spring, and the situation after the Arab Spring. Egypt is experiencing some intense decades under several (semi-) authoritarian regimes that have violated many human rights. The Arab Spring, that started in 2010, was a result of ongoing deterioration of the economic, political and social situation.

 The fifth sub-question will show an analysis of the policies of the EU on democracy promotion before the rising of the Arab spring in Egypt. Chapter five will exemplify the official documents communicated by the EU of its policies since 1995. Furthermore, research that has been done by stakeholders such as universities, independent institutions, think tanks and experts will also be examined. Identifying the priorities, the instruments and the methods of the EU’s policies will clarify to what extent its external policy has changed over the years, and it will become clear under which one of the two-folded approaches it can be placed.

 The sixth sub-question refers to EU’s policies on democracy promotion after the Arab Spring. The awakening of the Arab Spring was for many an unexpected event. As a result, the EU needed to change its external policies radically. Several EU officials proposed new ideas for external democracy promotion. Chapter six will point out what extent the EU changed its policy on democracy promotion in Egypt due to the errors of its prior policies and due to the Arab Spring.

## ****1.2 Methodology****

 There are many studies on the promotion of democracy (Burnell, 2000, 2007; Youngs, 2001; Schimmelfenning, 2005; Schumacher & Del Sarto, 2005; Baracani, 2008; Carothers, 2009; Khaled El Molla, 2009, 2011; Gillespie & Whitehead, 2010; Cardwell, 2011). Especially since the international arena has put the notion of democracy promotion in its international agenda more extensively. The discourse of Thomas Carothers (2009) on the promotion of democracy is used in this thesis. Carothers (JD-Harvard Law, MSc-London School of Economics and AB-Harvard college) is one of the most noted international experts and a leading authority of democracy promotion and international support. Carothers is the vice president for the Think Tank, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a professor at several universities. Carothers states that democracy promotion is a process of undergoing changes. He describes a profound and new theory, under which the continuous changes in the process of the promotion of democracy can be divided into two approaches. Namely, the developmental approach and the political approach. Applying this theory adds a new perspective to EU democracy promotion as it will simplify overview of differences between the EU initiatives on democracy promotion.

 Furthermore is this thesis based on the official EU documents related to democracy promotion and other research that has been done by universities, international experts, think tanks and NGOs.

## 2****. Democracy****

 This chapter will start providing a broad definition of democracy and its roots. The term democracy, also known as ‘*Rule of the people’* , is originally from the Greek word - demokratia – which comes from the words – demos – “people” and – kratos – “power”. These first steps of the definition of democracy go back to the fifth century BC where this Greek idea of a political system was established. However, in that period this system was only for the elite and only for men. The equality of men and women came with Christianity (Lagerlöf, 2003, p 403). Since then an exact definition of democracy has been debated, especially during the last decades as we have seen an outburst of democracies worldwide (Huntington, 1991). Although there are many definitions, one general definition of democracy can be referred to as liberal democracy. Meaning, a form of government in which democratic representatives allow the democratic rule and political liberties (Bollen & Paxton, 2000).

## ****2.1 Definition of democracy****

One of the most noted international experts on democracy is Robert Dahl. Dahl is a Sterling Professor in political science at the Yale University in the United States (US) and wrote several books on the varieties of power, but most of his books on democracy. His observation on the definition of democracy is, that there is no single definition. However, according to Dahl, the many theories on the definition on democracy that have been defined by experts and philosophers, are all related to each other. In other words there are many links between the different definitions on democracy. A general empirical definition he coined out is: “*all political regimes, which guarantee the real participation of the wider male and female adult population and the possibility to dissent and opposing, may be considered democracies*” (Dahl, 1979).

## 2.2 ****Definition of democracy in the EU****

After giving a general definition of democracy, it is important to outline a definition of democracy according to the EU. In 1947-8, several years after the end of World War II, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman had a series of speeches in which he called for a new political idea within Europe. Schuman strove towards EU unification, supported by other democratic parties in Europe. As a result the Schuman declaration was signed on 9 May 1950. The European unification made an end to the centuries lasting war between the archenemies Germany and France. Schuman proposed a supranational unification through effective solidarity that would take place step by step. Only democratic European countries were invited to join. A further step to unification took place in 1952, as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was signed by six European Countries: Luxembourg, Italy, France, Belgium, West Germany and the Netherlands. Since the ECSC, great commitment and willingness occurred by Western European countries, and as well by the US, to bring down the communist countries. As a result, between 1974 and 1990 the so called ‘third wave of democratization’ took place. During this wave, democracy expelled the (semi-) authoritarian regimes in almost thirty countries in Latin America, the Asian pacific region and Eastern Europe (Huntington: 1991). This wave of transition is seen as one of the most important international development in recent history.

The European Integration process took 36 years to implement a treaty in which the member-states had “*to work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions*” (The Single European Act, 1986, p 2). As a result, in 1992 the Maastricht Treaty was signed, also known as the Treaty on the EU (TEU), in which this political ambition on democracy promotion was set out. The TEU established the common foreign and security policy. This policy was governed by several provisions, whereas one of them defined that the EU shall develop a consolidate democracy in line with the Universal rights (TEU, Art J (1) 2). In 2007 the Lisbon Treaty was signed, also known as the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). In article 10 section A of the TFEU the most important statement on democracy is pointed out as follows:

“*The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which*

*have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.*

*The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and*

*international, regional or global organizations […] It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.*”(Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, Art. 10 A. 1)

 An authoritative definition on democracy is not explicitly set out in the official EU documents. However, article 10 (A) of the Lisbon Treaty states that the EU shall seek to share the elements of democracy within the framework of the United Nations (UN). Those elements are defined in two resolutions by the UN. Article 21 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), describes democracy as follows: “*The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures*” (Universal declaration of Human Rights, 1948, p 5). And in the other resolutions in 2005, the United Nations General Assembly affirmed the definition that “*democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives*” (UN resolution, 2005, p 30).

 Thus, the EU refers to the Universal rights stated by the UN in its external regional policies. These definitions stated in UDHR of democracy will be used in this thesis. The next chapter will focus on a different aspect of the EU’s policy, namely the external promotion of democracy .

## ****3. Democracy promotion****

Defining one definition for a phenomenon like democracy promotion that is undergoing a continuous process of diversification, is hardly possible to accomplish. The many opinions, approaches and views by NGOs, (international) experts, third parties and international organizations, form broad definitions of democracy promotion as is the case with democracy as such. Until today there is no universally accepted definition of democracy promotion. There is however a general description that EU democracy promotion is done through an external policy or partnership, which aims to promote the idea of constructing (or further develop) a democracy as a form of governmental system in (semi-) authoritarian countries.

## ****3.1 Political vs. developmental approach****

Due to political complexity, instability, violations and the wave of uprisings in a (semi-) authoritarian country like Egypt, it is extremely difficult for the EU to respond with a quick and fully evolved policy aiming to support the transition to a democratic society. As a results, the EU’s policies on democracy promotion towards (semi-) authoritarian regimes have been under serious pressure the last decades. One of the major criticisms on the EU’s external policy was the lack of EU anticipation to the continuously changing political situations. In parallel, extensive results will not be seen (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005).

 Carothers (2009) coins out that democracy supporters and providers, such as the EU and US, are adapting their external strategies and policies on the promotion of democracy continuously, instead of the early tendency to implement an ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy towards external states (Carothers, 2009, p.1). Due to the continuously changing policies a new characteristic was added. Namely, the creation of a two-sided approach on the promotion of democracy. Carothers (2009) argues that democracy promotion can be a political approach on the one hand, and on the other hand it a developmental approach. As he states: “*This basic division between the political and developmental approaches has existed inchoately in the field of democracy support for many years. It has come into sharper relief during this decade, as democracy-aid providers face a world increasingly populated by countries not conforming to clear or coherent political transitional paths. [...] The two core approaches— political and developmental— are indeed different in important ways. Understanding their differences is useful in grasping the evolving state of democracy assistance generally. Yet both approaches have multiple pluses and minuses, which depend greatly on how they are applied in specific cases*” (Carothers, 2009, P.5-6). The two theories stated by Carothers differ from each other. The differences will be explained in the following two subchapters. Important to note is that one of the two approaches cannot be considered to be better the other. Because both approached have multiple pluses and minuses. Furthermore are the results of the promotion of democracy different in each country as each social, economic and political situation differs from one other. Carothers also divides both approaches of democracy assistance into four major dimensions: 1) Value of democracy; 2) Concept of Democracy; 3) Concept of democratization; 4) Method of supporting democracy. Each of the dimensions are benchmarks in order to determine whether the activity by the EU on democracy promotion is a developmental or political approach.

## ****3.1.1 The political approach****

 External policies under the political approach are aimed at the process of rebuilding a political structure, for instance the elections and political liberties. The political actors and institutions that have direct influence on the elections, especially during the transitional phase, are assisted under this approach. For instance Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), political parties, media and election programs. It is therefore considered as a fast and short-term approach. Another element is that democracy and democratization under the political approach rests on a narrowed concept compared to the concept of democracy under the developmental approach.

**Value of democracy**

An important aspect of the political approach is the positive value of democracy, as a democratic society is the basis for political and civil rights. It is understood that under the political approach, democracy itself contributes to the development of a social and economic environment.

**Concept of democracy**

This approach highlights the roots of fair and competitive elections in which the citizens can participate freely in the political process. Followers of the political approach believe that supporting additional institutional features such as independent media and judiciary, are key elements to a democracy.

**Concept of democratization**

Under this concept the political approach is there to assist those who struggle against the opposing (authoritarian) regime. Although democratization is a long and complicated process, the political approach is based upon small political breakthroughs.

**Method of supporting democracy**

The method of supporting democracy under the political approach is assisting those who are in favor of a democratic society. Assisting directly and indirectly are both methods under the political approach. Direct assistance can be done through, for example, organize lectures/seminars, donate funds or support democratic parties, NGOs or CSOs. Indirect support, on the other hand, is focused on the institutions that can add security, fairness and political structure to the elections. For instance the support towards independent media and judiciary.

## ****3.1.2 The developmental approach****

 Under the developmental approach a broader definition of democracy is known, in which the socioeconomic dimension is highly important. The developmental approach is therefore seen as a long-term and slow approach, as the reform or transition to social environment needs more small changes. The idea of this approach is to assist in the effort of improving the social and economic environment that eventually will strengthen the transition to a democracy.

**Value of democracy**

A policy that assists under the developmental approach believes that supporting democracy is based on the basic features, like its “transparency, accountability and responsiveness” (Carothers, 2099). As a result the social and economic development is seen as a first priority. Meaning the three pillars (Economic, Social and Political environment) are differently prioritized compared to the political approach. Carothers states that this approach is putting the values of democracy as a second priority. The followers of the developmental approach are satisfied with positive social and economic results, without any process of democracy.

**Concept of democracy**

The concept of democracy under the developmental approach looks beyond a narrowed definition of democracy. Instead, the social and economic environment are seen as no less important aspects. Outcomes like justice and equality, under the idea of human rights and the rule of law, are emphasized as a concept of democracy.

**Concept of democratization**

The developmental process of the transition is a slow and long-term process with small results. Under this framework an external policy questions whether an authoritarian country is actually ready for such a transition to democracy. Furthermore, a developmental policy states that the economic and social basics are more important than a change of a governmental regime into a democracy.

**Method of supporting democracy**

The developmental approach is a more indirect approach towards a country and is mostly based on a partnership. The value of developing social and economic sustainability through supporting CSOs at a local level is a way of promoting democracy. And secondly there is the ambition to support democracy by building good governance (a nonpolitical idea).

## ****3.2 Definition of democracy promotion in the EU****

 Within the EU, democracy promotion has been proclaimed a fundamental right on the European external policy as was stated by the European Parliament (EP) as follows: “ *Democracy has underpinned the political, social, cultural and economic development of the European Union and from its collective ex­perience the EU is convinced that it represents the best form of government. The development and consolidation of democracy worldwide has therefore become a key objective of its Com­mon Foreign and Security Policy as well as its Development Cooperation Policy”*(European Parliament, 2009, p. 4)

In 1991, several EU institutions worked on a first set of guidelines for the EU’s democracy promotion policy, in order to strengthen concerted worldwide actions to promote democracy, the EU could publicly use the UN General Assembly’s definitions as the reference point of democratization. The EU, in its support to non-democratic countries, should after all enable these countries to follow their own path towards a democratic society. Catherine Ashton (High Representative of the EU) stated that the EU will not push its own EU’s prescription on how building a democracy. It is the job for the citizens of a non-democratic country that should discover this path to a democracy. The EU is there to support the short and long term targets to those people who favor the transition in line of democracy (Guardian, 2011) .

 The most recent EU initiative was introduced in 2012 a new definition of democracy promotion under the framework of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). This new EU idea is to promote towards a sustainable and *‘deep democracy’.* This element will be examined in chapter six of this thesis.

## ****4. The case of Egypt****

Before looking into the context of the several policies on democracy promotion by the EU towards Egypt, it is necessary to illustrate the background of the prior and current governmental and political situation of Egypt and introduce the awakening of the Arab risings. The MENA region, and the rest of the world as spectator and/or actor, witness now for more than two years the so called ‘Arab rising’, ‘Arab Democratic Spring’, ‘Arab Awakening’ or ‘Arab Spring’. Currently there are many debates about the definition that should be used for the events happening in the MENA countries since December 2010. Any discussion on an exact definition will not be included. In this work the term ‘Arab Spring’ will be used in order to prevent any confusion. This event is widely known as an era of sweeping changes in political systems in the MENA.

Mohammed Bouazizi, a twenty-six-year-old citizen in the Tunisian city of SidiBouzid, got held by a policewoman who confiscated his unlicensed vegetable cart and his products. “*Humiliated by his abuse and exasperated by his inability*” (Gideon Rose, 2011, p 8) Mohammed went to a governmental building, poured himself with gas, and let himself on fire (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Bouazizi’s suicide was one of the first signs of the long-time dramatic political events in the MENA region, and ignited the so called Arab Spring*.* Subsequently, a combustible mixture of sounds underpinned by dissatisfaction, despair, frustration, yearning and anger towards the political, economic and social situation followed on the streets of Tripoli. These events in Tunisia took many western political commentators by surprise (Burnell, 2011, p1). The flames not only consumed Mohammed Bouazizi (Gideon Rose, 2011, p 8), but within several weeks his death evolved into revolutions, protests and demonstrations by the people of the surrounding Arab countries of Tunisia. Inequality, violation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, bad socio-economic situation, authoritarian ruling, corruption in the highest level of politics and unemployment are just a small part of the manifold of motives that started the awakening (Ramadan, 2012). The awakening of the Arab Spring has been outlined as a ‘fight’ of the enlightened democratic Arab thinkers versus the powers of authoritarian regimes (New York times, 2011). The best-known slogan of the ‘Arab Spring’ is: “*ash-sha’b yurid isqaat an-nizaam”* (Teti & Gervasio, 2012), meaning the people demanding the downfall of the (semi-authoritarian) regime. President Ben-Ali fled to Saudi Arabia and President Mubarak of Egypt was forced from the office in early 2011, due to the large-scale of protests that demanded changes in the political and governmental situation and above all equality. This was followed by a struggling social, political and economic path. This struggling path had a snowball effect that continued in many other Arab countries, such as Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, Morocco, Libya, Syria and Jordan. Until this day the Arab Spring has caused the fall of longtime authoritarian leaders in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Egypt.

## ****4.1 The political system of Egypt - prior to the Arab Spring: The Mubarak era****

 Egypt’s governmental structure has a long and varied history. After the unpopular king Farouk was overthrown due to the Egyptian revolution of 1952, the Egyptian republic was declared in 1953. Anwar Sadat, founder of the National Democratic Party (NDP), became in 1970 the second president of Egypt and ruled the country for 11 years. In 1981 Sadat got assassinated, bringing Hosni Mubarak, through a referendum in the People’s Assembly (the lower House of Egypt’s Parliament), into power as president for almost thirty years. Mubarak was during Presidency the chairman of the NDP. The NDP was known for its authoritarian characteristics and idea of a single party ruling. During the regime of Mubarak, the emergency law in Egypt was enforced. An emergency law allows the police to have the exceptional right to arrest people without any suspicion and without charge, limited freedom of expression and maintaining the military court for this law (The New York Times, 2013). “*For his entire period in office, he kept the country under emergency law, gaining the state sweeping powers of arrest and curbing basic freedoms*” (BBC: 2013).

During the (semi-) authoritarian regime political reform was impossible, especially prior to 2005. It was prohibited that the opposing political parties could run for presidency. This was stated in article 76 of the constitution of Egypt. Instead, it was only possible to be reaffirmed by a referendum in the People’s Assembly once every six years. Due to the external pressure from the EU, the US and the demands by the Egyptian opposition (Muslim Brotherhood), Mubarak asked the parliament in the beginning of 2005 to amend several restrictions in the constitution, including article 76. By proposing the amendments, Mubarak wanted to show the rest of the world (especially the EU and US) that Egypt was moving towards a democracy. Under these amendments, the modified article 76 stated that multi-candidate presidential elections were allowed. However, some critics state that the amended article was designed to prevent members from the Muslim Brotherhood to run for presidency. The Muslim Brotherhood was and is still seen as the largest Islamic movement in the MENA region. An example of such a restriction is that the presidential candidates are guaranteed that the opposition will not have the potential to challenge the current incumbent (Ottaway, 2009, p 23). Driven by the motives of equality, the Muslim Brotherhood, other opposing parties and NGOs demanded a radical change in the political situation. This ‘protest’ resulted in the arrest of the upcoming politician, and the first man who competed against Mubarak, Ayman Nour. He was prisoned in January 2005 for more than four years. Thus, the suddenly amended constitution was still highly restricted, caused by other articles (Brown, Dunne, 2007), and aimed to block the Muslim Brotherhood, as the Muslim Brotherhood was seen as the biggest political opposition/threat of Mubarak. With the authoritarian governing style of Mubarak, the citizens of Egypt have experienced a new and tense transitional phase of a combination of a more free-wheeling political debate with self-serving reforms and harsh treatment towards the political opposition (Ottaway, 2009, p 22).

 In 2007 a constitutional referendum was held. This referendum covered amendments that mostly concerned the electoral law. The outcome of the referendum approved the new constitutional amendments. The changes in the constitution were just as in 2005 presented under the idea of a change into a more democratic Egypt. However, the amendments mainly gave president Mubarak more power. One of the amendments, eliminated article 179 of the constitution whereby an ‘emergency-style of sweeping power’ was given to Mubarak (Amnesty International, 2007). Mubarak was able to disband the parliament, draft and implement new anti-terrorism laws, move trials to the military court, and obstruct a party with the basis of religious activity in the Egyptian politics from register (Ottaway, 2009, p 23). The amendment with the intention to obstruct the registering of a party with a religious orientation, was also focused on the Muslim Brotherhood with the intention to hinder their hopes for getting a legal registration. Amnesty International described this event of a changing constitution in Mubarak’s favor as: ”*the most serious undermining of human rights safeguards in Egypt since the state of emergency was re-imposed in 1981*” (Amnesty International, 2007).

The Egyptian politician and dissident Mohamed El Baradei warned the world, and especially Egypt, for a “Tunisian-style explosion” due to Mubarak’s regime deteriorating ability to sustain safety and peace in Egypt and because the Arab Rising that awakened in Tunisia in December 2010 (The Guardian, 2011). The Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR) has documented 1051 cases of torture during the period 2000-2007. During the demonstration in 2011, 694 cases have been documented (EOHR, 2013). As expected, not long after his statement on the 25th of January in 2011, the first anti-governmental protests, also known as the “day of revolt”, erupted at the Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt. Thousands of Egyptian protesters gathered, by communicating via Facebook and Twitter, at the streets of Cairo with the intention to overthrow the government of president Hosni Mubarak (The New York Times, 2011). A few days later on Friday the 28th, also known as the *Friday of Anger*, the streets across Egypt were filled with protestors, who got inspired by the internet campaign in Tunisia. The nationwide escalation of protests went on for quite some time and on 11 February 2011 the vice president Omar Suleiman announced the resignation of president Hosni Mubarak.

Since the Arab Spring and the resignation by Mubarak, the Supreme Council decided to suspend the constitution and held the first parliamentary elections. Mohammad Morsi, member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected for president at on 24 June 2012.

## ****5. The EU’s promotion on democracy in Egypt prior to the ‘Arab Spring’****

The previous part of this research outlined a background on the definition of democracy promotion according to Carothers (2009). In this chapter the emphasis lies on the external policies by the EU on democracy promotion in Egypt’s since the implementation of the Barcelona process in 1995 until the ‘Arab Spring’, that started in December 2010. Each policy will also be examined in light of the two-folded approach stated by Carothers: the political approach and the developmental approach.

## 5.1 The EU and Egypt

As mentioned earlier, the EU places great emphasis on the promotion of respect for democracy, the rule of law and human right in its external policies towards non-democratic and non EU’s societies. More specific, the EU has evolved itself into an agent of democracy promotion in the MENA region (Schimmelfenning & Lacenex, 2011).

The first sign of a bilateral relation between the EU and Egypt dates from 1977, when the Cooperation Agreement was signed. The agreement introduced cooperation between the EU and Egypt in order to contribute to the social and economic development. Although this treaty was mainly focused on the economic, financial, and technical cooperation, the EU also opted this treaty as a policy that ensured safety and security. An outcome of the Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Egypt was the Barcelona Declaration or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995. This declaration was later improved with the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004.

## ****5.2 Motives****

 A mixture of motives lie in the heart of the EU when it comes to democracy in its external policy. Elements such as EU-enlargement, which is often seen as the major success of the EU’s external policy, future cooperation, trade relation between Egypt and the EU contribute to the ambition for the EU to support “deep and sustainable” democracy (Schimmelfenning, 2008). But for the EU, one of the most important aspects of promoting democracy in Egypt, is the protection of citizens. As mentioned in chapter one, the human rights of Egyptian citizens have been abused in many ways for the last decades. “*Human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respects for the human rights*” (Treaty of the EU, Art 2.1), are the values on which the EU is founded and is referred as an essential objective in its external policies.

Additional to this Mikaelsson (2008) argues that the following motives can underpin promoting democracy: internal positioning, international positioning, security motives, economic motives, ideological motives and altruistic motives.

* *Altruistic motives*

One of the most logical motives, as Mikaelsson (2008) describes, is: “*unselfish concern for the well-being of others*” (Mikaelsson, 2008). Moral and ethical reasoning is one of the major motives to support respect for freedom, democracy, human dignity, human rights and the rule of law. Much discussed elements of these motives can be found in the EU legal documents.

* *Ideological motives*

Ideological motives are also mentioned earlier. The importance of this motive is the aspect of democracy itself as a system. A democratic society contributes to the well-being of the people in a country. It is a moral job to secure those elements.

* *Internal and International motives*

The international status and position is clearly very important for the EU. By offering expertise through a political framework on democracy, the EU sends a signal in which it asks for recognition and acceptance from other international key actors. The EU represents itself as an international actor by its framework on democracy promotion.

* *Security motives*

The motive to secure the situation in Egypt through supporting democracy is due to fear of terrorism and communism. As the EU defeated the communist regimes and the cold war ended, the fear of communism disappeared largely (Mikaelsson, 2008). However currently terrorism is playing a crucial role now a days, especially these days because of the Arab Spring. It is believed that democracy contribute to the development of a stable region.

* *Economic motives*

Opening markets, deepen the trade partnership with Egypt and other different forms of self-interest can underpin the notion for the EU to promote democracy. The aim of the economic motive is eventually to gain economic benefits from its external policy. Democracy promotion can be used to stabilize the political situation in Egypt and increase its opportunities to gain access to important shares of the market. Important to note is that it is about the economic benefits for those who support. For instance NGOs and other organization involved in the process of democracy promotion abroad (Mikaelsson, 2008).

 It is possible to find combinations of these motive under a framework that supports democracy.

## ****5.2.1 Barcelona process or EMP****

##

 In November 1995, fifteen EU member-states and twelve Mediterranean countries, including Egypt, agreed on the partnership under the framework of the Barcelona declaration. This first regional agreement was a result of a Conference on a liberal ‘world view’ held in Barcelona attended by European and Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This ambitious process by the EU is also known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and was the first historic framework which was a basis for the bilateral and regional relations between the EU and Mediterranean countries. The declaration proclaims that the goal of the EMP is creating a partnership with “*the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership*” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). This agreement opened the door for the EU to assist and promote a democratic society through dialogue and cooperation.

For the first time in the historic relation between the EU and the Mediterranean there is pointed out that the partnership is based on political, social, human, cultural and economic elements. The Barcelona Declaration, a final framework of the EMP, prioritized three ‘baskets’: 1. a political and security partnership; 2. a zone of shared prosperity by economic and financial integration; 3. a partnership in cultural, social and human affairs. The first political basket deals with peace and security based on the universal values stated in the charter UDHR. The second basket is a framework for the cooperation between the EU and Mediterranean countries in order to promote economic development. This initiative was translated into a free trade zone. The third and last basket is focused on rebuilding cultural and religious gaps between people in the Mediterranean societies. However, the agenda on democracy lacked any concrete actions and approaches. The EMP looked beyond a political definition of democracy.

The early years (1996-2001) of the EMP are criticized a lot by many experts (Gillespie & Whitehead, 2002; Gillespie 2003; Youngs, 2004; Baracani, 2005). The criticism is mainly based on the novelty of the EMP. Neither was the EMP well prepared for major political changes in the Mediterranean. Subsequently, several (financial) instruments were designed. These instruments improved the ability for the EU to assist in reforming the economic, political and social structures in the MENA region. The old set of agreements, such as financial protocols for development and the Cooperation Agreements, were replaced by Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA) and the MEDA programme (in French: MEsures D'Accompagnement).

 The EMAA between the EU and Egypt was signed in 2001 by the Egyptian People’s Assembly, the EU and the member-states of the EU, and came into force in 2004. The Association Agreement (AA) was the first legally binding treaty that bounded the EU and Egypt (EU-Egypt AA). The EU-Egypt AA is an agreement that reflects on the ‘basket’ system of the EMP. However, as is described in article 1 of the EU-Egypt AA, this agreement was mainly based on the second and third basket whereas it is aiming to contribute to a balanced economic and social relation to eventually establish the so called *region-wide Free Trade Area*. Solely, the preamble of the EU-Egypt AA communication defines the importance of the strategy on democratic principles. Article 2 of this preamble describes that the relation between the EU and Egypt is based upon the principles of democracy set out in the UDHR (EU-Egypt Association Agreement, 2004, Art. 2). Thereafter article 4 of this preamble describes: “*The political dialogue shall cover all subjects of common interest, and, in particular peace, security, democracy and regional development* “ (Association Agreement, 2004, Art. 4). Thus the relation between the EU and Egypt is based on respect of the democratic principles by mutual political dialogue. Such political dialogue will take place when necessary at a ministerial level during an Association Council (AC). During this AC all interests of the EU and Egypt are discussed and official actions and aims are setup in accordance with each other. Despite this only in 2006, during the second AC that took place in Luxemburg, concrete actions were discussed. Namely, the EU expressed its concerns on the emergency law in Egypt, as Mubarak was delaying the abolition. Furthermore, the EU mentioned its concerns on the amount of death sentences. The EU called for reducing numbers of death sentences, as these penalties violate the universal basic rights of a person.

 A second instrument within the framework of the EMP is the financial support under the MEDA programme. The MEDA I was implemented in 1996, and was amended in 2000 by the MEDA II (until 2006). This MEDA programme gave the EU the opportunity to provide financial help to the MENA countries. The EU funded € 686 million under the MEDA I programme and € 600 million under the framework of the MEDA II to Egypt. Furthermore are the MEDA programmes aimed at the three ‘baskets’ stated in the EMP, as this was re-emphasized in the communication. In line of the promotion of democracy, the MEDA Democracy Programme (MDP) was established in 1996, launched by the EP. This framework enabled the EU to grant subsidies to NGO’s, universities and research organizations aiming to support the; *- transition to democracy; - consolidating the rule of law; -independent and free media; - freedom of assembly and freedom of association; - a pluralist civil society; - the protection of vulnerable groups (women, children, refugees, minorities); - education, training and awareness campaigns in the field of human rights; and confidence-building measures* (Karkutli & Bützler, 1999, p.11). Karkutli and Bützler (1999) examined the MEDA I programme of the first four years, commissioned by the EU. They stated that several methods, such as training and education, were used in order to promote democracy. In general, academics, jurists, professors and NGOs were identified as target groups for the MDP (Karkutli & Bützler, 1999).

To conclude, the MDP was an ambitious and highly needed initiative, however the funding by the MDP in general has been minuscule compared to the total available funding under the EMP (Baracani, 2005, p. 56). Karkutli and Bützler (1998) also stated that the involvement of Egypt in the MDP, has to be greater. As Egypt is seen as the most important partner and the people are still experiencing numerous of violations against human rights, Egypt only received 4% of all MEDA countries funds (Karkutli & Bützler: 1999). The creation of the Barcelona declaration was according to Richard Youngs, the former Director General of the Think Tank for global action FRIDE, an ineffective approach in order to foster political change in the authoritarian regimes (Youngs, 2005). The Barcelona process was definitely a good framework towards democracy promotion, but it was also far from being realized. Gillespie and Whitehead (2002) argued that the support by the EU towards the middle east “tends to lead to accommodation of authoritarian regimes rather than efforts to undermine them” (Gillespie & Whitehead, 2002, p. 198). In order to introduce the transition to a democratic society with free elections, the EU should have taken initiative towards the authoritarian regime. This was done through the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004.

 After revising the EMP, it is quite clear to state that it is a developmental approach. This approach prioritized the basics of the social and economic development towards a democracy, and was less in favor of direct political assistance. The following benchmarks will give an overview of the EMP as a developmental promoter.

**Value of democracy**

The EMP did not refer to the importance of free and fair election nor to the political values and rights in Egypt. But in the several frameworks the basics of the process towards a democracy has been spelled out and the respect for democracy, human rights and rule of law is re-emphasized several times. Economic and social stability is mentioned more and extensively drafted.

 **Concept of democracy**

The EMP referred to a broad definition of democracy. No specific measures were outlined that enabled the promotion of democracy.

 **Concept of democratization**

The Barcelona declaration was originally established to assist the MENA region for a long term of at least ten years. Slow process and small results were noticed under the framework of the EMP.

**Method of supporting democracy**

The Barcelona declaration enabled the EU to support and assist social, financial and economic development in Egypt. Under the EMP the EU believed that a relationship based on a social and economic partnership was the value in order to (re-) build a democracy.

5.2.2 The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

 In 2004, the EMP was still the main initiative on the promotion of democracy by the EU towards Egypt for almost a decade. But the accession of ten new European Members added a new internal and external agenda for the EU. Prior to this largest expansion in 2004, the EC started to think about the consequences towards its ‘new neighbours’. The new political geography of the EU offered new opportunities to further develop and deepen the relationship with South and East non-EU neighbouring countries (European Commission, 2005, p.2). Due to these geographical opportunities for the EU and due to the criticism on the EMP, the EU changed its vision on the notion of democracy promotion in its external policy. This new geographical vision used existing frameworks and programmes, like the EMP and EU-Egypt AA, for new objectives. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2004 between the EU and the sixteen neighbour countries ranging from Morocco to Ukraine. The ENP is a policy framework that is built upon the existing cooperation framework (AA and EMP) and is the idea of a wider European Initiative (Emerson, 2005, p.1). It consists of a set of ambitious goals “*based on commitments to shared values and political, economic and institutional reforms*” for the cooperation with the neighbor countries (European Commission 2004, p.3). The introduction of a partnership that is based on *shared values* and *reforms* are new elements within the framework of EU foreign policies under the ENP.

After the implementation of the ENP, the EC presented the ENP strategy paper, and seven country strategy papers. The ENP strategy paper formulates the objectives of the EU toward the Mediterranean as follows: “*strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation*” (European Commission, 2004, p.3). Thus on the one hand the ENP is in line with the principles of the EU’s external policy, where it aims to secure and stabilize policies via a partnership. And on the other hand, reshaping the economic and political cooperation and the new geopolitical vision creates a ‘ring of friends’ ranging from Morocco to Ukraine (Schumacher & Del Sarto, 2005).

In 2003 the EC submitted a proposal for the establishment of the ENP Actions Plans. The short-term (three to five year) Action Plans were adopted in 2004 and are the main instruments that realize the functioning of the ENP. An ENP Action Plan is a non-financial instrument, which sets out objectives on political, economic, and social fields, in order to deepen the relationship, for instance with Egypt. Financial assistance under the ENP is provided through other instruments. The EC started this idea of a new agreement between the EU and a single country of the MENA region, in order to prevent an ‘one-size-fits-all’ strategy towards the Mediterranean (Borzel & Risse, 2004). The idea of an ‘one-size-fits-all’ strategy was one of the main criticisms on the EMP, because the framework did not respond to a certain governmental situation in a specific country. Seven countries agreed with the ENP Actions plan, namely: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, The Palestinian Authority and Egypt. In each Action Plan a list of priorities was included, defined together by the EU and the partner country. Meaning, each ENP Action Plan differs from one other.

In relation to the evolving of a greater international scope for cooperation between the EU and Egypt, the ENP Action Plan sets out more detailed information. The first prioritized action outlined in the Action plan refers to democracy and the rule of law. The following is outlined:

“ *Enhance the effectiveness of institutions entrusted with strengthening democracy and the rule of law:*– *Strengthen participation in political life, including the promotion of public awareness and participation in election; – Exchange experience in the field of elections and jointly develop cooperation in areas of shared interest including through providing assistance on registering electors and capacity building; – Foster the role of civil society and enhance its capacity to contribute more effectively to the democratic and political process as well as to the economic and social progress in accordance with national legislation; – Pursue and support the efforts Government of Egypt towards decentralization and the reform of local administration; – Enhance the ongoing political dialogue between the Egyptian and the European Parliaments; – Establish a formal and regular dialogue on Human Rights and Democracy in the framework of the Association Agreement in the context of the relevant subcommittee; – Pursue and support the Government of Egypt in the further modernization and development of public services rendered to citizens, promoting accountability, transparency and contestability”* (EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan, 2004, p.5-6).

The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) is the financial instrument of the EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan and was introduced in the beginning of 2007. The ENPI replaced the financial instrument of the EMP, the MEDA programmes I & II. The objective of the ENPI is pointed out in article 3 (1) of the Regulation as follows: “*The European Union is founded on the values of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law and seeks to promote commitment to these values in partner countries through dialogue and cooperation*“ (European Parliament, 2006, p.1). Thereafter, article 2 (2) section C states that the ENPI assists through improving the role of the CSOs and NGOs, and observing the elections (European Parliament, 2006, p2). For the period 2007 – 2010, € 558 million is allocated to Egypt. Although there was a total amount of € 558 million, only 40 million, which is 7% of its total, funded the first prioritized area; the political reform and good governance. Nesreen El Molla (2009) questions the willingness of the EU, because only 7% of the total € 558 million, was spent on political reform in Egypt.

On analyzing democracy promotion in the context of the ENP, it is clear that its focus towards Egypt upgraded compared to the EMP, especially with the introduction of the EU-Egypt Action Plan. The Action Plan outlines the political status of Egypt, EU-Egypt relationship and the prioritized actions are extensively described (goals, target groups and methods of assisting). The former EMP assisted democracy in Egypt through ‘political dialogue’, that is considered as a ‘soft option’ (Nesreen El Molla, 2009 p.8), while the ENP places the promotion of democracy under the ´political dialogue and reform’ (EU Egypt Action Plan, 2004, Art 2.1.1). Thus the transformation of the EU’s external policy towards the promotion of democracy improved with the implementation of the ENP, due to the introduction of the term ‘reform‘ and because the EU-Egypt Actions Plan that sets out a series of prioritized actions.

 After looking into the official ENP communication, EU’s documents and revisions of research and related literature, the EU’s assistance of democracy promotion under the ENP can be described as a political approach. The following benchmarks will give an overview of the ENP as a political promoter.

**Value of democracy**

Due to the many accessions in 2004, the EU experienced a wave of changing political systems. This process of democrats gaining the upper hand in a society was translated in the ENP.

**Concept of democracy**

The ENP and its instruments definitely improved the concept of democracy promotion. While the EMP looked beyond the political aspect and was mainly focused on the economic and social assistance, the ENP has put democracy assistance under its first prioritized action. With the introduction of the ENP, the EU made big political shifts in its external policy towards its neighbourhood region. The manifold of elements outlined in the Action Plan contribute to enhance *”the effectiveness of institutions entrusted with strengthening democracy and the rule of law”* (EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan, 2004)*.*

**Concept of democratization**

The EU changed its external policy on democracy promotion, as it experienced the biggest enlargement in 2004. From this perspective the EU gained experience due to the political transition of acceded countries. The process of democratization became even more clear for the EU and translated this into its external policies (Baracani, 2005).

**Method of supporting democracy**

The ENP was due to the EU-Egypt Action Plan a short term process, as each Action Plan outlines the EU’s priorities and actions per country for the upcoming three to five years. As stated in the EU-Egypt Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Egypt showed in 2005 (see chapter 3) a small step forward to the process of democratization. The EU responded by offering assistance towards the government, in order to improve the electoral system, participation and at the same time some administrative practices. Thus the EU directly assisted the Egyptian government with its reform. Not only the Egyptian government was assisted in the transition. The EU also promoted democracy through the assistance to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and NGOs in order to “*Foster the role of civil society and enhance its capacity to contribute more effectively to the democratic and political process”* (EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan, 2004, p.5/6).

## 5.3 Major changes prior to the Arab spring

 The introduction of the EMP, as a *developmental approach*, attached important bilateral elements to the process on democracy to the non-democratic Mediterranean countries. However the results of this ambitious process, aiming to create peace and stability, have been miniscule and the approach was far from being realized. The EMP was orientated on a basic notion of democracy and was prioritized as a second priority, whereas the socioeconomic development were seen as more important priorities that contribute to a more democratic society.

 With the inauguration of the ENP, EU democracy promotion made a switch from *a developmental to a political approach*. The EC introduced the ENP as an initiative for a ‘*wider Europe’* and to create a ring of neighbour friends in order to prevent the creation of a dividing line between the EU and its neighbours. Several changes are observed between the EMP and the ENP. The first and most important aspect was the introduction of the Action Plans, in this case the EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan, that introduced regional assistance instead of the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach under the EMP. Secondly, in parallel, this added an observing element to its policy. Because the EU intended to respond specific to the situation in Egypt, observations and research had to be done in order to prioritize its actions. Thirdly, it is also observed that the EU experience of transition, gained from the accessions in 2004,is translated this into the ENP and its actions plans. And last but not the least a new method was aim was introduced. Namely, where the EMP referred to ‘political dialogue’, the ENP referred to ‘*Political dialogue and reform’*. The added value of *reform,* concept of democratization as a process, was further elaborated in the EU-Egypt Action Plan. The conclusion can be made that the EU shifted from a ‘passive engagement’ to ‘active engagement’ (Emerson, 2004, p96).

## 6. The ****EU’s promotion on democracy in Egypt after the ‘Arab spring’****

This thesis is focused on the comparison between the EU external policies to Egypt before and after the Arab spring. In the previous chapter the EU policies prior to the Arab spring have been discussed. The following chapter will give an overview of the EU response on democracy promotion to the Arab Spring in Egypt. A first response in early 2011 of the EU was the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP), which was followed by a revision of the ENP in mid-2011. An outcome of the revision on the ENP was the introduction of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) in 2013 that works within the framework of the ENP. In this part these three initiatives by the EU will be exemplified and also be divided under the political or developmental approach.

Important to note is that every one of these three policies, that will be discussed in this chapter, are currently still working as an EU initiative in Egypt.

## 6.1 The EU and Egypt

The Egyptian ‘*Arab rising’* began at the 25th of January 2011 and was caused by the repressed political, economic and social aspirations. This awake of the ‘Arab Rising’ or the ‘Arab Awakening’ was an historic event that surprised both scholars and policymakers (Pace & Cavatorta, 2011). The Egyptian Legislative elections held in 2010 were also one of the motives that underpinned the frustration of the Egyptian people towards the political regime of Mubarak. Namely, the Muslim Brotherhood accused the NDP, at that time ruling party in Egypt, of fraud and the manipulation of the votes in order to ensure the victory. The Muslim Brotherhood describes this event as a phenomenon that “*will go down in history as a blatant fraud and crime against democracy and the people it represents*” (Muslim Brotherhood official website, 2010). In December 2010, the EU’s first response towards the irregularities on the earlier elections of 2010 was given by the EU official High Representative, Catherine Ashton. Ashton declared the following:

*“I have followed with close interest the elections to the People’s Assembly of Egypt which took place on 28 November and 5 December. The European Union supports free and fair parliamentary elections, recognizing the responsibility of the Egyptian people to choose their own future and to build a stable democratic system. The European Union believes that in every country an open electoral process is the key to a strong nation and society.*

*Ahead of these elections we took positive note of the measures of the Government and the Higher Electoral Commission to increase transparency in the election process including local election observation. Unfortunately the implementation of these measures was insufficient. I was concerned by reports of irregularities, restricted access for independent observers and candidates' representatives into polling stations, media restrictions as well as arrests of opposition activists.*

*A significant segment of the opposition withdrew after the first round of the elections. I particularly regret the incidents of violence, some of them resulting in loss of life.*

*I encourage the Egyptian authorities to respond to these concerns. The EU will continue to call on the Egyptian government to permit domestic and international monitors to observe future elections, and remains ready to offer assistance in that regard. Egypt is a key partner of the EU and we remain committed to continue working together, building on the reforms already undertaken and on the programme set out in the EU/Egypt Action Plan."*(Catherine Ashton, 2010).

 Noticeable is that the statement by Ashton is excluding any possible sanctions towards the Egyptian government for its irregularities and insufficient elections. As Joel Peters points “ *the EU has always preferred the soft option of positive conditionality, arguing that dialogue works better than sanctions*” (Peters, 2012 p. 56). Thus at this stage it seems that EU’s response towards Egypt on the promotion of democracy always has been hard to accomplish. Although the EU has spelled out, in the several EU-Egypt agreements, its concerns, actions and issues on the political situation in Egypt, the EU has still been unable to influence the Egyptian government and work towards a deep and sustainable democracy and stop the torture by the police, state of emergency law.

## ****6.2 Motives****

 In February in 2011 the members of the European Parliament came together for a debate on the historic changes in MENA region during the prior months. During this debate Catherine Ashton concluded that: ‘*As the European Union, our offer to the region and its people is solidarity and support to put reforms in place. EU is a union of democracies – we have a democratic calling. So we will back this process of change, with patience, creativity and determination.’* (Catherine Ashton, 2011*).* Thus, a soft and low-key speech on the happenings in Egypt aimed towards the people of Egypt to gain their trust. Throughout almost all external agreements and policies of the EU, it is stated that EU priority is to ensure the promotion of democracy and secure the principles of human rights, and the rule of law. Guy Hofstadt, member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE), pointed out during the debate in Brussels, that the EU had ‘failed to give support to the people on the street’ (Hofdstadt, 2011). He asked Catherine Ashton to change the position of the EU towards Egypt, and concluded that: “*The EU should stand 100% behind the Egyptian people and its demands. Mubarak should leave his country to democracy*.” (Hofstadt, 2011).

 Several EU and Arab studies have analyzed the prior external policies on democracy promotion by the EU to the MENA region. The outcomes and recommendations of the studies varied a lot from each other, where some studies described the negative aspects others showed positive results. The EU assimilated some of these recommendations and translated this into its new external policies.

## ****6.2.1 A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Mediterranean (PfDSP)****

 The EU has clearly presented itself as both an actor and spectator over past two decades on democracy promotion within its external policies and relations (Schumacher, 2012, p 56). The EU’s approach towards the MENA region needed to be reshaped due to the radically changing political situations. And for this reason the EU intended to respond as an active player, instead of a passive spectator. As an important international promoter, the EC and the European External Action Service (EEAS) firstly reacted on the ‘events […] of historic proportions’ (PfDSP, 2011) with the launch of a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP). This policy claimed to be an innovative and novel framework that adopted prior errors of its past and mainly responded to the short-term consequences of the Arab Spring. This framework was presented by the High Representative of the EU, Catherine Ashton, already in March 2011, after the fall of the regime of Mubarak.

 Important to this thesis is that, as a first response to the historic awakening, the PfDSP provided a new important element in order to deepen the relationship between the EU and Egypt. Namely, under the idea of a differentiated approach the EU introduced the new *‘more-for-more’* approach. Meaning, the EU will give more assistance to those countries that ratify reform more in its political, economic and social structure in line with democracy. The urge towards the MENA region for reformism is hereby underpinned by the EU. The more-for-more approach is still seen in the current EU external policies as an important element.

 The communication of the PfDSP continued by describing its three main priorities, namely: 1. Transformation of democracy and the establishing of democratic Institution; 2. Create a stronger relationship with the people (people-to-people); 3. Promoting inclusive economic development. Under the first heading on democracy the PfDSP assists the civil society, establish a Civil Society Neighbourhood Facility (CSNF) and assist the social dialogue. Furthermore is mentioned that the EU is ready to assist democratic reform in which the judicial reform, fights against corruption and the transparency towards the Egyptian people is highly important.

Several instruments were introduced under the PfDSP, that enabled the EU to offer its knowledge and expertise “*to support capacity building with a particular focus on strengthening government institutions that can ensure the consolidation of change, including at regional and local level*” (PfDSP, 2001, p.5). Firstly, the communication points out that the EU can provide its expertise of the transition process, as the EU experienced a wave of political transitions in ex-communist countries. A second method of assistance, is the financial support towards NGOs and CSOs. The financial support can provide the needed push for the NGOs and CSOs to assist in the reform and the involvement in areas in which the citizens need to be assisted. Teti stated (2012) that the NGOs and independent trade unions in Egypt are the most important players on the movement towards reformation. They have used several methods in the struggle against the authoritarian regime over the past decade for the people of Egypt (Teti, 2012 p. 104). Assisting the area of NGOs and CSOs is important in order to “*develop a platform for civil society, political parties, trade unions and associations*” (PfDSP, 2011, p.6). Additionally, Carothers and Ottaway (2000) argued that the CSOs in the Arab world are sharing some of its features with the western CSOs. They are often setup by the government or by the opposition parties in the political area in order to further develop the political situation in line with democratic principles. This additional aspect can facilitate to the EU’s assistance.

It can be concluded that the EU showed a quick and ambitious step forward to the further development of the relationship with the Southern Mediterranean by introducing the PfDSP. It was a short term-approach aimed to visibly change the daily lives of the people in the Southern MENA region, excluding any major political changes. Long term objectives were later implemented in the Renewed ENP. Despite this step forward, the PfDSP defined democracy more general without any concrete political steps. Thus the PfDSP, a further evolved layer on top of the prior frameworks (EMP and ENP), is a more general approach towards the people. In parallel, one of the major disadvantages is the idea of an ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Although several indicators suggest that the EU should focus to the specificities of each country, no exclusive country reports were added under the PfDSP.

After examining the key elements of the PfDSP, the conclusion can be made, although this was a short term initiative, that this is a developmental approach. This framework responded to the errors of its past policies and to the radically changing political situation due to the Arab Spring. The following benchmarks will give an overview of the PfDSP as a developmental promoter.

**Value of democracy**

At the first page of the PfDSP communication is stated that the EU seeks better political participation which can only be addressed through faster and more ambitious political and economic reforms. Its focus lies on the basic features, like the fundamental freedoms, constitutional reform, reform of the judiciary, the fight against corruption and transparency (PfDSP, 2011).

**Concept of democracy**

With the implementation of the PfDSP the EU showed its willingness and commitment towards the Southern MENA region to support the reform process. Strengthening government institutions can assist in reform as well. The EU tend to change the daily lives of the people. In parallel, this framework is looking beyond the importance of political reform. The economic and social development are prioritized, as the EU strives to improve a more important role for the CSOs.

**Concept of democratization**

This framework can be seen as another layer on top of the EMP and ENP, as the communication of the PfDSP uses the same jargon as the ENP (Schumacher, 2011 p.109). Transition is one of its main priorities, but comes together with the economic and social development in the Mediterranean.

It should be noted that the EU responded quickly to the Arab Spring. Turning the challenges of the Arab Spring into opportunities, by playing an important role in the transition to a democratic society. This quick and short-term programme will be further developed in the renewed ENP, as it was launched later the same year.

**Method of supporting democracy**

As pointed out, a two-folded approach is used by the EU in order to assist in the process towards a more democratic society. First, the communication points out that the EU supports the process of building a stronger government by offering its expertise. The second method pointed out is the financial assist to NGOs and CSOs in the Southern MENA region. NGOs are one of the most important organizations within Egypt to promote and assist the population towards a more democratic society, good governance, respect for rule of law and human rights. Both these methods work under the idea of the ‘more-for-more’ approach. This means that Egypt should increase its standard towards human rights and the criteria towards its political system need to be improved as well.

## ****6.2.2 A new response to a changing Neighbourhood – The renewed ENP****

 As soon as Egypt succeeded to overthrow the ruling authoritarian Hosni Mubarak, the EU quickly responded with the PfDSP in March 2011. The PfDSP was implemented under the idea of a short-term partnership in order to change small and visible changes in the daily lives of the people. Subsequently, not long after this first response of the EU, a revision of the ENP was done and then further elaborated in a joint communication that was launched in May 2011 under the *‘*’New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’ programme. Over the last decade the EU’s external policies on democracy promotion towards Egypt have been increased and better targeted. However, the review on the ENP showed that the EU’s long term approach as well as its short term approach, lacked anticipation on the political shifts in the MENA countries (Kurki, 2012 p.6). There is room for improvement on all sides of the partnership within the MENA region. Especially the recent events and the revisions of the former external policies, have highlighted the fact that the EU has not yet been able to support political reform on a certain level as the EU hoped.

The ‘New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’, also known as the renewed ENP, is strongly focused on the promotion towards building and ‘*consolidate healthy democracies*, pursue *sustainable economic growth* and manage *cross-border links’* (ENP, 2011, p. 4) and ‘*must be based on the shared commitment to the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’* (ENP, 2011, p. 5). Thus three goals, similar as the priorities within the framework of the PfDSP, under the renewed ENP can be distinguished. The first heading refers to the EU democracy promotion. Under this heading an arena of novelty is added, namely the EU promotes a ‘*deep democracy’*. The communication states that there is no single model that is already made to implement with the intention to reform the political situation into a well-functioning democracy. The ongoing political changes in the MENA region are all different from each other. However, some of the aspects of these changes can be part of process towards a single model - *deep democracy*. According to the EU the aspects of a deep democracy are: *free and fair elections; freedom of association; expression and assembly and a free press and media; the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial; fighting against corruption; security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces* (ENP, 2011, p.6). The key is that the EU seeks a partnership with not only the government but with the whole society.

Thus the New ENP framework contains new elements, some of which were introduced in the PfDSP but not yet fully implemented. The communication of the renewed ENP re-emphasized that EU offers more assistance (‘more-for-more’) to those MENA countries that make greater progress towards a democratic society. On the other hand the EU also introduced the opportunity to uphold its policy towards one of its neighbours when they violate human rights and the aspects of democracy. This opposite counter strategy of the ‘more-for-more’ is called the ‘less-for-less’ strategy. For instance, due to the ongoing deterioration of the lives of the people of Syria, the EU suspended the (financial) support to the government and introduced sanctions (European Commission, 2012). Egypt, on the other hand, has shown initiative towards the reform of the government (more-for-more). As a results the EU will keep assisting the government and financing beneficiaries like NGOs and CSOs. Financing CSOs is done through the establishment of the Civil Society Facility (CSF). The objective of the CSF is to support local actors in the civil society and further strengthen their position at, both, the regional level and national level.

In June 2012 new presidential elections were held in Egypt. Mohammed Morsi was elected as the fifth president of Egypt in June 2012. These elections were seen as the nation’s first most democratic elections in Egypt’s. After Morsi got elected, the bilateral relation between the EU and Egypt improved. Several bilateral visits took place, under the term *high level political dialogue*, in Brussels and in Cairo between President Morsi and Barosso (EC President), Van Rompuy (President EU Council), Fülle (Commissioner Neighbourhood Policy) and Ashton (High Representative of the EU). In 2012 the Government of Egypt invited two experts of the EEAS to assess the elections on its fairness and peacefulness. The Commission concluded that the elections were done proper, fair and in a safe and peaceful environment. After an invitation of the Egyptian government, the EU proposed the EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) that dealt with assisting and observing the elections in the first semester 2013. As in terms of the ‘more-for-more’ strategy, Egypt showed some initiatives towards the reform of the government in which the EU financially responded. The launch of the Support to Partnership, Reform, and Inclusive Growth programme (SPRING), is a financial instrument under the framework of the renewed ENP that anticipated on the events of the Arab spring. This programme specifically aims to contribute to democratic transition and institution building in Egypt. Its focus lies on “*those institutions and actors which are key to building democratic societies, assisting the democracy reform of security sector and preparing for the implementation of mobility partners*” (European Commission, 2011 p.4). These Egyptian organizations and initiatives, highly important for the path towards a sustainable civil democratic society, will be supported by the EU SPRING-programme. Besides the € 449 million (European Commission, 2011 p.7) that was already made available for the period 2011-2013 by the EU towards Egypt, the EU promised that the total amount of funding was complemented with an additional €90 million funding package under the SPRING-programme. These two actions by the EU were due to the renewed ENP and they performed under the ‘more-for-more’ principle.

Thus the EU did not introduce a brand new ENP, but put another layer on top of the its prior policies. The new ENP framework describes a much more important notion on democracy and made it easier and more simple for the EU to assist and implement policy objectives. Whereas one of its major changes, undermined by the fact that neither a democratic society nor the path towards such a democracy can be reached by one single programme or model (Teti, 2013 p71), was the innovation of the ENP towards a ‘deep democracy’. A second area of novelty was the more-for-more and less-for-less principle under which the EU offers more or less cooperation to the countries that make more or less progress in their reform towards democracy. Furthermore, whereas the PfDSP did not anticipate specifically on one country, the renewed ENP does. This is done by a yearly assessment, also known as the EU-Egypt Progress Report. This report sets out the priorities (aim, target group and method) of the EU and Egypt partnership and its accomplishments and failures. And last but not least in 2012, with the election of Morsi, the political dialogue on high level occurred several times that attributed to a deeper relationship between the EU and Egypt. The renewed ENP describes that democratic transition is underway in the MEDA region. But it did not translate into fairer, more transparent and speedier justice. Especially in Egypt, where civilians are still tried before the military courts (European Commission, 2012).

 Under the renewed ENP, the EU is aiming towards a deep democracy, meaning that democracy is more than just free election and is also aiming towards the CSOs and NGOs. Establishing the right institutions that contribute to a free and fair transition to democracy is one of the keys of the renewed ENP. Thus, it can be concluded that this EU approach towards Egypt, after the awakening of the Arab Spring, is a political approach as it tries to strengthen the process of democracy by highlighting the importance of independent institutions that contribute to a free and fair democracy. The following benchmarks will give an overview of the renewed ENP as a political promoter.

 **Value of democracy**

It can be stated that the introduction deep democracy is a new process of building a political structure. New elements are added in order to make the transition in Egypt faster. The elements of a *deep democracy* are mainly aimed to improve process of the political situation.

 **Concept of democracy**

In the renewed ENP the aim of the EU is shifted to a ‘deep democracy’, which is underpinned by a different concept of democracy compared to the prior policies ENP and EMP. Catherine Ashton (2011) states that aiming towards deep democracy is not just by changing the government, for instance assist in free and fair elections, but far more than that. Building the right institutions will assist in the process towards the transition. Under this new aim the EU can support Egypt towards a genuine political transition (Guardian, 2011). Thus the concept of democratization under this renewed policy is seen as a political approach, as the elements under the ‘*deep democracy´* are specifically focused on the democrats gaining the upper hand in the society.

 **Concept of democratization**

Under the renewed ENP the process towards a democracy is seen as a political process as a whole, and not as an economic/social process with broad definitions. Political breakthroughs are important. Although it must be noted that the economic and social environment is important as well under the renewed ENP. The aim of the EU under the renewed ENP is to find a way for those who seek a democracy, through assisting the CSF.

 **Method of supporting democracy**

As mentioned, the EU aims towards a deep democracy in Egypt, through a partnership with the society and with the government. Creating a partnership with the Egyptian society through the launch of a Civil Society Facility, the EU wants offer more support to the civil society. A CSF manages the financial support for the project, led by civil society actors. It also seeks to strengthen the capacities and increase the involvement of the civil society in the regional area. Another instrument that assists NGOs and trade unions under the renewed ENP, is the establishment of the new and most recent programme, namely the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). This feature will be explained in the following section.

## ****6.2.3 The European Endowment for Democracy (EED)****

 The emphasis on democracy promotion within the framework of the PfDSP, has been criticized a lot by many experts (Youngs, 2011; Balfour, 2012; Tömmel, 2013; Manners, 2009; Khalifa Isaac, 2013; Schumacher, 2011). Due to these criticisms and the continually deteriorating political and socio-economic environment in the MENA region, the EU and other international stakeholders stayed ambitious to improve its external policies on democracy promotion. After almost two years after the first response by the EU towards Egypt and other MENA countries, the EU launched its third and most recent manifest, the EED. The design of the EED was already mentioned in the communication of the Renewed ENP in 2011 due to the call for its creation by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radoslaw Sikorki in February 2011.

 The EED is aiming to support and promote democracy in the non-democratic countries, especially to those countries having a bad state of relationship with the EU. Article 2 (1) of the statute of the EED points out its objective as follows: “*The objective of the Endowment will be to foster and encourage democratization and deep and sustainable democracy in countries in political transition […] on the European Neighbourhood*” (Statutes: European Endowment for Democracy, Art. 2.1). This article does not point out the exact aim but noticeable is the re-emphasized term ‘*deep democracy’,* as its origins lie in the renewed ENP. Furthermore article 2 (2) of the statute points out that “*direct beneficiaries of the Endowment’s activities may include: pro-democratic movements and other pro-democratic actors in favour of a pluralistic multiparty system on democratic ground; social movements and actors; civil society organisations; emerging leaders, independent media and journalists, non-governmental institutions, including foundations and educational institutions functioning also in exile; provided that all the beneficiaries adhere to core democratic values, respect international human rights standards and subscribe to principles of non-violence*”(Statute: European Endowment for Democracy, Art. 2.2). Thus, the EU is promoting towards a deep democracy underpinned by assisting the direct beneficiaries.

 With the introduction of the EED, the EU also intends to assist faster. This was translated in one of its main novelties, namely that the EED is autonomous from the EU. Meaning, bureaucratic hurdles of EU decision-making will have less impact on the decisions made by the EED. As a result the EED enables funding to those who cannot gain access to EU funding. This aspect was also a critical view on the other initiatives on democracy promotion. As the EMP and ENP are based on a partnership with a neighbour country, the EU supports mostly through concrete supporting actions and did not support the non-registered beneficiaries.

Thereafter the third article of the Statute points out that the EED will seek the most ‘effective and flexible’ way of, on the one hand directly support to the beneficiaries for the operation, project and material costs. And on the other hand the EED offers own activities, in manifold: ‘*the organization of seminars, studies, conferences, publications, networking events, training, facilitating of networking between local and/or regional beneficiaries or other; […] from think tanks, academic institutions, international organizations experts and any other relevant stakeholders*’ (Statute: European Endowment for Democracy. Art. 3.1.c). If compared to the EMP and ENP (although these initiatives are based on a partnership), the EED spells out its main goal more concrete. Adding the expertise by third parties , as is stated in article 3 (1) section C, is also a new element.

The introduction of the EED is a new and flexible quick framework, in which it aims to assist those who need it most and are not able to get EU funding. But, also because it is still such a young and new instrument, the EED is also surrounded by question marks. For instance because the EED is an autonomous international trust fund, the EU member-states and other (international) stakeholders have to give money on a voluntary basis. Due to the voluntary aspect there is currently about€14 million under the EED for the whole region. This voluntary support is besides the money that is already made available for the many other instruments of the EU. Another future challenge for the EED is to put its focus on a certain region. In the statute is not outlined where the EED will exactly operate, what its action and results are towards a deep democracy. Solely in article 2 (1) is stated that its focus lie on the neighbour countries. *An EU-Egypt EED country report* could outline the aims, actions and of the funding projects in Egypt. Thus there is an uncertainty whether the EED will ‘fly or not’ (Youngs, 2013).

 It is easy to state that the EED is a developmental approach. This is purely based on the methods and definition on the process of democracy. The people of Egypt need to be heard and assisted. Through assisting the non-registered organizations movements small results will. The following benchmarks will give an overview of the EED as a developmental promoter.

**Value of democracy**

Its value is to “foster and encourage democratization and deep and sustainable democracy” only to those countries in the early stage of transition. The political process of democracy is not its priority. However, the main idea behind the establishment of the EED are the social rights of the people in the Arab States. It is the EED that helps the unheard people in Egypt that fight for transition.

**Concept of democracy**

In the statute of the EED the term ‘deep democracy’ is re-emphasized. So the EU is looking for the creation of a partnership with the civil society. Solely this element, under the EED, can be seen as a political approach.

**Concept of democratization**

Its aim is to support countries that are looking for the transition of democracy only to those that are stated in article 2 (2) of the declaration. No support towards the Egyptian government will be realized under the EED. Thus the process of transition is in its early stage and is approach at its roots (the people).

**Methods of supporting democracy**

The EED aims to assist those beneficiaries (as stated in art 2 (2) of the declaration) that are in favor of a pluralistic multiparty system and are calling for transition in a country, in line of democratic principles. This can be done through direct financial funding or by offering its own expertise in order for those organizations to spread the idea of the process of transition.

## 7. Conclusion

This thesis focused on EU democracy promotion in Egypt, and whether its policy changed after the Arab Spring. It can be observed that over the years the promotion of democracy by the EU has changed. As a consequence of the Arab Spring the EU revised its prior policies. After the revisions, the EU officials pointed out that EU democracy promotion to non-democratic countries, prior to the Arab Spring, has not been as effective as the EU hoped. As a result, the errors made in prior EU policies were improved in following policies. The EU also adapted its policies as a response to the wave of political unrest in the MENA region. The major changes are in terms of the definitions, methods and aims.

Firstly, the definitions in the EU official documents on the promotion of democracy in Egypt, are defined more precisely after the Arab Spring. The term *deep democracy* added a new value to the process of democratization. As was stated by EU officials, EU democracy promotion in Egypt prior to the Arab Spring did not have major results. More extensive definitions will contribute in the promotion of democracy, as precise steps can be carried out easier and results might be more exact. Secondly, the EU shifted its methods of supporting democracy to the *more-for-more* approach, which enabled the EU to suspend or increase its aid. As is the case with Egypt, in which the EU increased its assistance in order to improve the process towards a democratic society. And thirdly, the aim of the EU changed in terms of funding. The EU funded Egypt significant more after than prior to the Arab Spring.

To conclude, the continuously changing situation in Egypt keeps the EU sharp. The Arab Spring influenced the EU’s policies. The EU responded to its prior errors and implemented new and innovative concepts in order to assist towards a deep democracy and deepen the relationship. However, the direct impact of the EU is not as simply by looking at results, as the EU mainly supports democracy under the idea of a developmental approach.

Further research is definitely needed, especially since we have seen the ousted of the democratically chosen president Morsi, as he failed to develop a better political and economic environment for the Egyptian people. Currently, the future prospect of Egypt is not looking well. The international community needs to stay alert in order to prevent a transition back to an authoritarian regime. Many questions remain regarding the implementation of democracy in Egypt and whether Egypt is actually ready for democracy as a governmental form.

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