'Attracting EU Agencies: increasing imbalance due to politicized integration'

NIG Conference 2021

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Content

- Background: my PhD on attracting IOs

- Three cases: CEPOL, EMA, ECMWF

- Research questions EU agencies

- Possible theorizing

- Possible methods

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What determines the successes and failures of governance networks in small to medium-sized Western European host cities in attracting International Organizations?

Geneva → The Hague → Vienna → Copenhagen

Main Conclusions:

The more outwardly looking the organizational network members are...
Instrumental

- The more positive the policy recipients respond

Discursive

- The more their narratives are aligned with the target group
  (IO representatives)

Relational

- The more diverse the networks attracting the IOs are,
  ...the higher the likelihood of success

Research questions EU agencies

- *How do these processes of relocating EU agencies work out in practice?*

- *How can the three cases be characterized in terms of politicization?*

- *What is the role of the distribution game in the attraction of EU agencies?*

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How do these processes work out in practice?

Timeline:

- The organization sends out a Request for Proposals

- Member states of the agency and others react with

a 'letter of intent' and answer all sorts of questions

- After 3-8 months there is a deadline for bid books

- A committee evaluates the bids; usually some of them do not meet the criteria

- A voting takes place, where in each round candidates are eliminated

The cases:
CEPOL   - EMA -   ECMWF

Budapest (2012-'14)   Amsterdam (2017-'19)   Bonn (2019-'21)

CEPOL - Budapest

- *Collège européen de police* (CEPOL) established in 2005
- In 2012 the UK informed the EP and the Council that it needed to move
- Competitors: The Netherlands, Hungary, Spain, Finland, Greece, Italy, and Ireland
- Politicized in 2013: institutional battle EP and the Council. Two camps: Salzburger Forum versus the Dutch bid
- The Hungarian bid accepted by an informal decision

EMA - Amsterdam

- European Medicine Agency needed to move during the Brexit negotiations

- Competitors: The Netherlands, Spain, Ireland, Denmark, Italy, Austria, France, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Poland

- Estimated gain: 60 companies would accompany the EMA

- Milan (25 votes), Copenhagen (20), and Amsterdam (20 votes); in the third round a draw (13 votes for Milan and Amsterdam)

ECMWF - Bonn

- European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts

- Competitors: Germany, Spain, Estonia, Portugal, France, Italy, Ireland, Austria, UK

- Bonn won with the Duck's movie and best offer

- The other winners were Austria and Italy, until Germany won

How can the three cases be characterized in terms of politicization?

- Possible theoretical framework for a paper:
  - define politicization (Hutter & Grande, 2014)
    - issue salience (visibility)
    - actor expansion (scope)
    - actor polarization (intencity and direction)
  - rank the cases in line with these categories
- Look at the bids and compare competitors:
  - What locational factors are most important for EU agencies
  - How did these matter?

What is the role of the distribution game in the attraction of EU agencies?

- In one case (CEPOL) the distribution game seemed determinant

- As it was established that EU agencies should be equally distributed, this should play a role

- Nevertheless, the political process and convenience to be situated at the heart of Europe plays a role too

Discussion

- How to proceed?

- What would be a good way to write an article about these three cases, based on 7 in-depth interviews, the bids and host policy analysis?

Thank you!

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Summary Results:

Table 9.1 Comparison of the variables and results

Perspective	Independent variables	Outcome as expected
Instrumental	1. Alignment of host policies with bid book	Opposite
	2. Perception of host policy and support	Partially
Discursive	3. Overlap priorities and narratives of organizational and policy network	Partially
	4. Overlap priorities and narratives of organizational network and international representatives	Yes
Relational	5. Network cooperation	No
	6. Actor-level property: a. Degree centrality b. Betweenness centrality	a. Partially b. Partially
	7. Network-level property: a. Network diversity b. Number of main nodes	a. Yes b. Partially

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