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M.T.I. Bollen
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[eds.]

Civil-Military Cooperation

A Marriage of Reason

The image on the cover of this edition of NL-ARMS is a fragment from The Marriage Contract (about 1743), the first of a series of satirical paintings about the upper echelons of society, called 'Marriage A-la Mode', by William Hogarth (1697-1764). The lack of mutual attraction, or even interest, by the prospective bride and groom, back to back almost, is apparent.

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-   J.L.M. Soeters, J.H. Rovers [eds.]

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2002 Civil-Military Cooperation: A Marriage of Reason
-   M.T.I. Bollen, R.V. Janssens, H.F.M. Kirkels, J.L.M. Soeters [eds.]

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Civil-Military Cooperation: Introduction

J. Soeters, H. Kirkels

In August 2002 the eastern part of Germany and major regions of the Czech Republic were swept by heavy rainfalls. Villages and splendid cities like Prague and Dresden were flooded, people had to be evacuated and roads, houses as well as objects of historical value were seriously damaged. In order to control the situation and prevent even more mishap, ordinarycitizens and soldiers worked frantically side by side to fortify the banks of the swollen rivers, and military engineers provided resources for the evacuation of people. If ever there had been problems between ordinary citizens and the military, these were certainly absent in this crisis situation. This collaboration can rightly be called an elementary form of civil-military cooperation. Forthe military, it certainly is an 'operation other than war', and seen from this perspective itdoes not look like the military's core business. However, this type of military action seems to become increasingly important. Modern societies tend to become 'risk societies' due to large-scale technology use and environmental developments, and as a result they areincreasingly confronted with unexpected, large-scale problems which exceed the coping capacities of ordinary civil institutions. In these situations the military are requested to come out of their garrisons and help fight the problems. The military are generally willing to respond positively to these requests because doing so adds to their legitimacy in society. In the Netherlands as well, the military participated in a fight against the water (1995), and they have only recently been involved in actions to control the outburst of animal epidemics, such as pig's fever and foot and mouth disease. Nonetheless, this type of action is not really representative of what could be called **'civil-military cooperation'**, or **CIMIC** in military argot. CIMIC refers to collaboration between the military and civil organisations in specific circumstances: during a (civil) war, immediately after a conflict, or as relief in humanitarian disaster. CIMIC nowadays usually deals with 'host nation support' and 'post-conflict society building', often in so-called 'failed states', and as such it has become an essential element of Peace Support Operations (PSOs). These have taken place and are still taking place all over the world, most notably in Europe, in the Balkans but also elsewhere, for instance, in Africa, Central-America and in the Far East. CIMIC and PSOs help to strengthen the reputation of the military in western societies, because they are in concordance with moral and idealistic motives among the general public. In today's concepts CIMIC is a one-sided relation: the military are requested to make their resources available to civilian organisations and authorities, not the other way round. More often than not, the central coordination of the operations does not lie with the military, whose task is supportive and not initiating. Besides, CIMIC – indeed, virtually all military action - is supposed to be available only for a limited period. In the beginning parties tend to be enthusiastic about each other's contributions, but that enthusiasm quickly ebbs away (Bollen, 2002). At the climax of a crisis, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and local authorities tend to welcome the military manpower, logistic and construction resources. Once the first hectic phase is over, however, the various parties tend to feel somewhat less comfortable with the situation and each other: everybody will feel the need to protect their own domain and independent identity and to secure their own turf (Bos, 2003). Even in stable situations, where the military is only doing good (reconstructing schools, repairing hospitals, building bridges), the recipients, mostly local authorities, will carefully watch the conditions under which the work is done.

It is this rather troublesome, at times even torturous, relationship that is the main object of study in the present volume of the *Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies* (*NL-ARMS*). It is troublesome since the parties partaking in this relationship are, to put it mildly, not naturally drawn towards each other. They do not know each other well and they sense that their organisational cultures are at loggerheads with each other. At times even, they harbour suspicions about each other's objectives. Yet, the circumstances are such that they force themselves to work together in order to alleviate the needs of a civilian population that is often completely dependent on their aid. Needless to say, the cooperation is often anything but smooth; after all, unknown is unloved. Pooling resources is inevitable in certain circumstances, and in those situations all parties involved see the synergetic effects of their collaboration. Under certain conditions, pooling resources leads to profit for all, as an axiom from network theory says. But even so, everybody tends to carefully watch his or her own vested interests.

It is because of this phenomenon that the title of the present volume of the *NL-ARMS* is 'CIMIC - A Marriage of Reason'. Without stretching things too far, it is possible to liken the civil- military cooperation to the nineteenth century 'marriage of reason', in which an affection for the partner in wedlock was of secondary importance, the main purpose of the alliance being to secure the family's fortune or estate, usually by producing (male) offspring. This analogy is certainly implicitly and explicitly recognised by many of the authors in this volume in their use of metaphor. Thus, the intriguing title of Bollen's doctoral dissertation ('Working Apart Together'-a clear reference to a LAT-relationship), which forms the basis of the two articles by **Beeres** and **Bollen,** refers to the situation in which two parties need each other's resources, but want to preserve their own domain, autonomy and working style. **Winslow** even uses the term 'strange bedfellows' to indicate the awkwardness of a relationship in which no love is lost. In this 2002 issue of *NL-ARMS* we have put together a collection of papers on civil-military cooperation. The focus is on recent experiences of the Dutch military, but one paper explicitly deals with the armed forces of another nation, i.e. the Canadians. Obviously, the international dimension has not been forgotten in the majority of the chapters. We have tried to recruit writers from academia as well as military commanders with 'hands on'-experiences, people from within the military and well-informed 'outsiders', who represent the civil part of CIMIC.

We start with a historical overview of CIMIC operations since 1945, by **Janssens** and **Teitler.** They deal with the development of CIMIC in World War II and its aftermath, during the operations in the decolonisation era, up to the current post-Cold War activities in the context of PSOs. Their contribution clearly demonstrates that the content and form of CIMIC has drastically changed over the past half-century. They also give us a first impression of the problems that people working in CIMIC operations may have to deal with.

In the two following chapters **Bollen** and **Beeres** describe and analyse two CIMIC-experiences in times of humanitarian crisis: one that took place in the middle of the 1990s in the Rwanda/Zaire-area and the other during the refugee crisis in Albania in the summer of 1999. Making use of concepts from network theory and cybernetics they try to analyse the giant database Bollen collected for her recent doctoral dissertation on this subject. This leads to interesting insights which may be of use in future attempts to organise collaboration between the military and civilian organisations. Again, we get an impression of the problems that arise when two traditionally highly-differing parties start to work together (not to mention the national differences between the militaries themselves, or the giant variety of organisations in the civilian sector itself).

Winslow's article on NGOs and the military in humanitarian crises is based on Canadian experiences; it deals with the Balkans and the Golan Heights in the Middle East. Like Bollen's study, this article is based on documentary sources as well as participatory research and a

large number of interviews. This analysis yields highly interesting results and indications of the friction that may occur when the military and NGOs work together. Although the results of CIMIC may be very well received, it is a form of collaboration that brings together 'strange bedfellows'. This phrase, by the way, comes from a military man, the former US General Shalikaskvili. Winslow's paper is an update of a previous publication and is published with permission of the *Militaire Spectator*, which journal published the original paper two years ago.

De Wolf represents the civilian side of civil-military cooperation; he is a member of the board of Cordaid. In his contribution, which is in fact an adapted version of an earlier address held at a CIMIC conference, he analyses the various differences between civilian aid organizations and the military and he concludes that the principle of neutrality of aid organisations no longer forms an obstacle for some civilian organizations to work with the military. He sees that the military and aid organisations are complementary in certain circumstances and thus may profit from each other's contribution. De Wolfs article is in more than one respect a turning point in this volume; he is not only the only representative of the civilian side of CIMIC, but his contribution also divides the academic contributions from the more practical 'hands-on' accounts by military commanders.

First of all, **Rappard** gives an overview of the recent policy developments leading to the establishment of the NATO CIMIC Group North; this groups consists of military capacity made available by the Netherlands, Germany, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland and Norway. Its staff is located in the Netherlands, and it is this group's task to provide CIMIC support units to brigades and battalions in PSOs as well as full deployments in Crisis Response Operations. Interestingly, in CIMIC operations the role of reserve personnel (as functional specialists) is becoming increasingly important, which again justifies the conclusion that CIMIC operations really do matter in enhancing the military's legitimacy in society.

Homan conducted an evaluation study of the impact of Dutch CIMIC projects in Bosnia during the last six years. He carried out the study on request of the Dutch Foreign Secretary, which in itself it is an indication that CIMIC is not exclusively a matter of the Ministry of Defence. The Foreign Secretary increasingly contributes financial means, hence the department's involvement in the evaluation of CIMIC operations. Homan points to the absence of indicators to measure the results for peace implementation and stabilisation. Although firm statistics are lacking, he produces a number of data that show that CIMIC really contributes to the peace process in the region.

Oostendorp, **Van Loon** and **Rijken** are the people with the real 'hands on' experience; they were battalion commanders in Bosnia (SFOR), in Kosovo (KFOR) and in Eritrea (UNMEE), respectively. Under their command CIMIC activities were carried out, although it should be said that CIMIC was not the primary concern in either case. That obviously was to ensure a secure environment in a designated area. Oostendorp, as well as his colleagues, emphasises that without the presence and the active monitoring of the military forces the peace and quiet necessary to restore faith in a better future are lacking. The execution of CIMIC tasks depends on these conditions. Pure military work and the more humanitarian tasks are completely interwoven, as Oostendorp claims. Van Loon's account of the spectacular first period in Kosovo reads like a thriller. At the time there was no administration in function in Kosovo, which compelled the military to install military rule (a rather unusual situation in Europe after the second World War). These circumstances required a much broader CIMIC approach than was originally envisaged and prepared for. Van Loon convincingly argues that in such situations the military are in need of specialists who are able to support the process of re-establishing the most fundamental aspects of a functioning administration. Rijken provides us with an account of his experiences as battalion commander of the Netherlands Marine Corps in the border area between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Marine Corps can rely on extensive

experiences with CIMIC activities, especially in the beginning of the 1990s in Cambodia, and later in Haiti. Here again, it is stressed that there can be no CIMIC without proper military presence and monitoring. As the situation was not so grave at the time (all previously warring parties had agreed with the peace arrangement), the battalion could devote quite some attention to CIMIC projects. Like the Dutch battalions in the Balkans, the Marines received certain funds from the Foreign Secretary and this money was used very effectively in a large variety of projects.

A final 'hands on' account refers to the establishment of the so-called DART teams (Disaster Assistance Response Teams). **Van den Boogaard** describes the increasing need for such small rescue units, the planning and implementation of these teams as well as some recent experiences. Recently, DARTs have been engaged in operations in the Dutch Antilles, Honduras and Mozambique; those teams have shown their usefulness in providing assistance in natural calamaties such as hurricanes and heavy rainfalls.

In the epilogue **Janssens** draws some major conclusions on the basis of a comparison of the various chapters. This comparison yields positive results as well as a number of organisational and administrative problems with CIMIC. His main conclusion, shared by us, however, is that CIMIC is a challenging way to ameliorate conditions of people in terrible circumstances, and as such it can be a positive and important contribution to a more stable and peaceful international society. Although civil-military cooperation has all the characteristics of a marriage of reason, with all its shortcomings, it has nevertheless often proved to be a lifesaver for millions of people in desperate circumstances. It may lack the mutual attraction and passion of a marriage of the heart, but it has often shown to be robust enough to weather many storms. And anyway, as Jane Austen put it: "Happiness in marriage is entirely a matter of chance."

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CIMIC since 1945.
Historical, Political, and Operational Contexts

[*NL-ARMS*, 2002: Chapter 2]

R. Janssens, G. Teitler

1.   Introduction

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is a NATO concept used during peace support operations that has gained some popularity over the last couple of years. Governments, international organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and armed forces cooperate during peace support operations to create new stable societies or offer relief during crisis situations. As United States Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., commander of NATO forces in Southern Europe during the operations Restore Hope in Northern Iraq and IFOR in Bosnia, said in April 1996, 'In November we had never heard of CIMIC. We had no idea what you did. Now we can't live without you.'[1]

Not only did Leighton express how important CIMIC was to him as commander, he also indicated that CIMIC was a relatively unknown concept until recently. There were several reasons why CIMIC was unknown. One explanation could be that Leighton was U.S. Navy, while CIMIC is basically an Army concept. Leighton was also American, while CIMIC is more a European NATO term.[2] Moreover, during the Cold War period CIMIC used to have a different meaning, closer to the idea of Host Nation Support. NATO's Cold War CIMIC was geared toward the possible great conflict in Europe between East and West. In those circumstances civilian authorities would support the military mission. The key factor of CIMIC during the Cold War was the support by civilian authorities to military commanders. Harbour facilities, railways, and roads would be earmarked for military use, making an easy transfer of military means to the operational area possible. Food and fuel would be handed to the military units as part of a continuing logistic support (Janssens & Visser, 2000: 102).

In the period since the Cold War the concept of CIMIC has taken on an almost opposite meaning. CIMIC is now a military activity that forms a part of a peace support operation, which might include giving support to a local or national government. Some of the contemporary CIMIC activities of a military unit could be the building of roads, bridges, schools, and hospitals, or giving supplies to civilian authorities. This reversal in meaning of CIMIC - from civilians supporting a military operation to a military operation in order to aid civilians - is the natural result of the new type of military operations since the end of the Cold War.

It would be incorrect, however, to see CIMIC as only a contemporary form of military activity. CIMIC takes place during military operations in which military forces cooperate closely with local government to establish a more peaceful society. In this article we will show how this type of military operation has developed over the last fifty years, and what challenges and opportunities CIMIC offers in its old and new form.

2.   Civil-Military Cooperation in its various forms

CIMIC, in its present meaning, forms a part of peace support operations. The NATO definition of CIMIC is, 'The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil populations, including national and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.'[3] The idea of co-

operation between military and civilian authorities in this kind of operation is not new. It can also be found in such concepts as 'Civil Affairs,' 'Nation Building' or 'Heart and Minds Campaigns.' 'Nation Building' and the specific American notion of 'Civil Affairs' assume a predominance of the military forces in a peace enforcing operation, which can involve changing the political structure of the occupied nation. 'Hearts and Minds' campaigns are established to win the support of the local population for a military operation and, ultimately, for the government that initiated the campaign. Characteristic of CIMIC, though, is the lack of political involvement. Military personnel are used to help out in rebuilding the economy or institutions such as hospitals or schools. Changing the local political structure or power balance in the operational area is not part of the design.

The absence of an (outspoken) political dimension is understandable in the context of a peace support operation. The original idea is that peace support operations take place in an area where all parties involved want a peaceful solution to their conflict. If peaceful cooperation is the premise, then efforts at changing the political arena are detrimental to the operation.

In reality, though, not all peace support operations are that clear-cut. Sometimes peace support operations lose the support of one or more parties involved, as in Cambodia, or the operation turns violent, as in Somalia. Some operations, as in Haiti, where a democratic government was re-installed, are political from the beginning to the end.

As in all Western military operations, politicians determine what kind of operation will be executed. Governments whose armed forces have a CIMIC capacity, have already decided that there will only be a limited political aspect to their peace support operations. In general, their military commanders agree with them. They train their troops for conventional warfare. Peace support operations, where their soldiers execute very different tasks, are of limited interest.[4] Paradoxically, political involvement might result in their being caught up in a shooting war, which they do not want either, since they will not be up to full combat preparedness during a peace support operation. The American experience in Somalia is the dreaded case in point.

Another assumption concerning CIMIC is that all kinds of NGOs are actively involved. The idea is even that NGOs will most likely be in the operational area before the peace support operation begins, and will remain there after the military activities have ended. In other words, NGOs have a better knowledge of the local circumstances and they can offer important information to the peace support troops, which makes the idea of Civil Military Cooperation even more important. At a local level this regularly works out, too. Both military commanders at unit level and local NGO workers see the obvious needs of the population and try to solve them as well as circumstances allow.

On top of that, there are also expectations at a strategic level. NGOs are expected to take over whenever the military commanders or their political leaders decide to pull out the military forces after they have achieved the goal of establishing peace and order. The assumption is that NGOs, and maybe also the governments of the intervening nations, have an overall plan and an end state for the peace support operation in mind. This is often not the case, which makes cooperation between military forces and NGOs at a strategic level often hard to achieve.

Cooperation between military forces and NGOs can also be difficult because of the complicated relationship of NGOs with national governments. Most NGOs have come into being as a result of their conviction that national governments could not or did not want to address certain (international) problems. 'Médecins sans Frontières', for instance, was established because physicians believed not enough was done to help people in the conflict in Bangla-Desh. Often, it is crucial for NGOs not to be affiliated with any national government either, to make sure that the parties involved in the conflict see them as independent, which can make Civil-Military Cooperation hard.[5]

3.   World War II and its Aftermath

During the Second World War the Americans and British practised a form of what we now call CIMIC in areas liberated from the enemy as well as in enemy territory. In both cases, the military command had to look for local politicians to work with. In general, this was easier in liberated countries, where it was often clear who had opposed the wartime regime. The choice was not always clear-cut, though. The United States had a hard time picking the 'right' French ally. In South Korea the American choice of Syngman Rhee as the political leader was less than fortunate, since his ultra-conservative ideas did not support the development of a sound democratic regime. While occupying enemy territory, it was often even harder to find trustworthy politicians (i.e. politicians who would cooperate with the Western powers). Civilian authorities still functioning here were deemed unacceptable. Moreover, purging these elements would take considerable time. It was therefore inevitable that the military had the scene to themselves—at least as long as it took to find suitable civilians to assist them in running the occupied areas and within the confines of the goals set by their politicians. The 'local' political leaders they needed had to come from abroad (where they had gone into exile before the war), from prison, concentration camps or retirement. Some of the exiles, though, had attached themselves to the American or British military (as well as to the Russians). Most of them wore allied uniforms, but were able to function as interim partners in CIMIC. All in all, the concept of CIMIC did not, strictly speaking, apply to occupied enemy territory during and directly after the World War. The victorious allies had no other option than to instill a form of military government here.

Only gradually did true civil-military cooperation emerge. Besides, the military government was of a very special kind. Apart from governing a ravaged country, the occupying military had two other functions to perform. First, to bring to justice war criminals and persons held to be responsible for the outbreak of the war and imposing a criminal régime on their society. Second, to reform the political, economic, educational and social spheres of the defeated countries. In this they mostly had to find their own way. Although, in the American example, the planning of occupied territories had taken place in cooperation with the State Department during the war, the War Department had pushed the State Department to the sidelines with regard to the execution of *Civil Affairs*. Originally, President Roosevelt had intended to let the State Department coordinate the work of all kinds of United States government agencies during Civil Affairs, including that of the War Department. After the first World War II experiences with Civil Affairs in North Africa, Roosevelt decided that the War Department should lead the planning and the initial stages of military government in liberated and occupied territories. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George C. Marshall, recalled the reason for this change in policy: '[commander of the operation, General Dwight D.] Eisenhower's disgust with these seventeen civilian agencies roaming around areas in Africa, causing him more trouble than the Germans ...' (Janssens, 1995: 149). The British followed the American example, even though they only began to plan at the end of the war, partly because their people and means were tightly stretched. With the war over and eager to concentrate once more on their *core business*, the armed forces found themselves forced to continue this work. It would take time and the rehabilitation of the erstwhile enemies (due to the outbreak of the Cold War) to bring this situation to an end.

These radical developments did not occur in the liberated countries in Western Europe. Here the advancing British and American armies did not find a political and societal vacuum that they had to fill by themselves. In these territories, politically and socially acceptable civilians were present, willing and able to enter into cooperative relations with the allied military. These civilians, however, were not yet acting as autonomous partners. While the war lasted, they functioned under a special régime that gave extended powers to their own military. So, in

a way, even here the concept of civil-military cooperation was not applicable in its pure form. Local civilians - from the private sector and government services - did not always come into direct contact with representatives of the foreign military. These contacts were regulated, coordinated and supervised by military personnel of their own countries, acting under martial law (De Jong, 1980).

This delicate constellation functioned on the whole rather smoothly. To account for this happy situation, the following points should be taken into consideration. In the first place, during and (shortly) after the war, the military enjoyed an unprecedented prestige in Western Europe - even in the Netherlands, an otherwise markedly unheroic nation. This high esteem could not but help the military in imposing the restrictive measures that were deemed necessary in the period following the departure of the German forces. The military were very much *in the picture*. To be in contact with them, to work with them, to be in a position to be helpful to them, even to be seen with them, lent some prestige to those civilians cooperating with them. Second, the liberators were helped by the fact that the Germans had, in Western Europe at least, not completely destroyed the pre-war governmental and societal structures. Much was damaged, but enough had survived the harsh regime to help the allied military. Consequently, they were able to delegate a considerable part of their responsibilities. With so many experts at hand from the local economic, financial, medical, educational, and other spheres, there was no need to keep all cards in their own hands. Even the removal of collaborators and the bringing to justice of war criminals could be delegated to local authorities (the problems to which this policy led in France, with its complicated Vichy-past, cannot be dealt with here).[6]

In the liberated areas CIMIC was, as long as the war lasted, directed at two main fields of action. First, a major concern were humanitarian problems, such as the supply and distribution of food. Second, and more important to the military commanders, the emphasis lay on the preparation of these countries for their role as operating bases from which assaults on Germany could be launched. To fulfil this second function, elaborate logistical preparations were called for. Harbour entrances had to be cleared, infra-structural repairs to be made, a skilled labour force to be assembled and set to work, etc. Many humanitarian relief measures, moreover, were clearly helpful in the context of the military preparations. As a matter of fact, it is sometimes difficult to separate the two fields of action. Taking care, for instance, of refugees wandering through the countryside fits in both categories. Apart from their humanitarian dimension, these measures were deemed necessary in order to clear the roads for military purposes, to bring some order in the administrative chaos, to prevent the outbreak of epidemics among an undernourished population, and to stimulate the revival of economic life. So, humanitarian and military considerations were supplementary in the final phase of the war.

Eventually - after the war - a political motive came into play that was to grow in importance once the Soviet threat cast its shadow over Western Europe. Economic and social recovery was seen as a means to prevent Western Europe from falling prey to social unrest on which radical (leftist) parties could flourish. At the time these worries seemed hardly ill-founded. Communist parties, for one thing, were rather strong (partly due to the prestige their members had earned as resistance fighters). Moreover, there were still memories of how the *Great Depression* of the 1930s had led to all kinds of radical political movements, from both the left and the right. Under these circumstances a speedy economic recovery to prevent a repetition of this process was an attractive goal for both the military and the civilian side of government. The other side of this coin, however, was that in order to help this recovery the military had to learn to trim their sails. In some Western European countries this consideration led to frictions (Brouwers, 1992). The military, after all, had to take account of what looked to them as a Soviet superiority in conventional arms. Still, the idea to give economic recovery priority as the best defense against the Soviet threat was instrumental in launching the Marshall-plan.

The Americans - including the military - expected the Western Europeans to defend themselves. To attain this goal, a healthy economy and a stable society would be helpful.

Military and civilian authorities did not only deliberate on the amount of money to be spent on the economy and rearmament. Several others issues can be mentioned. Among them one will be singled out here, because it formed a direct link between the experiences of the war and the possibility of a Soviet attack. In the 1930s large-scale inundations were prepared in the Netherlands in order to stop a German advance before it reached the heart of the country. After the German attack on Poland, these inundations were put into effect, a military measure that forced the government to evacuate thousands of people to other areas in the Netherlands. This measure, calling for close cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, caused many private inconveniences, but was concluded rather smoothly. What had not been foreseen, however, and for which consequently no preparations had been made, was the evacuation in May 1940 of the Royal family, the Cabinet, the national gold reserve, top civil servants, parts of the armed forces, etc. In order not to be caught unprepared a second time, elaborate measures were planned as soon as the Soviet threat became apparent.

This time, Great Britain was not selected as the destination. First, because this country was thought to lie within the grasp of the Soviet forces. Second, because a government-in-exile should (ideally at least) not operate from foreign soil. As an alternative the West Indian islands were chosen—Dutch territory and conveniently close to the United States. Initially, the evacuation was planned on a truly grand scale. Tens of thousands of people were placed on priority lists—from the members of the Royal family to captains of industry. At the same time it was thought necessary to prepare for the reception of (perhaps hundreds of thousands of) Germans, who were expected to flee westward in case of a Soviet attack. To these refugees many Dutchmen would no doubt be added. These people on the run would pose both a humanitarian and a military problem, as they would spread panic, claim scarce resources, and hamper military movements. Clearly these problems asked for more than simply a Dutch approach. Soon, however, these grave concerns ebbed away. The military frontier of the Western alliance was shifted eastward, from the river IJssel to the inner German border. It was hoped now to absorb a Soviet attack on German soil without triggering a mass exodus. Even more importantly, the idea of a full-scale conventional confrontation in Central Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact receded into the background. It was hoped to deter aggression with the aid of thermonuclear weapons. Against this background, it should cause no surprise that the evacuation plans were given less and less attention, while the preparations concerned an ever-smaller number of people (Teitler, 1992).

4.   Decolonization, Insurgencies, and CIMIC

The first wave of nationalism that swept over the Western colonies hit South-east Asia. The ease with which the Japanese had taken over the British-, French- and Dutch-controlled territories had much to do with the strength of these revolutions. Another reason of course, was that the colonial masters simply intended to return to their possessions and put the clock four years back. Having promised independence to the Philippine people, the United States was spared the turmoil of a nationalist revolution (though the successor state had to contend with communist and Muslim-separatist uprisings). The return to colonial rule was, incidentally, a rather disorderly affair. The allies had reckoned with a long struggle to the death of Japan and its sudden surrender in August 1945 caught them by surprise (Teitler, 1990). As a matter of fact, the over-extended British, but also the Dutch and the French, were not yet ready at that time to take over their colonies. Most civil servants still had to return from prison camps and were often too exhausted after their experiences there to directly take up their pre-war responsibilities (De Jong, 1986). Others, however, had been recruited and trained during the

war in areas that had escaped occupation. For them *Civil Affairs* sections had been formed as part of the allied armed forces. Still, their numbers were inadequate to cover all that was suddenly asked of the civil service. To make matters worse, the colonial societies with their business firms, plantations, clubs, associations, schools, churches, and hospitals had been completely destroyed by the Japanese. So, the situation found by the allied military in South-east Asia was utterly different from the one they had encountered in Western Europe.[7] Compared with the latter area, the British, French and Dutch colonies were clearly in need of a much stronger input, for a longer period of time, by the military in the reconstruction of the economy and society.

This situation was intensified by the fact that these colonies were almost at once confronted by nationalist and/or communist revolutions. The insurgents availed themselves of several political and military tactics to reach their goals. Guerrilla warfare was among them, but did not play an equally prominent role everywhere. It is worth noting that in the French and British colonies - Indo-China and Malaya -, where the revolutionaries were dominated by communists, guerrilla warfare was more important than in Indonesia. Here the insurgents were mainly nationalists (with a rather strong leaning towards Islam), who sometimes ruthlessly dealt with their communist rivals. It is too easy to attribute this difference to the communists drawing their inspiration from the example and writings of Mao Zedong. Such an explanation ignores the many political, cultural and economic differences between the colonies in question. Be that as it may, the Dutch were the first to feel compelled to grant their opponents independence. Their national resources were smaller than those of their French and British colonial colleagues. Besides, their opponents - not being tainted by communism - were as future rulers of Indonesia acceptable to the Americans (McMahon, 1981). After all, the United States had not hesitated to hand the Philippines over to what it saw as a comparable political movement. The Dutch were unable to withstand this pressure, to which many other countries beside the United States lent weight. By 1949 Dutch colonial rule was over. This outcome at least spared them the exhausting years the French had still to go through in Indo-China before they too were forced to leave South-east Asia. Even the British in Malaya did not escape this outcome in the end. Still, of the three Western European colonial powers only the British left of their own free will. So, in the end, all three colonial powers had to grant their colonies independence. It was the road they went that differed, and it was this difference that mattered in the context of civil-military cooperation.

The importance of CIMIC for counter-insurgency can hardly be overrated. This proposition, moreover, retains relevancy beyond of the de-colonization process. The Cold War brought many other instances of counter-insurgency and in each of these CIMIC (or its absence) played a key-role in determining the outcome of the struggle. This cooperation is what has been called the *hearts and minds campaign*, since the British counter-insurgency in Malaya (Stubbs, 1989). The idea behind this campaign is simple. It is the reverse of Mao Zedong's famous dictum that guerrilla fighters need the help of people in their theatre of operation - for food, shelter, sometimes for weapons, always for intelligence. So, counter-insurgency should aim to sever this link. This can be done in two complementary ways. The first belongs to the strictly military domain. By constant and aggressive patrolling with very small units, the enemy is forced to be constantly on the move. To accomplish this feat these units will have to surpass, or at least equal, the guerrilla fighters' ability to live, move and fight in inhospitable regions. In this way the insurgents become the hunted party, a condition that prevents them from contacting the local population. Without intelligence, food and shelter, their situation is one of increasing vulnerability. Eventually, there is for them no way out of this predicament. They can, of course, try to escape from their pursuers by retreating into ever more peripheral wastes. There, however, they are cut off from support and cannot hope to attract new recruits. The insurgents are doomed here to ineffectiveness and will eventually simply whither on the

vine. The second way to deal with guerrilla fighters is to convince the local population that their future is not well served by the insurgents. When this message comes across the insurgents will receive less and less help and they will be forced to take what the locals used to give them of their own free will. Inevitably, the local population will resent this robbery and will be even less inclined to exert themselves to help the insurgents. In the end, the result is the same as with the military counter-insurgency: the enemy is cut off from his supporting base, a condition in which he cannot survive for long.

So, in any insurgency the Achilles heel of the revolutionary movement is its relationship with the local population. All efforts by the government forces should be directed at separating these two entities. To this end, they will have to wield both the stick and the carrot, and while civilian authorities cannot contribute much to the use of the (military) stick, the military can be of help when it comes to using the carrot. A hearts and minds campaign is essentially an attempt at winning over the local population. To be sure, not all of the government measures taken to this end will be popular at first. It can be deemed necessary, for instance, to resettle the rural population. First, in order to offer them better protection; second, to control their food supply and supervise the way they are dealing with their surpluses. Such a resettlement programme can cause a lot of trouble to the peasants, and it will take time, ample resources and convincing arguments to smooth the way. What is also needed is close cooperation between the military and civilian agencies involved in this project. A hearts and minds campaign can only succeed when the insurgents can be kept at a distance and are not allowed to disturb the process by using violence against local dignitaries.

So, protection by the military is called for, at least until the time when the villagers can be trusted enough to be given arms in order to look after their own security. It is imperative to reach this point in time as quickly as possible. After all, binding the military to the stationary defense of villages and rural towns is a waste of scarce resources. Once they can leave the protection of these objects to the local inhabitants, they are free to enter guerrilla territory and try to make it unsafe for the insurgents. The hearts and minds campaign itself should be a mixture of a social and political programme (aimed at redressing grievances) and simple community work. In the latter category fit the introduction of medical services, housing projects, educational and other public facilities, including infra-structural works (such as roads, bridges and dams). Especially important, moreover, are projects aimed at the regulation of food supplies and the improvement of police services. The first project serves a dual purpose. First, it should end social inequalities (in this way giving the lie to guerrilla propaganda). Second, it should deprive the insurgents of an easy source of sustenance. The police, finally, should realize that they occupy a key position in counter-insurgency. They must try to become fair and incorruptible in their dealings with the local population. Only then will they be able to gain the trust of the locals and gather the intelligence on which the military depend for their successes.

A hearts and minds campaign should bring the military into close cooperation with civilian authorities, both public and private. To implement it wholeheartedly and flexibly has proven, however, to be a rather difficult task. Even the British, who take pride in having ended the Malaya insurgency in this way, have not always been equal to the task on later occasions as was shown in Kenya, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland (Mockaitis, 1990). Still, one feature of their Malaya campaign should be stressed here. It concerns the pre-eminent position the British assigned to the civilian side in CIMIC-relations. No doubt this arrangement reflected their administrative and political history. It should not come as a surprise then that other countries, France, for instance, or the United States, did not automatically follow this line in their hearts and minds campaigns. Nor, as a matter of fact, were they inclined to pay the same amount of attention to this campaign in their counter-insurgency doctrines as the British did. To be sure, after the classic success in Malaya it is difficult to completely ignore the impor-

tance of a 'hearts and minds' campaign. However, more often than not, this attention amounts in practice to little more than paying lip service. In this context, the French experiences with CIMIC in the Algerian war are especially instructive.

From the beginning, the French military dominated this relationship, a situation that contributed little to the successful conduct of counter-insurgency (Paret, 1964). In the end, moreover, some radical elements in the military establishment even adopted the view that they alone knew how to counter the threat of the communist (as they labeled all nationalist) insurgents. This view led to a belief in the necessity of a counter-ideology, without which the West could not hope to withstand the communist assault (or its lure). Furthermore, these radicals convinced themselves that the French society - in their eyes on the brink of moral degeneration - ought to be saved from itself. The military, in other words, had the sacred duty to act as guardians of a society that had lost its moral vigour. Inevitably, this kind of reasoning led to a *perverse kind of CIMIC*, in which the military aspired a political role. Another point to note is that in this way the military vented their frustration with a war they could not win, an outcome for which they held not themselves, but society and politics responsible. After all, in their view these entities had failed to give them their full support. After first neglecting *low level* CIMIC, the French military radicals in Algeria finally opted for a *high level* variant. They staged a coûp and for a short time ruled Algeria by *military government*. Fortunately, this perversion of CIMIC has no general relevancy. It can only be understood against the background of two phenomena. First, the West was - according to the French radicals - not fighting the Cold War vigorously enough and, then, there was the peculiar French tradition of the military to see themselves as the saviours of a nation that was often indifferent to its own true interests.

The United States tried to use Civil Affairs in Vietnam. Various programmes were developed, all in line with the idea that by supporting and protecting the local population, the guerilla movement would find it harder to operate successfully. In general these programmes did not achieve their aims. There were two major reasons for their lack of success. First, the U.S. Army cooperated with the South Vietnamese armed forces in these programmes. The South Vietnamese military moved the programmes on too fast and were prone to corruption. Second, the U.S. Army decided to deploy their battalions at full force, including artillery support, even for Civil Affairs activities. At one point, to measure the success of their operations, the U.S. forces used a 'body count,' which sometimes led to indiscriminate killing of the South Vietnamese population in order to destroy the guerilla movement. Obviously, these kinds of actions did not increase the popularity of the U.S. armed forces or the South Vietnamese government with the South Vietnamese people. Consequently, this kind of CIMIC did not diminish the role of the Communist guerillas and was a failure (Krepinivich, 1986).

In the context of the history of CIMIC it is interesting to see that the Americans used a new approach. During World War II, Civil Affairs was run by the military only. In Vietnam, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps worked together with civilian American government organisations, such as the (American) Agency for International Development (AID).

5.   CIMIC and the Post-Cold War Period

At the end of World War II and during the Cold War civil-military cooperation took place in preparation of, during, or after a war in which countries were directly involved. In the period after the Cold War, CIMIC took place during peace support operations, basically post-conflict operations. In these cases, the military were (initially at least) no party to the conflict and acted as a neutral. In as far as they resorted to violence they did so more in a police than in a strictly military capacity. They were therefore bound to the use of minimum force, guided in this by rather restrictive rules of engagement.

The end of the Cold War and the success of international cooperation in the liberation of Kuwait offered a positive outlook on conflicts around the world. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, in his 'Agenda for Peace,' used the cooperation in the Security Council to strive for more efforts at resolving these conflicts.[8] Boutros Ghali's proposal spurred new types of peace support operations. Previously, peace support operations were mostly about guarding the border between two nations that had been at war, as in the Sinai between Israel and Egypt or in Kashmir between India and Pakistan. The second-generation peace support operations generally took place within nations, and were aimed at helping to set up new democratic regimes, as in Cambodia or in former Yugoslavia. CIMIC became an important part of these operations, both within and outside NATO operations.

In addition to Boutros Ghali's policy initiative, CIMIC in its present shape has two more origins. The first additional origin lies with the American armed forces. They practised their form of CIMIC, Civil Affairs, during the liberation of Kuwait, and later in Northern Iraq. After the failure of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and the disturbing consequences of non-intervention in Rwanda, American Civil Affairs officers were again successful during Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti and IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia. When the United States government decided to diminish its contribution to SFOR, European NATO partners were also asked to participate in CIMIC activities (Heflebower, 1998).

Around this time NATO requested three European nations, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, to establish their own CIMIC capacity. The Netherlands decided to cooperate with five other countries in the region, among others Germany, Denmark, and Poland, which has recently resulted in the CIMIC Group North. Italy and the United Kingdom are still working on their CIMIC forces. Although never officially stated, it seemed that NATO's request for European CIMIC forces was the result of an American initiative. While the European nations in NATO were preoccupied with their 'peace dividend' (i.e. scaling down their defense budgets at the end of the Cold War), the United States government became worried about the divergence between American and European NATO forces. It spent more money on defence and, consequently, it had more troops and more technically advanced equipment. From the American perspective, it seemed also that in general the United States was more willing to commit troops to military operations than most European governments; troops which were consequently more battle-hardened. As a result, the United States government apparently decided they would do the full-scale operations, and the Europeans could do the resulting peace keeping operations.

The second additional origin of contemporary CIMIC was the experience Europeans gathered in peace support operations during the 1990s. For example, while the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps was deployed in Cambodia, supporting the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the then Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation visited the country. He was very impressed by the work of the Marines, and decided to give them 500,000 Dutch guilders (about 200,000 U.S. dollars) to develop local support projects, like building schools, hospitals, or roads (Ter Beek, 1996: 112). These funds – the so-called *Potje Pronk* (Pronk's Money Box), named after the Minister - were available to the Marines and Dutch Army during later peace support operations as well. The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, for instance, used funds from 'Potje Pronk' during Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq and during Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti. Spending this money wisely and as effectively as possible, the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps gathered even more experience in the CIMIC aspects of peacekeeping.

Originally, the post-Cold War United Nations peace support operations were founded on the voluntary cooperation of the parties involved in the conflict and the nations that contributed military personnel to the UN peace keeping force. This explains why the intervening military forces took a neutral stance. They were there only to restore and to keep order and peace. The

parties directly involved in the conflict were supposed to have agreed on a willingness to achieve peace. In this context CIMIC was helpful in establishing economic and social foundations for a new society, by giving aid to setting up new roads, bridges, schools, and hospitals. At the same time, local military commanders had to deal with local government, and cooperate when possible. While during previous periods CIMIC meant taking over some or all tasks of local government, in recent years it has all been about working together with local government.

It soon turned out that few operations would run according to this scheme. In Cambodia in 1993, one of the parties, the Red Khmer, decided not to participate in the agreement they had helped to set up, making future arrangements more difficult to attain. In Angola in 1992, in Rwanda in 1994, and recently in Sierra Leone, the parties that had signed a peace treaty did not adhere to it, and this resulted in a new conflict. Problems also arose when nations that participated in United Nations peace keeping operations showed less commitment than expected. Another issue was that risk assessments were not always accurate, which resulted in missions that proved to be more difficult than expected or prepared for.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had been Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations in 1992 and 1993, after which he became Under Secretary General in this job until he was elected Secretary General in 1997. To address the problems during these operations, Annan had reports written on the disasters during the United Nations operations in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Wanting to improve the United Nations record in peace operations, Annan had a panel under chairman Lakhdar Brahimi write a report with recommendations. In this so-called Brahimi report it was suggested, among other things, that the Secretary General and his staff be given a more central role in these operations. Simultaneously, member states of the United Nations were asked to show more commitment to peace operations.[9]

While the United Nations organization tried to get better at peace operations, nations have recently begun recently to act more through regional organizations, with the consent of the United Nations. The Organization of African States tried to deal with the civil war in Liberia; NATO occupied Kosovo and established a provisional government there.

As referred to above, NGOs were most of the time active in the regions where the peace support operations were to take place. Cooperation between the military and NGOs often went smoothly at a tactical level, especially when some of the local parties did not believe in a peaceful solution of the conflict. What was more problematic was that NGOs among themselves, and NGOs and the national governments who had sent peace support forces, did not talk or agree on the means and ultimate goals of the peace support operation. Military forces involved in the peace support operations often defined their success in terms of establishing and keeping order and peace, not so much in solving the conflict as such.

6.   Conclusion

The concept of civil-military cooperation refers to an essentially one-sided relationship. It regards the ways in which military personnel aid civilian authorities to fulfil their duties. The converse relationship is not covered by the concept. In this case, civilians assist the military with activities ranging from logistical support to irregular warfare. This assistance is left out of the discussion here. CIMIC is a one-sided affair for at least two reasons. First, because the civilian side of the relationship is clearly in disarray. Second, because the military have at their disposal some of the expertise needed to rectify this situation. Moreover, it is necessary to stress that the civilians do not exclusively belong to the group of public servants at the various levels of government. Representatives of private organizations are at least as important. After all, without the activities of industrial firms, commercial organizations, clubs, churches, political parties, etc. no civil society will function properly. Consequently,

the military should do well not to look for CIMIC-partners exclusively in the public realm. Representing their governments, the military sometimes too easily focus their attention on whom they recognize and value as civilian colleagues. Understandable as this tendency perhaps may be, the military should be wary of neglecting (or even cold-shouldering) civilians from the non-governmental sphere. In the long run this policy - intentional or not - harms the prospects of reconstruction, which is after all the aim of CIMIC.

In this context yet another point should be stressed. Beside its one-sidedness CIMIC is in principle characterized by 'self-destruction'. When they perform their role properly, the military will in the end make themselves superfluous. Their job is not to stay and become indispensable, but to leave the troubled area as soon as possible. They should, consequently, grab every opportunity that might hasten their departure. Cooperation with representatives of the private sector can very well be one of the means to accomplish this. Economic recovery, for instance, is sometimes not properly looked after by government officials. In that case, the military do well not to exclude private businessmen from their range of local contacts. Finally, it is noteworthy that in a few instances *CIMIC* can be a misnomer. The concept presupposes the presence of civilians, able and willing to enter into relations with the military. This presence, however, is not self-evident. Sometimes, the breakdown of government and society is almost complete, leaving the military no civilian counterpart with which to start a fruitful cooperation. Another possibility is that able civilians are present but, because of their links with organized crime or a criminal régime, are unacceptable for CIMIC. Under these circumstances the military cannot avoid standing in for the missing or unsavoury civilians. When there is no one to co-operate with, there is no substitute for *military government*.

The last few years CIMIC has turned out to be an indispensable instrument in the tool kit of *peace support operations*. The preoccupation with these missions and the many problems they give rise to, has sometimes led to the view that CIMIC is a quite new phenomenon. The popularity among students of international relations and strategy of the concept of *failed states* (and of *failed cities*) has added to this view. After all, over the past few hundred years states have shown an unmistakable tendency to centralize and grow. Failure and disintegration of states seem to be recent developments, and this conclusion is without much further consideration extended to CIMIC. The magnitude of the problems accompanying peace support operations should not lead us to believe, however, that these phenomena were unheard of in the past. To be sure, every stage in the development of states, societies, and international relations brings forth its own peculiarities. CIMIC now will be different from what it meant to former generations. Still, it is important to realize that the relevancy of the concept is not confined to the last few years. On the contrary, CIMIC can boast rather deep roots, and it will certainly do no harm to see our present-day problems in the light of past experiences and problems. Some historical knowledge about these matters is indeed indispensable to arrive at a better understanding of what CIMIC can and cannot do. Without this knowledge one can easily ask the wrong questions or concentrate on the wrong issues. It is only natural that in the course of the twentieth century the importance and exact meaning of CIMIC have undergone several changes.

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1   Admiral Smith quoted in Dutch Army Publication, Operational Staff, Chief of the Army, Section Lessons Learned, CIMIC, Publication no. 7: p. 3, January 2000

2   The United States armed forces work with the concept of Civil Affairs, which will be dealt with later.

3   For the NATO definition, see: http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mc411-1-e.htm.

4   For the consequences of peace support operations on the combat readiness of military personnel, see: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 'Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services vary', May 1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-69, to be found on the website of the U.S. Government Accounting Office (www.gao.gov).

5   For a more extensive debate of the strategic dimension of contemporary CIMIC, see: R.V.A. Janssens, 'Strategische Belangen bij Vredesoperaties: Politici, Militairen en Hulpverleners en hun rol in CIMIC' [Strategic Interests in Peace Support Operations: Politicians, Soldiers and Aid Workers], in: *Marineblad*, 2000 / 4: pp. 138-144, and R.V.A. Janssens, 'De Koninklijke Marine en CIMIC: Nieuw en Vertrouwd', [The Royal Netherlands Navy and CIMIC: New and Familiar], in: *Marineblad*, 2002 / 1: pp. 11-16.

6   This, too, is dicussed in detail in the later volumes of *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog* [The Kingdom of the Netherlands during World War II].

7   For the situation in South East Asia: S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War against Japan, Vol. V. The Surrender of Japan* (London, 1969), Part 3, E.A.C. in the Post-War Period (August 1945 - November 1946): pp. 223-375.

8   See: http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html.

9   For the Brahimi report: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, August 17, 2000, http://www.un.org/peace/report/peace_operations.

On the Conditions for CIMIC during Humanitarian Operations

[*NL-ARMS*, 2002: Chapter 3]

M. Bollen, **R. Beeres**

1.   Introduction

In July 1994 the world watched as approximately 2.3 million Rwandans spilled over the Zairan and Tanzanian borders in a human migration reminiscent of biblical times. On the other side of the globe Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims viciously battled for ethnic dominance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Soon thereafter, in yet another part of the world, Chechens and Russians launched endless, gruesome attacks at each other. At the end of the decade hundreds of thousands of Kosovars fled their hometowns for fear of President Milosevic' Serbian militias. Almost overnight cities bustling with life like Pristina, Pec and Prizren turned into ethnically cleansed ghost towns.

During the last decade of the 20th century upsurges of intense animosity among many of the world's five to eight thousand ethnic groups induced large-scale human suffering and, severely disrupted social, political and economic structures and relations with the afflicted regions. In the beginning of the 21st century the intrastate conflicts seemed to be rooted deeply throughout all layers of society. They occurred between the population groups with different identities living together in the same regions. For this reason these conflicts are referred to as identity conflicts. According to UNHCR up until the mid-nineties the world-wide number of refugees totalled between 13 and 15 million. During the same era it was estimated that the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) lay between 10 and 24 million (Frerks, 1998). Although from the mid-nineties onwards these numbers have been declining, there is still a remarkable difference with previous times. In the 1970s, for instance, UNHCR estimated the number of refugees to be 2.5 million (U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1995: 3). As a result of the identity conflicts during the 1990s, the number of complex humanitarian emergencies soared. From the mid-nineties onwards the international community has become increasingly aware that in order to deal with the consequences a wide spectrum of resources and a multi-faceted response are required. Amongst others, this has brought forth new linkages between differing and non-traditional partners, such as civilian humanitarian organisations and international militaries who have been pulling together on humanitarian operations.

In spite of positive results, civil-military cooperation during humanitarian operations has been controversial from the onset. One of the reasons underlying this controversy may be that both sets of partners seem to be highly aware of the cultural, political and motivational discontinuities between them. Civilians, for instance, have argued that the use of military units in support of humanitarian operations and peace renewal is really a contradiction in action. The use of armed force, they believe, simply reinforces the notion that coercion is necessary as a means to settle disputes. Also, aid-organisations have expressed their fear that in collaborating with the military, the latter may try take over control, which may lead to a situation in which humanitarian goals are subordinate to the pursuit of political and military objectives. As a consequence, they may prefer to keep the military at arm's length during humanitarian operations. In line with the above, some humanitarian organisations have been strongly advocating a clear line between military and humanitarian responsibilities. At a press

conference in Skopje, April 9th, 1999 a spokesman of 'Médecins sans Frontières' (MSF) stated:

> Although heavy logistical assistance by NATO has been useful, NATO is first and fore-most a military organisation, currently involved in the conflict and not a humanitarian actor. NATO is neither responsible nor able to co-ordinate humanitarian relief activities, nor should it be.

Meanwhile, among the military, there are some who have voiced the opinion that intermingling with civilians may cause the military to get involved too deeply in humanitarian operations and may in fact promote mission-creep (Janssens & Visser, 1999: 5-99). Confronted with civilian operational cultures, many representatives of the military disapproved of the lack of coordination and the absence of unity of command in the humanitarian field. According to them, relief workers tend to act in an undisciplined way, seem to be accountable to no one and seem to have little regard for military rank and hierarchy. Moreover, in the perception of the military the activities of many relief agencies seem to be strongly driven by their need for publicity, rather than humanitarian goals only.

More than a decade into multi-actor humanitarian operations, civilian and military parties alike still seem to be divided on matters of civil-military cooperation, which may put the effectiveness of civil-military alliances at risk (Gordenker & Weiss, 1993: 1-12).

This paper focuses on three questions. Firstly, what causes civilian actors and the military to cooperate? Secondly, is civil-military cooperation limited to specific areas and, finally, how to decide to which civil-military alliances time and energy should be devoted?

Section 2 describes an episode of the repatriation of Kosovar refugees during operation Allied Harbour in 1999. In this section we point out some of the collaboration processes that have developed between the military and civilian actors within the Emergency Management Group (EMG). In addition, we present some examples of failing civil-military cooperation. Next, in section 3 we discuss some conditions for civil-military cooperation to occur and we describe some of the characteristics of civil-military alliances. Section 4 focuses on the ways in which specific kinds of military contributions may influence the need for prolonged cooperation from the civilian actors' perspective. In section 5 we provide some notes on how to decide which civil-military alliances are important to enter into. Finally, section 6 summarises the findings of the paper.

2.   Civil-military cooperation on repatriation during operation 'Allied Harbour'

From March until May 1999 international militaries and aid organisations collaborated to provide accommodation for hundreds of thousands of Kosovar refugees spilling over the Albanian borders. Throughout the country hundreds of camps and collective centres were built. In July 1999, as the first author of this paper interviewed the Canadian assistant chief of staff G9 at AFORHQ, many of these camps had already been deserted. Ever since Kosovo-Force (KFOR) was deployed in Kosovo, refugees had gathered their belongings and hurriedly left for home. In their wake, many NGOs closed up their activities in Albania and left the camps to follow the refugees.

The consequences of this spontaneous repatriation thwarted the goals of the Albanian authorities and the remaining aid organisations. Firstly, almost all sites had been looted and valuable resources, such as generators and medical supplies and equipment designated by the Albanian authorities for the Albanian people, had vanished overnight. It was assumed that they had either been taken into Kosovo or else were being traded on the black market. Secondly, the security situation in the camps had seriously deteriorated. Nobody seemed to be

able to guarantee the safety of the refugees that stayed behind. Thirdly, representatives of UNHCR worried about the safety of refugees en route to Kosovo.

According to the government of the host country and UNHCR, repatriation should take place in an organised way under the auspices of the UN, supported and protected by AFOR. Following the request of the government and UNHCR, AFOR-military assigned to the transportation desk of the Emergency Management Group (EMG) in collaboration with the Albanian Ministry of Transport planned staff and transportation needed to repatriate the Kosovar refugees in an organised and safe way.

According to the Canadian CIMIC officer at AFORHQ, never before in the history of Albanian railroads trains had been known to keep to their schedules as punctually as they seemed to be doing now. The general euphoria about this was dampened only by one problem. There turned out to be almost no refugees to board the trains. So far, in spite of the meticulous planning, the organised repatriation seemed to be missing its point. According to the Canadian officer this might be caused mainly by the military's lack of humanitarian expertise:

> The military have too little humanitarian expertise. (...) We don't know how the refugees think. We know now they don't want to be repatriated by train, because they are not on the trains. We are good at logistics. Never before have the trains in Albania kept to their schedules. We planned transit points at Mjede. That is convenient, because of lots of open space for the buses and trucks to park. No refugees showed themselves. Apparently, they want to be near a town when boarding a train. Mjede is no town. Also it appears they need more room for their stuff. On the trains there is no room.

To compensate for this lack of humanitarian expertise the Canadian officer suggested that instead of devoting lots of time and energy into planning and talking to high-ranking officials, the military should focus on cooperation with civilian relief workers and local authorities. According to him, civilian actors at the operational level only know about the actual living environment and needs of the refugees, because they live and work under the same circumstances:

> Civil-military planning of activities is a problem. AFOR relies on higher policy levels for assessment, but the trouble is, you can only find out what is needed by talking to the people on the ground. Talking with representatives from Geneva is of no use. They are too far away from reality.

From the observations of the Canadian officer, it may be concluded that during repatriation within the EMG civil-military cooperation between AFOR, UNHCR and representatives of the Albanian government had taken place. These collaborating parties were agreed on the absolute priority of organised repatriation. They felt that in this way the interests of both the Kosovar refugees and the host country were best protected. The Kosovar refugees, on the other hand, who did not participate in this alliance, seem to have perceived reality from a different perspective altogether. In their view, organised repatriation would have meant they would have to stay in the camps for a longer time, whereas they would only be allowed to take a limited amount of luggage. Therefore, they preferred to arrange their own means of transportation and leave whenever it suited them best.

Interaction between the EMG transportation desk and representatives of the refugees or the supporting NGOs did not exist. As a result, staff at the transportation desk were not aware of the refugees' perspective on repatriation, nor were they able to anticipate on the refugees' courses of action. This, in its turn, frustrated the interests, motives and needs of the parties involved in the EMG-interface, who were getting increasingly annoyed with the behaviour of refugees and the NGOs that supported them.

Another consequence of the lack of interaction between the parties involved in spontaneous versus organised repatriation was the deterioration of the relationship between the transportation desk and the WFP. In spite of the fact the refugees were making far less use than expected of the appointed facilities, members of the transportation desk of the EMG held on to their initial planning. As a result, they had to reject many requests for logistical support by WFP. Meanwhile, the empty trucks waiting in vain for the arrival of refugees did not escape the attention of the WFP-officers, who perceived reality from yet another point of view. Due to the shortage of transport facilities their feeding pipe lines to Kukes were becoming endangered. Since the refugees had rented most commercial means of transport, the WFP became increasingly dependent on military support. According to the WFP-officers the transportation desk at the EMG was "virtually run by AFOR". Therefore, they were holding AFOR responsible for their troubles at Kukes:

> In the beginning AFOR gave a lot of help. Ever since the organised repatriation started, however, they have rejected many requests for transport capacity. I don't understand why AFOR is this pigheaded. They have the capacity for moving 3,000 people a day. They are only moving 800. That means they have capacity to spare for food transports. The thing is, they want to stick to their planning, even though their trucks are empty.

According to the officers of the WFP the military were not fully committed to their job of supporting the aid organisations. They felt the military were bureaucratic and unable to change their planning, even if reality dictated change. The CIMIC-officer at the EMG transportation desk was getting increasingly irritated. Although in the first weeks he praised the WFP for being 'the best international organisation'during repatriation, he complained about the lack of understanding and the single-mindedness of representatives of the UN food organisation.

During operation Allied Harbour there were many instances in which civil-military co-operation was considered a success by both sets of partners. However, the actors involved varied widely with respect to their motives, interests and the goals to be achieved. Because of these discontinuities, multi-actor cooperation was to a large extent dependent on the actors' expertise in conflict management. To complicate matters even more, due to the dynamic context of the operation the demands for help shifted considerably over a short period of time.

In order to be able to fulfil the demands for receiving and accommodating refugees, different sets of actors with different skills, expertise and knowledge are required than those needed in case of repatriation or rehabilitation of affected area in the host country. As a consequence, alliances that may have been appropriate during one phase of the operation are not necessarily identical to those needed in subsequent phases.

In the following section we discuss some of the causes and characteristics of civil-military alliances.

3.   On the causes and characteristics of civil-military alliances

Civil-military cooperation does not occur naturally. The military and civilian organisations represent different interests and are backed by different resources. Besides, both sets of parties will be differentiated in terms of power. Because of discontinuities such as these, alliances between the military and civilian organisations will be conflictuous by nature (Long, 1989).

By no means does civil-military cooperation constitute an exception with regard to other interorganisational alliances. Sociologists introduced the concept of *antagonistic co-operation* to describe one of the more prominent characteristics of interorganisational relationships. With it they refer to interorganisational processes that occur notwithstanding the many conflictuous elements between fundamentally differing parties. Based on this view, interorgani-

sational alliances will be viable to the extent that the cooperating partners are able to recognise and accept their differences and conflicts of interest (Lammers et al., 1997).

The questions arise as to why civilian actors and the military may decide to cooperate and by what characteristics these alliances can be described. In their study on interorganisational cooperation Pfeffer and Salancik have introduced the *resource dependency perspective* (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). According to these authors organisations that are either dependent on the same resources or else are sequentially connected may decide upon a strategy of collaboration to strengthen their position in the market and to increase their independence with regard to suppliers or competitors in their line of business. Whether interorganisational cooperation will indeed take place also depends on the attendance of potential partners and on the market share of the lead-organisations in a specific line of business.

According to their theory, civil-military cooperation will occur to the extent that both sets of organisations are dependent on the same scarce resources. Secondly, for cooperation to take place the parties should be sequentially connected. Thirdly, a sufficient number of potential partners –neither too few, nor too many- should be present. Usually, at the beginning of a humanitarian operation, there will only be a limited number of humanitarian organisations present. Often, they will lack the coping capacity needed to solve the problems. Therefore, at this stage the military may be regarded as indispensable partners. Finally, in a situation in which their market share enables the leading organisations to control the market, cooperation would not be deemed necessary, since these organisations would consider themselves to be highly independent already. However, in the early stages of a humanitarian operation even institutional pillars in the humanitarian field such as the UN-organisations and influential NGOs seem to lack sufficient means and methods to deal with the consequences of humanitarian disasters on their own. Therefore, fourthly, civil-military cooperation will be facilitated when the market share of the leading organisations in the field is tending towards the average.

During humanitarian operations there are many instances in which civilian organisations and the military alike are depending on the same scarce resources. For example, both sets of parties may need drivers and trucks in order to distribute relief goods, to move patients to a hospital or to relocate refugees. By cooperating on transportation, not only may both sets of parties be able to reach their goals but also synergetic effects may enable them to do so even sooner.

There are also occasions in which civilian organisations or the military depend on their partners' output in order to be able to perform their own jobs. For instance, due to the deterioration of the security situation NGOs may be dependent on the military to protect their food convoys. In order to provide appropriate protection the military in turn may feel the need for additional information on indigenous groups to be supplied by the NGOs.

It can be concluded, firstly, that any civil-military alliance will to some level be characterised by interdependency with regard to reaching the goals. In line with this characteristic, Mijs (1987: 48-61) states interdependency will only result in interorganisational cooperation, under the condition that the partners to the alliance are aware of their interdependence. In other words, this author distinguishes between a kind of objective interdependence –obvious to all the world- and more subjective feelings of interdependence. Only when both sets of parties are able to actually recognise their interdependencies, will actions towards cooperation be taken.

Secondly, in civil-military alliances both sets of partners will be aware of their mutual dependencies. An example was provided during camp construction in Albania. UNHCR and UNICEF were highly dependent on military support to be able to shelter the refugees. At first, the military constructed the camps according to their own military standards. From the perspective of the UN-aid organisations the 'long rows of tents' lacked communal spirit,

child-friendly spaces, etc. Only after consultation with UNHCR and UNICEF, did the military become aware of the sort of camps refugees needed. From that moment on, according to a representative of UNICEF, civil-military cooperation on camp-construction turned out to be a success:

> The help from the military was necessary to increase the shelter capacity. Once we explained the standards they followed them accurately. We secured an arrangement that all new camps would have child friendly spaces, education and recreation, social services and mother and child health care available. A Dutch officer designed playground materials, went into Durrës and got the designs made. I'm sure that if the refugees had stayed over winter, there would have been many more projects like that.

During humanitarian operations the civilian and military parties involved often have little or no previous experience with collaboration. Although the awareness of certain interdependencies may result in tentative alliances, cooperation itself may generate another kind of dependency upon the unknown partners' cooperating behaviour. In other words, collaboration with a relatively unknown partner will increase uncertainty. In order to decrease high levels of uncertainty the partners' behaviour has to become more predictable to some extent. Clearly defined domains are one way by which representatives of the partner-organisation become more predictable. A domain is defined as 'the organisation's locus in the interorganisational field, including its manifest goals and its channels of access to task and maintenance resources' (Warren, Rose & Bergunder, 1974).

Domain consensus constitutes the third characteristic of civil-military alliances. By way of domain consensus both sets of partners are able to define more or less clearly the issues on which they may cooperate and the limits to their shared endeavours as well as the ways in which tasks and responsibilities are to be divided.

Next to interdependency and domain consensus, civil-military structures should be characterised by yet another element to be able to cope with the consequences of humanitarian disasters. Webb (1996: 288-301) suggests the magnitude of a crisis and the importance of trust are positively linked, because of the substantial levels of uncertainty that each crisis appears to evoke. Moreover, crisis conditions increase the chance of cognitive and organisational errors. Dependency on others is greater during crises and with that dependency go premiums on determining trustworthy people and trustworthy coping methods. Civil-military alliances should be characterised by trust, because only when a certain level of trust has developed may civilian and military partners dare to depend on one another in situations entailing risks.

Based on the above, we suggest civilian actors and the military will form alliances because, taken on their own, both sets of partners lack the coping capacity to reach their goals. To bring this about, first of all, a sufficient number of potential partners should be available and the market share of the leading organisations should tend towards the average. Moreover, civil-military alliances should at least be characterised by interdependency for achieving their goals. Secondly, civilian and military partners alike have to be aware of their interdependencies. Because the partners to the alliance usually have no former experience in working together, measures will be taken to increase the unknown partner's predictability. Therefore, thirdly, civil-military alliances will be characterised by a certain level of domain consensus. Finally, in order to cope with high levels of uncertainty and dependence induced by crises, mutual trust is needed to be able to take level amount of risk.

In the following section we discuss the coherence of these characteristics from the point of view of civilian actors and their effects on civil-military alliances.

4.   Limitations to civil-military cooperation

According to the Oslo Guidelines military assets are deployed "to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged gap between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them" (UNDHA, 1994). Thus, many are agreed that the use of military assets to assist in the humanitarian sphere is designed to supplement, rather than supplant the work of traditional humanitarian agencies.

Minear and Guillot (1996) have stated that from a functional standpoint military assets can make three major kinds of contributions. Firstly, the military can work to foster a protective framework of overall stability within which civilian populations are protected and humanitarian activities are carried out. Secondly, the military can support the humanitarian organisations with logistics, personnel, engineering, security advice, etc. Thirdly, the military can carry out relief activities themselves, often referred to as *civic action.*

During the field research of the first author in Albania in 1999 representatives of international aid organisations argued the armed forces (AFOR) were engaged in yet another kind of contribution, namely the organisation and coordination of humanitarian activities.

Deployment of the military in order to foster security and protection for civilian populations and humanitarian organisations is generally regarded to fall within the military domain. Civilian actors seem to be aware of the importance of some level of safety and stability to be able to perform their humanitarian tasks. Military protection will often be accepted, for, when faced with violence, the coping capacity of civilian organisations in general fails to meet the requirements and there seems to be little doubt about the military expertise in this area.

The same can be said about military tasks involving the support of humanitarian organisations and the governments of host countries. As we explained in the previous section, during the early stages of the humanitarian operation civilian aid organisations and the authorities in host countries usually are in great need of additional military support. Therefore, many civilian actors stress the importance of a timely military presence. As at this stage of the operation both the military and civilian actors seem to be aware of their interdependencies some level of domain consensus in these two areas of contributions can usually be reached.

However, domain consensus should not be mistaken for a change in attitude towards the military, nor should it be confused with trust, in the sense of fostering positive feelings about the partner's organisation. As studies among relief-workers in Tuzla and Haiti in 1997 have shown, most relief-workers recognised the need for arms to protect themselves and the local population, but at the same time refused or were not able to carry out these tasks themselves (Miller, 1997). Although they accepted the deployment of the military in order to ameliorate the security situation, they did not change their negative attitudes towards the military on the job. This paradox is explained by the concept of *dirty work.* By transferring the necessary but dirty work to the military, relief workers were able to think positively about the use of military support to guarantee safety and protection. At the same time they could adhere to their negative opinions about the military personnel performing these tasks and the organisation they represented.

Based on the above, it can be assumed civilian actors may want to keep on cooperating with the military as long as they feel the need for protection and additional support.

As the humanitarian operation continues, the specific demands for support may change, and the number of civilian aid-organisations usually increases. Both changes in demand and support appear to affect the earlier dependence on additional military resources. As the need for civil-military cooperation seems to be mainly demand-driven, civil-military alliances may cease to be of much use from a civilian point of view, when the military are not able to adapt soon enough to the changing context (supposing the security situation does not deteriorate).

Military deployment on the other hand, is a political matter. To end a military mission decision-making processes at political levels are required. To complicate matters, political considerations may not always be in step with the situation in the humanitarian field and besides, political decision-making may take any amount of time. As a result, in situations when their civilian partners no longer seem to have much use for them, military commanders in the field may find themselves faced with serious problems in keeping their men and women employed. It is at this point that the military may take recourse to projects in the field of civic action.

As a rule, civilian aid-organisations will be critical of military initiatives in civic action. Firstly, according to many civilian actors, supplying direct aid traditionally belongs to the domain of humanitarian organisations. Thus, by providing direct aid the military may be viewed as trespassing. Secondly, moreover, the military are often regarded to be lacking the necessary humanitarian expertise to do the job properly.

In an interview held in Tirana in 1999 a relief worker of Merlin described the way in which the American military and Merlin clashed on the degree of medical care needed in camp Hope. According to her, the army doctors wanted to provide the refugees with medical care around the clock. In her opinion, however, such standards were unheard of in this part of the world and besides the refugees were not used to such care at home. Moreover, the suggested standard of medical care in the refugee camp contrasted sharply with the state of the Albanians in neighbouring villages, which fuelled their feelings of animosity towards the Kosovar refugees. The relief worker stated that whereas cooperation with the military on camp construction had been useful, they obviously lacked the humanitarian experience needed in relief programmes.

Thirdly, many civilian actors object to the military's reluctance to timely transfer their services to NGOs or local institutions before their mission expires. Civilian aid organisations will even be opposed to the military extending their own facilities for medical or dental care to the refugees or the local population, because, according to them, the continuation of such facilities cannot be guaranteed.

Fourthly, military initiatives on civic action may be regarded as unfair competition to NGOs. Even more so, when the military are believed to make use of financial resources from the same donor organisations the NGOs depend on. Finally, many civilian organisations are convinced that contributions in the area of civic action keep the military from performing their core-business, such as apprehending war criminals, confiscating illegal arms and protecting civilians.

From a military point of view, however, civic action is believed to create goodwill with the population and local authorities. This may increase the level of acceptance of the military presence at local level, which in its turn may have positive effects on force protection. Moreover, due to the nature of the small-scale projects the military are able to intermingle with the local population or even with refugees. Direct contacts of this kind often seem to have bolstering effects upon the motivation.

Military initiatives in crisis management may be even harder to digest for many civilian organisations. For one reason, by lending a hand to the management of the crisis the military may be regarded to be attempting to make policy instead of restricting themselves to a supporting role only. Military involvement with the coordination and organisation of the operation are likely to evoke high levels of distrust. Civilian actors may suspect the military of trying to take their responsibilities away from them, which adds to their fears that their humanitarian approach to problem solving may become jeopardised by military planning and logistics. In an interview the office-manager of the WFP remarked:

> In Albania there was no coordination on the side of the government. That is because
> AFOR played such a prominent role in the EMG. Instead of supporting functions only,

AFOR was also into policy-making. They took over responsibilities from UNHCR. UNHCR were planning with the government for voluntary repatriation, but AFOR had already set up a logistical plan. They just took the initiative away from UNHCR and we all saw how that worked out.

Military involvement in crisis management is viewed as cutting through the historical roles of the UN-organisations responsible for the refugees and the coordination of humanitarian activities. In line with this, representatives of UN-organisations may fear that close contacts between the military and the government of a host country on crisis management will have a negative effect upon their own influence with these authorities. The fact that host country authorities often have an axe to grind, which at some point may become contrary to the interests and goals international aid organisations strive at, only adds to this anxiety.

The lack of confidence in the military's motives for involvement in crisis management, compounded by the fears regarding their own position, will prohibit many civilian actors from admitting to any dependency on military support in this field. As a consequence, even when civilian actors are complaining that the lack of effective coordination and control interferes with their working methods and goals, this does not mean civilian organisations will accept military initiatives to fill the gaps.

From a military point of view playing an active role in crisis management by organising or coordinating relief activities may accelerate the operation as a whole, thereby promoting the chances of success of the humanitarian operation. Besides, by participating in the management of the crisis, the course of the humanitarian operation may become more predictable. As a consequence, the military may be better able to anticipate on the demands for their support, which may improve the effectiveness of the military mission.

In summary, without the – awareness of - interdependence, domain consensus and trust, civil-military alliances will not be viable. The extent to which these characteristics will develop in civil-military alliances seems to be dependent on two conditions. Firstly, the humanitarian operation can be distinguished in different phases, during which demands for help and the influx of civilian agencies may shift considerably. As a consequence, interdependencies will fluctuate. Secondly, the kind of contributions the military engage in during the operation can either inspire or impede the development of trust. From a civilian point of view military initiatives in the fields of civic action and crisis management will often prohibit the development of interdependence and domain consensus. It is to be expected that in these areas civil-military alliances will be severely impeded. On the other hand, as long as the military concentrate on protection and the assistance of civilian actors, while adhering to a facilitating and supportive role, many civilian organisations will be in favour of cooperating with them and will continue to do so. In the next section we look into some ways for deciding the kind of alliances that are important.

5. Some contextual notes on how to decide which alliances are important

Up to this point we have spoken of civil-military alliances as though they consisted of basically two sets of parties, namely civilian actors and the military. In practice, however, the situation in the humanitarian field is far less homogenous. For instance, NGOs vary widely with respect to their grass-roots ideologies, their operating cultures and the motives and interests they represent. Some NGOs are non-governmental indeed; others are to a large extent supported by governments and public authorities (Aall, 1996). Despite the fact that during the nineties the humanitarian relief industry grew into a booming line of business there are also limits. Although the increase in humanitarian operations has raised the demands for NGOs, they are mostly employed in the same target sectors, such as transport and logistics, camp construction, basic medical care and hygiene. In other words, many NGOs find

themselves on overlapping domains. As a consequence, competition among the various NGOs is not an unknown phenomenon. In combination with their diverging goals and interests, this has resulted in turf battles, complicating the sharing of information and coordination of humanitarian activities.

Throughout the nineties, UN-aid organisations have faced serious problems concerning the tuning in of their responsibilities. Coordinating the various demands for assistance and sampling or distributing of information among members of the UN-family has proved to be extremely difficult. In order to improve the UN reaction to humanitarian disasters and other emergencies that surpassed the coping capacity of any single agency, in 1992 the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was established. However, in 1996 the UN was again criticised sharply for their response to the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda. Amongst others, they were blamed for their lack of coordinating power and for the uncooperative attitude UN-organisations adopted towards each other (Steering Committee, 1996). In July 1998 the Office superseded DHA for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). According to the Albanian authorities, however, getting the UN-organisations to share their information during operation Allied Harbour, still proved to be 'one of the major problems in managing the crisis'[1]. From the above it can be concluded that with regard to civilian actors also, interorganisational cooperation does not seem to come naturally.

The multitude of interests, motives and objectives civilian actors strive at, may make it difficult for the military to decide which partners they should form alliances with. Usually, those alliances will be considered important that will best satisfy the needs for additional resources and complementary expertise, decrease the costs and risks of the parties involved, as well as offer possibilities for economies of scale and scope (Nohria & Eccles, 1992). These conditions will bolster the collaborating partners in their perception of being partakers of a win-win situation. A situation such as this is, by definition, beneficial to the inter-organisational network as a whole.

However, civil-military alliances are not only about the job that has to be done. They are also about representatives of different social environments coming into contact. In fact, many of the problems that arise between sets of civilian and military partners seem to be hardly task-related at all. Instead, they seem to arise from different sets of cultural, political and normative values that are mirrored in diverging motives, goals and views on humanitarian operations. Once the emergency job has been done the pressure on performance lessens and civil-military partnerships become less task-oriented. At this point actor-related discontinuities between both sets of partners may become more visible, causing at least one of the parties to reconsider the desirability of prolonging the concerted action. Therefore, in deciding which alliances are important to reach humanitarian goals, it might be advisable to take both task- and actor-related aspects into account.

For instance, before embarking on an international humanitarian operation the military generally assess the emergency situation from a task-oriented perspective. Based on these assessments, the military may plan the deployment of personnel, materials and reinforcements. Another outcome of such an assessment, however, might be an actor analysis of the key players in the humanitarian field. Actor analyses should not only focus on the specific demands for military support, but also on the key actors' approach to the operation, their strengths and weaknesses, their motives for participating and on the ways in which they set about to reach their goals. Based on the outcomes of actor analyses the military may gain an insight into civilian expectations regarding the military role and behaviour, enabling them to anticipate on the cooperative intentions and attitudes towards the military support. Based on these actor analyses the unknown partners may become more predictable, which in its turn may enable the military to foresee potential problems in the field of cooperation and to timely adapt to these problems.

6. Conclusions and recommendations

During humanitarian operations there are many instances in which civilians and the military are dependent on one another in order to reach their goals. Both sets of parties will decide to cooperate as long as they assume cooperation to be in their mutual best interest. However, as a result of structural fundamental differences between the military and their civilian counterparts alliances are bound to be fragile. Taken on their own, interdependencies generate too few safeguards to shield the collaborators from hidden agendas, self-interest or from their partners' opportunistic behaviour.

1. Great importance should be attached to the transparency and accessibility of civil-military alliances to all partners. Therefore, structures for civil-military cooperation should be located 'outside the wire'.

Interdependencies for achieving their goals, the awareness of these mutual dependencies, a certain level of consensus concerning the humanitarian and military domains as well as a certain level of trust are characteristic of civil-military cooperation processes. At the beginning of a humanitarian operation the lack of resources and supporting structures, compounded by threat, time pressure and massive human suffering may intensify the awareness of the dependency on the military for additional support and protection. Likewise, on the military side there appears to be a need for additional humanitarian expertise.

2. From a civilian point of view cooperation with the military is especially useful during the early stages of a crisis. Therefore, civil-military cooperation will benefit from a timely presence of the military mission that has complementary assets and expertise at its disposal.

After the emergency situation has been dealt with and some level of stabilisation sets in, civilian actors may become aware of the fact they are growing less dependent on the military for achieving their humanitarian objectives.

3. Civil-military alliances appear to be essentially demand-driven. During the different stages of the operation demands may shift considerably. From a civilian perspective, cooperating with the military will cease to be of use when their military partners are not able to timely adapt to these changes.

Civil-military alliances are focussed on getting the job done. They need to work together to achieve shared goals. Therefore, interaction will be primarily task-oriented. However, at the same time, civil-military alliances consist of partners coming from different environments. At some point, shared goals are reached or else have become obsolete due to context shifts. As a result the task-oriented interaction may become less intensive. This may prevent civilian and military partners from experiencing shared positive outcomes. Hence, the level of trust may diminish, thereby hindering the partners to deal with actor-oriented discrepancies.

4. Without intensive interaction, the extent to which partners to the alliance will foster positive expectations about each other will decrease. As a result, they may not be able to accept their actor-related differences as being natural and legitimate. However, if from the initial stages of cooperation onwards, civilian partners and the military were willing to make an effort to also meet after work, interaction in social settings might help to overcome problems caused by temporary lapses in task-oriented cooperation.

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Notes

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[1]   Interviews conducted by Bollen with Mr Islami, special coordinator to the EMG, and Mr Mile, head of the EMG repatriation cell, Tirana, July 1999

Viable Cooperation in Civil-Military Relationships

[*NL-ARMS*, 2002: Chapter 4]

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1.   Introduction

During the last decade of the 20th century civil-military cooperation became a characteristic of humanitarian operations. In spite of positive results there are many instances to show that good working relationships between civilian and military actors do not come about naturally (Bollen, 2002). The complexity of civil-military relationships may account for the strenuous collaboration between civilian and military actors. This complexity stems from the following set of characteristics (Bollen & Vogelaar, 2000: 41-54):

Context-related characteristics.
The context of humanitarian operations is dynamic by nature. During the first stages of humanitarian operations, only a limited number of international humanitarian organisations are present. Often these organisations are not able to cope with the complex demands for help. The authorities in the host country usually lack the capacity to deal with the consequences of receiving and sheltering large numbers of refugees. However, during later stages, after the initial emergency situation has been dealt with, demand for and supply of help may change radically. Some degree of stability may set in and usually resources and (infra)structural support become more easily available (Frerks, 1999).

Organisational characteristics.
Civil-military alliances are temporary and cannot be coordinated by hierarchy. Representatives of both types of organisations differ in operating cultures, views on leadership, decision-making processes and the degree of autonomy on an operational level. Both sets of partners may question the appropriateness of working together (Wolfson, 1997: 43-52).

Task-related characteristics.
During the various stages of a humanitarian operation, i.e. the stages of reception, accommodation, repatriation and rehabilitation of affected area) the primary activities vary. Different humanitarian tasks require different sorts of expertise. Adding to the complexity are differing degrees of time-pressure and levels of interdependency between civilian and military co-workers, the non-routine nature of the tasks and their perceived importance (Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996: 166-196).

Actor-related characteristics.
Civil-military interfaces are between partners who differ materially from each other. Apart from the goals they may share temporarily, they strive for different targets and are backed by different resources. Besides, both sets of partners are differentiated in terms of power. Because of discontinuities such as these, alliances between the military and civilian organisations are discordant by nature. Both trust and distrust in the partner's behaviour can manifest themselves at the same time (Long, 1989; 1999; Lewicki, MacAllister & Biest, 1998: 438-485; Winslow, 2001: 525-534). Moreover, the various groups of civilian actors appear to be divided amongst themselves about the appropriateness of collaborating with the military and about their motives for asking military support (Minear, van Baarda & Sommers, 2000).

The complexity due to this set of characteristics may lead to the premature dissolution of civil-military alliances. By this we mean that the alliance falls apart before both sets of partners have reached their shared humanitarian goals. In one way or another the civil-

military network has to remain *viable* for as long is necessary to reach the joint goals. Therefore, in order to achieve the mutual humanitarian goals, the complexity has to be effectively and efficiently distributed among the participants of the interorganisational civil-military network.

The **Viable System Model** (VSM) offers a framework for diagnosing and (re)designing the distribution of complexity in order to ensure the viability of an organisation. In order to remain viable, an organisation must have the potential to both adapt and realise the primary activities that constitute its identity (Beer, 1985; 1990; 1995). This potential, crucially, depends on the realisation of five interrelated functions. According to Beer, these five functions are necessary and sufficient for the viability of an organisation.

In this paper we have adopted the VSM to analyse the viability of an interorganisational civil-military network in the context of a humanitarian operation. More in particular, we will assess the viability of civil-military collaboration in the case of the operation Allied Harbour (1999), using the VSM as a template.

To this end, the remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. In section two, VSM is described, and, more in particular, the five functions required for viability and their inter-relatedness. Section three discusses civil-military cooperation processes that took place during operation Allied Harbour between the NATO-military forces and the authorities of the host country, the representatives of UN-aid organisations and NGOs. We will compare the reality of civil-military cooperation to the standards provided by VSM and identify potential problems that may thwart the viability of civil-military networks. In section four we will assess the viability of civil-military cooperation during operation Allied Harbour. Finally, section five presents a summary of the findings of the paper.

2. The VSM: functions and relations for viable cooperation [1]

In order to achieve the mutual humanitarian goals, military and civilian actors have to be able to form temporarily viable structures for cooperation. In this section we will describe the five functions, and the relations between them, that account for the viability of a civil-military interorganisational network

Function 1: primary activities

Function 1 consists of the collection of primary activities of a viable system. These primary activities constitute the system's *raison d'être* (Espejo et al., 1996: 110). For example, if the raison d'être of a civil-military network is to receive and accommodate refugees in the host country, its collection of primary activities can be providing shelter, food and water, basic healthcare and transportation. In the VSM each of the primary activities collected in function 1 is modelled to be a viable system. This means that each of these primary activities contains the functions needed for viability. This principle is called *recursion*.

The civil-military network that provided reception during the first stages of the humanitarian aid to Kosovar refugees in Albania in 1999 may serve as an example of recursion. The network as a whole (the first level of recursion) consists of four primary activities: reception, accommodation, repatriation and rehabilitation of affected area. Each of these primary activities (the second level of recursion) can be split up into tasks. For instance, the civil-military network concerned with reception, may be involved in the following tasks: safety and protection, registration of refugees, transport, construction of camps and camp management. Each of these tasks (the third level of recursion), in turn, may be split up into teams (the fourth level of recursion) with their own primary activities. Each level of recursion should both have the self-regulating capacity to adapt to developments in its particular environment and remain a part of

the larger viable whole. The freedom of the parts (e.g. safety and protection, registration of refugees) is constrained by the synergy of the whole (e.g. the network concerned with reception as a whole). In this way, the VSM not only deals with functions at one level of recursion but it also pays attention to the relations between different levels of recursion.

The existence of a collection of primary activities as such is insufficient to maintain the viability of the civil-military network. The primary activities need to be forged into the larger whole of the network. For this purpose, four additional functions are required: coordination, control, intelligence and policy.

Function 2: coordination

In a civil-military network primary activities may depend on shared resources, such as people, materiel, expertise and know-how, or the output of other primary activities. This dependency on shared resources makes the primary activities interdependent. In this case the allocation of these particular resources to a project in the primary activity 'reception' may require the revision of the allocation of these same resources to a project in the primary activity 'accommodation'. Without a function that supports the coordination of these interdependencies, both primary activities may become entangled in a process of oscillation between allocating and revising the allocation of these drivers and trucks to the various projects. It is the task of function 2 to prevent these oscillations. Function 2 facilitates the coordination of interdependencies between function 1-activities. Examples of function 2-activities are the design and implementation of shared civil-military planning systems, or the introduction of a language to discuss coordination problems in terms of the set of primary activities.

Function 3: control

The primary activities and coordination are necessary. However, they are not in themselves sufficient for the viability of a civil-military network. Each primary activity can still pursue its own goals without contributing to the realisation of the identity and strategy of the viable system as a whole. For this reason, Beer distinguishes a function that ensures *synergy* between primary activities. This function is called control. Its task is to translate the goals of the viable system (e.g. of the civil-military network as a whole) into goals for the primary activities (e.g. reception, accommodation, repatriation and rehabilitation) and to monitor the realisation of these goals. In this way, control takes care of the contribution of the primary activities to the realisation of the identity and strategy of the viable system. Control has three instruments to perform its task. First, it gives direct commands and receives direct reports from the management of the primary activities. Second, control can audit the management of the primary activities. The aim of these audits is to become aware of the problems the management of the primary activities face and to help to solve them. Third, control ensures the synergy of the primary activities by controlling the coordination effort by function 2.

Control not only focuses on the realisation of the identity and strategy of the viable system by its primary activities; it is also involved in the adaptation of its identity and strategy of the viable system. Because of control's knowledge about the modus operandi and problems of the primary activities, its second task is to review proposals for innovation produced by the intelligence function (see below) and to assess whether these proposals can be realised given the potential for change of the primary activities. To this purpose, control is involved in a continuous discussion about the feasibility of proposed innovations.

Function 4: intelligence

Functions 1 to 3 are necessary for the realisation of the identity and strategy of viable organisations. However, they still are not sufficient to guarantee organisational viability. To be viable also means to be able to adapt and to make adaptation possible, a fourth function is

required: intelligence. It is the task of intelligence to scan the environment of the civil-military network for relevant developments and to initiate adaptation in such a way that the primary activities stay aligned with them. For instance, usually the first stages of a humanitarian operation are referred to as the emergency situation. After the emergency situation has ended, most refugees will be sheltered and looked after appropriately. As a result, there is no longer a need for building refugee camps. The demands for help will change. Instead of a need for 'hands' there may now be a demand for specialist know-how, such as engineering. Intelligence should anticipate on contextual changes such as these, pick up any new developments, assess them and, if relevant, translate them into proposals for change.

Function 5: policy
Adding the intelligence function seems to complete the list of functions required for the realisation and adaptation of a viable organisation's identity and strategy. According to Beer, this is not the case. The reason for this is the specific focus of the control and intelligence functions. Control focuses on the *realisation* of identity and strategy of the organisation, while intelligence focuses on initiating *adaptation*. If the interaction between control and intelligence is not coordinated, three problems may occur. First, interaction is not sufficiently intense. Proposals for change are not assessed in terms of the organisation's potentials for change. Both the realisation and adaptation of the organisation's identity and strategy may grind to a halt. In the other two problems interaction between control and intelligence is intense, but one of the functions dominates the other. When intelligence dominates control, the organisation runs the risk of 'innovatism'. Innovative products or technologies are proposed and introduced that do not match the potential for change of the primary activities. For instance, the introduction of high-tech means for administration to centralise the distribution of humanitarian aid may not match with the way in which humanitarian workers carry out their primary activities in the camps. In the end such a domination of intelligence might even lead to the neglect of primary humanitarian tasks. When, on the other hand, control dominates intelligence, the organisation runs the risk of 'conservatism'. Proposals for innovation are rejected because of an obsession with current engagements and the projects in hand. For instance, the military may stick to their planning based on earlier stages of the humanitarian operation, even if reality dictates a change. To counter such problems, the VSM proposes a final function called policy. Policy has the tasks of co-ordinating the interaction between control and intelligence and consolidating its results in a (re)definition of the identity and strategy of the civil-military network. The identity and strategy of the civil-military network should fit developments in the environment as well as its potential for change. Policy completes the list of functions necessary and sufficient for viable cooperation.

Relations between functions
The VSM not only describes the functions needed for viable cooperation. It also describes the interactive relations that should exist between the functions and the characteristics these relations should have. For instance, the interaction between control and intelligence should be continuous, intense, balanced and detailed. Or the direct commands and reports between control and the primary activities should come in regular intervals and be aggregated.
From the perspective of their relations, the five functions of a viable system can be divided into *two* groups.
The first group, primary activities, coordination and control, deals with the *realisation* of the civil-military network's identity and strategy. Table 1 summarises the relations between the functions in this group (columns 1 and 2). Furthermore, it lists the requirements for interaction in terms of frequency, detail, standardisation and focus (columns 3 to 5).

Related functions	Relation	Frequency	Detail	Standardisation	Focus on
Control – Primary activities	Direct commands and reports to and from primary activities	Regular intervals	Low	High	Management by exception of synergy of primary activities
	Audits of primary activities	Irregular intervals	High	Low	Creating awareness of and finding solutions to problems of primary activities
Control – Coordination	Monitoring and control of coordination by control	Regular intervals	Low	High	Contribution to overall synergy by coordination
Coordination – Primary activities	Coordination of interdependent primary activities	Continuous	High	Low	Supporting interaction between primary activities

Table 1:   Relations between the primary activities, coordination and control

The second group, control, intelligence and policy, deals with the *adaptation* of the network's identity and strategy. This group of functions attempts to keep the civil-military network aligned with expected developments in its environment (Espejo et al., 1996). The relations between the functions in this group are summarised in Table 2.

Related functions	Relation	Frequency	Detail	Standardisation	Focus on
Intelligence – Control	Generating finalised proposals for change	Continuous	High	Low	Balancing and integrating proposals and potentials for change
Policy – Intelligence and Control	Balancing contributions by intelligence and control	Continuous	Low	Low	Supporting interaction between intelligence and control
	Consolidating proposals for change	Irregular intervals	Low	Low	(Re)defining the network's identity and strategy

Table 2:   Relations between control, intelligence and policy

The two groups are linked by *control,* which forms part of both groups. In the group that is responsible for adapting the civil-military network's identity and strategy, control reviews

proposals for change made by intelligence from the viewpoint of the capacity for change of the primary activities. In the group that focuses on realising the network's identity and strategy, control concentrates on synergy between the primary activities. In the next section we apply the VSM to analyse the viability of civil-military collaboration in the case of operation Allied Harbour (1999).

3. Civil-military cooperation in 'Allied Harbour'

3.1 Background

In the night of March 24 1999 NATO launched the first of a series of intense air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this way NATO aimed at putting a quick stop to the hostilities committed against the Albanian ethnic minority in Kosovo. By the end of the month the Kosovars fled en masse to Albania. The huge influx of refugees posed serious problems for the Albanian government, as a consequence of which the authorities in Tirana formally requested international support to cope with the refugee crisis.

On April 16 the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) commanded the execution of the humanitarian operation *Allied Harbour* and commissioned Lieutenant General John Reith (COMAFOR) to command the international NATO forces in Albania (AFOR). Initially, AFOR included 7,300 militaries from Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. (Apart from these NATO member states, the governments of Austria, Saudi-Arabia and the United Arab Emirates decided bilaterally to send military contingents for humanitarian support).

In his mission COMAFOR emphasised the need for full cooperation between the military and civilian actors in order to achieve the humanitarian goals of the operation. This emphasis on civil-military cooperation was in accordance with current NATO CIMIC policy. However, by the time AFOR was fully operational, the **Emergency Management Group** (EMG) had already been established as the main platform for the management and coordination of the humanitarian aid in Albania. Instead of establishing military-led CIMIC centres, COMAFOR decided to attach his CIMIC officers to the EMG.

The EMG can be seen as the facilitator of the cooperation between the various civilian and military organisations involved in the humanitarian operation Allied Harbour. In terms of the VSM it can be said that the EMG focused on the primary activities of the civil-military network as a whole, i.e. the first level of recursion. The EMG facilitated viable civil-military cooperation in order to realise and adapt the civil-military network's identity and strategy to the changing demands and supplies for help.

In order for the EMG to facilitate viable civil-military cooperation, it had to be clear about the primary activities of the civil-military network as a whole. The EMG divided the humanitarian operation into four separate stages: reception, accommodation, repatriation, and rehabilitation of affected area.

We assume these stages to be the primary activities of the network as a whole.

Reception.
As a direct consequence of a humanitarian emergency people take refuge in neighbouring countries. During this stage the authorities of the so-called host countries are faced with problems due to the 'registration and reception' of the refugees. In order to be able to receive the refugees, the host country's government and the NGOs present may apply for additional military support to the United Nations and international governments.

Accommodation.
Often the facilities in the host country may not suffice to accommodate large numbers of refugees over an indefinite period of time. During this stage the provision of additional 'shel-

ter, infrastructure and community services' is necessary in order to realise acceptable living conditions.

Repatriation.

When peace and quiet in their home country are restored the refugees are expected to repatriate. During this stage the authorities of the host country and the UN-aid organisations are concerned that repatriation take place in an 'orderly and protected way'.

Rehabilitation of affected area.

Governments of host countries attach great importance to the outcomes of this last stage of the humanitarian operation. During this stage the emphasis lies on the 'assessment and the compensation of the damage' the host country may have suffered on account of the reception, accommodation and repatriation of the refugees.

3.2 Purpose

In order to assess the viability of civil-military collaboration in the case of operation Allied Harbour the following subsections explore the viability of each of the civil-military networks concerned with reception (subsection 3.3), accommodation (subsection 3.4) and repatriation (subsection 3.5). This is because by September 1 1999, i.e. before the stage of rehabilitation had set in, AFOR's mission had terminated. During the fourth stage of the humanitarian operation NATO militaries were no longer involved in civil-military cooperation processes.

We investigate the extent to which the five functions of the VSM and the relations between them account for viable civil-military cooperation in Allied Harbour. We base ourselves on the experiences of both AFOR militaries and civilian actors regarding their collaboration during operation Allied Harbour. These experiences were collected by means of open interviews with 23 respondents (AFOR- 8; UNHCR- 2; UNICEF- 1; OCSE- 2; NGOs- 4 and representatives of the Albanian government- 3) in Albania in July 1999 (Bollen, 2002).[2]

Table 3 (overleaf, on page 38) presents an overview of the primary activities that can be identified within the stage of reception, accommodation and repatriation of operation Allied Harbour. It is worth noting that we only pay attention to the primary activities by civilian and military actors that were carried out in unison. The primary activities performed by either the military or the civilian actors of their own accord will not be assessed in terms of their viability (see the dark grey-coloured boxes in Table 3).

3.3 Civil-military cooperation during reception

In this subsection we explore the viability of civil-military cooperation in the network concerned with reception. To this purpose we interpret the opinions of civilian and the military concerning their collaboration for each of the five functions of the VSM.

Function 1: primary activities

During reception we distinguish the following collection of primary activities: transport of refugees, transport of food and non-food, construction, and camp management (see Table 3, overleaf on page 38). This collection of primary activities constitutes function 1 of the viable system 'reception'.

Transport of refugees

- (Civilian) Co-ordinator UNICEF:
    UNICEF has cooperated with AFOR on logistics and transport of refugees. Especially with the Dutch unit in Durres.
- (Military) Chief of Staff Dutch-Belgian CJTF-R:
    We accompanied convoys of refugees from Kukes in the north of the country to the camps in the south.

Primary Activities	Reception	Accommodation	Repatriation
Safety and protection	+ (host country)	+ (host country)	-- (host country)
Registration refugees	+ (UNHCR)	+ (UNHCR)	+ (UNHCR)
Transport refugees	+ (UNHCR, bilateral / AFOR militaries)	+/-- (UNHCR, AFOR)	Organised: + (UNHCR, AFOR) Unorganised: + (NGOs, refugees)
Transport food / non-food	+ (WFP, ICRC bilateral / AFOR militaries)	+ (WFP, ICRC bilateral / AFOR militaries)	Organised: -- (WFP) Unorganised
Construction (e.g. roadwork, infrastructure, refugee camps)	+ (UNHCR, UNICEF, bilateral/AFOR militaries)	+/-- (UNHCR, UNICEF, bilateral / AFOR militaries)	Not relevant (residue caseload winterisation)
Camp management (e.g. health, education, community needs)	+ (NGOs, WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR, bilateral / AFOR militaries)	+ (NGOs, WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR, bilateral / AFOR militaries)	+ (NGOs, WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR, bilateral militaries)

Table 3:   Overview of primary activities in the stages reception, accommodation and repatriation of operation 'Allied Harbour'

+   Task was performed during primary activity
--   Task was not performed during primary activity
+/--   Task performance gradually declined

Organised repatriation took place under the auspices of UNHCR and was protected by AFOR. Unorganised repatriation occurred when the refugees left the host country on their own initiative.

Transport of food and non-food
- (Civilian) Logistical officer WFP:

  WFP puts in requests for logistical support at the EMG-logistical desk. They check with AFOR if it can be done ... We got a lot of cooperation from the Dutch army. They were the most present AFOR partners. They participated in Durres in daily meetings. They gave out locations for transport. The Dutch army gave us the largest military support.
- (Military) Transport co-ordinator Dutch-Belgian CJTF –R:

  WFP is our main customer. From April 23 we have transported 3,000 tons of relief goods. The warehouses all over the country have been stocked. Contacts with WFP have run smoothly. Every other day we have a meeting on transport activities.

Construction
- (Civilian) Co-ordinator UNICEF:

  To increase the shelter capacity the military have been necessary ... At first the camps built by the military were unacceptable. We expected the refugees to stay for over a year. Those camps would not do at all.
- (Civilian) Relief worker IMC:

  Because the NGOs were not present at the beginning there was a need for military assistance in setting up refugee camps. They don't have the knowledge of setting up camps for refugees. They have no sense of community needs or refugees' needs. They build great long lines of tents, which prohibits any community spirit at all.

Camp management
- (Civilian) Relief worker Merlin:

  The NGO I work for has been mainly involved with medical work in the camps ... I have been working with the US army in the camps. They were good at camp construction and logistical support ...The army wanted much higher standards of medical services. They provided for doctors 24 hours a day. In this part of the world that is unheard of. It was simply not necessary. Whenever you don't agree with the military they will try to force their opinion.

In each of the primary activities during reception civil-military cooperation occurred. In the primary activities of transport of refugees and of food and non-food both civilian and military partners agreed that the collaboration was to their mutual benefit. In the primary activities of construction and camp management some problems occurred.

In construction, initially, standards about the layout of refugee camps were not available to the military. As a result, the first camps were not adequate to shelter refugees over an extended period of time. According to representatives of UNICEF and UNHCR, as soon as their organisations provided the military with standards on the layout of refugee camps, the military followed these standards accurately. In other words, the necessary coordination took place on the level of the primary activities itself. As for the militaries' involvement in camp management, civilian relief workers felt the military lacked the necessary humanitarian expertise. Amongst others this became manifest in the military view on health care that exceeded the refugees' needs.

Function 2: Coordination
During reception the primary activities depend on shared resources. Whereas it is to be expected that interdependence will be especially high between the primary activities transport of refugees and of food/non-food, during reception each of the primary activities had to cope with the resources that were allocated to them. For this reason, potential problems with regard to sharing mutual resources were not experienced at this time by the civilian and military partners. They focused on performing their 'own' primary activity in the field. However, at

another level, i.e. the civil-military network concerned with reception, perceptions with regard to coordination differ.

- (Military) Liaison Officer and security officer for the OCSE:
  Coordination between actors within the EMG was difficult. We did not know the location of the camps; neither were we aware of the exact numbers of refugees in the camps. The exchange of information between the aid organisations was troublesome.

We conclude that, whereas the primary activities in the field can be considered viable, the viability of the civil-military network concerned with reception was endangered by the lack of information needed for coordinating interdependent primary activities.

Function 3: Control

Control aims at the creation of synergy between the different primary activities. This means that control translates the goals of the civil-military network concerned with reception into targets for the primary activities and monitors the realisation of these targets. During reception the goal of the civil-military network was to provide approximately 250,000 refugees with instant relief. However, as the following opinions will make clear, this goal was not translated, in terms of direct commands, into operational targets for the primary activities. Therefore, shared operational targets were not available.

- (Civilian) Co-ordinator for the OCSE in the HIC:
  At the beginning we needed camps fast. However, the completion date of the camps built by bilateral troops was never met. There was too much luxurious Western-European refugee relief. That is why everything took so long. In the beginning, help was too limited and too fragmented. There was no cooperation.
- (Military) UK CIMIC-officer:
  I am with the EMG logistical and transport desk ... We have roadwork going on, but individual NGOs ask for connection roads between the highway and their camps, of which there are hundreds. They have no priority.

Without operational targets, the primary activities are operating almost fully autonomously. Thus, cohesion between them is hard to achieve. Synergy cannot develop, which in its turn may lead to sub-optimisation. Furthermore, from the first quotation above, it can be concluded that standards for coordination of the primary activities, the second instrument of control, were also lacking.

Moreover, the exchange of information from the humanitarian field to the control function, the so-called direct reports, was seriously impeded.

- (Military) German CIMIC-officer assigned to the HIC:
  I have tried to develop a database based on the information about what was brought into the country by whom. This has been very difficult because you can't command the NGOs to deliver information. They just don't report and are accountable to no one.

The third instrument of control is the auditing of the management of the primary activities in order to become aware of the problems the primary activities face and help to solve them. According to the chairman of the HIC, also a member of the EMG, audits during reception pointed at the following problems:

- *There was friction with humanitarian workers ... in places where the military set up their own camps. Security was too strict in the Austrian camp. They were not letting anybody in or out. Other camps were too modern. These people don't need round the clock military field hospitals. They are not used to that at home ...*

- *AFOR should have been clearer about the total mileage of road works they were going to construct. The road from Kukes to Tirana is not improved as much as they promised and the road from Durres to Tirana has not been started on yet.*

Although aware of the problems, control could not help to solve them. Apparently, it did not command the means to solve these interorganisational problems.

Finally, within AFOR some of the military were convinced they did not possess all the resources needed to cope with the reception of the refugees effectively:

- (Military) Transport co-ordinator Dutch Belgian CJTF-R:

  I think we are more of a combat unit than a humanitarian unit. Everybody is very much involved. But a humanitarian mission should consist of other resources. Instead of a battalion of Belgian Paratroopers we should have had three transport companies at our disposal... Now, only 120 soldiers on a total of 1,500 soldiers are available for humanitarian tasks.

This last quote points to the absence of an assessment of the demands for military assistance prior to the mission. This is confirmed by other Dutch militaries assigned to CJTF-R. As a result, during reception the control function was confronted with a goal that was not clearly defined, a lack of authority and information to command the primary activities and a shortage of adequate resources. We conclude that control could only contribute in a limited way to viable civil-military cooperation during reception.

Function 4: Intelligence

In order to be viable the civil-military network needs to be able to adapt to changing circumstances. Intelligence scans the environment of the civil-military network for relevant developments and to initiate adaptation in such a way that the primary activities stay aligned with them. Probably because of a lack of experience with humanitarian operations on this scale and scope, intelligence appears not to have been functioning effectively both at the level of the civil-military network as a whole and at the level of the primary activity construction.

- (Civilian) Co-ordinator of the OCSE at the HIC:

  Everybody was overcome by the rapid developments with regard to the influx of Kosovars into Albania.

- (Military) German CIMIC-officer assigned to the HIC:

  You could tell by the refugee camps that were constructed by the military without consulting the relief organisations first. There was too much luxury. The inhabitants of the camps could dispose of water and electricity, whereas the local population could not. As a consequence, the local Albanians' attitude towards the refugees turned aggressive. The military were not able to anticipate on these hostile feelings.

Function 5: Policy

Policy has the tasks of co-ordinating the interaction between control and intelligence and consolidating its results in a (re)definition of the identity and strategy of the civil-military network. From the above it has become clear that both control and intelligence could only make relatively small contributions to the viability of the civil-military network concerned with reception. Therefore, it can be expected that the amount of coordination of the interaction between both functions for viability has been limited. As a result, according to the military liaison-officer for the OCSE, the EMG was not able to perform its functions with regard to crisis management:

  There were three goals to be met. Firstly, the EMG was supposed to manage the crisis... Secondly, the EMG was supposed to coordinate the activities of the aid-organisations and

thirdly the EMG had to provide a platform where representatives of the host country government, donors, the military and the aid organisations could meet. Only with regard to achieving this last goal, can the EMG be considered to have operated successfully.

3.4 Civil-military cooperation during accommodation
Accommodation began by the end of April 1999. The numbers of refugees had stabilised, shelter had been provided and the civil-military network concerned with accommodation was getting used to the crisis conditions. In this subsection we explore the viability of civil-military cooperation in the network concerned with accommodation. Again, we interpret the opinions of civilians and the military concerning their collaboration for each of the five functions of the VSM.

Function 1: primary activities
During accommodation the collection of primary activities in which civilian actors and the military cooperate is essentially the same as during reception (see table 3). In order to explore the viability of the civil-military network concerned with accommodation, we look whether changes have occurred in the opinions of the military and civilian partners with regard to their cooperation.

Transport of refugees and (camp) construction
- (Military) CIMIC-officer at CJTF-R:
  Once the refugee camps were built and after we relocated the refugees from Kukes to the camps we had to beg for work with the aid-agencies. They were not desperate for our assistance any longer.

Transport food and non-food
No changes occurred.

Construction
Most camps had been completed by now and the attention was shifting towards road construction and the improvement of the harbour and airport facilities.
- (Military) Canadian CIMIC officer:
  The aid-organisations did not fully get what they asked for. They wanted far more engineers. NATO nations, however, are very stretched for these specialists. The pool is shallow… Our intent is to continue engineer support to Kukes road. The problem is, all is well for NATO to say, "we will do this", but individual nations can pull out any time they want.

Camp management
- (Civilian) UNICEF:
  The Dutch army in Durres designed playground materials. They went into town and got them made. I'm sure that if the refugees had stayed during winter many more projects like that would have been done. When they see the impact on refugees soldiers come up with very good ideas.

As in reception, in each of the primary activities during accommodation civil-military cooperation occurred. By now, the NATO military force was fully operational. At the same time, the number of civilian aid organisations present in the host country had increased drastically. Donors had provided these aid organisations with financial funding. The acute emergency situation had been dealt with. As a result, many civilian aid organisations felt they were able to cope with the demands for help without the need for military assistance. Secondly, it appeared that the military were not fully prepared for the changes in the demands for help. The demands had shifted from a need for 'hands' to a need for specialist know-how and expertise (e.g. engineering and transport). As a result, some of the military commanders were

faced with the problem of keeping their men and women occupied. Extending help to the Albanian population was sometimes regarded as a solution to this management problem:
- (Military) CIMIC-officer Dutch-Belgian CJTF-R:
  Suddenly you are faced with the problem of finding work for 1,500 men and women… From the beginning, the attention has been focused on the refugees. The local population is in need of practically everything. We need Civic Action money to be able to do something on behalf of the local population. The Dutch military did not have these budgets. With the financial aid from their government, our Belgian colleagues have revised two school buildings, a police station and a gas station. Despite our shortage of funds, we have tried to be of assistance on a smaller scale.

We conclude that some of the militaries in the civil-military network concerned with accommodation turned to other activities outside the network, instead of the (primary) activities they had come for in the first place.

Function 2: coordination
During accommodation the primary activities still depended on shared resources. During this stage the transport capacity needed for the refugees gradually declined. From now on this capacity would be used on behalf of the primary activity 'transport of food/non-food'. As mentioned above, due to the changes in the demands for help, civilian aid organisations were now in need of specialist military support. However, AFOR could mostly dispose of large numbers of infantry and cavalry unable to fill the need for engineering and transport:
In accommodation, the mutual perceptions about the partners' cooperative behaviour were beginning to diverge. According to, the civilian aid workers the military were unable to fulfil their specific demands.
- (Civilian) Logistical officer WFP:
  The army is for free, but the negative side is: you get no commitment, therefore, there is no reliability. They are bureaucratic, cannot change their planning fast enough if reality dictates changes; the destination to Kukes was very difficult because of the state of the roads. They bring along lots of troops, but they don't bring all the assets needed.
- (Civilian) aid-worker International Medical Corps:
  We did not need 7,500 troops. We needed 500 engineers and 500 transporters.
The military, on the other hand, complained about the lack of understanding of their civilian counterparts:
- (Military) U.K. CIMIC-officer:
  We have lots of infantry and cavalry available. They have helped building camps, schools and playgrounds. Now the demand is for engineers and chauffeurs, but those types of units are overstretched already. NGOs don't understand there are limits.
- (Military) U.K. CIMIC-officer:
  Over 90% of the logistical requests was met. We offered contracts for the rest, but that would not do. People remember the 10% and they complain.

We conclude that the lack of a common language and a collective vision on civil-military cooperation during the humanitarian operation now begins to make itself felt. As a result mutual irritation and frustration between civilians and the military emerge.

Function 3: control
During reception the information exchange between control and the actors in the field, by means of direct commands and direct reports, hardly developed. Essentially, everybody in the field was concerned with performing their own primary activity in their own way. During

reception this lack of information sharing did not yet hinder the parties from carrying out their primary tasks. During accommodation, however, the absence of information led to problems in the coordination of demands and supplies for humanitarian aid.

- (Civilian) Authority of host country:

  We wanted to build databases about the distribution of refugees over the country on behalf of local authorities. Also we wanted to have databases for customs to balance the needs and offer of humanitarian aid brought into Albania and databases about the way in which the aid was distributed over the country. It has not worked well, because it was difficult to get the information needed from the different organisations.

Moreover, after the emergency situation had been dealt with, the lack of shared goals and conflicting motives between the partner organisations became apparent at another level of the civil-military network: within the EMG.

- (Civilian) Authority of host country:

  The main problem within the EMG is the management of the different cultures between the aid organisations. Getting the organisations to share the information between them was next to impossible.

Instead of paying attention to improving the cooperation within the primary activities, the attention of control now shifted to improving efficiency of (secondary) processes that could be controlled more easily.

- (Military) U.K. CIMIC-officer:

  On the initiative of UNHCR and the Albanian government we have expanded the port. Until AFOR came in one to two ships a day could be handled. With our support this is now up to four to five ships a day.

- (Military) Dutch transport coordinator:

  Loading and unloading cargo in the harbour caused us major headaches. The Albanian bureaucracy had a crippling effect. We proposed some measures to improve the efficiency. Now things are running more smoothly.

Function 4 & 5: intelligence and policy

As in reception, intelligence and policy did not contribute to the civil-military network concerned with accommodation. As a consequence, changes in the environment could not be anticipated. They were only noticed when they actually occurred. For as soon as Kosovo-Force (KFOR) declared parts of Kosovo to be a safe place to return to, almost overnight the refugees embarked on their spontaneous repatriation. Confronted with large numbers of repatriates, the authorities of the host-country and UNHCR had to decide quickly on a plan for organised repatriation.

3.5   Civil-military cooperation during repatriation

By the end of June 1999 rumour had it that Kosovo was a safe place to return to. As a result, many Kosovar refugees gathered their possessions in order to return to their homeland as soon as possible. Amongst them there were many that decided to rent their own transport. Having arrived in Albania bereft of all their goods, the refugees wanted to take along the aid contributions they had received. Sometimes relief workers in the camps supported the refugees on their journey back home. At the same time, however, the Albanian authorities and UN-aid organisations attached great importance to an organised repatriation. Otherwise, the safety of the returning refugees and those staying behind in the camps could not be guaranteed. Besides, the Albanian government had planned on keeping some of the humanitarian goods such as machinery, generators and hospital appliances for the use of the Albanian people.

Function 1: primary activities

During repatriation we identified only one primary activity in which civilian actors and the military collaborated: transport of refugees (Table 3).

Transport of refugees

On request of the Albanian government the CIMIC officer assigned to the EMG transport and logistical desk was heavily involved in organising plans for repatriation. According to both representatives of UNHCR and the Albanian Ministry of Transport civil-military cooperation during planning was successful:

- (Civilian) UNHCR logistical officer:

    In repatriation it has been very useful to have military planning capacity. That saved us a lot of work.

- (Civilian) host-country:

    In the repatriation cell within the EMG AFOR has been helping UNHCR. We produced a repatriation plan together with UNHCR and AFOR. Cooperation with AFOR has been very successful. Together we handled 400,000 refugees and we are still handling them back to Kosovo.

However, not all the civilian actors agreed upon the success and the effectiveness of the civil-military cooperation during repatriation. For instance, representatives of the WFP, who were dependent on military support in order to distribute their food supplies, felt they were thwarted in achieving their humanitarian goals by the priority AFOR extended to organised repatriation.

- (Civilian) Coordinator WFP branch office Tirana:

    Instead of keeping to supporting functions only, AFOR is also in the policy-making function. AFOR takes over responsibilities from UNHCR. UNHCR were planning in the government for voluntary repatriation, but AFOR had already set up a logistical plan. They just took the initiative away from UNHCR. There is no consistency in promoting voluntary organised repatriation of only 600 people a day, whereas 15,000 a day are already repatriating spontaneously.

- (Civilian) Logistical officer for the WFP:

    In the beginning AFOR gave a lot of help. Ever since organised repatriation has started, however, they have rejected many requests for transport capacity. So now we are getting trouble with our feeding pipeline into Kukes. I don't understand why AFOR is this pigheaded. They have the capacity for moving 3,000 people a day. They are only moving 800. That means they have capacity to spare for food transports. But they want to stick to their planning of repatriation, even though their trucks are empty.

Function 2: coordination

By now, the use of transport as a shared resource had become a major problem. Civilian actors that were involved in other primary activities than transport of refugees, felt they were hardly supported by the military at all. According to these actors, the military had prematurely disengaged themselves from the alliance, whereas the need for additional military assistance was still high.

The problems concerning the use of shared resources were not solved. In the beginning of September 1999 AFOR's mission was formally terminated. According to some of the military this was too soon as there still seemed quite a lot of work to do.

- (Military) Canadian CIMIC officer AFOR-HQ:

    Now the civilians have a problem, because they do not know what is going to happen next. We do not have the answers. Our mission has run out. There is no definition yet about a next mission.

- (Civilian) UNHCR logistical officer:
  UNHCR has a rehabilitation responsibility. But that also regards civil-military co-operation. There is a need for military security; a merging of civil development and peace support, because peace is very fragile here. It can break down at local level by accident or by economic problems. We should find a NATO presence with another mandate.

4. Assessing viability of civil-military cooperation

In this section we use the VSM to assess the viability of civil-military collaboration in operation Allied Harbour, on the basis of the empirical material discussed in section three. Firstly, we assess the viability of the group of functions that support the *adaptation* of the civil-military network. Subsequently, we will we determine the viability of functions that support the *realisation* of the identity and strategy of the civil-military network.

The group of functions that support the adaptation of the identity and strategy of the civil-military network consists of policy, intelligence, and control. To keep the civil-military network aligned with relevant developments in its environment, intelligence and control generate proposals for innovations that redefine the network's current identity and strategy. Policy should facilitate and balance the interaction between intelligence and control and, finally, consolidate its results in plans for innovation

As our empirical data show, during the stages reception, accommodation and repatriation of operation Allied Harbour the functions concerned with adaptation were hardly performed by the civil-military network in any of the different stages (reception, accommodation and repatriation). At the same time, however, our data also make clear that the need to perform these functions did indeed exist. In the beginning, the partners neglected to form a collective identity and strategy for the civil-military network. A subsequent collective approach to the crisis was not developed. Without a collective identity and strategy it is difficult –even impossible- to scan the environment for relevant developments that might necessitate a redefinition of that identity and strategy of the civil-military network. As a result, the civilian and military partners could only run behind the environmental developments. Ultimately, the Kosovar refugees demonstrated their own skills in crisis management by organising their own repatriation before the civil-military network was able to plan for their journey back home.

Secondly, the group of functions supporting the realisation of the identity and strategy of the civil-military are control, coordination and the primary activities. The primary activities realise the (operational) goals derived from the civil-military identity and strategy. Coordination attempts to solve problems due to interdependent primary activities. To realise the identity and strategy of the civil-military network, control aims at maintaining the synergy and cohesion between primary activities. Its primary task is to translate the identity and strategy of the civil-military network into operational goals for the primary activities and to monitor and control the realisation.

In the primary activities we identified (transport of refugees, transport of food and non-food, construction and camp management) civil-military cooperation occurred frequently, often to the mutual satisfaction of both sets of partners. Whenever problems occurred, the tendency was to find solutions at the level of the primary activity itself. However, as our data show, there was hardly any interaction between the different primary activities. Coordination was impeded by the lack of information exchange. Finally, control had the impossible task of deriving operational goals from the civil-military identity and strategy for the primary activities. Impossible, as such an identity and strategy had not been formulated in the first place.

All in all, we conclude that whereas civil-military collaboration did occur, the civil-military network concerned with the stages reception, accommodation and repatriation of the humanitarian operation Allied Harbour was not viable. During operation Allied Harbour, the complexity was not distributed among the participants of the civil-military network. As a consequence, it was distributed among the participants of a collection of autonomous primary activities. At this level civilian and military partners had to cope with the complexity on their own.

5.   Summary and conclusion

In this paper we set out to assess the viability of civil-military collaboration in the case of the operation 'Allied Harbour' (1999). To this end we used the Viable System Model developed by Stafford Beer as a template.

We conclude that civil-military collaboration in operation Allied Harbour did indeed occur during the stages reception, accommodation and repatriation. However, the civil-military network was not viable. During operation Allied Harbour, the complexity could not be distributed among the participants of the civil-military network. As a consequence, it was distributed among the participants of a collection of autonomous primary activities. At this level civilian and military partners had to cope with the complexity on their own.

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Notes

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[1]   Section 2 is based on Achterbergh, Beeres and Vriens (2003).

[2]   These data were gathered to describe 'the ways in which collaboration processes [between civilians and the military in the case of Operation Allied Harbour] developed, the ways in which the unfamiliarity and the differences between the partners affected the alliances and the problems with regard to civil-military cooperation that were encountered' (Bollen, 2002: 248). The statements in the sections 3.3 – 3.5 are quotes (in italics) from these interviews.

Strange Bedfellows:
NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian Crises [1]

[*NL-ARMS*, 2002: Chapter 5]

D. Winslow

1.   Introduction [2]

This article intends to examine some of the tensions that can arise between civilian relief workers and military personnel in peace operations.[3] The context is the qualitative change that has taken place in the post-Cold War period concerning the types of peace operations that military[4] personnel and humanitarian workers are asked to participate in. Militaries no longer just protect national sovereignty and that of allies. They intervene more and more in intrastate conflicts. Military mandates are wider and more ambiguous and the tasks more multi-dimensional and multi-functional. In addition, they are often tasked with facilitating humanitarian relief, social reconstruction and protecting civilians in areas where there is no peace. According to Williams, "the military have taken on new and significant political roles." They are now asked to broker deals, shelter the displaced, protect human rights, supervise the return of refugees, organise and monitor elections, and support civilian reconstruction (Williams, 1989: 14). This takes them into the domain of civilian relief organisations.

There are also larger numbers of civilian relief workers in peace operations also performing a wide variety of tasks such as food delivery, monitoring elections and human rights, managing refugee camps, distributing medical supplies and services, etc. They can belong to any number of organizations with varying budgets, tasks, goals, competence, types of personnel, etc., which can make liaisons between them and the military at times difficult (Last, 1998: 162). In peace operations, one can now find the large International Organisations (IOs) such as UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) in addition to the well-known international NGOs such as CARE, OXFAM, Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) and the ICRC (International Committee for the Red Cross). There are also larger numbers of smaller NGOs in areas of conflict in the post-Cold War period. For example, in 1989, 48 international NGOs were registered with the United Nations. By 1998, there were 1,500 (Simmons, 1998: 75-76). These NGOs may be religious or secular, include personnel from one nation or several, be truly non-governmental or in fact receive large sums from government grants. Finally, a peace operation may also have small groups with a humanitarian interest running around, doing any variety of things from distributing old prescription glasses to trying to set up dental clinics. According to one Canadian sergeant:

> A problem that confronts peacekeepers who must deal with NGOs is the wide range of competence they demonstrate. Fortunately, some are highly effective while others are simply useless. Many small agencies may be very well-connected to the local situation yet lack the administrative capacity to manage the money donated to them. Other groups simply lack the ability to coordinate their actions with outside organisations. The impressions formed by peacekeepers who have seen some of the less competent agencies, unfortunately, may colour their perception of the whole spectrum of humanitarian aid organisations (Pollick, 2000: 59).

Traditionally, interactions between the military and humanitarian workers were characterized by avoidance or antagonism. Each group held (and sometimes continues to hold) stereotypes

of the other. According to some US analysts, American military personnel are described by some NGOs as "boys with toys", rigid, authoritarian, conservative, impatient, arrogant, homophobic, civilian phobic, excessively security-conscious, etc. (Bruno, 1999: 38; Dearfield, 1998: 4;). In contrast, one of the battalion commanders I interviewed referred to NGOs as "non-guided organisations" and other authors note the following comments: "Children of the '60s", flaky do-gooders, permissive, unpunctual, obstructionist, anarchic, undisciplined, self-righteous, anti-military, etc. (Steihm, 1998: 20). According to Williams, humanitarian organisations form the nucleus of an international civil society whose 'esprit de corps' distrusts national military structures (Williams, 1998: 39).

Miller (1999: 181-192) tells us that the aid workers' anti-military attitude stems from their organisations' origins. Many were created to alleviate suffering caused by war (e.g. the ICRC) or to provide an alternative to military service (e.g. The American Friends Service Committee). In peace operations soldiers may find it morally acceptable to participate in humanitarian actions, however, it is highly unlikely that humanitarian workers would ever find it acceptable to take part in military actions. Pamela All has made the following comment on the NGO-military relationship:

> Traditionally, NGOs and the military have perceived their roles to be distinctly different and separate. NGOs have felt uneasy with military forces, either from their own countries or from the country receiving assistance, particularly when the latter are employed in the service of dictators with unsavory human rights records. Military leaders, on the other hand, tend to regard NGOs as undisciplined and their operations as uncoordinated and disjointed (All, 1996: 440).

In the 1990s the nature of international conflict meant that relief workers increasingly found their lives and their work at risk. Relief workers in Rwanda and Chechnya were deliberately killed in 1997. In Burundi and the Sudan NGOs were expelled and workers killed because they were witness to local atrocities. In other countries workers have been victims of land mines, armed hijacking of vehicles, banditry, kidnapping, bombings, etc. A Canadian Defence Ministry official noted that some NGO workers had more battlefield experience than most Canadian Forces personnel (Williams, 1998: 41).

Because of these sad events and the deterioration of field situations, aid workers began to conclude that they needed weapons on their side in order to fulfil their mandates. For example, in Somalia the ICRC suspended its normally irrevocable principle of avoiding cooperation with military forces in its relief operation in order to protect its relief convoys. The chaos in Somalia became so bad and the negotiating position of humanitarian agencies so tenuous that military force became the only viable alternative (Natsios, 1997: 354).

But even security arrangements can prove to be a contentious issue. David Owen found the military in Bosnia "bitter in their denunciation of some of the NGOs who to them were a pestilential nuisance, resisting all attempts at coordination and then complaining that they were not properly protected" (Owen, 1995: 208). A Canadian officer I interviewed in Bosnia was equally cynical concerning NGOs, saying that the NGOs wanted nothing to do with the military until there was a perceived security threat, and then they started showing up to make sure that they could be evacuated or protected by the military. However, working with the military can be problematic for some NGOs. The Independent Commission on Kosovo has described the NGO dilemma in this way: "The central humanitarian mission of protecting civilian life and safety is precisely what is under siege in military engagement. How can humanitarian organisations develop closer and more continuous working relationships with military organisations without compromising their mission?" (International Commission on Kosovo, 2000: 208).

Until recently, when civilian relief workers and military personnel were both involved in 'traditional' peace operations, they performed their tasks separately. There was thus little functional need for cooperation between these groups. As the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, General Maurice Baril has remarked: "Humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organisations seemed to be in every area of conflict but remained independent and reluctant to modify their approach and agree to coordinate their efforts with the military force" (Baril, 1997: 119). Moreover, some of the tasks assigned to the military (for example, delivering relief supplies) are no longer distinct from humanitarian work. Thus, the military are expected to work not only alongside, but also in cooperation with NGOs and other relief organisations. In these circumstances, an effective interface for civil-military cooperation becomes essential. In order to promote civil-military cooperation, it is important to understand some of the difficulties that can emerge in peace operations between the members of these communities. In this article, I will explore some of the tensions that can arise between the military and relief agencies. I have identified five possible points of tension to be found in peace operations, which I have been calling a 'cultural interoperability model'.[5] These points of tension are related to organisational differences in terms of:

a. organisational structure and culture,
b. tasks and ways of accomplishing them,
c. definitions of success and time frames,
d. abilities to exert influence and control information,
e. control of resources.

In addition to documentary sources, particularly the work of the American sociologists Laura Miller and Charles Moskos, research for this paper was carried out in the archives of the Canadian Department of National Defence Headquarters. During the crisis in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, Canada attempted to lead the formation of a multinational coalition. The crisis resolved itself before the coalition could actually be deployed. However, there were a number of important lessons learned from this effort (Appathurai & Lysyshyn, 1997). Information also came from unstructured interviews and focus groups carried out with Canadian soldiers in Bosnia (October 1998) and in the Golan Heights (February 1999).[6] In addition to interviews with Canadian military personnel, I also conducted a few interviews at NATO headquarters and with European battalion commanders who have been deployed to the Former Yugoslavia. I have also consulted with members of large international relief agencies such as the UNHCR and the ICRC, but I have little interview data from the smaller NGOs who do not have contact with the military in an area of operations. This is an area for future research.

2.   Organisational structure and culture

In a speech on civil-military partnerships in humanitarian intervention given in Toronto, in the autumn of 1999, Lieutenant-Colonel D. D. McAlea described obstacles to fostering Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC):

> Number one: NGOs just don't trust the military; they're suspicious of military.
> Number two: they jealously guard their independence. NGOs have to be careful not to compromise their objectivity because they could lose their funding… There are suspicions on both sides because they have different cultures (Ross, 2000: 2).

In this paper, tension in organisational structure and culture refers to differences in organisational goals (including values and basic assumptions), organisational composition (gender,

age, and ethnicity), and actual organisational structure. Dandeker and Gow have said that, "culture comprises a set of ideas, beliefs and symbols that provide a definition of the world for a group or organisation and guides its action" (Dandeker & Gow, 2000: 59). NGOs and the military are often seen to be at odds with each other concerning the basic goals that guide their action (alleviate human suffering vs. preparation for war), approaches to violence (non-violence vs. controlled use of violence), their approach to nationalism (internationalist vs. strongly nationalistic) and decision making styles (decentralised vs. hierarchical).

The military's primary mission is still fighting and winning wars and in a theatre of operations they continue to work on these skills. For example, when I was in Bosnia I was able to observe a Canadian live firing exercise. For some NGO members it is hard to work with the military because it is hard to forget their fundamental purpose. As one NGO member who had worked with the Canadian military on a peacekeeping training exercise remarked, "They seem like nice people, both the civilian and military people mixed, but I think of military people training in acts of war …" (Miller, 1999: 191). Some military members feel that participating in peace operations dulls their warrior's edge. These soldiers and officers do not believe in their role as 'global street workers'. Peace operations are considered inappropriate for combat soldiers. As a Canadian soldier told me in Bosnia, "This is not what we trained for, which was green." Similarly, Canadian politicians have been criticised for trying to make the military into NGOs in uniform. On the other hand, many soldiers and officers acknowledge that their presence in a peace operation makes a difference. As one NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer) in Bosnia remarked, "In UNPROFOR - they were shooting at us and children were throwing rocks at us. In IFOR - we were taking the guns away from the big guys. In SFOR – we see people coming back, children are waving at us."

Miller's work shows that in spite of the perceived benefits and a shift towards support of armed intervention in the regions where they work, relief workers remain essentially anti-military:

> An anti-military and anti-weapons bias persists in relief organisations because militarization and violence are still the primary causes of much of the suffering that these agencies are attempting to relieve. The crises in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia were all caused by clan or ethnic warfare. The human rights abuses in Haiti were the result of a military coup and a brutal dictatorship. NGOs accepted weapons as a necessary evil for reaching their goals when other methods no longer could provide a safe environment (Miller, 1999: 191).

Some differences between the two groups concern motivation. Soldiers and officers participate in a peace operation because it is their job. They stay for their tour of duty and do what they are ordered to. In one Canadian study on ethics, it is said that the extra money earned was also a strong motivation for participating in peace operations. "I have been on many tours, I do it for the money. I don't believe in peace, in helping people who don't want to help themselves" (National Defence Headquarters [NDHQ], 1999: 13). The Ethics Report goes on to say that: "The often articulated motivator of extra dollars as the prime consideration for volunteering complicates the decision making process in high intensity ethical situations. The comment dollars are the number one motivation, rather than duty, was not uncommon" (NDHQ, 1999: 13).

In contrast, relief workers volunteer for hardship, often making many personal sacrifices in order to pursue altruistic goals:

> NGOs, who operate with much less individual security and often with fewer amenities than soldiers, are personally invested in the mission, and are committed for the long term to addressing whatever needs may arise. They are where they are by choice, and

are devoted to their vocation. Many of them find it difficult to believe that soldiers could truly be committed to the same goals as they are (Miller, 1999: 94).

In Miller's study, relief workers expressed the view that soldiers were there simply because they were ordered to be there. This in turn led some relief workers to feel morally superior to soldiers. "In a number of interviews, distrust of the military was translated into comments suggesting that the US military or individual soldiers help out only because they are ordered to do so or have self-interested reasons for doing so" (Miller, 1999: 192).

Differences in organisational structure can affect the way groups interact. What is the hierarchy in the organisation? How are decisions taken? Organisations such as NGOs tend to have a more flattened hierarchy with decentralized decision making. When one American colonel in Bosnia referred to NGOs as "one general and many privates" the response of an NGO executive was "How about one general and many colonels?" (Moskos, 2000: 33). According to Col. Bob Stewart, the commander of the first British deployment to Bosnia in 1992: "The military are hierarchical, authoritarian, centralized, large and robust, while UNHCR is flat, consensus-based with highly decentralized field offices" (Williams, 1998: 36). Thus UNHCR's perceived lack of structure and tendency to delegate decision making to people of a much younger age than the military can be a source of frustration (Williams, 1998: 37).

In addition, the gender and ethnic composition of the organisations in theatre may affect the way they interact with each other. Militaries in peace operations are predominantly male[7], while relief workers are often female in their late twenties to early forties (Miller, 1999: 193). Similarly, UN field staff are predominantly female. UN agencies, such as UNHCR, recruit women on a positive-discrimination basis, which means that half of the staff of UN agencies and NGOs operating in Bosnia is female (Williams, 1998: 34). Young male soldiers between 19–22 years old may have difficulty dealing with relief workers who are female and considerably older. Finally, ethnic (including racial, cultural and religious) differences can have impact on the way organisations behave with each other and with the local population. Miller and Moskos showed that military units that were mixed race and mixed gender had more humanitarian attitudes to the local population than all-male uniracial units, which adopted a more aggressive stance towards locals (Miller & Moskos, 1995: 615-637).

3. Tasks and ways of accomplishing them

It is my belief that the greatest contribution the military can make is to restore order and security so that humanitarian activities can then take place. However, more and more the military are being asked to undertake humanitarian and development activities. For example, in Kosovo the Canadian Battle Group's CIMIC cell actually maintained and ran several development projects - worth Canadian$ 750,000 - on behalf of the Canadian International Development Agency. According to the military, this allowed the Battle Group to directly address the needs of the local population and helped them win local support for their presence (Delaney, 2001). This type of 'hearts and minds' campaign to win over the locals can also promote support for the operation back home. Almost any military article on CIMIC will have the inevitable photo of a soldier with children. This of course attracts more sympathy than coverage of any military action the soldiers might undertake.

But not everyone agrees that development activities should be within the scope of a Battle Group. As General Briquemont has commented, "The military cannot take the place of humanitarian organisations, which have their own objectives and methods and their own know-how; it is clearly useless to try to outdo the ICRC or the UNHCR" (ICRC/UNPOFOR, 1995).

An ICRC representative even goes so far as to criticise the concept of CIMIC itself:

> A degree of caution should be exercised when referring to CIMIC. In whichever way the concept is interpreted it conveys first and foremost a military function. It is thus not an appropriate term for describing the ICRC's relations with the military, or for describing the function of a delegate whose essential role is liaising with the military. The inherent danger of CIMIC is that it could induce the military to go beyond their (military) mandate and focus more on humanitarian activities than on peace and security tasks (Studer, 2001: 7).

The other problem with mixing military and humanitarian actions is the possible confusion that can arise in the minds of the local population. Ogata tells us UNHCR's humanitarian activities have become closely entwined with the military, strengthening its humanitarian capacity but also complicating its efforts: "If UN peacekeeping forces were to engage in offensive action, it would no longer be possible to maintain the non-political and impartial base of UNHCR's humanitarian activities, however serious the needs of the victims might be" (Ogata, 1995: 119-127). The ICRC has exactly the same position. According to one ICRC official, when the dividing line between humanitarian and military action is blurred, "the very concept of humanitarian action, which is a the heart of the ICRC's mandate and activities, risks being undermined" (Studer, 2001: 1).

Ogata also expresses concern over the effect that military operations have on the neutral and impartial image of relief efforts. For example, while UNPROFOR convoy escorts provided protection and deterred attack, their presence in some cases heightened local hostility (Williams, 1998: 40). Again, the ICRC shares this view:

> This is perhaps the ICRC's main concern, in particular the risk of weakening the concept of impartial humanitarian action in the eyes of the belligerents. This concern is due less to the limits of military involvement in humanitarian action per se than to the 'contagious' effect that it may have on civilian humanitarian activities, because any association with military missions – real or perceived – is likely to affect the way in which the population gauges the neutrality of the civilian humanitarian workers, insofar as they are – or are judged to be – no longer 'innocent bystanders' but rather potential parties to the conflict. Mixing mandates risks turning humanitarian workers into perceived enemy agents and thus jeopardizing their personal safety (Studer, 2001: 5).

Similarly, when I was in the Canadian Area of Responsibility in Bosnia, some NGOs in the town of Drvar refused to have any more contact with the military because they had been targeted during riots. They felt that they had been singled out for violence because of their association with the military. Therefore, tensions can arise between humanitarian and military actors because of their respective mandates and modes of operation. Humanitarian organisations are concerned with protecting people and ensuring basic human rights and the security of the victims on all sides of a conflict, whereas the military use of force might be directed just against one party in a conflict.

Of course the military are also concerned with maintaining objectivity and this can lead to maintaining distance from the local population. Because of security issues, military personnel find themselves in armed camps, behind fortified walls and barbed wire. They remain separate from the local population with little opportunity for extended social contact. Keeping distance from the local population can be perceived as demonstrating a lack of trust in the host population. This is not to say that the military do not go into the community to help. In Bosnia, the Canadians rebuilt a hospital wing, set up a dental clinic, built a woodshed for a school, cut and delivered wood to the elderly, etc. However, the militaries like to do things for people rather than with them. In contrast, relief workers often place themselves in the midst of

the local population with few boundaries (be they physical or social) between.[8] Because of the closeness, relief organisations often incorporate local cultural modes in the way they accomplish their tasks. This is reflected in work habits:

> The military's standards and preferred way of completing its tasks (the most rapid, most efficient, highest quality way) do not mesh with the NGO approach, which employs, teaches, and gives control to members of the community, incorporates local cultural modes, and uses locally accessible resources when possible. In Bosnia the USAID director at that time observed, "[The US military] had a tendency to want to take over, so we had to stop that, I have to teach the military each time not to run things" (Miller, 1999: 192).

The NGOs themselves can have mandates that differ from each other and this can lead to tensions with the military. The inability of NGOs to collaborate with each other was often cited as a problem during my trip to Bosnia in 1998. I was told, "NGOs are a business, each with their own agenda and sometimes their own agendas don't coincide with other NGO activities. Sometimes NGOs don't want to talk to each other." One problem the Canadians faced was that the UNHCR wanted to return refugees (Serbs), while another organisation wanted to get the (Croat) Council going. "So they have different mandates and get into conflict with each other. Sometimes the NGOs here seem to be working at cross-purposes to each other." Another interviewee, commenting on the SFOR mission, said NGOs were not well co-ordinated, which created "duplication of effort, missed information, poorly completed projects and villages with rebuilt homes but no electricity or water and a host of other problems."

Sometimes there is a gap between civil and military understandings of the strategic goals of a mission. For example, Garofano tells us that in Bosnia US military leaders did not believe that they had a mandate to do nation building - and may have wanted to avoid the burden of one (Garfano, 1999: 47). On the other hand, humanitarian workers express frustration with the military's inability to act in certain situations:

> Our director witnessed a guy firing randomly in the air after leaving the scene of a crime. A UN peacekeeping truck was looking, trying not to get shot, but otherwise doing nothing. I'm sure they were careful because they didn't have a mandate to act. I imagine they were ordered not to do anything. That would be OK, but the military is here doing what? (Miller, 1999: 187).

Relief workers commonly call upon military forces to become more actively and deeply involved. In Bosnia a relief worker complained: "You cannot leave de-mining up to the [warring] parties. You have to take responsibility. You say not, you're not the police, fine; not de-mining, fine; not capturing war criminals, fine. What are you doing? You have to take responsibility for something" (Miller, 1999: 189). And in Haiti, relief workers pushed for more military commitment: "The UN [troops] should participate more in peacekeeping: patrols and police work. Foreign troops are not supposed to get involved in local actions, but people think they could have done more to disarm the local thugs" (Miller, 1999: 189).

On the other hand, many NGOs "seemed almost intentionally blind to the political and military implications of some of the suggestions and requests they made both privately and to the media" (Appathurai & Lysyshyn, 1997: 7). During the Great Lake crisis, this was reflected in different opinions as to what was an appropriate role for the military, i.e. some NGOs wanted the military to go into the refugee camps in Eastern Zaire and separate and/or disarm belligerents (Appathurai & Lysyshyn, 1997: 9). However, fulfilling the tasks the humanitarian agencies wanted would have involved serious risks and it would also have required important political decisions that many participating nations did not want to take.

4.   Definitions of success and time frames

According to Pope (1994), the long-term commitments of NGOs in a region may lead to substantial differences in how a mission accomplishment is defined. NGOs may not declare a mission a success until all human suffering has been alleviated in the area.[9] Public opinion and the media, on the other hand, may simply want to put an end to fighting (send in troops in order to prevent the escalation of the conflict). The national politicians[10] may have another definition of success (no casualties in the field, good publicity for their government, etc.).

The military's definition of success is determined by the mission that has to be accomplished. In addition, European military commanders have told me that a mission may be considered a success if their troops sustain no casualties and they are able to bring them all home safely – even if the actual mandate was not completely fulfilled. This can be interpreted by some as indifference to the local population or the humanitarian aspects of the mission. According to Miller, the US military share similar concerns about avoiding casualties among their own people and about 'mission creep', i.e. prolonging a mission because new objectives are constantly being set. "Many aid workers have detected these concerns, and look down on the military leaders as wanting to perform only the minimum required and then withdrawing as quickly as possible" (Miller, 1999: 191).

The brevity of military tours (usually six months) can also cause tension with NGOs who are often the first to enter and the last to leave a troubled area.

> Once familiarized with local conditions, [military] officers have little time left to establish solid working relationships with their civilian counterparts, or acclimatize themselves to local values, culture and politics… By contrast, it is unusual for civilians to serve for less than 12 months… It was not unusual for civilians with UNPROFOR to be in their post for three years (Williams, 1998: 36).

In addition, different military units may have different forms of rotation with some militaries rotating individuals while other rotate whole or parts of units at a single time. In addition, humanitarian agencies sometimes demonstrate a misunderstanding of the speed with which the military can deploy. In the Great Lakes crisis,"there was a clear expectation that armies would be fully deployed in theatre almost instantly after a political decision was taken. It was not well understood that this operation involved the movement of tons of machinery and hundreds of people to Africa, and their establishment on the ground, all of which takes time" (Appathurai & Lysyshyn, 1997: 12).

Last (1998: 166) discusses immediate (2-6 months), short-term (1-2 years), medium-term (5-10) years and long-term (10+ years) intervention in the Former Yugoslavia. In each of these time frames, the focus is different. So, for example, in the immediate and short-term military and civil security are the primary focus, while in medium- and long-term the emphasis is on economic reconstruction, education and development. Each of these forms of intervention requires different resources (military and security forces vs. social and economic development projects) and different social actors (military and police vs. relief and development agents). Thus, tension can occur when different social actors are operating with different time frames in mind in the same theatre of operations.

Tensions can also arise when no end state has been defined. As Dandekar and Gow (1997: 327-348) have pointed out, one of the serious points of tension in a strategic peace operation is that the belligerents are in control of the end state and it is only when they decide that the conflict has been satisfactorily resolved that the peace operation will end. Thus, the Former Yugoslavia could end up as a long Cyprus–type mission. In peace operations where the goal of the mission is defined as humanitarian, it becomes difficult to decide when the operation should come to an end. For example, in the case of Zaire, when the refugees were freed from

coercion and began to return to Rwanda, the international community then engaged in a debate over whether the military mission was still required. Those who defined the role of the military mission as 'humanitarian' noted that there were still people in need and supported the extension of the mission, however, as Appathurai and Lysyshyn point out "there will always be people in need in eastern Zaire …" (Appathurai & Lysyshyn, 1997: 4).

5.   Abilities to exert influence and control information

Different groups are able to exert influence at a number of levels. In fact, the decision to undertake a peace operation may arise because of public pressure brought on by NGO and media reports. Public opinion can also play a critical role in the decision to send in or pull out troops. Organisations such as the NGOs and the media are able to exert influence not only at the national political level but also in the international arena. This can frustrate military commanders who are not able to influence political and public opinion in the same way. During the Great Lakes crisis, the NGOs had political interests not unlike governments. According to Appathurai and Lysyshyn, "These agencies have relationships with parties on the ground and with other national governments, and compete with each other for influence and financing. Some (not all) of these clearly tried to influence the Multinational Force during the crisis, providing suspiciously high numbers of refugees in need and using the media as a lever" (Appathurai & Lysyshyn, 1997: 6-7). According to Delaney, this was also the case in Kosovo, where local civil authorities and humanitarian organisations exaggerated the acuteness of problems and the means needed to address them in order to get more funds and resources (Delaney, 2001). The commander then finds her or himself trying to explain the disconnection between the information (s)he has about the local situation (numbers of refugees, etc.) and the portrait that is being painted back home or in the international press.

Tied to the ability to exert influence is also the ability to control information. A military commander finds her or himself at the interface of many relationships where different organisations want access to the information (s)he possesses. According to Miller, NGOs believe that the military can assist them in information gathering (Miller, 1997). In Bosnia the Canadian military shared information with the NGOs through the population surveys the CIMIC people carried out. Canadian military personnel also monitor returning refugees. In Kosovo, the Canadian CIMIC clerk established and maintained a database that kept track of population distribution, medical facilities, water supply, schools, civil authorities and shelter distribution (Delaney, 2001).

However, the intelligence community is a two-way street and NGOs must be willing to share information as well. Some organisations such as the ICRC are reluctant to share information because it might endanger some of their confidentiality agreements (Studer, 2001: 9). Nevertheless, because NGOs often have a longer experience with the local population, their insights can be of value to the military. The military however, have to be willing to accept information that is not packaged in the way they are used to seeing it. According to one relief worker in Bosnia:

> There's no sense for the American military to reinvent the wheel: we had a lot of surveys and figures on refugees. The US military was starting to do it all over again. We saved them three to six months of work, and in return we have gotten a lot of support: they opened routes across the zone of separation, for example.
>
> Both of us come from very strong cultures and both of us think we're right and know how to do things best. Who's going to take the first step? We've gone through a process. In the beginning, we were very reluctant, but we made the first step to help them learn how we think, how we work, to try to get them to understand the value of what we're doing. They started to realize how much we knew: that we had sensitivity to

what's going on in the country and that we could help them in situations in which they didn't know what to do (Miller, 1999: 192).

In addition, different organisations are often not aware of what others are doing, so when NGOs criticise the military for 'not doing enough', it could be that they are simply not aware of what the military are actually doing. The Canadian military try to facilitate the sharing of information and promote coordination between NGOs. For example, in Kosovo the Canadian Battle Group's CIMIC cell acted as a go-between, finding an NGO to carry out well decontamination work and assisting them in finding adequate funding from available donors (Delaney, 2001). In Bosnia, the CIMIC liaison section's role is to assist the international organisations in their Area of Responsibility, particularly the ICRC, UNHCR, and their partners. CIMIC units also deal with the smaller NGOs in the Area of Responsibility. One of the problems these civilian organisations face is that they are small. They have to be small to keep their overhead down and be capable of direct action. However, because they are small they often lack access to current information and they cannot coordinate with other organisations. According to one OXFAM worker, the lack of coordination in Kosovo led to duplication of essential services and competition among NGOs to work in the same camps.[11]

Another gap in the information sharing relates to Islamic activities. The Canadians have little or no information of any development actions from Islamic groups that seem to be quite active in Bosnia. Not only the military are ignorant of Islamic group activities. Moskos reports that 7 of the 33 NGOs with official standing in the UN operation in Somalia were Islamic. Yet, Moskos' computer search of US press reports revealed that, "Not one story was ever written on any of the Muslim NGOs – not one" (Moskos, 2000: 46).

The military try to be sensitive to the NGOs. "We don't want to appear heavy-handed so we try to arrive at consensus." In this way, the military try to develop and co-ordinate NGO strategy. As one officer said, "It is important to show consistency of effort." In Kosovo, the Canadian military organised weekly coordination conferences between representatives of UNHCR, the NGOs, the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo, the OSCE, local civil authorities and military CIMIC representatives. In these meetings the military provided information on mine threats, safe routes, damage assessments, schools, medical coverage and population distribution (Delaney, 2001). This communication can be essential in areas where telephone communications and cellular coverage are practically non-existent. Similarly, the Canadian military in Bosnia organised regular meetings plus ad hoc information sharing between NGOs. One of the mechanisms for this was the called the Principals Group. When I was there, the Principals Group of NGOs met in the Canadian camp in Coralici. The military facilitated the meeting and produced the agenda. I was told, "We decide the focus and explain why so we can have a common effort." In addition, the head of the Canadian Medical Unit in Bosnia has a monthly meeting with the World Health Organisation in Bosnia, and (s)he also kept in contact with other medical staff in the area (for example, Médecins Sans Frontières) about the main medical problems in the region.

Finally, one cannot discuss control of information without discussing the media. Both the military and NGOs are concerned about their relations with the media. According to Moskos, "NGO funding often depends of favourable press coverage" (Moskos, 2000: 33). And as a leading figure in the International Rescue Committee remarked, "You go where governments or U.N. agencies want you to go to get your share of contracts that otherwise would go to other agencies. And one way to get such contracts is by getting the press to publicize your work" (Rieff, 1999: 27). This can lead to competition among NGOs for press coverage. Some members of the Canadian military find this 'distasteful'. As one peacekeeper put it:

> The theatrical demeanour of these organisations, their tendency to go into dangerous situations, and their disregard for cooperation with other groups are particularly irritating to peacekeepers. This sort of competition is particularly galling when a group places its pursuit of publicity above the goals of the overall peacekeeping mission (Pollick, 2000: 60).

The military presence in theatre can also be a valuable resource for NGOs since it often draws political and media attention to an area. This can assist NGOs in publicizing their efforts and in raising funds. However, NGOs often have strained relations with the media, much the same way as the military do. As a senior officer in Sarajevo told Moskos, "The media understand NGOs even less than we do" (Moskos, 2000: 46). The military are often apprehensive about the media and particularly about negative coverage. Then again, so are the NGOs. For the military a bad news story may spell the end of an individual's career; for an NGO it may mean the end of funding (Moskos, 2000: 50).

6. Control of resources

In peace operations the different organisations often find themselves in competition for resources. The NGOs may be competing among themselves in order to secure funding and equipment and they may be competing over access to certain areas or regions that the military must safeguard. The military deploy with valuable resources – food and medical supplies, communication and construction equipment, transport and fuel, etc. Relief workers in Haiti described to Miller how early in the mission, in 1994, thousands of soldiers were deployed. At that time, they shared their resources:

> After Cyclone Gordon… they volunteered. And they had an outpost next to our office. We knew each other, were friends, and they asked what support we needed. Engineers came out and set the course of the river back, which had just spread out all over. They made walls as barriers to prevent land degradation and protect the banks of the rivers. They also did an aerial survey with their helicopters for us. They worked well with the communities then (Miller, 1999: 188).

In Bosnia, the Canadians shared their personnel with the UN Mine Action Centre. While I was there, the military had someone in Bihac working as the Centre coordinator. He checked safety, techniques used to actually clear mines, and that the right people for the job were hired. Canadians also worked closely with the UNHCR to anticipate resource needs in Bosnia. However, I was told that the demands in 1998 were small compared to 1994-1995, when the UNHCR used Canadian military vehicles. During the Kosovo crisis, the numbers of refugees overwhelmed the NGOs on the ground. The UNHCR asked NATO to coordinate all transportation of food, relief supplies, and medical care. NATO troops also helped set up the camps for the hundreds of thousands of refugees (Moskos, 2000: 50).

However, some organisations are increasingly wary of using military assets in carrying out their own operations. This is because military assets can be used for peace keeping or even peace enforcement at the same time that they are being used for humanitarian assistance in the same geographical area. So even though organisations such as the ICRC understand only too well the value of armed protection of ICRC equipment and personnel, they have become cautious in using military assets for their operations. In Somalia, for example, it was not possible for the ICRC to use military aircraft which only the day before had been carrying military equipment for peace enforcement purposes (Studer, 2001: 10).

At other times, NGOs want the military to share their material resources. Different from the positive description above, of NGO-military cooperation in the beginning of the mission in

Haiti, by 1997 only a minimal US military force was present and it seemed to be conserving its resources. A relief worker expressed the following frustrations:

> They have all that equipment here, money, people. Why not build roads, improve streets, build infrastructure? A lot of this is very capital-intensive and they have it. As it is, they're spending all this money to be locked up behind walls, and we don't know what they're doing (Miller, 1999: 188).

Similarly, when the group I observed first arrived in Bosnia, the NGOs wanted the military to deliver goods and cattle for them. The military said no. Thus, there is also competition over soldiers as resources. That is, there are a large number of competing demands placed upon a soldier's time and upon military resources to accomplish both humanitarian and military aims. According to one Canadian officer in the Former Yugoslavia, they didn't have the resources to meet the demands of the military and humanitarian tasks: "We are pushing the envelope and doing our damn best to keep all the balls in the air."

Finally, there may be misunderstandings and disagreements as to the proper use of resources. Humanitarian agencies may want the military to go beyond their mandate in order to disarm the local population or catch thieves and criminals (Miller, 1997). One example of different views on using and withholding resources can be seen in the following situation in Bosnia:

> A Canadian led team had arranged to halt SFOR-coordinated humanitarian aid to the town of Kotor Varos until the municipal leadership demonstrated a willingness to accept the return of displaced ethnic minorities. The team's efforts were undermined, several days later when an NGO announced a major donation to the town. The NGO thought it was more important for them to be seen providing aid to the town than for the humanitarian stakeholders to present a united front. With this NGO's money the mayor was able to ignore pressure to accept minority returns (Canadian Department of National Defence, 1999: 22).

7.   Conclusions

NGOs and the military may be strange bedfellows but they will have to stay in the sheets together because of overlapping tasks and scarce resources in mission areas. And there is a growing consensus that coordination is both necessary and useful. Just as in any couple relationship, they have to work continuously at improving communication, building bridges and developing mutual respect if they are to coexist and cooperate. Otherwise they will find themselves working at counter purposes to each other.

Although this article has stressed differences, it is also important to remember that NGOs and the military also share many things: a commitment to peace and stability, a hard working attitude, international experience, life with hardship and danger, personal risk of injury, illness and/or death, decision making under pressure, a 'can do' attitude or a 'make do with what you've got' attitude, an appreciation of competence, a willingness to work among the suffering, the dying and/or the dead, a frustration with conditions on the ground, a frustration with decisions they believe are political and make their work less effective, etc. (Steihm, 1998: 30). There is as much nobility in sacrificing your life for your country as in saving life in a country far from home.

Moskos has advanced the hypothesis that in peace operations we can observe an embryonic convergence between the two institutions: "a 'softening' of the military, if you will, and a 'hardening' of the NGOs" (Moskos, 2000: 33). Thus as the military and NGOs carry out overlapping missions in the same areas they develop common ground for improved relations. A recent survey by Nuciari (2001) of 260 officers from 9 countries[12] indicates that officers had fewer problems with NGOs than they had with the local population.

There certainly appears to be a growing recognition by military forces of the value of working with NGOs. For example, the US Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook has a whole chapter on civil-military relations, which includes a discussion of NGOs, UN agencies and other international relief agencies.[13] And the relief community is developing an appreciation of the military's assistance in realizing humanitarian objectives. Efforts are underway to work more closely together. Flora MacDonald, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, went with NGOs to both Somalia and Rwanda. She said there were about 200 NGOs operating and "the confusion was total." However, MacDonald said Kosovo was different in that there was tremendous integration in the work being done by the Canadian military and the NGOs there – integration she had not seen elsewhere (Ross, 2000: 4).

Working together helps each community to view the other as equally professional and committed to common objectives. This is a very important point. In fact Miller's (1997) central argument is: organisations that share a common goal and depend on each other to reach that goal, can develop a cooperative relationship and yet retain distinct organisational memberships and cultures. In short, you don't have to be best friends in order to be able to work well together. Good working relations can be developed and I believe that these relationships should be encouraged outside of peace operations. For example, Canadian Forces in 1996 began an exchange with the NGO CARE in which an officer is attached to the organisation on a six-month basis. Some NGOs send personnel to the military for mine-awareness training. These types of exchanges promote mutual understanding.

In theatre, the CIMIC coordination centers permit detailed cooperation between the many NGOs and local authorities.[14] CIMIC operations need to be finely tuned and staffed with competent people. Often there a shortages which means that a battle group is forced to use untrained officers in a CIMIC role or keep them 'double-hatted'. This means that they can be taken away from their CIMIC tasks if their other duties call (Delaney, 2001; Pollick, 2000: 61). Of course, for a military professional, a career in civil – military relations may not mean professional advancement the way being involved in the core business of combat does. There is a need for clear tracks of professional advancement possible in order to encourage participation in these functions. Another military option is to use reservists who have a wide variety of non-traditional military skills. With this in mind, the Canadian Department of Defence intends to create units within the Reserves dedicated to CIMIC activities (Pollick, 2000: 62).

Another aid would be to co-locate headquarters in the same area. Of course being close to each other is not a guarantee of effective communication; nevertheless, it could facilitate it. Dialogue can also be improved through pre-mission meetings between the military and the NGOs, early agreement on responsibilities and objectives, central coordination, shared communications equipment, regular inter-agency meetings in-field, exchanged liaison officers, to name a few. It is also critical that relief agencies be included earlier in the strategic planning stages of an operation. A particular emphasis should be placed upon improving consultation at the policy level, information sharing and analysis. For the foreseeable future, at least, NGOs and the military have no choice but to remain in bed together if they are to ensure the coordination of humanitarian relief, reconstruction, peace building, and the political and security aspects of a mission.

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Notes

[1]. This article is an enlarged and revised version of a piece that was published under a similar title in 2000 in *Transnational Associations/Associations Transnationales*, Vol. 5, pp. 222-232. The title was inspired by General Shalikaskvili. In a 1995 conference on military efforts in humanitarian crises he referred to the military, humanitarian agencies and the media as "strange bedfellows [that] can be a very good combination." (Cited in Charles Moskos (2000), *The Media and the Military in Peace and Humanitarian Operations*: 34, Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, Chicago).

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[3] I will use the term 'peace operations' partly to avoid getting involved in a controversy over labels and to have one term to describe the wide range of activities which are often called peacekeeping. In fact, peacekeeping is NOT a term found in the UN charter but it has come to refer to a wide variety of actions and interventions, which renders the peacekeeping role itself both ambiguous and open to variable definition (F. Pinch, (1994), *Lessons From Canadian Peacekeeping Experience: a Human Resources Perspective*: p. 17, FCP Human Resources Consulting, Ottawa, August 1994).

In July 1992, an attempt was made by the UN Secretary General to identify various types of action in *An Agenda for Peace*. In Chapter II of this document, 'peace-making' and 'peacekeeping' are described. Peacemaking is the action to bring hostile parties to agreement while peacekeeping is the deployment of a UN presence in the field. Other concepts found in this chapter are 'preventive diplomacy' [action to prevent disputes from arising, to prevent existing disputes from escalating and to limit the spread of conflict]; 'post-conflict peace building' [action to identify and support structures which will strengthen and solidify peace]; and 'peace enforcement' [restoring and maintaining cease-fire by force] (Cited in: M. Bertrand, (1995), 'The Confusion Between Peacemaking and Peacekeeping', in: D. Warner (ed.), *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping*: pp. 163-164, Kluwer Academic, Deventer). Bertrand tells us that

although these terms seem clear, in fact the distinction between the different forms of actions is blurred, and that there is confusion among them (Bertrand, 1995: p. 164).

[4] Please note that my use of the word 'military' is very loose. Since the vast majority of my research experience is with the Army my knowledge of things 'military' mostly refers to Army knowledge and experiences in peace operations.

[5] For an application of this model to UN and NATO operations in the Former Yugoslavia, see Donna Winslow and Peer Everts (2001), 'It's not a Question of Muscle: Cultural Inter-operability for NATO', in: G. Schmidt (ed.), *NATO - The First Fifty Year*: pp. 85-104 (Palgrave / MacMillan, Hampshire, UK).

[6] I wish to thank the Canadian Department of National Defence and the soldiers and officers of the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group deployed in Bosnia and the Canadian Logistics group stationed on the Golan Heights for taking care of me. I am well aware that such trips require time and energy to organise and I am extremely appreciative of the support and information given to me during these trips.

[7] In traditional peacekeeping operations from 1957 to 1989 only 25 of the more than 26,000 troops were female. From 1989 to 1992 the number of females rose to 255 but that was still approximately 1 percent of the total military members in peace operations (J.C. Beilstein (1995) 'The Role of Women in United States Peacekeeping', in: *Women 2000*, Vol. 1: p.1)

[8] Of course this is not always true. As one writer for the *Economist* cynically observed, "In troubled zones where foreign NGOs flourish, weekends bring a line of smart four-by-fours parked at the best beaches, restaurants or nightclubs. The local beggars do well, but discrepancies between expatriate staff and, say, impoverished local officials trying to do the same work can cause deep antipathy." (Opinion section, 'Sins of the secular missionaries', in: *The Economist,* January 29th, 2000).

[9] Sweatt describes how differences in conceptual end states negatively affects NGO and military relations. See S. Sweatt (1995), *The Challenges of Civil-Military Relations at the Trailing Edge of War.* Monograph of the Naval War College. Newport, RI.

[10] National governments may also be responding to political imperatives – e.g. to stop the flow of refugees to national country. See M. V. Metselaar (1997), 'Understanding Failures in Intelligence Estimates – UNPROFOR, the Dutch and the Bosnian-Serb Attack on Srebrenica', in: J. Soeters and J. Rovers (eds.), *'The Bosnian Experience', Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies*, 1997: pp. 23-50, esp. p. 27.

[11] Quoted in Opinion section, 'Sins of the secular missionaries', in: *The Economist,* January 29th, 2000

[12] The countries were Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Sweden and the USA.

[13] See US Joint Warfighting Center (1997), *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, Joint Warfighting Center, Ft. Monroe, VA

[14] The CIMIC liaison section in the Battle Group I visited consisted of 18 people and their role was to assist the international organizations in the AOR (the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UNHCR, and their partners). The CIMIC liaison section also assists co-operation with the municipal and cantonment authorities in their efforts to successfully implement the civil aspects of the Dayton accords. For example, they co-ordinate with the UNHCR to help the returning displaced persons. CIMIC also has the task to conduct liaison efforts with international organizations such as the UNHCR and the IPTF (International Police Task Force), who are the Dayton Accord's implementing partners.

CIMIC from the Aid Organisations' Perspective [*]

[*NL-ARMS*, 2002: Chapter 6]

W. de Wolf

1. Introduction

A bridge like, for instance, the one across the Hollands Diep (a formidable estuary, separating the north-western provinces from the south of the Netherlands) is seen by aid organisations as a public road, making it possible to travel from south to north. In other words: a public utility for general use; a civilian property, therefore. Seen through the eyes of the military, this same bridge is a military, strategic target to be defended or attacked; which goes to show that one and the same physical object can be viewed entirely differently.

Writing about civil-military cooperation from the perspective of aid organisations is not an easy task. Aid organisations regard reality differently than the military, and the last thing they will do is regard it in terms of the military or from a military viewpoint. Aid organisations are not directed at military targets, much less do they use military strategies aimed at defence and security. They are directed at victims and the possibilities for helping helping those victims.

What the military see as a humanitarian action differs, at least at first sight, widely from a humanitarian action presented on TV by a number of cooperating aid organisations. Carpet bombing in Kosovo and Belgrade has a humanitarian objective and is therefore defined by the military as a humanitarian action, which it is. Aid organisations are puzzled by such a characterisation. They feel violence and help to victims do not go well together. On the contrary, a social worker does not go to a problem family wearing battle fatigues. By presenting him/herself in that outfit, his/her aid mission would be a failure at the outset.

However, aid organisations and the military are dependent on each other. Both operate in conflict situations and both are confronted with violence and violations of human rights. Before going into the details of the cooperation between the military and the aid organisations, it is important to elaborate somewhat further on the differences between the two institutions. This will give us an insight into the reason why cooperation, which is not so evident at first sight, is essential for the success of humanitarian actions, and this insight will give us the opportunity to improve future civil-military cooperation.

2. Differences between aid organisations and the military

2.1 Target group and impartiality

As indicated above, the target groups are different. The military speak of the enemy, who attacks or who commits genocide, or, even more generally, violates human rights in a violent manner: *the good guys* who have to be protected and *the bad guys* who have to be overcome. The aid organisations are directed at the victims, and it does not matter to them whether they fall on this side or the other. Victims of war, by definition, never fall among one fighting party only, but among all parties. The aid organisations want to reach and help ALL civilian victims, although that is often impossible. Thus, Cordaid does not only want to reach Albanian Kosovars, but also Serb Kosovars. It supports Serb refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Its help is not impartial, but where it concerns victims, it is. The aid supply of

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[*] The present text is a translated and slightly adapted version of an address delivered by the author during the conference 'Zwaarden èn ploegsscharen?' [Swords as well as Ploughshares?], On the desirability of Civil-Military Cooperation; Driebergen, 1999.

humanitarian organisations does not distinguish between *the good guys* and *the bad guys*. It is really about relief to all victims.

2.2   The strategic difference

Aid organisations do not define their strategies in terms of the territorial defence of a country or the international legal order as do the military, who are equipped for using violence if necessary. Aid organisations think in terms of aid to victims and have geared their management strategies to that end: what has to be done today, in a material and immaterial sense, to keep victims alive; what is required tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. Aid organisations do not resort to violence and among them it is even accepted to say that violence is counter-productive to relief. After all, fire attracts fire, and aggression spawns aggression.

In the daily practice of humanitarian operations another strategic difference can be discerned. The military are equipped in a material sense to carry out their mission in all sorts of circumstances. They have packages ready, as it were, irrespective of the circumstances on the spot. Whether it concerns a dressing station or a field kitchen, the materials are ready for use, only to be flown in to whatever destination in the world.

Aid organisations, in contrast, are much more reactive in nature. In order to relieve the needs of the victims, they will use local means. If these means are available on the spot, they will be used there. Aid organisations organise their aid in such a way that victims can cook their own food on their own fire or stove. In African camps victims build their own cabins, with the aid organisation only delivering the cheaper plastic sheets.

The big strategic difference in every-day practice is the humanitarian actions of the military, mentioned above. Aid organisations are demand-driven, they use the possibilities that the victims and their environment have. The military are supply-driven, which is a major difference in approach.

2.3   Difference in objectives

How can victims regain their self-respect, so that they can begin to work again on their development and society as quickly as possible, without our support: that is our objective as aid organisations. The objective of the military is subsidiary to the political objectives of the government they work for. In the Dutch constitution the primary task of the military is:

> *to ensure the external safety, i.e. the defence of the national and allied territory.*

Since the establishment of the United Nations, and in the context of an advancing globalisation, a second important task has been added:

> *the protection and implementation of the international legal order within the framework of a supra-national authority, in casu the UN.*

As a government institution the military are subordinate to the political objectives. Aid organisations are independent and directed at societal objectives.

2.4   The statutory difference

Aid organisations are not government institutions like the military. They are independent private institutions and they wish to remain so for more than one reason. Nine out of ten victims of war are civilians and not military. Aid organisations do not want to be government instruments, and because of their objectives and strategies, they cannot be. The military are a government institution; aid organisations like Cordaid are private initiatives. The military

work with government money, non-governmental organisations, for a considerable part, work with gifts.

3.   Cooperation between armed forces and aid organisations

Aid organisations and armed forces meet when they are carrying out their humanitarian missions, whether they are of a civilian or military nature. They need each other, and they can help each other. Their differences, however, create dilemmas that have to be solved.

3.1   Safety

In order to ship aid goods to the right place and target group, accessibility to an area is a prerequisite. The local employees of Cordaid do not venture into a minefield. The aid organisations count on the military – green berets or blue berets, that does not make a difference – to guarantee their safety. Cordaid will never send its personnel to victims, armed with a pistol in their pockets or a rifle slung over their shoulders. Help is not achieved with physical violence, on the contrary: it will frighten victims off. Delivering a sack of rice in an armoured vehicle creates confusion. Victims, who because of the violence have left their hearths and homes, do not want to be helped by an institution, in this case the military, that comes up to them in an armoured vehicle.

And still: what if it cannot be done otherwise? What if victims cannot be reached because of the immediate proximity of warring factions? Should we leave the victims to fend for themselves or should we call in the armoured vehicle? Experience shows that this sort of situation does not occur very often. My view on this dilemma is as follows: necessity knows no law, but make sure it is an exception.

3.2   Logistic cooperation

I began my presentation with an example of the bridge across the Hollands Diep. Large infra-structural objectives such as bridges, sea and air ports, main roads, etc., are necessary from a logistical point of view to transport aid goods and humanitarian workers to the areas in which the victims are. Such infrastructural artifacts have often been demolished by the warring factions because of their military strategic importance. This makes it impossible to get the aid goods to the victims.

The present employment of the military on the airport of Tirana is an important support for the aid organisations in their attempts to get their aid goods transported. Where do we draw the line with regard to the employment of armed forces for the benefit of relief to victims?

The aid organisations can handle a great deal in the way of logistics. They are capable - and have been for a number of years now - of realising Operation Lifeline, without any support from the military. Lifeline is an airlift operation that has saved the lives of many Sudanese people. Aid organisations do not knock at the military's door just like that. Only when we are faced with acute shortages and no cheaper alternatives can be found at short notice, do we appeal to the military for their support.

Within the context of the present-day privatisation tendency, it is not at all obvious to call in the help of the military. Private enterprises or aid organisations are also involved in public works in peacetime. So why not in times of war? Oxfam may serve as an example. This organisation has specialised, among others, in the construction of water supplies for large groups of refugees, as, for instance, in the Great Lakes area and in Albania today. The actions of Cordaid – the supply of thousands of cubic tons of food and other aid goods – were realised without the help from the military.

It is, however, possible to give a converse argumentation: as the military have already been equipped for this kind of major infrastructural work and for logistic support, why not work

together and make use of each other's capabilities? Why should private organisations invest in expensive means of transport to realise these tasks, while the military have it all ready. 'Make use of the capabilities of the military', the argument goes.

There is something to be said for this, even if it is an upside-down reasoning. Following it, we soon find ourselves in the discussion that Achterhuis (1981) describes in his book *De markt van welzijn en geluk* [The market of well-being and happiness]. This approach leads to the question that Achterhuis posed to the international aid organisations: Do institutions preserve themselves, irrespective of their mission or objectives? They are equipped with their specific capabilities and means, but they preserve themselves more for their own sake than for realising their objectives. Not for nothing have I stressed several times in this address that for aid organisations the help to victims comes first. A help that is directed at the victims picking up their own development as quickly and in as large numbers as possible. It must not be so that we help victims because we have the means to do so, on the contrary: we need means because we want to help victims. Should such a question on institutionalisation not be posed to the military? Is the objective not made subordinate to the available means in the upside-down argumentation?

When we talk about the means with which the military are equipped, a second question immediately forces itself upon us: how available is the material of the military? I have just applauded the employment of the military on Tirana airfield. But for a few weeks now the preparations for the military campaign into Kosovo have been in progress, and we are now a few days into the actual campaign itself. In circumstances like these, aid organisations have a hard time getting the military to arrange food transports for refugees in Northern Albania. The military operation has the priority. For the aid organisations, however, the victims in Northern Albania are a priority, too, even if they cannot appeal for help to the military right now. The trucks are needed for the transport of soldiers and materials, in other words, they are not available for food transport for the refugees.

A closer cooperation and a better tuning seem more than desirable. The question is, how far this cooperation must be carried through. What are the limits? Under which circumstances and in which form must the cooperation be realised? These questions take us right to the heart of the debate on civil-military cooperation. Within the framework of this conference I would like to go into two aspects of this cooperation. The objectives of the military, or in the words of Professor van Iersel, the ambitions, and the conditions.

4.   Aspects of cooperation

4.1   The ambitions of the military

Just like individual civilians, an aid organisation has an interest in armed forces that *ensure external safety, i.e. the defence of the national and allied territory*. As an aid organisation it matters very much to us to have safe access to the areas where the victims are. Therefore, the second objective of the military, which I mentioned above, is equally important to us: *the protection and implementation of the international legal order, preferably within the frame-work of a supra-national authority, in casu the UN.*

Aid organisations often have to operate in extremely perilous circumstances, in which personal safety is hardly ever guaranteed. On more than one occasion, many of my colleagues and I, as relief workers, have stared death in the face. When this happened there were no armed forces for miles around. In war situations such as these, protection of civilians, and consequently relief workers, by the military is insufficient. The safety objective of the military with regard to civilians should have priority, in my view. After all, let us not forget that nine out of ten victims are civilian and only one in ten military. If we, as aid organisations, can do our bit to diminish the number of victims, we are quite willing to do that. Cooperation

between aid organisations and the military to enhance the safety of civilians is a challenge that we must meet.

There is a second important reason why I, as a relief worker, would like to discuss the ambitions of the military. Both organisations operate in the same field, namely that of humanitarian aid. They both claim a certain share of that market and in many areas the humanitarian task of the military is complementary to that of the aid organisations. More and more, however, we are ending up in the grey areas where our activities overlap.

Why should the military not make themselves more useful, especially in times when the main tasks with regard to protection and security are making fewer demands on them. This would mean killing two birds with the same stone: an optimal employment of means, available anyway, and, simultaneously, the useful employment of the military for the benefit of aid to victims. Such a point of view is quite understandable from a psychological and sociological perspective. Once this road has been chosen, it stands to reason that, from an institutional angle, this orientation is preserved and, if necessary, improved. By placing the military in a global peace environment, the change-over to what Van Iersel calls the "civilising" of the military is rather small.[1]

However attractive this train of thought may seem – especially for pacifists - a number of criticisms with regard the civilian supply of aid by the military are justified.

4.2 Every man to his trade

In the Outline Letter of this conference an example is given (on p. 15), in which the military have appropriated the task of helping problem youths. Allow me to discuss in some detail a personal experience from Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1994. The refugee camp had been established on the runway of the local military airfield under the protection of Dutch UN troops. The Lieutenant Colonel of the Dutch contingent offered to take over an orphanage that his men had renovated with great enthusiasm. Cordaid already had a programme for orphans in the town of Tuzla, 6 kilometres away. This programme was directed at placing the children in guest families, so not at accommodating them in an orphanage. There was this beautifully renovated orphanage, but no orphans. After consulting the mayor of Tuzla we found an alternative destination for the building, but it took extra expenses to make it suitable for the reception of families that up to that moment had been accommodated in tents.

This example begs several critical questions of the type that we, as professional aid workers, ask ourselves every day:
- Renovation of an orphanage: why and on whose initiative?
- Who is going to pay for the long-term running costs of such a home?
- Has there been a comparative cost-benefit analysis with regard to alternatives?
- Is an orphanage the most sensible solution for orphans from a pedagogical perspective?
- Who is going to manage such an orphanage, provided it is the least objectionable solution?
- How does an initiative like this relate to the policy and managerial capacity of the local organisation or of the local authorities?

In other words, when initiating humanitarian activities, the fact that there are people willing to make an effort and material is available, is certainly not enough to guarantee that those activities will produce an adequate answer to alleviate the needs of victims. Apart from an insight into the managerial and policy aspects, humanitarian aid presupposes a professional know-how of the short-and long-term aspects. The above example shows that the military are/were inadequately equipped with regard to these aspects.

Humanitarian aid is not, as is often suggested, a logistical operation, in which all victims receive shelter, a lump of bread, a bowl of soup and an aspirin. Professional know-how of

nutrition, health, expenses, control, local capacities, local policies, etc., are most certainly of equal importance in humanitarian actions. Respect the professionalism of the aid worker. We, the aid workers, do not feel an urge to tell the military how to conduct their operations. The professional know-how of aid organisations, I venture to say, is not by definition to be found in the backpacks of the military.

4.3 Societal construction also in crisis situations

In the strategic policy framework of *Pax Christi* this aspect of humanitarian aid is described as 'local capacities for peace'.[2] Is it possible, I ask myself, for a government institution to support (local) private organisations in such a manner that they are and remain instruments that contribute to the functioning of an open democratic society, in which law and order have the best chance of success. The government is not society, it only represents a fraction of the whole of that society. Who exclusively works with the government in Goma (Congo) will soon find out that the social reality in the Kivu is quite different from what the government would like us to believe. The Non-Governmental Organisations take part in constructing a democratic society. Societal construction, seen in this light, comes down to reinforcing the local capacities for the sake of peace and maintaining peace.

Conversely, the question is, whether there is not a very great chance of the military employment in humanitarian activities blocking the development opportunities of private organisations, eventually leading to a civilian society modelled along military lines?

Politically speaking, the construction of local capacities is essential in shaping the sense of societal responsibility of the individual citizen. Environmental organisations, human rights organisations, but also interest groups such as trade unions and employers' unions constitute an important pillar in our society. Non-Governmental Organisations like Cordaid see it as one of their objectives to support these organisations and to reinforce them. In crisis situations, too, Cordaid, apart from alleviating the direct needs of victims in the Albanian Human Rights Center, brings up the matter of the violation of human rights in Kosovo and supports the women who have been raped. This does not seem to me to be an objective of a government institution like the military.

What, then, can the ambitions of the military be with regard to CIMIC? On the basis of the above I would like to make the following delimitation:

- The humanitarian task of the military with regard to civilian victims should be reactive. If there is no demand from the side of the victims themselves and/or the aid organisations or the local authorities, then do not deliver it. The fact that there is a supply of aid, does not necessarily mean there is a well-founded demand.
- Even if there is a demand for aid, there is still excellence in restraint. Extending effective aid to victims in an efficient manner can only be realised when the necessary professional know-how is there. Good intentions do not always yield the desired result.
- The humanitarian task of the military is supportive and not initiating. In the light of the political context of durable peace, i.e. a societal construction in which democratic rights and peace are essential, it goes without saying that the military adopt a helpful stance, not only towards the local authorities but also towards civilian initiative, in order for the 'local capacities for peace' to be fully realised.

The financial policy of the government with regard to the civilian tasks of the military should, in my opinion, be placed within the context of these three limitations. As these government resources are limited they should be used professionally and efficiently.

5. Conditions for civil and military cooperation

a.   I will be brief about the conditions in the present context. It is of importance that the aid organisations as well as the military fully realise that both organisations not only have their own statutes, but also totally unique cultures. Regulations and procedures are completely different in both organisations. Authority and responsibilities are structured much more hierarchically than in the world of the NGOs. Such cultural and procedural differences do not always enhance good cooperation. Respect for each other's own identity and position is the basis for a good cooperation.

b.   A second condition is of a completely different nature and often meets with a lack of understanding from the military. Concrete help is not effective with a truncheon. The cooperation between 'Médecins sans Frontières' and the military has foundered on this. Surgeons do not wear guns when operating on people. Military uniforms - and military weapons, in particular - throw up insurmountable barricades for the administering of social and psychological aid.

c.   A totally different condition for cooperation is the basis on which it is realised. In the eyes of the aid organisations the military, is only one of the suppliers of logistic services. It is unacceptable that for a six hour-flight in a C-130 I have to pay twice the amount I would have to pay for a commercial carrier with the same capacity. In that case Cordaid will choose for the commercial alternative, as it allows it to give more aid at lower costs. The military should ask themselves why aid organisations make so little use of their C-130.

d.   Apart from the costs, the availability of the carrier and the time-consuming bureaucratic procedures form a problem for the aid organisations. In other words: our cooperation must be founded on a business basis. The military present the aid organisations with an outline of the costs and the terms of delivery. The aid organisations see whether the other suppliers can deliver the same goods cheaper and/or with the same quality. In the context of the Dutch mercantile tradition and the present-day tendency for privatisation of government services, this last condition should not fall on deaf ears.

6. Conclusion

For a long time the principle of neutrality has formed an obstacle for some aid organisations to cooperate with the armed force. Fundamentally, however, this argument is no longer a reason to forgo cooperation, especially when we see UN-forces being deployed in between warring parties.

The background to the whole discussion is the fact that the military and aid organisations - however different they may be - are complementary and their activities only overlap to a limited extent. At this conference, the theme of which is 'Swords and Ploughshares', I would like to appeal to the military to give priority to their primary tasks of SAFETY and DEFENCE of the international legal order. Together, we will come a long way towards working for peace, a process in which each organisation has its own task. The aid organisations are willing to conclude a contract of cooperation, in which the delimitation that has been described above is respected and in which the services and logistic support are delivered on a business basis. Thanks to such a contract the cooperation between the military and the aid organisations and private initiative can be extended further than is now the case.

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  * The studies on nuclear deterrence, in which theoretical research and case studies have often been carried out without any vital relation to each other, are an example of this. In the forementioned study Van Iersel refers to this omission.

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  On opportunities and risks of CIMIC: http:/www.dodccrp.org/

Notes

[1] A.H.M. van iersel, *Basic Document* (containing 'terms of reference'): p. 1. Basic document for the conference 'Zwaarden èn Ploegscharen?' [Swords as well as Ploughshares?], On the desirablity of Civil-Military Cooperation (Driebergen, 1999).

[2] For an elaboration of this vision and the concept of 'local capacities for peace', see: Pax Christi Nederland (1998), *De Vrede najagen*, Strategisch Beleidskader 1999-2004 [Chasing Peace. Strategic Policy paper], 28 November 1998, Utrecht.

An active Dutch CIMIC Policy is not a bridge too far!

[*NL-ARMS*, 2002: Chapter 7]

H. Rappard

1.   Introduction

Some four years ago, the increased attention for civil military cooperation (CIMIC) led to a situation in which the Netherlands Chief of Defence Staff requested the Services to develop a CIMIC Policy, which would give him sufficient information about the CIMIC capacities needed for the Netherlands Armed Forces. The Army took the lead in the development of this joint CIMIC Policy.

The objectives of this article are to clarify the outlines of the Netherlands Armed Forces CIMIC Policy and to make clear what kind of CIMIC organisation has been implemented in and for the Netherlands Armed Forces. The article will first focus on 1 (GE/NL) Corps and the Royal Netherlands Army's Operational Command and will then turn to the CIMIC Group North.

After an introduction of the term CIMIC, including a definition and some terminology, the great importance of CIMIC in actual operations will be explained. Models will be used to illustrate the options for the CIMIC organisation in the Netherlands Armed Forces. Furthermore, an explanation will be given of how this CIMIC Policy can be made operational for the Netherlands staff units and for the international CIMIC Group North. Special attention will be given to the recruitment of military and Functional Specialist personnel for the Netherlands CIMIC elements. Finally, this article will describe some actual and future developments - a future the Netherlands is developing together with NATO, Germany and several other countries in the northern region of Europe, such as the Czech Republic, Denmark, Norway and Poland.

2.   The definition and key functions of CIMIC

By developing the Netherlands Armed Forces CIMIC Policy, the NATO Military CIMIC Policy (MC 411) was used as a basis and a principle. Although this policy was not completed at that moment and was still under revision, the MC 411 was used from 1997 onwards. In the NAC-approved MC 411 of July 2001, the general NATO definition of CIMIC is as follows:

> *The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.*
> (MC 411, July 2001)

In the Netherlands' national approach the word 'NATO' is replaced by 'Military' because this will make the definition applicable for military operations controlled by other international organisations, such as the United Nations or the European Union.

As MC 411 describes, the immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full cooperation of the military commander and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies and population within a commander's area of operations in order to allow him to fulfil his mission. This may include direct support to the implementation of a civil plan. The long-term purpose of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of the international objectives in operations.

As a result of this very broad definition the CIMIC key functions may be abbreviated into C³I. However, in CIMIC this means communication, cooperation, coordination and information. Command and control are deliberately omitted because they are of minor importance in CIMIC.

Thus, in short CIMIC liaises with the civil organisations and authorities in the mission area not only to support the military units and commanders in the operation area, but also to support the civil world in its efforts to implement and establish a better civil environment. That is why the CIMIC organisation is the military interface with the local community and at the same time the interface with the military organisation. In fact, CIMIC is indispensable in bridging the gap between the small military world and the far more extensive civil society. A few years ago this was a bridge too far, but now the bridge is nearing completion.

3. The CIMIC areas of interest

Within CIMIC there are five different areas of interest.

In the area of Civil Administration tasks can be identified such as legal assistance, economic policy, public finance, spatial and environmental policy, education and culture policy, social policy, movement and transport policy, public health policy, security policy, media and communications policy and agriculture and nature policy. (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Election 2000 in Bosnia

Civil Administration Functional Specialists provide functional expertise, advice and assistance in identifying and assessing civil administration systems, agencies, services, personnel and resources. They determine the capabilities and effectiveness of civil administration systems and the impact of those systems on CIMIC activities. They develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing civil administration systems, agencies, and resources.

Examples are assisting in the organisation of elections, the international Police Task Force in Bosnia, re-writing of existing laws and legal systems and advising on the development of modern monetary systems.

In the area of Civil Infrastructure tasks can be mentioned such as construction and demolition activities, the provision of energy and water, attention to communications, public communications, public transport, roads, waterways, railroads, harbours, airports, factories, etcetera. This area is essential after the conclusion of a conflict in which a lot of infrastructure has been destroyed.

Civil Infrastructure Functional Specialists provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in identifying and assessing the Civil Infrastructure strategy. They provide advice and assistance for the establishment of a short and long-term strategy on Civil Infrastructure. They are involved in the review of the process of regulations, arrangements and contracts made with ministries and regional and municipal administrations. They provide advice and assistance in establishing the technical requirements for civil infrastructure systems to support the population. (Figure 2).

A great many examples can be mentioned, such as the repair of buildings, railway connections, oil refineries, electricity and gas and water distribution networks in several nations where military forces were deployed.

In the area of Economy and Commerce the main tasks are industrial development, development of retail and sale, insurances, postal services, banking and accounting, trade, ICT, media and communications, supply and transport, maintenance support and medical support, as well as the support of all kinds of other economic and commercial activities. (Figure 3).

Figure 2: Repair of Infrastructure

Economy and Commerce Functional Specialists will provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in identifying and assessing Economy and Commerce projects and systems. They provide advice and assistance for the establishment of a short, medium and long-term strategy on Economy and Commerce activities and development. These Functional Specialists are involved in the review of procedures, regulations, contracts and arrangements made with ministries and regional and municipal administrations. They provide advice and assistance in establishing the technical requirements for Economy and Commerce systems according to the guidelines given by ministries. They provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in monitoring and assessing the economy, economic systems, commercial activities, agencies, services, personnel and resources in a wide range of areas.

Figure 3: Oil Refinery Sprski Brod

In Bosnia SFOR supports this process of activating the economy and commercial activities. The Netherlands has been very active in supporting the start of new commercial activities and the restart of civilian companies.

Within the area of Humanitarian Aid or Assistance the main tasks are care of civilians, public health, displaced persons and refugees, human rights, civil information, disaster relief and disaster relief services.

Humanitarian Functional Specialists are to provide technical expertise, advice and assistance in identifying and assessing humanitarian aspects. They provide advice and assistance for the establishment of a short and medium-term strategy on Humanitarian Affairs. They are involved in the review of the process of regulations, arrangements and contracts made with IOs, NGOs, ministries and regional and municipal administrations. They provide advice and assistance in establishing the technical requirements for government Humanitarian Systems to support the population. (Figure 4).

For example, the Netherlands participated in operation Provide Comfort in 1991 with an Engineer Aid Battalion, as they did in the first year of the KFOR operation in Kosovo.

Another example was the deployment of Dutch forces in Macedonia and Albania in 1999. Furthermore, the Netherlands deployed army, navy and marine elements to Central America after hurricane Mitch struck this area.

Figure 4: Refugeecamp Quatron, Albania

In the area of Cultural Affairs tasks include care of cultural aspects, the protection of religious and cultural heritage, arts protection, protection of archives and care of valuable buildings and monuments.

Cultural Affairs Functional Specialists have to ensure the safeguarding of cultural property in operational areas. They supervise the identification and safeguarding of all works of art, monuments, archives, religious buildings, shrines and consecrated places. They provide safeguards and any other required protection of collections of artefacts and objects of historical or cultural importance, including appropriate records thereof. They assist in recognising art objects and determining their owner. They continuously supervise the evaluation and disposition of such objects through officials and actions to safeguard objects of either cultural or historical value.

They make recommendations on plans to use buildings or locations of cultural value, such as temples, universities and shrines for any purpose other than that for which they are intended. They inform military forces of the social, cultural, religious and ethnic characteristics of the local populace and they develop codes of behaviour on the use of religious buildings, shrines and consecrated places. They mediate in disputes between opposing ethnic, cultural, religious and social groups in the area. (Figure 5).


Figure 5: Sarajevo Library

An example in this regard is SFOR's taking care of the repair of the university and the library of Sarajevo.

Finally, additional CIMIC tasks include interpreter tasks, translation support, liaison and the provision of regional knowledge.

Special prerequisites for the execution of CIMIC activities are the budgets to be made available by international and national organisations. The NL Ministry for Development Cooperation donates small budgets to Netherlands Forces in Bosnia and Afghanistan to plan and execute smaller CIMIC projects. This money is spent, for instance, on the restoration of hospitals, schools and smaller industries.

Figure 6:
Does the World bank intend to
fund CIMIC Projects too??

Larger budgets could be provided by, for instance, the World bank or the European Union. (Figure 6).

Without budgets and funds CIMIC is limited to communication, coordination and cooperation. With budgets and funds CIMIC capabilities can be used to their full potential and will be eminently capable of actively supporting most areas in the civil environment.

4.   The importance of CIMIC

In developing the Netherlands Armed Forces CIMIC Policy, it was crucial to prove the real importance of CIMIC. CIMIC has been important and inevitable for ages. Military forces have always made use of the support of the civil environment, on a voluntary basis or by the use of force. To limit this overview, I would like to start with a quotation from General Dwight Eisenhower (Figure 7) in 1945:

Figure 7: General Dwight D. Eisenhower

"The sooner I can get rid of the questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be!
Sometimes I think I live 10 years each week, of which at least 9 are absorbed in political and economic matters … And what a lot of headaches I found. … Water supply shortage. No power. No food. No fuel, and corpses all over town ..."
After this remark a long period of allied military government followed for Germany and certainly this period convinced the Americans of the importance of Civil Affairs and the link between CIMIC and military operations. Therefore the United States still has a large CIMIC capacity that has been used in operations in Vietnam, Grenada, Haiti and of course the Balkans.
The British Army has not been convinced of the importance of CIMIC for as long, which meant that a few years ago they also had to start with CIMIC from

scratch. The big problem is that this takes a lot of time; time, in fact, which we do not really have if we look at current operations.

I would like to underline the importance of CIMIC with some quotes from NATO authorities and the Dutch administration. These quotes reflect the importance of CIMIC, now and in the future. (Figure 8).

"Whatever we call these operations, they will require a civilian component and a civilian-military interface. That's been the case in all of these operations in the past and most certainly in Bosnia, and it will be one of the key lessons learned for the future."
Carl Bildt, High Representative UN Bosnia, May 1996

"As I have said before, CIMIC successes permeate the entire operational effort and contribute significantly, not only at the macro level, but across the whole spectrum of civil implementation."
General Joulwan, SACEUR, January 1997

" I heartily endorse this CIMIC Group proposal."
Lt.Gen. M. Jackson (UK), Former Commander, IFOR MND (SW)

Figure 8: Importance of CIMIC for NATO

NATO stresses the necessity of CIMIC in every military operation, which is why the Alliance requested its nations to give more attention to CIMIC and the development of CIMIC capacities.

Under the code-name CIMIC 2000, NATO made further plans for CIMIC with the aim of establishing an appropriate CIMIC organisation for NATO.

At first, NATO requested the nations to establish CIMIC Staff capacities for brigade level and above, General CIMIC Support Companies, CIMIC Functional Specialist capabilities and 3 CIMIC Groups (North, South and ARRC). The CIMIC Group capabilities should be assigned to NATO, if necessary.

The Netherlands was asked to establish one of these CIMIC Groups as a framework nation. The other nations that were asked to provide a CIMIC Group were the United Kingdom and Italy. In a later phase Germany and the United States were requested to provide a CIMIC Group and the request for the United Kingdom was withdrawn. This final request was based on a CIMIC Group for the Northern European, the Southern European and the Atlantic region. This NATO request provided the Netherlands with a great opportunity to take a leading role in the international CIMIC world; an essential part of the military world now and in the future.

The Netherlands government also supports CIMIC. A few years ago our Prime Minister, Wim Kok, visited the Dutch Forces in Bosnia. In the evening news this was covered by a television item of two minutes. In these two minutes the news station only covered CIMIC and the Prime Minister spoke only of the support by the military to assist in rebuilding a nation. (Figure 9).

Furthermore, the Dutch Minister of Defence, Frank de Grave, underlined the importance of CIMIC, which is why CIMIC plays an important role in the Netherlands Defence White Paper

2000, which was approved by parliament in February 2000. In outline the White Paper states that: "recent years proved that the Dutch Armed Forces, in close cooperation with the civilian authorities and organisations, played a very important role in the reconstruction of nations.

Figure 9: Importance of CIMIC for the Netherlands

This cooperation between the military and civilian world is essential for the success of any peace support operations. There is to be a joint capacity for civil-military cooperation for peace operations. At the request of NATO, the Netherlands will, together with Germany, set up a core staff for a CIMIC Group, which will be expanded on deployment to form an international joint CIMIC unit. That unit can be enlarged in peace support operations into a Netherlands CIMIC unit of about 200 military personnel. It will also be possible to deploy the CIMIC unit for humanitarian relief for the benefit of development cooperation".

This is a national text and only reflects the Netherlands' input. The actual organisation of this CIMIC Group will be described later. However, the above text from the Defence White Paper 2000 confirms the important role of CIMIC for the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. Also in other ministries such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs, Overseas Development and Internal Affairs the interest in CIMIC will be enhanced. The conclusion is that CIMIC is sure to grow in this millennium.

Besides the recognition of the necessity of CIMIC and the conclusion that NATO and the national political level have very positive opinions about CIMIC, the level of CIMIC also depends on the objectives the Netherlands Armed Forces want to achieve with CIMIC and the participation in CIMIC activities.

5. The objectives of the Netherlands Armed Forces CIMIC Policy

Active Dutch participation in CIMIC will have a positive effect on the image of the Armed Forces. They can offer a larger package of services that will be highly appreciated by the national and international community. Nationally this will contribute to improved acceptance of the Armed Forces in civilian society.

Secondly, the Armed Forces will have better possibilities to use reserve personnel. The Netherlands has a large group of enthusiastic reserve personnel who are eager to participate in Crisis Response Operations. And the Armed Forces can then use them in the fields in which they excel!

The third objective is that the influence of the Netherlands may increase at higher multi-national levels of military commands. Active Dutch participation in CIMIC will enlarge the possibilities of influencing decision-making at these levels and reinforce the possibilities of supporting the Dutch international cooperation policy in military operations. It also could provide better chances for the national industries to participate in the rebuilding of destroyed or disrupted countries.

Finally, CIMIC offers better possibilities for actually supporting Dutch foreign policy. CIMIC offers the political leadership more options for the deployment of the national Armed Forces. Thus, CIMIC could contribute to lasting peace in certain regions of the world, support the improvement of human rights, support free trade and contribute to solving the world-wide refugee problems.

Besides these positive objectives, there are always some risks. Especially at the beginning of the policy development process, the risk of starting a discussion about the main mission of the Armed Forces was regarded as very threatening. At the moment this risk is no longer as great. The government recognises the importance of the Armed Forces in Crisis Response Operations and for the first time in ten years the yearly budget for the Ministry of Defence has been increased by parliament. Especially the Army is regarded as a Service that cannot undergo any more reductions, and the Army is again reorganising to become a more operational entity, capable of deployment for modern military operations.

The second risk was of course that it would cost money and personnel without any compensation. At the start of the policy development, there was a distinct possibility that the Services would be given the means to establish a CIMIC capacity but with an additional guideline to reduce elsewhere. In the meantime, however, the Ministry of Defence provided additional budgets to establish the Dutch parts of the CIMIC Group and a budget is allocated for the yearly operating costs of the Dutch parts of the CIMIC Group.

6. Models

Generally speaking, three models were developed, including especially the CIMIC Group in the Netherlands Armed Forces. Finally the Army was chosen as a single Service manager for this CIMIC Group, for the following reasons:

- CIMIC activities and projects are mainly executed on land and can be seen as a part of land operations
- The various Services are responsible for the organisation, the equipment and the training of the operational units and
- In accordance with NATO doctrine a CIMIC Group will be assigned to and commanded by a Land Component Commander
- The final argument was that, as a prerequisite, the Netherlands wanted to cooperate with Germany to establish this CIMIC Group. Especially in 1 (GE/NL) Corps and in MND (C), the Dutch Army has good experiences with the cooperation with German soldiers and German units. Therefore the Netherlands strived for international cooperation with Germany from the beginning.

7. Options

Several options for participating in the CIMIC Group were developed, from a zero-option to a maximum option, in which the Netherlands provides roughly 50 % of the CIMIC Group. In all options international cooperation was a prerequisite. At the moment only the maximum option is of importance. The mind-set has changed!!

The maximum option is the Netherlands as one of the framework nations of a CIMIC Group with a multinational and active capacity of roughly 40 posts and a multinational capacity on deployment and after activation of roughly 400 posts. The most important principles in this option were: it should be a joint CIMIC Group and it should be an international CIMIC Group!

Furthermore, the Dutch exclusively focus on management and Functional Specialist capacities for CIMIC activities, including necessary direct support. Thus, the Netherlands is not interested in focusing on units that can execute CIMIC tasks, such as units with cranes, construction machines, bulk lorries, bulldozers and railway equipment. This will remain a task for civilian organisations. Military equipment can only be used as complementary assets, and only if the Armed Forces have a temporary spare capacity.

8.   The Framework CIMIC Group as described by NATO

Originally, based on the NATO CIMIC 2000 plans, a Framework CIMIC Group consisted of a Staff (34 personnel), a Headquarters Company (22 personnel) including a Staff of Functional Specialists (290 personnel) and three General CIMIC Support Companies, each consisting of a Staff of 32 personnel and three small platoons of 10 personnel each. (Figure 10).

In this CIMIC Group the Netherlands wanted to play an important role and wanted to provide personnel for key positions. Further-more, the Netherlands wanted to be responsible for parts of the direct support of this unit and to provide its share of the main equipment.

This CIMIC Group will be activated and deployed in accordance with the type of operation. In peacetime and in situations in which there are no operations, only a multinational nucleus staff of 40 to 50 multinational personnel will be available. This nucleus staff should be capable of activating the complete CIMIC Group and of planning and preparing all kinds of CIMIC activities.

Figure 10: NATO's CIMIC Group

The Staff has to prepare and to manage CIMIC activities and projects at the level of a regional NATO Commander, a Corps Commander or a Land Component Commander. Furthermore, the CIMIC Group will have to coordinate with civilian organisations, superior national and international authorities, NGOs and IOs.

The General CIMIC Support Companies are in fact the CIMIC eyes and ears at the lower levels of command. They also have to plan and coordinate CIMIC activities and projects at divisional and lower levels and they are tasked with establishing CIMIC centres.

The Staff containing the CIMIC Functional Specialists is an organisational part of the Headquarters Company. If a specific CIMIC activity requires detailed specialist capacity and knowledge, this can be provided by the Functional Specialists and they will prepare, lead or co-ordinate CIMIC activities and projects. They assist both the Staff and the General CIMIC Support Companies by providing advice on issues that require specific knowledge and experience.

NATO requested the Netherlands to establish the Staff of the CIMIC Group, the Headquarters Company and a large number of CIMIC Functional Specialists. Apart from that, all NATO nations were requested to provide General CIMIC Support Companies and a number of CIMIC Functional Specialists.

On deployment of the CIMIC Group as a whole, NATO estimated an international strength of about 500 personnel in which the Netherlands should take part with roughly 200 personnel.

The question is now how to make this CIMIC Policy operational and finally integrate it into NATO, the 1 (GE/NL) Corps and the Netherlands Operational Command?

9. G9 and S9: Operational CIMIC staff capacity.

The staff capacity for CIMIC, as requested by NATO, is badly needed for the Armed Forces. As explained above, CIMIC definitely supports the execution of military operations and contributes to force protection. Without the preparation and execution of CIMIC it becomes quite difficult, if not impossible, to meet the military objectives. As far as the Army is concerned the G9 and S9 CIMIC staffs have to be properly manned to lend substance to the CIMIC tasks of any military unit or command.

Therefore the related organisations and training have been introduced. Now it is possible to man CIMIC staff elements with professional personnel at all operational levels in the Royal Netherlands Army. These CIMIC Staffs should cover the basic CIMIC capability. It is possible to look for combinations with existing staff capabilities and the higher levels of command can be provided with extra CIMIC staff capacity that is able to support the lower levels (pooling).

In the case of an actual deployment of operational units, the integral CIMIC staff capacity will be insufficient for a Crisis Response Operation. Assigning personnel who already fulfil a peacetime job in these staffs to a CIMIC function can enlarge this capacity, the most likely examples being personnel from the controller and the financial and personnel branches.

If more capacity is needed, reserve personnel and personnel fulfilling peacetime jobs in other staffs and units can fill the gap. Finally, personnel can be collected from the Dutch parts of the CIMIC Group as long as they are not assigned to support the international CIMIC organisation during a Crisis Response Operation.


Figure 11: CIMIC Staff capacity

In the organisation of our Ministry of Defence there is no dedicated CIMIC staff personnel yet. In my view dedicated CIMIC personnel should be incorporated into the operational part of the Dutch Ministry of Defence. The possible establishment of a Dutch Joint Operational Headquarters at this level may provide the right opportunities to include an operational CIMIC Staff at the highest national military level of command.

For CIMIC policy matters, combinations have been made with existing staff responsibilities within the Defence Staff. A few years ago close cooperation started at this level in the 'Defence-Netherlands Industry Platform'. CIMIC has been on the agenda since the Platform was set up. The Royal Netherlands Navy, Air Force and Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary [*Koninklijke Marechaussee*] came to the conclusion that it is not necessary to appoint dedicated CIMIC personnel in their Services, but they actively participate in the Dutch parts of the CIMIC Group (Figure 11).

Only the Army has appointed dedicated CIMIC staff personnel. The Policy Branch of the Army Staff has appointed one officer for CIMIC policy matters and the Army's Directorate of Operations has established a CIMIC Section.

Headquarters 1 (GE/NL) Corps is now transforming into a High Readiness Forces Headquarters in which, besides Germany and the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States are to participate. This Headquarters has established a CIMIC Staff Division with a Peacetime Establishment of 11 personnel and a Crisis Establishment of 21 personnel coming from all participating nations.

At the lower operational level, CIMIC staff capacity is pooled within the Army Operational Command. A G9 Section with 18 staff officers and NCOs has been established. The main task of this CIMIC Staff is to support all possible missions the Royal Netherlands Army should be prepared to execute. (Figure 12).


Figure 12: Operational CIMIC Staff Capacity

The first mission of the Royal Netherlands Army is to deploy 3 battalions at the same time in three different theatres and to sustain these deployments for several years. In this case every deployed battalion in a Crisis Response Operation will be provided with 2 trained and experienced CIMIC personnel and additionally with 6 CIMIC augmentees. These augmentees come from a pool of more than 50 trained CIMIC officers and NCOs who fulfil a daily peacetime job elsewhere in the Army.

The second mission is to deploy one brigade in a Peace Enforcing Operation. In this case they will be used to form the nucleus CIMIC staff of that brigade and the battalions. Such an operation can be sustained for one year if all personnel from the Army Operational Command G9 Section and some CIMIC augmentees are used. This means that the Crisis Establishment of 10 CIMIC Staff that is mentioned in the boxes of the brigades can only be deployed twice in one year for only one brigade.

The third and last mission is to take part in a Collective Defence Operation. In that case the 18 personnel from the G 9 Section will be divided over the Army Operational Command, the brigades and the commands, thus forming the experienced CIMIC staff for every level of command. Personnel already available within these staffs and normally fulfilling peacetime jobs will reinforce this CIMIC capacity.

The mission of these CIMIC Sections is to coordinate and to plan all aspects related to the execution of CIMIC activities and projects. This implies that even the G1 to the G8 Sections will perform CIMIC tasks within their area of responsibility. The CIMIC Sections operate in the unexplored area between these sections. It concerns mainly smaller CIMIC projects and activities, civil administrative issues and contacting the numerous civil authorities and officials including NGOs and IOs in the area of operations of that unit or command.

It may happen that specific military operations will primarily have a CIMIC character and the G9 will therefore play a central role in the planning and execution of the military operation. At that moment, the Commander will focus his attention on the planning and execution of these CIMIC activities and projects. The other staff sections will perform a more or less supporting role in such an operation.

10. International cooperation in the CIMIC Group North

At first Dutch international cooperation was focused on Germany and, at the request of the Netherlands Chief of Defence Staff to combine the mutual efforts, Germany responded positively. Germany and the Netherlands co-chaired the Working Group CIMIC Group North (Figure 13). NATO nations from the northern part of Europe were the next target and the first

Figure 13: Logo Working Group CIMIC Group North

informal talks took place in spring 1999 at SHAPE Headquarters. At the first meeting of the Working Group CIMIC Group North in November 1999 it was decided that the Dutch and the German Chiefs of Defence would formally invite the other Northern European NATO nations to participate in the CIMIC Group North.

The reaction of the nations with regard to this invitation can be found in Figure 14. It can be concluded that 6 nations wanted to participate in the CIMIC Group.

The Working Group decided to draft a Letter of Intent that should clarify the intentions and the objectives for this international cooperation. The Letter of Intent, which was approved in November 2000, states:

"The objectives of establishing CIMIC Group North are to provide the Participants with an essential military capacity, to improve daily, multinational co-operation and training, to achieve mutual reinforcement of the CIMIC qualities and CIMIC capacities of the Participants, to optimise operational efficiency and to limit costs. The CIMIC Group North will be established, with initial participation of Germany, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland and Norway and will form a CIMIC capacity for NATO and that may be made available to other international organisations".

Figure 14: Reactions of NATO Nations

The Dutch and German Armed Forces led the process that was to lead to the establishment of this combined and joint CIMIC Group North. To achieve this main goal, within 2 years the Working Group CIMIC Group North developed a large number of documents such as a Memorandum of Understanding, Technical Arrangements on Personnel and Support, an Operational Policy, an Operational Concept, a Training and Education Policy and an ICT Concept. Besides these documents the Working Group described the complete organisation in Organisation and Job descriptions, a Peacetime Establishment, a Crisis Establishment and a Materiel Establishment. All of the above documents form the basis for the CIMIC Group North that started as an Activation Staff on 3 September 2001 in their Headquarters at the Nassau Dietz Barracks in Budel, Netherlands.

The Mission Statement of the Group was internationally and interactively developed with the 6 nations. It describes the main missions of the CIMIC Group North: "CIMIC Group North is a dedicated CIMIC capability to actually engage, as directed, in CIMIC activities in order to support any military mission; to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and to serve as an essential forum for CIMIC consultations".

Within the limits of national constitutions and availability of forces and pursuant to the decisions taken by the nations, CIMIC Group North is tasked with operating in:
- Collective Defence Operations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,
- Multinational Crisis Response Operations and Peace Support Operations led by NATO, the UN, or other Ios
- Support of Humanitarian Operations.

All deployments will take place in accordance with the applicable mandate and agreements.
In particular, the CIMIC Group will permanently plan and prepare for CIMIC activities and projects in military operations taking place all over the world. This unit also will permanently prepare CIMIC capacities in the fields of personnel, equipment, financial resources, training and education of personnel and national and international co-ordination in the CIMIC arena.
Furthermore, CIMIC Functional Specialists have to be obtained from the reserve component of the various Armed Forces of the nations that participate in the CIMIC Group North. In addition, personnel will be derived from the several national and international departments, governmental organisations, civil community and civil trade and industry.

Figure 15: Organisation CIMIC Group North

This Functional Specialist capacity will only serve in the CIMIC Group. Subsequently it is the nations and the CIMIC Group's shared responsibility to recruit, select, assign, train and inform their mobilisable CIMIC personnel, including the Functional Specialists. The organisation of the CIMIC Group North is depicted in Figure 15.

Within the Staff the active strength contributed by the Netherlands will consist of 23 persons from all 4 Services. Additionally 31 military personnel from Germany and 6 Staff officers from the other 4 participating NATO nations augment this active strength. All participating nations provide a so-called CIMIC Support Unit. These CIMIC Support Units differ in strength from 50 personnel to 126 personnel. The Netherlands CIMIC Support Unit is built in a modular way and can support all operational options for the Dutch Armed Forces. (Figure 16).


Figure 16: Netherlands CIMIC Support Unit

The unit is capable of supporting any deployed Dutch Battalion with a CIMIC Support Module including 2 CIMIC Support Teams. In the case of deployment of the CIMIC Group North the Dutch CIMIC Support Unit can support that operation as an entity for 6 months, but also for a longer period if only one or two CIMIC Support Elements are deployed for periods of 6 months. Except for one operations officer, the complete CIMIC Support Unit has to be activated with personnel serving in a peacetime job elsewhere in the Armed Forces.

The various areas in which CIMIC Functional Specialists will have to operate are mentioned in Figure 17.

NATO requested that the Netherlands grant a huge number of specialists. The Netherlands will provide, however, no more than 120 CIMIC Functional Specialists; 360 persons will be needed to fill these posts. NATO specifically asked the Netherlands to appoint specialists in CIMIC fields such as Civil Infrastructure, Economy and Commerce and some other CIMIC tasks. The Netherlands, however, will provide Functional Specialists for the whole spectrum of CIMIC. This will give the Dutch the possibility of a certain level of independence.

Most participating nations will or may provide CIMIC Functional Specialists. The Netherlands is now recruiting sufficient CIMIC Functional Specialists to fill 120 posts in all 5 CIMIC areas. Germany intends to provide the same number of Functional Specialists but has not yet claimed any Functional Specialists posts. Denmark has confirmed that it will provide 50 CIMIC Functional Specialists in the areas of Humanitarian Assistance and Civil Infrastructure. Norway and Poland intend to provide roughly 50 Functional Specialists after a request to do so. Both nations are still studying the possibilities of how to realise this. Finally, the Czech Republic cannot provide Functional Specialists because of national legal restrictions. This means that the 5 providing nations will be capable of filling the complete Functional Specialists organisation of 317 posts.


Figure 17: CIMIC Functional Specialists Areas

The total mission strength of the CIMIC Group North, on deployment, could count 230 personnel from the Netherlands, with an additional 230 personnel from Germany. Another

300 personnel or even more could come from the 4 other participating NATO nations. This could result in a final and total strength varying from 700 to even more than 800. In principle CIMIC Group North will not use more than 400 personnel on a deployment in a Crisis Response Operation. This means that the additional strength of the CIMIC Group North provides the participating nations and NATO with a robust CIMIC Group with sufficient sustainability.

11. Deployment of the CIMIC Group North

At the start of an operation, Commander CIMIC Group North may decide to use most personnel of the Peacetime Establishment in the start-up phase. This period may be 1 or 2 months. At the moment the staff is running smoothly; augmentees may take over some positions.


Figure 18: CGN Deployment in a Collective Defence Operation

In a Collective Defence Operation, CIMIC Group North will be tasked with supporting a Corps or even a Regional Command. CIMIC Group North will direct CIMIC Support Units to support divisions and the CIMIC Support Units could direct CIMIC Support Elements to support brigades and possibly battalions. Commander CIMIC Group North will also decide how and when to deploy the Functional Specialists; centrally, decentrally or in a combination, taking into consideration national command and control arrangements (Figure 18).

In the case of a Crisis Response Operation, CIMIC Group North will be tasked with supporting a Land Component Command or even a Force Command.
CIMIC Group North will direct CIMIC Support Units to support divisions or brigades and the CIMIC Support Units could direct CIMIC Support Elements or CIMIC Support Modules to

support brigades and battalions, taking into account national command and control arrangements. Functional Specialists will be deployed depending on their reaction time and necessity in the operation. When deployed CIMIC Group North will decide how to direct and to use the Functional Specialists; taking into consideration national command and control arrangements. (Figure 19).

Figure 19: CGN Deployment in a Crisis response Operation

12.   Command and Control

In principle, the Coordinating Committee is the authority to supervise and to give overall guidance with regard to all CIMIC Group North matters.

As a general principle, personnel, materiel, units, installations and offices contributed to CIMIC Group North will remain under their respective nations' full command.

The Commander CIMIC Group North has operational command over the CIMIC Group

Figure 20: Command & Control in Peacetime Situation

North Headquarters and, when deployed, operational command or operational control over assigned Functional Specialists as well as, following transfer of authority, operational control over the CIMIC Support Units. (Figure 20).

CIMIC Group North Headquarters will be a NATO Assigned Force to SACEUR. Within this assignment it will be under the operational control of CINCNORTH as soon as the state of readiness is declared

in accordance with NATO procedures. Therefore CIMIC Group North Headquarters will seek guidance from RHQ AFNORTH on all NATO operational matters.

For Collective Defence Operations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, CIMIC Group North will, after Transfer of Authority, be placed under the operational control of CINCNORTH. He may then decide to deploy CIMIC Group North in direct support of several Corps, such as 1 (GE/NL) Corps and Corps North/East.

In Crisis Response Operations and other NATO operations, CIMIC Group North will be placed under the operational control of the Joint Force Commander or an appropriate Land Component Commander

Figure 21: Command & Control in Crisis Response Operations

in accordance with the force generation process. (Figure 21). In the near future, High Readiness Forces Headquarters can provide these Land Component Commands. There we can find the possible link with 1 (GE/NL) Corps and the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. In other than NATO operations CIMIC Group North can be assigned to an appropriate Force Commander.

13. Training and Education

Besides taking part in operations, one of the most important tasks for the CIMIC Group North is the provision of Training and Education. For this purpose the CJ 7 Branch formulated the following mission:

> *In cooperation with other staff branches of the CIMIC Group North, to provide CIMIC Training and Education at the operational and tactical level for military personnel and civilians at reasonable cost in order to enhance CIMIC capabilities of the CIMIC Group North, participating nations, cooperating nations and other organisations with a view to supporting a military mission.*

To achieve this mission, CIMIC Group North developed CIMIC courses at tactical and operational level with a duration of two weeks each. Besides these two courses, CIMIC Group North developed a CIMIC Orientation Course of one week and a CIMIC Functional Specialist Course of three days. All courses are open for military and civilian personnel from the participating nations, other nations and for personnel of IOs and NGOs.

As a basis for these courses a lot of information and experience will be used from a wide range of instructors from several NATO nations, civilian society and also from IOs and NGOs.

For educational purposes and to serve as a guide for CIMIC, the Netherlands developed a CIMIC Handbook. This Handbook gives CIMIC guidance for the Netherlands Forces and should be used by all Dutch CIMIC Staffs.

14. CIMIC Personnel

Personnel who have to prepare and execute CIMIC tasks can be divided into 2 main groups: those who prepare and direct the CIMIC activities and projects (the managers or generalists) and those who bring with them their specific (civilian) knowledge (the Functional Specialists).

It is important to man the posts for generalists with professional, well-motivated military personnel with broad experience. This implies that in the basic and continuous training of these military personnel, more and appropriate attention will be paid to CIMIC issues.

In general, these personnel can be active, professional military personnel who fulfil peacetime posts

Figure 22: Functional specialists in action

in operational units or posts in purely peacetime military organisations. Besides this peacetime post they can fulfil a CIMIC post, if required, for a Crisis Response Operation. If necessary this category of CIMIC personnel may be completed with reserve personnel.

Military personnel belonging to specific Services can bring in some Functional Specialist knowledge. They can, for instance, fulfil posts for air traffic controllers, aviation and airport specialists, harbour specialists, military police, logisticians, transportation specialists, engineers, lawyers etc. However, they are also organic military professionals fulfilling jobs in operational units as well peacetime military organisations. Therefore only specialist personnel fulfilling a peacetime post can be allocated to a CIMIC Functional Specialist post.

Most specific civilian knowledge has to be obtained by using reserve personnel who, based on their civilian work, possess the desired specific skills and by using the civilian specialists from the Ministry of Defence and other departments, various local public organisations and the trade and industry sector. All CIMIC Functional Specialists will be deployed as military personnel and their legal status and terms of employment will be guaranteed.

The use of reserve personnel and militarised civilians for CIMIC activities has been prepared thoroughly and carefully. This should be a task for the Army Personnel Command in close cooperation with Dutch personnel of the Personnel Branch (CJ 1) of the CIMIC Group North, other Directorates of Personnel of the services and the Recruitment and Selection Directorate.

It is neither likely nor reasonable that the necessary Functional Specialists will leave their job for six months. This is only possible when both the specialist and his employer support the mission because a civilian company's interest is involved. Most likely the employer and the specialist will accept a CIMIC Functional Specialist job for 2 or 3 months. This implies that all CIMIC Functional Specialist functions have to be manned by an average of at least 3 people to guarantee an operational sustainability of at least 6 months.

15. Present developments

The Netherlands Armed Forces are in the middle of the recruitment and selection of the CIMIC Functional Specialists. Because of the need for civilian Functional Specialists working and educated at university and academy level, the Netherlands chooses a personal approach of

the potential Functional Specialists and their employers. Therefore a system of networking has been developed. (Figure 23).

Candidates for every CIMIC Functional Specialist's area will be recruited by one of the five network teams. The network managers in this team use their civilian and/or reserve officers' network to select qualified candidates. These qualified candidates will be forwarded to the Army Personnel Command for physical examination, screening and for contracting. In these contracts the terms of employment, including reasonable payment, play a major role. The Dutch Armed Forces have developed very good terms of employment for this purpose. Also the possible compensation for the employer has been taken into account, although a lot of employers in the Netherlands support the principles of 'Social Enterprise' and therefore see a need to support CIMIC at reasonable or no cost.


Figure 23: Recruitment of Functional Specialists

If the examination, screening and contracting are successful, candidate Functional Specialists will be appointed as reserve officers and posted in Functional Specialist's jobs in the CIMIC Group North.

At the moment the network teams already have enough potential candidates to fill all the posts and they have forwarded 50 % of the necessary Functional Specialists to the Army's Directorate of Personnel for contracting.

Since September 2001, CIMIC group North has been training and developing itself to become an operational CIMIC unit by September 2002. For this purpose the Staff has developed a schedule and Standard Operational Instructions. Training in the procedures was given for the first time in an internal study period in February. In March the Staff of the CIMIC Group North participated in the NATO exercise 'Strong Resolve 2002' in Poland. Two Exercise Study Periods with key personnel of the CIMIC Support Units took place in 2002. Besides these two Exercise Study Periods the Staff of the CIMIC Group North took part in exercise 'Cooperative Adventure' of the AMF(L) and exercise 'Cannon Cloud' of AFNORTH. The cycle of CIMIC Courses started in May and is still ongoing. Therefore CIMIC Group North is well on the way to reaching its operational status by the end of 2002 and looking forward to any real deployment in a military mission anywhere in the world. This will be the moment when CIMIC Group North can really prove its value and the meaning of its logo (Figure 24).

In this logo the green is the NATO colour for international Headquarters and therefore symbolises the strong link with NATO. Blue is the colour of Europe. Orange represents the colour of the Host Nation where the CIMIC Group North Headquarters is stationed. The world symbol expresses the possible areas where CIMIC Group North may be deployed. The six orange dots represent the six participa-

Figure 24: Logo CIMIC Group North

ting nations or in the future, if more nations would like to participate, the six continents of the world. The lines between the dots symbolise the cooperation of the six nations throughout the world.

Finally, the slogan 'cooperating' in the middle of the logo is the most essential characteristic of CIMIC and modern Crisis Response Operations. And 'cooperating' is the critical characteristic for CIMIC and for this CIMIC Group. Without cooperation there would be no CIMIC at all.

16. The future for CIMIC

In 1999 the Netherlands Armed Forces had almost no military personnel specially trained for CIMIC or fulfilling a CIMIC post. Now, in 2002, the Netherlands Armed Forces have more than 50 military personnel specially trained for CIMIC and fulfilling an active CIMIC post in the CIMIC Group North or in an operational national or international Staff. Another 150 military personnel who are or will be trained CIMIC personnel and who fulfil peacetime posts elsewhere in the Armed Forces can reinforce this capability. Furthermore, it is estimated that by the end of 2002 the Netherlands Armed Forces will be able to deploy 120 CIMIC Functional Specialists who by then will have been trained and contracted.

With this CIMIC capability it should not be too complicated to develop CIMIC in the Netherlands in such a way that the Netherlands Armed Forces can be seen as a world-wide example for a modern approach to CIMIC.

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The Dutch Battalion in Bosnia-Herzegovina and CIMIC projects in the period 1996-2002 [1]

[*NL-ARMS*, 2002: Chapter 8]

C. Homan

1.   Introduction

Since the nineties the Netherlands armed forces have becvome increasingly active in humanitarian aid and reconstruction in countries where they have carried out peace operations. This activity implies close cooperation with civilian institutions, for which the concept of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) has been developed over the past few years. For the armed forces CIMIC is not a policy objective in itself, but a tool for the purpose of force security, peacekeeping and reconstruction.

Nowadays the term CIMIC encompasses the coordination of and cooperation between military commanders and the civilian population, including national and local authorities as well as international, national and Non-Governmental Organisations and institutions that support a military mission.

Carrying out small-scale infrastructural projects is one of the most important CIMIC activities. Following a visit of the then Minister of Development Cooperation to the Dutch IFOR-battalion in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996, DM 1,000,000 (ca. €510,000) were made available for CIMIC projects, which formed the start of a whole programme. In the period 1996-2002 the Minister of Development Cooperation has granted nine allocations, amounting to a total of ƒ 8,914,000 (€4,045,000).

This contribution examines the execution of these projects since 1996 by the Dutch IFOR (and later SFOR) battalion stationed in Central Bosnia.

2.   History of the CIMIC projects

The history of these small-scale infrastructural projects of the Dutch armed forces goes back to the early eighties, when the UNIFIL battalion in Lebanon organised activities such as building schools, improving and starting up water management, processing of waste and giving medical help. During operation 'Provide Comfort' in Northern Iraq in 1991 Dutch Engineers and Marines assisted in the reconstruction of the remains of Kurdish villages. The financial support for these activities, however, was hardly structured: the contributions came from various parts of the Development Cooperation budget, amongst others the budgetary category of Emergency Aid and Humanitarian Emergencies.

The UNTAC operation in Cambodia proved a breakthrough. Partly as a result of a visit of the Ministers Ter Beek (MoD) and Pronk (Development Cooperation) the Marine battalion was given half a million Dutch guilders (€225,000) for so-called 'Pronk projects', to be carried out under the same conditions as the so-called 'Kleine Ambassade Projecten' - KAP (Small Embassy Projects) - that had been in existence since 1977. After a report on the progress of the Cambodian projects the Minister decided to donate an extra half million Dutch guilders. In the former Yugoslavia DUTCHBAT carried out a number of humanitarian projects around the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica, and in the peace operation in Haiti the Marines, too, got half a million guilders for such small-scale projects.

All these projects had to meet certain conditions, which were essentially the KAP criteria. Broadly speaking, the following requirements were set:

- small-scale and local initiative - this requirement implies that the costs of the project may not exceed ƒ 50,000 (€22,500) and the request for the project must in principle be made by the local population;
- maximal use of locally purchased goods and materials;
- clearly defined groups, actively involved in the project, making a contribution to the best of their abilities;
- after rounding off the projects, the activities must be carried on by the population; the project may not have a charitable character;
- rehabilitation aid must not be given in the form of large deliveries of food and medicines, except when they are intended as a bridge to a more permanent solution;
- humanitarian projects have to be adjusted as much as possible to the activities of other aid organisations present.

For the Dutch military personnel executing these small-scale projects served as a means to increase the population's trust in them, which would enhance their peacekeeping task. Moreover, the population volunteered useful information sooner and this contributed to the security of the personnel.

3. Dayton Peace Agreement

The CIMIC activities of the Dutch battalion in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) are taking place within the context of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). They date back to September 1995, when the United States and Russia pressed the presidents of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia to accept a peace settlement based on the territorial integrity of Bosnia, subsequently signed in Paris on 14 December of that year. According to the agreement, BiH was going to comprise one state, with a central government, a democratically elected president and parliament, one central bank and monetary system. Simultaneously, the state would consist of two separate areas, viz. the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republica Srpska. The Bosniacs (Muslims) and Bosnian Croats, who together formed the Muslim-Croat Federation, got 51% of the BiH territory, the remaining 49% going to the Bosnian Serbs in the Republic of Srpska.

The so-called Implementation Force (IFOR), established by UNSCR 1031 of 15 December 1995, was to create circumstances for the execution of DPA. IFOR was to assist in a step-by-step realisation (within the year) of the peace process and was allowed to use violence when necessary. At the end of 1996 IFOR was replaced by the (smaller) Stabilisation Force (SFOR). IFOR/SFOR oversees the implementation of the military aspects of DPA. The objective of DPA is the return to peace and stability and SFOR's task is to prevent hostilities and to foster stability in support of the peace process. Besides, DPA specifies that SFOR, within the possibilities that are given in the mandate, gives support to civilian organisations with a view to the return of all ethnic entities in Bosnia to their former homes.

4. General situation

The war in the former Yugoslavia cost nearly 280,000 dead/missing and 25,000 permanently disabled people. More than 2.5 million persons were displaced or fled abroad. At this moment some 660,000 or about 26% of the refugees and displaced persons have returned to their homes, with the return to minority areas being exceedingly slow.

At the political and economic level progress towards a multi-ethnic, democratic and prosperous country is rather slow. The three nationalist parties still exercise considerable political power. Apart from that, international help, which has been responsible for most of the post-

war economic growth of the country, amounts to at least 30% of the GNP and will be reduced in the coming years. The wealth generated inside the country itself will not be sufficient to support a reasonably functioning social welfare system. The average unemployment in BiH is close to 40% and causes a serious social-economic problem. It is especially the younger generation that are bearing the burden of this unemployment.

5.   The Dutch battalion in Canton 6

5.1   Area of operations of the Dutch battalion
The Area of Responsibility (AOR) of SFOR is divided into three multinational sectors. The Dutch units, formed around the core of a mechanised battalion, are part of sector South-West. After two of the six battalions there were pulled out in 2000, the sector was restructured. The area covered by the Dutch largely corresponds to the Bosnian Canton 6 and lies entirely in the territory of the Muslim-Croat Federation. The area stretches 80 kilometres from northwest to southeast and 50 kilometres from southwest to northeast, a size comparable to the Greater London area.

5.2   Terrain and climate
The terrain in Canton 6 features a high central mountain range, which divides the area from northwest to southeast. Near the southwestern border of the Dutch battalion area there is another mountain range.
The weather shows the typical characteristics of a continental climate: hot to very hot summers (up to +40 degrees centigrade) and cold to very cold winters (up to –25 degrees centigrade). Many villages are difficult to reach by country roads or mountain paths, which in winter can only be used by APCs and in some cases only with special snow vehicles.

5.3   Refugee problem
All ethnic groups were involved in the war in the early nineties, when Canton 6 was the scene of heavy fighting, which resulted in extensive war damage. UN investigations have revealed that war crimes were committed in Canton 6. Before the war Canton 6 was home to 342,000 inhabitants: 43% Bosniacs, 39% Bosnian Croats, 12% Bosnian Serbs, and 7% others (a.o. Roma). The present population mainly consists of Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats, because the Bosnian-Serb community largely fled the area during and after the war. In Canton 6 live about 20,000 to 25,000 registered displaced persons (DP) who, having fled their original homes, have now returned to this Canton. At the moment some 115,000 original inhabitants of this area (20,000 Bosniacs, 41,000 Bosnian Croats, 35,500 Bosnian Serbs and 18,500 others) do not live here. Immediately after the signing of DPA this number was 186,000.
The number of returned Bosnian Serbs has increased sharply over the past eighteen months. After Sarajevo and Herzegovina-Neretna, Canton 6 has the highest number of returned DPs in BiH. Figures on Canton 6 over the year 2000 show that 13,588 persons (6,477 Bosniacs, 5,965 Bosnian Croats, 1,222 Bosnian Serbs and 24 others) registered as 'returner'. In 2001 8,641 persons (2,760 Bosniacs, 3,586 Bosnian Croats, 2,277 Bosnian Serbs and 17 others) registered. The figures for Canton 6 are not entirely reliable. A comparison of the figures of Canton 6 with those of UNHCR showed that about 80% of the 'returners' were registered by both organisations.

6.   The Dutch battalion and CIMIC projects

The assignment for the Dutch battalion specifies the civil-military cooperation in Canton 6 as follows:

1 (NL) Mechbat carries out the area security in the assigned area, enforces the military stipulations of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), prevents the spreading of hostilities of the Armed Forces in BiH and supports the civilian organisations responsible for the implementation of the civilian aspects of the GFAP by guaranteeing a safe environment. 1 (NL) Mechbat supports civilian reconstruction within its possibilities. This will foster a durable stability and peace, making the presence of NATO forces unnecessary in the long run.

Besides, the operational order states that a subordinate task of the battalion is to pro-actively support civilian reconstruction. The desired end state is:

for people in BiH to live and work with each other in peace, as much as possible in a multi-ethnic society, under their own government and governmental institutions.

Within the context of this assignment the battalion maintains relations with international civilian organisations such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIB).

7.   S-5 Section

The head of the S-5 section in the battalion staff at Bugojno is a major and he is in charge of CIMIC activities, including the small-scale infrastructural CIMIC projects. His official task is to liaise between the battalion and other parties. With a permanent staff of nine people, he maintains contact with the cantonal authorities, the Netherlands Embassy, international organisations (OHR, UNHCR, OCSE, IPTF, USAID, etc.) and NGOs (ASB, HELP, UMCOR, etc.). The S-5 section is divided over the camp sites in Bugojno and Novi Travnik.

The staff officer of the S-5 section, also 2iC, is a captain who operates from the battalion staff at Bugojno. From there he maintains contact with the local authorities and represents the head of the S-5 section. The other staff officer of the S-5 section is a captain who works with the other team in Novi Travnik, where he maintains contact with the authorities in his area.

All personnel working in the S-5 section rotate every six months with the battalion, except for the head. There is a transfer period of about a week, in which the details of the S-5 work in the designated area are covered and the new team can meet the authorities they will have to work with.

Concerning the execution of CIMIC projects, the S-5 was initially assisted by a Tactical Support Team (TST), with a staff of eight, that was mainly in charge of making 'area assessments' of the municipalities and manning the CIMIC/INFO centres. The TSTs have now been replaced by a Technical Support Group (Togp), with four personnel of DGW&T (Directorate of Civil Engineering) of the MoD: head Togp, a captain and overall coordinator; a structural engineer; an electrical engineer, and a heating engineer. Togp is in charge of assessing projects, tenders of contractors and monitoring the execution of the projects.

Civilian personnel is temporarily militarised.

8.   Procedures for CIMIC projects

The procedures followed by the battalion for carrying out CIMIC projects are essentially based on those used by the DGW&T organisation in the Netherlands and at the moment they comprise the following (partly overlapping) steps:

1.   *Identification of projects (no 'stand alone' projects)*

An agreement has been made with the cantonal and municipal authorities that they will propose programmes – which by definition will enhance the coherence in the projects -, indicating priorities and including an estimate of the costs. This requirement is intended to prevent

the authorities from 'selling' all reconstruction projects as priorities, allowing them to get rid of their responsibility for the choice to be made.

2. *Validation by the attached Togp*

The Togp assesses the technical aspects of the project. Until the most recent allocation the NL Embassy had to give its permission; this authority has now been given to the battalion.

3. *Inviting tenders*

The municipality involved is responsible for writing the tender, which is submitted to and evaluated critically for any imperfections by Togp.

4. *Contract or allotment*

When the definite tender is ready the various contractors are invited to make a bid on the project. Then, the necessary capacity and know-how of the contractors will be assessed by the Togp. Whenever possible, contractors from the local municipality are invited. The DGW&T requirement of at least two bids is easily met in the Dutch battalion area. It is standard practice to invite about 6 contractors for a bid: 3 bids from the municipality - provided the contractors have the proper qualifications-, and 3 bids from within the Canton or even from outside. In principle, the contractor with the lowest bid will be given the project. When the differences between bids are minimal, a local contractor may be given preference.

5. *Contracting*

The battalion arranges a financial contract with the municipality, which in turn arranges a contract with the contractor.

6. *Monitoring progress by Togp*

Togp monitors the progress of running projects through regular inspections.

7. *Completion of the project*

Togp inspects the completed project for any defects.

8. *Maintenance phase*

Any defects have to be put right by the contractor within two months after completion. When he fails to do so, a penalty clause fixed in the contract becomes effective.

9. *Payment (phased)*

Depending on the quantity of required material, there is phased payment. A first down payment of 30% takes place on signing the contract. Subsequently, two times 30% of the costs are paid. The last payment of 10% takes place two months after completion of the project. In case of small projects the total amount can be paid at once (minus 10%).

10. *Handover*

After the maintenance phase is over, the (responsibility for) the project is handed over to the municipality or any other body which was involved in the process.

11. *File building*

All documents pertaining to the project are filed and sent to the Comptroller of the Contingency Command in Banja Luka, who forwards them to the Netherlands. After completion of an 'activity number' the comptroller sends a financial overview to the MoD. Subsequently, the MoD will arrange a settlement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

9. Project criteria

The basic document for the CIMIC programme is the Memorandum from the Bureau of Emergency Aid of 21 March 1996, in which several criteria for the projects are specified.

1. *Local population*

According to the first criterion projects have to benefit the local population in the AOR. This is an obvious criterion and all projects do indeed meet the requirement. It may concern a number of families (as in house repairs), a village community (water supply) or an entire

municipality (in case of a hospital). The size of the group benefiting from a project may differ every time. In general the projects involve facilities for a residential community.

2. *Rehabilitation*

The second criterion states that priority should be given to repair of physical infrastructure. As reconstruction is also mentioned, this concerns repair of infrastructure that was damaged or destroyed in the conflict (rehabilitation). All projects are essentially infrastructural works, half of which can be seen as rehabilitation. The other half comprises real repairs, replacement or new infrastructural works. The criteria that apply here were intended for the first programme, which terminated on 31 December 1996. As far as is known, these criteria have not been formally reviewed since then. Since the beginning of 2001 the municipalities have taken care of the identification and the attention has probably shifted more towards new works.

3. *Involvement*

Involvement of the local population in the identification and execution is the third criterion. In general the local population (through the municipality) is indeed involved in the identification, but not usually in the execution. Since the beginning of 2001 the municipalities have been making priority lists. Before that time the Dutch battalion was leading in the identification process and had to take the initiative in visiting sites and institutions to find out where help was needed (as in the case of the Jajce hospital).

4./5. *Distribution over ethnic entities*

The fourth and fifth criteria refer to the distribution of the projects over the three communities. It is standing policy to distribute the projects evenly over all the municipalities and communities. However, seeing how the communities are scattered over the area, it is obvious that it is impossible to avoid projects that will only benefit one community. It is therefore attempted to carry out projects for the other two communities as well. Apart from Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs, there is still a small group of Roma. A number of CIMIC projects benefit this minority group.

6. *Handover*

The sixth criterion refers to the handover of the projects. For all projects it is clear who are the owners and where the responsibility for maintenance lies. Usually the municipalities are the owners of the projects (schools, hospitals, etc.). In a few cases ownership lies with state companies (water supply, sports hall), a village community (water supply) and individual citizens (repair of houses). A well-regulated handover, however, does not necessarily guarantee durability.

7. *Coordination*

Coordination is central to the final criterion. Initially, the coordination was mainly directed at the 'international community' in the Canton, consisting of the Dutch battalion, UNHCR, OHR, (RRTF), OSCE and UNMIBH. Municipalities and NGOs did not take part in the meetings on a structural basis. Recently the 'Implementers' Club' has been set up as a coordinating body, in which the Central Bosnian Canton takes part along with the 'international community'.

10. Project realisation

The main effort of the CIMIC projects lies in the period between April and September as wintry conditions often hamper their exececution. In this way an impulse is given to the local community and the project support rendered has a double effect. Understandably, the first Dutch battalions were more involved in a direct execution. In the first place, immediately after the conflict there was the need for quick repair of essential infrastructure like bridges and roads. In connection with this, the battalions (with engineer units) were better equipped for carrying out the projects themselves, in view of their materiel and expertise. Only in the initial

phases houses were repaired through CIMIC projects, but this practice was abandoned when it was felt that projects directed at an entire community would generate more positive attention than projects offering individual support.

The nature of these projects requires first of all the expertise of Togp. However, the projects have to be carried out in a complex context and in identification as well as execution also social-political aspects play a role. The Royal Netherlands Army has recognised this and will attach G-9 personnel (CIMIC) of the staff of 1-DIV to the S-5 section of the battalion in the next rotation.

11.   Durability

In the projects ownership usually lies with the municipalities, and it is clear for all projects who is responsible for maintenance after completion. Although the projects have been handed over, their durability is not guaranteed. The means at the disposal of the municipalities are limited. It is not uncommon that salaries are not paid in time and there is little money available for daily or periodical maintenance. A CIMIC project in 1996 was the repair of a roof of a sports hall in Novi Travnik. Recently, however, a CIMIC project for repair of the same roof was again carried out.

In many cases the durability of a project will be uncertain, mainly due to the dismal general economic situation and the high unemployment rate. These relationships give little reason for optimism. Furthermore, international organisations have picked up signs, indicating that there are doubts about the permanency of the return of displaced persons and refugees. Especially young 'returners' leave the country after all because of the high unemployment.

12.   Other public activities

The CIMIC projects are instrumental in creating good relations between the population and the Dutch battalion and fostering force security. However, the battalion carries out more activities that contribute to that end. Thus, specific battalion materiel is used for jobs such as cutting back old high trees in the centre of Travnik. Other examples are the use of the battalion's heavy crane or the generator. In short, specific materiel is employed for the benefit of the population to assist in works for which the local authorities do not have the facilities themselves.

A new development in the battalion's CIMIC activities is the so-called Economic Reconstruction in Bosnia project. Since March 2001 reservists have participated in this project (also known as IDEA - Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Activities), giving advice to small businesses. The project is carried out in cooperation with the 'Defence-Business Platform' which was established on 3 November 1999 by the Minister of Defence and the then Chairman of the association VNO-NCW (a federation of Dutch Employers' Organisations). The objective of the 'Platform' is to foster a broad dialogue between the MoD and the world of business in order to enhance cooperation and mutual interests, while bearing in mind each other's responsibilities.

Besides, activities are supported by donations that the battalion receives from Dutch municipalities or army units. Apart from that, the battalion has been involved in monitoring projects that were financed by the Netherlands Embassy and carried out by other organisations in the AOR.

A special CIMIC project concerns the 'Humanitarian Reconstruction Project'. For each of the two valleys in the AOR there is a budget of KM 25,000 (ca. €12,800). These funds can be used by patrols when they identify small needs among a population that lacks the means to alleviate them.

13. Developments of the programme

Carrying out CIMIC projects has become increasingly complex over time. Consulting the parties involved (on identification, planning and coordination) has become a more frequent phenomenon, the execution has become more developmental in character and certain activities are specifically linked with the return of DPs and refugees. Over all, the following developments can be distinguished:
- In the beginning, there was more direct execution by the Dutch battalion, which later on contracted out most of the projects.
- Identification has been transferred from the Dutch battalion to the municipalities.
- Coordination has been broadened over time and now also involves the cantonal authorities.
- Originally the programme was directed at reconstruction of infrastructure (damaged or destroyed in the conflict), but gradually there is more improvement of renewal of infrastructure.
- Initially, permission for individual projects rested with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then with the Netherlands Embassy and now with the battalion itself.
- The Technical Support Group (Togp) replaced the Tactical Support Team (TST) that was assisting in the execution of the CIMIC projects.
- Whereas initially it was the Directorate of Human Rights (DMV), and later the Directorate of Europe (DEU), of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that held the budget, since 1 January 2002 the Netherlands Embassy has been the budget holder.

Another change in the programme concerns the AOR of the Dutch battalion. Originally it included part of Republica Srpska, but since 1 May 2000 the battalion operated exclusively in Central Bosnia (Canton 6). Soon, however, the AOR will be extended somewhat to include three municipalities in Canton 7.

Originally, the programme was directed at repair of infrastructure, in other words reconstruction or rehabilitation (bringing back to a state of before the conflict). For quite some time a distinction was made between three phases in humanitarian aid: (1) emergency aid (in acute emergency situations, the providing of food, medical care, water/sanitary facilities and shelter/clothing), (2) rehabilitation, and (3) development. These phases were perceived as a continuum. However, problems arose with defining the ends of the first two phases. It was also argued that there was not really a continuum, as activities after a conflict would be immediately directed at emergency aid, rehabilitation and development simultaneously. In any case, in CIMIC projects there was only rehabilitation in the first instance. At the moment several projects can still be categorised as rehabilitation, but at a given time also development activities have been embarked upon (e.g. extension of water supply system, construction of play/sports grounds, improvement of roads, etc.). It is clear these initiatives do not concern repair, but the construction of new facilities.

With regard to CIMIC projects the MoD, too, distinguishes three phases, viz. 'peace-enforcing', 'peacekeeping', and 'nation/society building'. The first two phases correspond with rehabilitation, where in the first phase the emphasis lies on the most vital infrastructure and in the second on creating a situation that enables the return of refugees and displaced persons. In the third phase reconstruction is combined with measures stimulating the economy. In these phases a gradual takeover of activities by the population is assumed.

The third phase only contains elements of 'nation building', which is essentially part of development. Although in this phase infrastructural reconstruction projects are still mentioned, it is clear that several infrastructural projects cannot be categorised as rehabilitation,

but as development. So, the programme is gradually moving from rehabilitation to development.

In the context of Development Cooperation several points are deemed specifically important. They concern the build-up of capacity, reinforcing local institutions, fostering 'local accountability' and transparency, and developing a 'civil society'. CIMIC projects only pay explicit attention to the latter aspect. The fact is that, in connection with the Dayton Peace Agreement, CIMIC projects contribute to the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multi-cultural state, in particular with regard to the return of refugees and displaced persons. Several projects are specifically directed at stimulating this return (by restoring community facilities). Furthermore, certain initiatives are fostering cooperation between communities (e.g. the reconstruction of a road by the federal armed forces). There are also initiatives to integrate two parallel systems by means of CIMIC projects (e.g. realising a laboratory facility in one hospital which is also used by a hospital of another ethnicity). Finally, projects that benefit more than one community have priority and especially the distribution over the three communities is a guiding principle.

14.   Conclusions

In fact the objective of CIMIC projects is a dual one: reconstruction linked with peace implementation/stabilisation. The objective is defined and formulated from the perspective of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for whom reconstruction is paramount. For the Dutch battalion, however, peace implementation/stabilisation takes pride of place. For the Dutch battalion reconstruction is in principle a means rather than an end, which does not mean that CIMIC projects are seen as anything less than a full task.

Central Bosnia was the scene of heavy fighting in 1992/1993 and the damage to and destruction of infrastructural works was in proportion. Since 1996 more than 300 CIMIC projects have been carried out, many of which were essential facilities, such as bridges, roads, schools, hospitals, power and water supply. Moreover, the majority of these projects are directed at community facilities. Countless facilities have been rehabilitated and often improved, compared to their pre-conflict state. Through these projects the population can again make use of facilities they have had to go without for a long time.

The CIMIC projects have not only improved the living standard of the population, they have also contributed to the return of refugees and displaced persons, including minorities.

A tour of Bosnia clearly reveals that the conflict did considerable damage to the infrastructure and that CIMIC projects have brought much repair. It is also without doubt that the highly valued help has contributed to reconstruction and that the role of the Dutch battalion in all this is much appreciated.

Peace implementation/stabilisation
The absence of indicators makes it impossible to measure the results for peace implementation/stabilisation. Several signs, however, are indicating that CIMIC projects were instrumental in furthering the primary task of the Dutch battalion:
-    The number of incidents in Central Bosnia is relatively low.
-    In comparison with other Cantons, the percentage of returned minorities is high.
-    According to 'surveys', the acceptation of the Dutch battalion by the population in comparison to battalions of other nationalities is high.
-    The relations with military, religious and political authorities are excellent.
-    The Dutch battalion has not had a single threat directed against it.
-    The number of incidents in the Republica Srpska part of the AOR increased after the British had replaced the Dutch battalion.

- The situation in the divided city of Vitez improved after the arrival of the Dutch battalion.
- The Dutch battalion has a good reputation.
- CIMIC projects make it easier to approach the population and are a good vehicle for the gathering of information.
- The first return of minorities took place in the AOR of the Dutch battalion.
- The Dutch battalion has a better reputation than battalions of nationalities that do not support reconstruction.

Finally, the question could arise whether by now enough 'goodwill' has been generated in order to continue peace stability without CIMIC projects. This would mean that an important instrument for maintaining contact with the population and the gathering of information would fall away.

It is also possible to consider whether the contribution could be lowered or phased out. This view is supported by the fact that the international cooperation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Netherlands has shifted to other parts of the country. On the other hand, the Dutch AOR will be extended before long. It has been shown that CIMIC projects contribute to peace implementation and therefore it stands to reason to also use this tool in the new area. If this instrument is to be retained for the present area, it seems inadvisable to lower the contribution. After all, enough means should be available for spreading the projects over the entire AOR and simultaneously over the three communities.

More questions regarding the continuation of CIMIC projects can be asked. Nevertheless, it is a fact that throughout the years the population has come to cherish certain expectations with regard to this support. The Dutch battalion has in this respect manoeuvred itself in a position of dependence. Besides, the question is how far the 'goodwill' of the population extends. Would we still be the best of friends if no CIMIC projects were carried out?

The above shows that there is hardly a choice with regard to the CIMIC projects. Terminating the CIMIC projects would more than likely bring an end to the good relations with the population, the reputation of the Dutch battalion and peace stabilisation.

Abbreviations

AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASB	*Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund* [Workers-Samaritans-Association]
BiH	Bosnia-Herzegovina
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
DGW&T	Directie Gebouwen Werken & Terreinen [Directorate of Civil Engineering MoD]
DP	Displaced Persons
DPA	Dayton Peace Agreement
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace
HELP	*Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe* [Help to self-help]
IDEA	Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Advice
IFOR	Implementation Force
IPTF	International Police Task Force
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KAP	*Kleine Ambassade Projecten* [Small Embassy Projects]

KM   Konvertibilna Marka [KM 1 = DM 1; ca. € 0.50]
NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation
OHR   Office of the High Representative
OSCE   Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RRTF   Reconstruction and Return Task Force
SFOR   Stabilisation Force
Togp   *Technische ondersteuningsgroep* [Technical support group]
UNHCR   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
TOR   Terms of Reference
TST   Tactical Support Team
UMCOR   United Methodist Committee on Relief
UNIFIL   United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIB   United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNSCR   United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTAC   United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USAID   United States Agency for International Development

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Notes

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CIMIC in an SFOR Peace Support Operation in Bosnia

A. Oostendorp

Everything in this country could eventually end in total surprise and there was nothing that could not at any moment prove to be the opposite of what you could expect.[1]

1.   Introduction

It was with some hesitation that I accepted the invitation to make a contribution to this issue of *NL-ARMS*. The period during which I served in SFOR stood not on its own, for many went before us and have followed since. Too great an emphasis on one of many IFOR or SFOR tours does not do justice to everything that was achieved by others. Besides, I am convinced that each six-month period has its own emphases. In one, the orderly course of an election organised during that period is central, in another, the increasing numbers of returning refugees and displaced persons is the main issue. So there is the danger that a member of another SFOR contingent does not recognise his or her situation in what I am saying. I will limit myself to the period around the sending out of my battalion. On the basis of this limited experience it is still possible to draw several lessons that can be useful for the decision making with regard to CIMIC in the operational decision making process of commanders during peace operations. I have opted not to deal with the subject of CIMIC as an activity that stands on its own, but as a fully integrated part of the operational plan. Besides, this approach enables us to use examples from practice to give an idea of the many different aspects of CIMIC, which by some is seen as a panacea.

The most important objective of this article, therefore, is to share our experiences. The first part begins by stating the task that I received from my divisional commander, after which a short retrospect of our period, which ran from December 1997 until May 1998, is given. I will subsequently deal in some detail with the way in which we carried out that task. The questions that will be discussed there relate to the contribution that CIMIC can make to the realisation of the unit's mission and progress in the area. By means of concrete examples the concept of operations will be illustrated. In the last part I will try to present some tentative conclusions that can be instrumental in formulating lessons learned.

2.   The Battalion

Before going on, it may be useful to explain how the battalion was composed and divided over the Area of Respnsibility (AOR), an area of about 2,800 square kilometres in Bosnia. The battalion area was divided by the line of separation between the Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation. The Serb part to the north was assigned to the Bravo team, whereas the Alpha team worked in the south. Both teams could dispose of armoured infantry and tanks, and the northern team, which had originally derived from a reconnaissance battalion, also had reconnaissance platoons in its organisation. At the location of Battalion HQ the elements of the battalion reserve, consisting of the battalion reconnaissance platoon, a heavy mortar platoon and a crowd and riot unit (a Royal Marines light infantry platoon), were accommodated. Furthermore, in the southern part of the battalion area the Logbase, which

contained the core of the logistics company, was located, along with the base of the Dutch contingent command. All told, the mechanised battalion had about 1,050 personnel, drawn from 57 different units of the armed forces.

3. The mission

The battalion had to ensure a secure environment in the designated area and – insofar the capability allowed – support the other organisations that were involved in the rebuilding of Bosnia. The secure environment was mainly guaranteed by checking as strictly as possible the *entity armed forces* (EAF), the three local forces, that in the IFOR period (late 1995-1996) were still referred to as *former warring factions*. The guideline from the British divisional commander was clear: *zero tolerance*. This leaves little room for free interpretation and it was usually well understood by the three entities. In general, the task involved checking the compliance with all the stipulations that were laid down in the military chapter of the *General Framework Agreement for Peace* (GFAP), better known as the Dayton Peace Agreement. In the worst case this meant enforcing compliance with these agreements, if necessary with the use of violence. Thus, all movement of the three forces was bound by strict rules; no exercise or transport could take place without prior notification and permission from SFOR. The fact that the local population know that SFOR will not tolerate that military parties block the progress in Bosnia in any way, gives them the peace of mind to concentrate on constructive matters. That sounds simple but is not always easy to bring across to people. The local military parties know that SFOR is allowed to act in case of violation of the agreements and SFOR commanders always make it very clear that they will. What is crucial, however, is to convince the potential opponent that you will really act, and the longer a peace force is in a certain area, the more difficult that becomes. It requires of the new SFOR unit, from the first day of their arrival, a very resolute and professional execution of all activities. The first impression it makes determines to a large extent the success that can be attained in the six months to come. Respect has to be earned!

The second part of the task requires a more detailed discussion. SFOR was only one of the organisations that play a role in the international interplay of forces involved in the rebuilding of Bosnia. In very simple terms it can be said that the *secure environment,* which is SFOR's responsibility, is an important precondition for the successful execution of the other organisations' tasks. If, for instance, SFOR does not manage to guarantee safety during a visit of *Displaced Persons and Refugees* (DPREs)[2], UNHCR cannot fulfil its task. Apart from this formal role there was an important secondary task, viz. the coordination with the dozens of *International* and *Non-Governmental Organisations* (IOs and NGOs) that operate in the battalion area. The objectives of these organisations are strongly divergent, but all will benefit from peace and quiet in the area. The exchange of information with SFOR allowed the giving of support to run more smoothly, but it also made it possible to gather extra information on the complex situation in the area.

4. A brief retrospect

The battalion deployed to the area of operations shortly after elections had taken place. Our predecessors had done their utmost to monitor these elections adequately, as quiet proceedings were a major condition for the normalization of relations in the country. Our taking over and the initial phase of our tour, therefore, were directed at implementation of the election results. Soon a second development came up that was going to demand our attention more and more: the return of DPREs to the places from which they had been driven away or fled. In the beginning only orientation visits were made, but before long there were plans for the

definitive return to several locations in our area. And it did not end with plans only, the return really began. Not in large numbers in the beginning, but the success of the first return was essential for the confidence of other groups of DPREs.

The first disruption of this positive development took place in the night of 17 and 18 December 1997. In our sector two PIFWCs (Persons Indicted For War Crimes)[3] were arrested, one in Vitez and one in Ahmici. The arrest was carried out by an SFOR *special forces task force*. This seriously disrupted the peace and quiet in the area, in spite of the fact the action went flawlessly. The two PIFWCs were suspected of having been involved in the massacre of the Muslim population in the village of Ahmici on a dark night in April 1993. It had happened practically under the eyes of the British UN battalion in Vitez, just a few kilometers down the road.[4] Emotions among the local population after the nocturnal arrest ran high. Blockades were put up and the local radio called for demonstrations. The battalion was ordered to restore the disrupted relations as soon as possible.

A second disruption manifested itself in the relation with the three military parties in the area. The *train and equip* programme, developed by the Americans, began to take shape, but not without teething troubles. There was no coordination with SFOR. The programme was intended to bring about a balance of power among the three forces, so that they would not so easily resort to armed conflict against each other. Incidentally, the three parties appeared to think they were free to start on this programme without the permission of SFOR. This forced us repeatedly to apply the principle of *zero tolerance*.

As the judicial process at the International Court in the Hague progressed there were more and more requests on the battalion to secure the special investigation teams of the *International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia* (ICTY). They gathered evidence against the PIFWCs and checked the truth of the statements brought forward by all parties. In these actions, too, the village of Ahmici, where one of the arrests took place in December, regularly turned up.

A severe winter stayed away, which gave the population the chance to concentrate more on the near future in the coming year. The wish to return to their old homes was deeply rooted. When the first reconnaissance visits of DPs to their old villages and towns took place without too many great incidents, it became important to guarantee the *secure environment*. Certain parties in Bosnia benefit from the chaos in the country, so they have a great interest in disrupting public order and blocking progress. It occurred regularly that incidents were purposely set up in order to create a sense of insecurity among the population. The importance of acquiring a good insight in the objectives of all parties involved became increasingly evident.

5.   The execution of the mission

The task to ensure a *secure environment* in the designated area and, simultaneously, insofar the capability allowed, to support the other organisations involved in the rebuilding of Bosnia, must be seen as the long-term assignment for all SFOR battalions of the division (the *framework operation*). In an annex to the order the divisional commander indicates what specific emphases must be given. Special assignments, such as securing the arrest of PIFWCs, were issued in separate orders, in some cases under strict secrecy. That was not the case for the standard operation. He thought it of eminent importance that as many members of the battalion as possible knew about the principles and emphases of the execution of the task. As an illustration I have included my annex to the *Commander's Intent* for the second month of our period. In the first phase the emphasis was on making impression ("these men are not to be tampered with"), getting to know the area, making contacts, extending the network and, of course, preparing for the arrests and the consequences that would ensue from them.

Annex D (Commander's Intent) to Operation Plan No. ../..
Of C-11 (NL) MECHBAT (January 1998)

1. GENERAL
After a flying start during which we were confronted by increased tension in the southern part of our AO[5] and the ensuing force protection measures, it is now time to make up the balance. We have familiarised with the contacts that we took over from our predecessors; we have also had the opportunity to leave our marks and we have got to know the terrain better. We have also experienced the difference between an event in our final exercise and reality. In short: we have come out of this first period stronger. We now have to carry on from here and fully concentrate on our assignments.

2. MILITARY EMPLOYMENT
Our main task is the checking of the EAF, so that they comply with the agreements in the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). The consequences of the reorganisation of HVO and the ArBiH[6], along with the fuzzy structure of the Train & Equip programme, necessitate an intensive monitoring in the southern part; random checks are not sufficient anymore. In the northern (Bosnian-Serb) part we must also have a complete picture, so that we are positive that all EAF are committing themselves to DPA. Only the conviction that SFOR is closely supervising all parties takes away all prejudice and offers a basis for (mutual) trust. This implies that every movement, every site inspection and every contact with representatives of the EAF must be meticulously prepared and executed.
Maintaining and increasing our level of readiness and particularly the preparedness for action through training and practice must be a standard part of our programme. The idea behind the employment of the battalion reserve is an example of that. Get to work with it! Show it to your environment, so that they see what we stand for. Invite them join in certain parts. But remain unpredictable as well; do not only patrol by day or in the evenings. Establish temporary posts and stay there for several days, of course after thorough preparation and reconnaissance. Our main task is to guarantee a secure environment, which will foster progress in Bosnia rather than stagnate it.
Only if we are fully credible with regard to the checking of the EAF and our military professionalism, will there be an opportunity for success in the rebuilding and support of civilian institutions.

3. SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS
The civilian institutions can only do their job in a secure environment, which we guarantee through our presence and actions. Wherever possible we can support them: we have the means, the energy and an organisation that is able to translate planning into action (actions speak louder than words). I am fully prepared to employ the full extent of the battalion's resources, so also those of the logistics company, should a humanitarian organisation make a request for them. They know this by now and they will make more and more appeals on us for help. We have to be careful, though, not to fall into the dependency trap – we support, but it is they who are responsible.

A secure environment must be seen quite broadly. The return of the DPREs – the main issue of the coming months – will need all the support that we can give. Even if that means we have to resort to our fighting capacity, needless to say, always with a minimum of violence. We will have to see case by case what support is best suited to the situation. Through our liaison activities we can each time create the conditions by informing local authorities, CIVPOL and IPTF timely and pointing at their own responsibilities. But in the worst case we will intervene. That is extraordinarily difficult for the commander on the spot, but only then will our credibility stay intact. Before any visits take place we should be known, respected and familiar in the area.

We must help and encourage the local population to fend for themselves, but that principle may never be an excuse to stand by and watch when our efforts could make a difference. We will act upon each violation of the security of the local population and we will employ our means to guarantee a peaceful course of the visits and return of DPREs, even if this means the use of (minimum) violence.

4.   POINTS OF INTEREST IN OUR AO

The return of the DPREs has already begun, but it will greatly increase over the coming months, especially after the winter. This means we will have to prepare ourselves well. The difference between DPs and REs is that we will probably be better able to anticipate on the movements of the DPs, as they are still living somewhere in Bosnia, and want to return to their own, former houses or villages. The REs are abroad at this moment and will return without much prior notice. Because of that they may thwart existing plans of DPs, which is of course a major source of unrest, especially as there will be much financial support from the countries where the REs are at the moment.

This is one more reason to concentrate on the DPs. In order to make their return go smoothly we will have to know where they come from, where they want to go, where they want to make visits, what the sentiments are in the areas concerned, and whether there is enough housing capacity in those areas. All elements of the battalion have already started a first inventory. The LOs at team and battalion level are sounding their contacts and the patrols report on the situation in the villages. Our attention should not be directed at the large cities but the suburbs around them. Wherever possible we will improve the circum-stances by means of projects, on the strict conditions, however, that the local authorities give their cooperation.

We intend to employ all our means. Projects support the civilian and inter-national organisations in places where agreement has been reached on progress, in accordance with DPA. It seems that KNESEVO will qualify before long, so we must be ready to show some results there. The second municipality in this part of our AO, KOTO VAROS, still needs to be convinced, so that we can also give support there.

In the MKF sector[7] quite a few projects have been carried out and are still being developed. We can continue on that road, but the unilaterality with which the support has been given so far must decrease. Here, too, our projects must support those authorities that fully comply with all stipulations of DPA; an ”*open city*”- declaration is not enough, in my opinion. They have to be truly an

open city and enable the return of DPs. We therefore have to check whether BUSOVACA, for instance, has already taken up and accommodated many DPs and whether they feel safe there.

Of course there are also projects that can go on, irrespective of the attitude of the authorities. They are projects that the whole population can benefit from, such as hospitals, schools, sports halls. This type of project is now being launched in the RS part of our AO, and through this we try to show the authorities that it is sensible to meet the criteria stated in DPA. Where the economy can be given a new impetus by, for instance, opening up remote villages, we can act. Sometimes our effort can be very down to earth, making use only of our own means; then we must certainly do it, on condition that we divide our efforts over the various entities. By making use of our info-ops and media channels we can also show this to all parties.

5.   SUMMARY
There is a lot of work to be done, and progress to be made, but there will also be disappointments. We have seen how vulnerable relations still are. We must also be able to show an understanding of this. One step back can sometimes be necessary and useful. 11 (NL) Mechbat is responsible for a secure environment in its AO, it maintains good contacts with all parties involved and militarily it remains at a high level by practice and training activities, by its unpredictability and reputation of good discipline. Remember that every military movement outside the base is in fact a message!

What is striking is that the fragment chosen is a mix of objectives, on the one hand, and guidelines on the execution, on the other. These guidelines are necessary to attain a unity of execution, not only within the Dutch battalion, but also with the units of other partaking countries. The borderlines between the areas of the units were not identical with the canton borders of Bosnia itself, and they certainly did not match the areas in which local military commanders had their responsibilities. The actions of SFOR personnel, therefore, had to show uniformity to a large extent, if only to prevent being played off against each other, an art that the various entities had mastered to perfection. Another important observation is that the military aspect of the assignment was completely interwoven with the more humanitarian task of supporting the other organisations in the area. Without the monitoring of the military forces, the peace and quiet necessary to restore faith in a better future are lacking.

6.   Military and humanitarian task

In this section I will try to illustrate by a number of practical examples how brittle and thin the line is between the two elements of the assignment. Right through the southern part of the Dutch sector runs the river Lasva, through the towns of Travnik and Vitez. The former city has been dominated of old by Muslims, the latter is known as a Bosnian-Croat enclave in Muslim territory. Vitez is identified as a hot spot in all threat analyses. Our predecessors had made an attempt to clean the Lasva, on request of the Travnik authorities. The Lasva was full of all sorts of waste, ranging from car wrecks to - as it appeared later – dumped ammunition. This latter fact was the reason that the Dutch cleaning operation had been abandoned by my predecessor. During my first visit to the mayor of Travnik he brought up the subject. It did not

come as a surprise, for the archive that had been handed down, showed that it was a recurrent item. The mayor asked me when we were going to finish the job. Well briefed by my CIMIC officer, I told him that he knew very well why we had abandoned the work, but that we were quite willing to give support to a cleaning action undertaken by the military personnel of the barracks in Travnik, in cooperation with their colleagues from Vitez. In the first instance that seemed a bridge too far, but after lengthy negotiations and endless patience of several functionaries from our battalion it worked out very well. Thus we brought together the former enemies.

An important lesson we learned from this action was that we made sure that in every following contact we had an idea beforehand who would have to bear the responsibility. Because of the enormous pressure that is put on the local administrators by the international community as well as their own, often short-fused, group, they have a tendency to hide behind SFOR or any other organisation. An impression of SFOR not keeping its promises is thus created and progress in the area is made dependent on SFOR action or inaction, whereas - as in this particular case- they themselves can and must take the responsibility. The British divisional commander used the term 'dependency trap' in relation to this phenomenon. A second important lesson concerns the importance of continuity. Six months is a long time to be from home, but the local population has all the time in the world and can afford - from whatever interest - to delay the progress desired so much by us. A good transfer of know-how and contacts is therefore essential. The excellent records of previously conducted conversations helped us to think up plans even before the first meeting with an administrator.

A second incident took place during the return of a Bosnian-Croatian family to an environment where mainly Muslims lived. Without any clear occasion the situation exploded. The visit had not been announced beforehand and the team responsible had not been able to take precautions. Afterwards it showed that the whole thing had been set up. The partial press that accompanied the family made an enormous fuss about it in the media. It was suggested that SFOR did support the return of Muslim families, but did not do anything for the other entities. In subsequent meetings it took quite an effort to give a more objective rendering of the incident in the local media. What helped us enormously was the fact that we could point out to them the positive effects of cooperation. An essential element of this cooperation is information; if you tell us beforehand, we will secure your visits in the same manner as anyone else's. Two weeks later another visit took place. There were many people about and the local press was there in full strength. A platoon post had been erected at the edge of the village a few days earlier and there was heavy day and night patrolling. On the hill opposite the village we set up the video-practice equipment, used for training tank crews, so that the whole visit could be recorded on videotape. These precautions proved to be adequate, to the disappointment, no doubt, of certain somewhat radical media. Actions like these were always supported by an information campaign, explaining what was going to happen or had happened, and most of all, why it was done the way it was done (information operation). Afterwards the unpleasant feeling stays: why was it necessary to make the first visit fail, bringing back the sense of insecurity among the own population. It is very important to find out what interests are at play for all the parties, but surprises cannot always be avoided.

An important lesson learned from this incident is that an even-handed attitude towards all parties is essential for the credibility of the peace force. Yet, there will always be certain parties that wish to put this impartiality to the test. Honest information and a way of operating that is clear for everyone, are good means to counter that situation.

A final word about NGOs. I have a great admiration for the sometimes highly idealistic organisations devoted to giving humanitarian aid. I also understand they are sometimes rather hesitant in their attitude towards the military personnel of a peacekeeping force. Where we can manage to improve the support by good coordination, much can be done, but the

dominant organisational urge of the military often does more harm than good. We have always welcomed those organisations that found the way to our camp and we helped them wherever we could, but the many others that chose to go their own, deserve as much respect.

7.   Lessons learned

There are several lessons from our experiences in Bosnia that can be taken into account and applied in a broader (in protracted operations) scope. Six months is too short a time to make clearly visible progress in a country that has been torn by ethnic strife since time immemorial. That fact alone must be a clear indication for commanders, and from that awareness they can formulate realistic targets for their 'tour of duty'. Targets that can only be reached beyond the limits of the six month-term of the mission of one commander, may only be set with the knowledge and approval of his successor or by order of a higher commander (national or international).

Progress is possible but requires continuity. The transfer of know-how and contacts from one battalion to the next is a good contribution to that end. It is important that the successive commanders show that they have integrated the experiences of their predecessors into their objectives and plans. A change in the way of operating is immediately noted in the immediate area in which the battalion is working. A later commander who brought up the idea to call in the help of the Dutch local and regional authorities, got the following reaction, 'That's what you did three years ago. Many promises were made, but we have never seen anything'. The credibility of the total Dutch contribution is at stake at such a moment.

Again and again we had occasion to ask ourselves why something happens in a given location at a given time. The interests of the various parties often give the clues to insight in why incidents occur as they do. It takes a huge effort to find out the agendas of all the actors. The intelligence organisation demands the continual attention of the commander, and this once again underlines the great importance of a careful transfer of gathered intelligence.

CIMIC activities must be fully integrated into the operational plan, as each mission confronts us with a multitude of actors. The fact that some of these actors recently were each other's opponents makes it even more complex. When planning, it is important to realize that while concepts like 'neutrality' or 'impartiality' have great value, circumstances and the assign-ments by order of the authorities sometimes require actions against one of the actors (partial, therefore). The example of the arrest of two Bosnian-Croatian PIFWCs illustrates this. Therefore it is better to use the term 'even-handedness' in the way of operating.[8] In operations such as these it is impossible to be fully impartial at all times, certainly in the eyes of the parties involved. They will always try to discredit the peace force. The commander has to make sure that negative effects of his actions are 'equally distributed among the parties' and that it is not always the same party that is portrayed as the scapegoat.

8.   Conclusion

Six months time is too short to make noticeable progress in a country where ethnic tensions go back since time immemorial. Progress is possible but requires continuity, and the transfer of know-how and contacts from one battalion to the next is a good contribution to that end. Again and again we have to ask ourselves why something happens in a given location at a given time. The interests of the various parties often give the clues to insight in why incidents occur as they occur. CIMIC activities must be fully integrated into the operational plan, as each mission confronts us with a multitude of actors. In the Balkans, the days are over that CIMIC was merely a PR instrument to demonstrate unity. The protracted presence of a

peacekeeping force cannot work without an intensive cooperation with the local population, its representatives and the IOs and NGOs on the spot.

Notes

1 From *De Kroniek van Travnik* [The Travnik Chronicle] (1945) by Ivo Andric (1892-1975), author and Nobel Prize Winner, born in Travnik, Central Bosnia, situated in the sector of the Dutch Battalion.

2 Displaced persons are those who, as a consequence of the war, have left hearth and home, but who are still somewhere in Bosnia. Refugees are those who fled and are now outside Bosnia. In connection with this the terms 'homeless' and 'refugees' are sometimes used.

3 PIFWC stands for *persons indicted for war crimes*. ICTY has compiled a list of persons who have been indicted for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.

4 The events that took place in this period are described quite movingly in the book by the commander of the British battalion, Bob Stewart, *Broken Lives*. It is not in stock anymore. The book is available in the library of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy.

5 AO stands for Area of Operations, comparable to the Dutch 'gebied van verantwoordelijkheid' (Area of Responsibility).

6 HVO and ArBiH are the two armed forces of the Bosnian-Croatian and Muslim entities, respectively.

7 Bosnia is divided into two parts, the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Muslim-Croatian Federation (MKF). Of old the three entities were living all over the country, but because of the war most Bosnia Serbs have gone to live in the RS and the other two groups in the MKF. The return to the former homes was one of the main objectives of the international community.

8 The British use 'even-handedness' in cases like these, a term which, in my opinion, is more appropriate.

CIMIC in the early phases of the KFOR mission in Kosovo [1]

[*NL-ARMS*, 2002: Chapter 10]

A. van Loon

July 25, 1998. On Friday afternoon private trucks driven by policemen are all over the place. There isn't a single shop window that is not broken and there isn't anything left of value in any shop. Somewhere in the main street an officer is stuffing the boot and the back seat of his Volkswagen Golf with unrecognizable goods … Just a few moments more and Orahovac is empty and clean, and free of Albanians - the few left will stay quiet for the time being. Just a few moments more and in Orahovac nothing ever happened. (Maas, 1999)

1. De *Gele Rijders* and CIMIC

In 1999 the *Gele Rijders* ('Yellow Riders'), the traditional name for the soldiers of 11 Battalion Horse Artillery, and with them soldiers, hussars, and gunners of numerous other units, were deployed to the municipality of Orahovac in Kosovo. In the evaluation report the Secretary of Defence sent to Parliament[2] special attention is given to the extraordinary task that KFOR carried out in the early phases of the mission: "In practice KFOR has executed military rule for a period of time". Restoring law and order has been the most characteristic part of the activities of KFOR. Like other KFOR units that initially entered Kosovo, the Battalion was faced with a situation which demanded action in many different ways. What it boiled down to was that KFOR temporarily took on administrative or government tasks for as long as it took international organisations (in particular, of course, the UN interim government) to take them over.

Military rule in the sense of the Dutch Law of War (Oorlogswet Nederland) evokes associations with World War II as well as with the police actions in the former Netherlands East Indies. This is amply demonstrated by the Van Dale Dictionary definition of Military Rule as 'legal authority over the civilian society in the hands of the military, known as the temporary highest authority immediately after the liberation in 1945'. The military rule under General Kruls that was established in the liberated parts of the Netherlands from 1944 onwards was aimed at the restoration of law and order. In the absence of a government this military rule could (and had to) perform acts of government. In this specific case military rule was placed above the lower bodies of civilian authority (provincial, municipal and water control authorities).[3] The authorities of military rule can be very broad indeed and are only justified in extreme situations. A full analysis of the complexities of executing military rule goes beyond the scope of this article.[4] In the reality of KFOR-1 this discussion was not really the issue of the day.

Originally, the *Gele Rijders* were to go as a pure fire support unit. Consequently, no CIMIC activities were foreseen at all and so no CIMIC personnel had been allocated. Only later, in the planning process, the need for CIMIC arose. In the end, two artillery officers were appointed as CIMIC officers. The employment of specialists did not even come up at all. In the light of the air campaign and the many uncertainties of the overall situation, it was understandable that CIMIC was not a major priority. Another reason why the Artillery Battalion was somewhat wrong-footed with regard to CIMIC was the fact that it was (is?) more or less taken for granted that CIMIC is something for specialists.

Recently the importance of and the attention for CIMIC has increased sharply. The establishment of the CIMIC Group North is a good example of this. CIMIC covers a very wide area, including matters of administration, civil infrastructure, economic and commercial activities, humanitarian relief and cultural affairs. The importance of CIMIC, therefore, is beyond question. Modern military operations require a broad approach and CIMIC is an integral part of them.

Given the limited scope of the present article, I have tried to avoid giving a sheer description of the many activities that were undertaken (or could have been undertaken), and I have therefore focussed on only two aspects of the present thoughts on CIMIC. The lessons to be learned from the experiences of the mission of the *Gele Rijders* may not apply to other missions, as every mission has its unique characteristics. Nevertheless, there are some lessons of a more general nature.[5]

The first focal point concerns the perception of CIMIC in terms of 'specialists'. Of course specialists are necessary; it could not be otherwise in such a broad profession. However, there is also a need for a broader view on CIMIC, or, in other words, an embedding of civilian aspects in the military decision making procedures. The interaction with the population and the international and non-governmental organisations is too important to be left solely to the specialists.

The second theme in this contribution is that CIMIC must also be a way of thinking. Just as every soldier must be capable of defending himself of herself, or acting adequately in NBC circumstances, he or she should be able to do his/her bit in the more civilian aspects of an operation. For the commander at all levels thinking about civilian aspects of an operation should be as self-evident as the principles of combat.

2. From fire support to area responsibility

Initially, the 11 Battalion Horse Artillery was earmarked to go to Kosovo with 12 German Armoured Brigade, to provide fire support for the German Brigade. At the time there was no need or opportunity to consider other tasks. When in February the first contacts were made, there was no clear picture at all about the mission and course of action. All options were still open. What was clear from the beginning was that the German Brigade commander had the intention of involving his Dutch Battalion commander in the planning process to the full. It soon emerged that in all possible contingencies the German Brigade would be given the province of Prizren as its Area of Responsibility (AOR). Besides, in an early stage, the Brigade concluded that the initially available two (German) manoeuvre battalions were not enough to cover the whole area. Moreover, it became clear during the planning process that, if everything went according to plan, the requirement for fire support would be very limited indeed, and possibly even only in a reserve mode. In case of compliance with an agreement, artillery as well as other heavy means (such as Leopard and Marder) could be held in reserve, only to be deployed in the event of escalation. Because of the scarceness of available units the idea was launched to give the Artillery Battalion an area of responsibility as well. After the green light was received from the Netherlands the plan was worked out along this pragmatic approach.

Naturally, after the failure of Rambouillet[6] and during the ensuing air war many contingencies were planned for and analysed. In particular, the question of how the Brigade could deploy as fast as possible in order to avoid a power vacuum was frequently discussed. It was absolutely clear that, certainly in the beginning, the city of Prizren was going to be a priority. Initially, too, it was recognised that the border area with Albania would become a second priority, due to smuggling activities and possible non-compliance of the UCK (the Kosovo Liberation Army). Of course the LOCs (Lines of Communication) were another major concern. On the

basis of these considerations, Orahovac emerged as the obvious choice for the Artillery Battalion in all possible courses of action. In the end the operations plan was that the two German Battalions and the Dutch Artillery Battalion, each as a Task Force (Kampfgruppe), would closely monitor the Serb retreat, and in doing so, ensure at least a presence, thus avoiding a power vacuum.

The age-old military adage that plans seldom survive the start line proved to be correct here as well. When they arrived in Prizren on 13 June chaos reigned. In the midst of all this chaos the Brigade Commander decided, on the insistence of the Serb Chief of Police, to send troops to Orahovac the very same day. In the end Task Force Orahovac began its existence as an "attack from the march", and the first day only with tanks and armoured infantry. Detailed planning in the preparation phase is by no means a guarantee for an execution according to plan. What careful planning in this case did bring about was the laying of a common basis for alterations in the plans. Detailed map studies and scrupulous study of deployment options made it possible to continue the march, thus keeping the initiative.

In one respect the original assessment of the situation proved to be spot on. The rapid and disciplined retreat of the Serb forces never necessitated the use of artillery. The decision to have the Artillery Battalion execute part of the primary task of Commander KFOR, "establish and maintain a secure environment, including public safety and order", proved entirely correct. It soon became apparent that all the available troops of the Brigade were necessary for this task. In Prizren personnel of the Air Defence Company were soon manning checkpoints and cooks and mechanics were also used as infantry support. Only when extra battalions arrived (from Austria and Turkey) did the pressure decrease somewhat. If the Dutch Artillery Battalion had not taken the responsibility for Orahovac, the Brigade would not have been able to act adequately here, and the consequences for the Serb minority can easily be imagined.

The limited attention for CIMIC in the preparation phase was not so much the result of an underestimation of the importance of CIMIC as such. What can be said, though, is that it was not a prominent aspect in the decision making. The Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR) in his evaluation report speaks of "little effective UN/KFOR planning". This resulted in a less than well-coordinated cooperation, especially in the early phases. A broader attention for CIMIC, particularly in this phase, might have provided a better insight into the tasks that would have to be carried out until they could be handed over to the civil authorities (in this case the UN).

As the deployment of the interim authorities and especially the police component was slow, the military had to fill the vacuum, a situation that had explicitly been foreseen in the UN resolution.[7] That KFOR would have to act in this field did not come as a surprise, but the manner in which and especially the time frame were much less clear. A greater attention in the preparatory phases for the cooperation between the military and the civilian components (KFOR and UNMIK) would have provided a much clearer answer to these specific questions. Therefore, the conclusion is justified that CIMIC must be an integral and indispensable part of the decision making process.

3.   Military rule

Like other KFOR units the Dutch Battalion was confronted with the necessity to execute military rule almost immediately after deployment. The final evaluation report, mentioned above, states, "As a consequence of the circumstances in Kosovo and the absence of countless facilities and bodies of public administration, the unit has been forced to take over a number of these civil functions until other bodies were able to take on these tasks". KFOR temporarily took responsibility for administration because creating a 'secure environment' cannot be

separated from public safety and order, monitoring the upholding of human rights and starting up public main services. There simply was no alternative. In June the Artillery Battalion, like other KFOR units, was faced with an utterly chaotic situation. With the departure of the Serbian army and police virtually all administrators had left and all areas were facing an administrative vacuum. The first aspect that required immediate action from the KFOR troops was the execution of the police task. The task of maintaining public law and order, and, more specifically, setting up a police force had been explicitly given to the civilian UN interim authorities in UN resolution 1244. It was the intention to first establish an international police force (UNMIKPOL), and, in a in a later stage, to build up an independent, impartial, local police.[8] Until UNMIKPOL was ready to take up its work the military would have to take over the police tasks. Initially, the military were to limit themselves to tasks that were strictly necessary for maintaining public law and order.

For KFOR the execution of police tasks was essential, as the UCK was only too eager to take over the police role in Kosovo, which was absolutely unacceptable for KFOR. The UCK wanted to employ their own police to carry out the police task in particular, arguing that they were forced to do so as it took so long for the UN police to begin carrying out its task. The decision whether or not certain police tasks had to be carried out was strongly determined by the need to curtail UCK initiatives.

Especially in Orahovac the position of the Serb (and Roma) minorities played an important role in this. It was unacceptable, particularly here, that the UCK would take over police tasks. From the very first days this fact constituted the main reason for fully taking over the police task and not allowing the UCK to get involved in any way. This of course meant that a large diversity of police tasks had to be carried out.

Arson and looting, but also maltreatment and various forms of theft had to be dealt with. The most frequent offence was the carrying of arms contrary to the agreements.[9] In Orahovac the openly carrying of arms was not tolerated from the beginning. There were also plenty of other less serious offences. A good example of dealing with relatively minor offences – in order to prevent the UCK from appropriating police authority – was the illegal cutting of wood. In the forests around Orahovac the cutting of wood had always been regulated by strict rules to avoid erosion of the steep inclines, which would affect the valuable vineyards. The UCK quickly grasped that here lay an opportunity to execute authority. They planned to start supervising the woodcutting and impose sanctions. In order to prevent the UCK from thus gaining even limited police authority, the supervision of woodcutting was temporarily taken on by KFOR.

The police task in Orahovac was particularly difficult, as it was here that in the early days of KFOR many corpses of murdered Albanians were found. The corpses were not only discovered in mass graves, but many were still lying about in the open air. It goes without saying that the returning population, confronted with the many dead and completely devastated villages, had a great need to tell their stories.

One of the first steps taken by the Dutch Battalion, in particular, was the setting up of a central point where people could tell their stories, and voice complaints. It was for these very pragmatic reasons that what was to become the first police station in Kosovo was opened up. Initially, it was not the intention that people could file formal reports, it was much more a point where the scarce interpreter capacity could be employed most efficiently. The small office manned by two experienced senior NCOs and an interpreter proved to meet an enormous need. The fact that the population had the feeling that their stories and complaints were taken seriously, took away most of their anger. This action, born of necessity, illustrates that when a civilian task must be taken seriously, there is not always the possibility to wait for experts. In this case the choice was made very consciously to employ personnel here without

specialist expertise, but with a lot of life experience. It is, however, obvious that the availability of trained experts makes this work a lot easier.

4.   Police specialists

In spite of the enthusiasm of the soldiers, the need for specialists of police tasks was recognised. The arrival and deployment of the UN police took much longer than expected. Normal service personnel were confronted with problems that went far beyond their knowledge and experience. The German Brigade from the start used their organic military police (*Feldjäger*) to carry out police tasks.

In Orahovac, too, part of the police work was taken over by specialists. By allocating a small platoon of German *Feldjäger* and by involving the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary contingent (with permission of The Hague) as advisors for specific investigations into serious crimes, it was possible to work in a much more structured manner. Both groups of military police worked under the auspices of the Dutch Battalion. The German Feldjäger took over the complaints bureau and established an adequate police station to replace it. In fact they catered for the basic police care and in cooperation with the regular soldiers took care of the required law and order. The Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary took on the role of advisors and concentrated on investigations into a number of serious crimes. When on 27 October the UN police, consisting mainly of Americans and Germans in Orahovac, took over their task, the American Chief of Police concluded that Task Force Orahovac had laid a unique foundation for his work. The preparatory work and the way in which essential tasks were carried out greatly facilitated the UN police in assuming its responsibility.

5.   CIMIC and force protection

Another aspect that points at the interweaving of CIMIC in more general operational processes concerns the relation with the force protection of the unit. At first sight the execution of a great variety of police tasks, in particular, brings with it a certain risks. It seems obvious that every action may also cause a reaction. Every arrest may bring on retaliation, every inspection may end in a firefight. This, however, cannot be the basis for effective military action.

Police action in Kosovo was by no means always dangerous or even unpleasant. Much happened in an atmosphere of consultation. KFOR personnel were trusted and accepted as mediators. In connection with this it is necessary to point out the totally different situation as compared with that in Bosnia. The service personnel and especially the Dutch and the Germans in Orahovac could perform their task without any great threat. All entities had an interest in being on a good footing with KFOR. Therefore, there was only very sporadic evidence of direct threats towards these soldiers and the patrols often had the nature of police teams. This does not mean that it was always easy to deal with criminal activities and, of course, those that were caught (or prevented from) perpetrating their illegal activities were not happy.

The most telling example is the way arson attempts were dealt with. Especially Albanian youths tried to vent their anger or frustration by setting fire to Serb buildings. As this always happened at night it was extremely difficult for patrols to catch the arsonists, especially as they always perfectly knew their way in the town. In a similar situation in the town of Zjum soldiers of the German parachute battalion who were stationed there were fired upon. One of the German soldiers owed his life there to his excellent bullet-proof vest.

It never got that far in Orahovac. The frequency of patrols and especially the determined actions of the Dutch and German soldiers of Task Force Orahovac certainly contributed to

that success. When at the end of July the KFOR commander explicitly ordered to carry out more foot patrols to get more contact with the population, this had been standard procedure in Orahovac for quite some time.[10] In this sort of situations an active posture, in which not only the trust but also the respect of the population can be won, can be an important factor in force protection. A good impression and acceptation by the population allows a pro-active stance that makes reactive protection less relevant.

6.   The municipal administration

It goes without saying that it was important to come into contact with the local population as quickly as possible. Establishing a consultative structure with representatives of the various entities in the municipality of Orahovac, therefore, was a first step towards a more normal administration. Some members of the former Serb municipal administration were still present but they could speak on behalf of the Serb entity only. Initially, the only available point of contact for the Albanians was the UCK. When former administrators and other respected representatives had returned with the refugees a more balanced consultative structure could be realised, which enabled KFOR, and later UNMIK, to consult with committees from the various entities who were also recognised by their followers as legitimate representatives.[11]

The situation in the early days of KFOR necessitated the establishment of an improvised administration, which made it possible to discuss problems and make decisions. Here, CIMIC went beyond coordination with civilian institutions; it was all about creating the circum-stances that would allow the population to propose solutions themselves. UNMIK's policy was directed at establishing as quickly as possible a relatively normal administration, in which a large role for self-rule was deemed necessary.

The military had to make the first moves, here. It was not until August that the first administrator for Orahovac, the Mauretanian Kane, was appointed.[12] After he had been given a small staff in September he could make a start with administering the municipality, initially mainly through consultation with the committees and with the Dutch Battalion's support. Eventually this developed into an interim administration, led by an UNMIK administrator. The municipal council as well as the administrative council (comparable to the municipal executive) were made up of representatives of the various entities. It certainly cannot be said that this was a normal administration, but the first steps had been taken.

7.   Public Utilities

Apart from the police task and municipal administration, Dutch KFOR personnel also undertook a broad range of matters that were essential for the normalisation of life. In doing this, the intention was always to hand over tasks as quickly as possible to suitable internatio-nal organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and possibly also to local authorities, insofar as they could be expected to carry them out fairly and impartially.

Thus, one of the Dutch Battalion's aid stations helped set up the regional hospital of Ora-hovac. For a time the aid station staff actually ran the day-to-day management, which allowed returning Albanian doctors to go to work efficiently and for a new hospital administration system to be set up. Treatment of Serb sick and wounded people could only take place under direct supervision of Dutch medical orderlies. The hatred among the Albanian doctors and nurses was so intense that a decent treatment could not be guaranteed otherwise, at least not in the beginning.[13] The repair platoon did their bit by the truly miraculous feat of getting the local fire engine into action once more, after which a fire brigade, made up of volunteers from the population, was founded. The garbage collection service was set up in a similar manner. The extremely professional German aid agency *Technisches Hilfswerk* (THW) supplied the

garbage trucks and the garbage cans and volunteers did the job of collecting it. An important provision was always that all the work also had to be done in the Serb part of the town. Initially, this took place with a KFOR escort, but at a later stage the garbage trucks could collect the garbage all over town unescorted, without any problems.

Power and water had always been a problem in the entire region. The capacity of both the water works and the electricity grid was insufficient. Besides, the water works had been damaged in several places during the war and a number of pumps had broken down, which regularly caused water shortages, especially in the summer months. Where the shortages were particularly acute, support could be given in cooperation with the THW to the Serb as well as the Albanian side with the help of special mobile drinking water reservoirs. In particular the Serb residential area, which was situated higher up in Orahovac, received drinking water on an almost daily basis during the summer months. On the request of a Serb doctor, quality checks of the drinking water were carried out with the help of THW. With regard to power there were many similar problems. In particular the state of maintenance was very poor (according to experts, worse even than in other parts of Kosovo). In addition many (90%) safety fuses had been bypassed or replaced by copper wiring, which caused dangerous situations. There were still mechanics, though, to repair the wiring and transformers.

By mediation and consultation the two CIMIC officers of the Dutch Battalion ensured an impartial distribution of facilities. The importance of these activities for the normalisation process must not be underestimated. Often the talks about the supply of water, power or other facilities offered an opening for discussing more fundamental matters. The 'stick and carrot'-approach was hardly ever needed, but no doubt it played a role in the background.

The interim administration also had to prevent the enrichment of a few at the expense of the community, while at the same time it was important to create conditions for companies that could operate on their own feet. It was striking that the (Albanian) directors thought it quite normal to receive strict guidelines; apparently they had been used to this during the communist Tito era.

Thus, it was agreed that the bakeries could deliver bread to the Dutch Battalion itself at a reasonable price. In exchange they had to supply bread and other products to shops in the Serb residential area, which after some hesitation and initial escorts by the Battalion was indeed effected. The same approach was successfully applied to Podrima, a food wholesaler. These successes may serve as examples for the attempt to let the population solve their own problems as much as possible.

In the beginning of May 2000 a delegation of the Eindhoven regional cooperation (SRE) visited Orahovac to explore how civilian institutions from the municipality of Eindhoven could build on the work of the Dutch military (SRE, 2000). During the mission of the *Gele Rijders* in Orahovac in 1999 the idea had come up to see to what extent the municipalities in the Eindhoven region could contribute to the rebuilding of this Kosovar municipality.[14] Its purpose was to show that in spite of the fact that the Dutch military would depart from Orahovac, Dutch support would still be possible.

A fact finding mission was set up in early 2000 to see what help could be given. The team consisted of experts in public utilities and two experienced municipal administrators. It was supported by one of the Battalion's CIMIC officers, who, incidentally, had left active service by that time. A thorough knowledge of the local situation and, in particular, the existing contacts, allowed the team to quickly get a good idea of the required and realisable help.

Three specific projects were chosen. At the time the present article was written the power supply had been improved, including the construction of street lighting, which is so important for creating a sense of safety. For the schools a number of sports facilities had been built, and a park had been constructed as a meeting place for people of the different ethnic groups and

for children to play. These are fine examples of the military laying the foundations for civilian institutions to take over and build on.

8.   CIMIC officers

In connection with this, the role of the Dutch Battalion's CIMIC officers must be considered. The whole idea behind CIMIC is based on cooperation between the military and civilian authorities. In a situation in which civilian authority has broken down completely the normal CIMIC concept is only relevant to a limited extent. In such a case it is essential to establish a basic structure, which provides the foundation for a civilian administration. This is a fundamentally different approach from the classic CIMIC approach. The two CIMIC officers concerned themselves with a very wide range of issues, necessary for the normalisation of social life. The intention was always to hand over tasks as quickly as possible to suitable aid organisations and, if possible, also to local authorities, insofar as they could be expected to carry out the tasks fairly and impartially.

Quite apart from what has been achieved and the pragmatic approach adopted, it remains advisable to anticipate on a situation in which the military also have to take over administrative tasks temporarily. When this is the case it stands to reason to equip them for this task. This can be realised by training CIMIC officers, or by attaching administrative experts recruited from the reservist reservoir.

9.   Expertise

Effective action in such complex situations requires the availability of the right experts. For the Dutch Battalion the first need that became apparent was that for police experts. This requirement was met by allowing the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary officer[15] to advise the Battalion commander in police matters. Of course it would be preferable to settle this unequivocally beforehand, in which case attaching one or more experienced permanent advisors would be the best solution. This could also be achieved by attaching experienced regular police officers.

The availability of an expert for legal matters (lawyer) is also essential. The operational commander must have immediate access to a lawyer who has a relevant knowledge of and experience in administrative, and, if possible, international law. In Kosovo the Dutch Battalion command could make use of the services of the lawyer of the German Brigade. It is, however, advisable that the operational commander, who has to operate in difficult and unclear circumstances in a legal vacuum, should be able to rely on an immediately and constantly available expert legal advisor of his own nationality.

Because it is probably very difficult to assess beforehand what specific expertise is needed, a flexible system of quickly deployable specialists should be set up. Incidentally, this does not only concern experts in the area of public administration described above, but also in environmental matters. Suppose there had been a factory leaking chemical material? To deal with the requirement commanders in the field identify during the execution of their mission, a pool of experts on immediate call, as flexible as possible, needs to be set up. This aspect should be taken into consideration in the light of the setting up of a new CIMIC organisation. There are surely experienced administrators, police officers, lawyers, environmental experts and many other specialists who are reserve officers and willing to do this kind of fundamental work on a temporary basis. There is a real possibility here for future deployment of specialists in missions.

It is striking that COMKFOR mentions this aspect in his evaluation report, when he concludes, "What was required was a pool of experts on call, who could deploy to the Operation

when required, take stock of the situation, recommend action and then, working closely together with HQ KFOR and UNMIK, find the expertise and resources required, both locally and from external agencies, to address the problems."

What is necessary is not so much specialists who take over the civilian side of the operation, but experts who can give the right advice at the right moment. The CIMIC field is so broad, certainly in a 'failed state' situation as in Kosovo, that assessing beforehand which expertise is required at what moment is quite difficult. An effective deployment of such experts, or indeed asking the right questions, requires a complete embedding of CIMIC as a principle in the operational processes. It is here that CIMIC officers play a crucial role, as they have to achieve a seamless match between the unit's requirements and the experts. They should also ensure that the right questions are asked. Although the two CIMIC officers of 11 Battalion Horse Artillery did an excellent job, it is certain that in the future CIMIC will require more training and expertise. For future deployment the same energy should be put into the training and integration of CIMIC officers as into the training of more traditional experts. In a way it is striking to realise that whereas, for instance, S2 officers, signallers, and certainly fire controllers had been permanently trained, both CIMIC officers had been appointed at a very late stage and had not had any specific training at all.

10. CIMIC ?

CIMIC in its classic form is based on cooperation with civilian authorities, but in Orahovac, as in the entirety of Kosovo, there were no acting civilian authorities to cooperate with. Strictly speaking, therefore, there was no civil military cooperation either, and this begs the question whether the term CIMIC always covers the field of activities sufficiently.

A first problem is that the present terminology on CIMIC stems from the days that CIMIC had a clearly defined supportive function and was directed at the creation of conditions for more classic operations of military units. Kosovo is a very clear example of CIMIC acquiring a function of its own, essential for mission-achievement. CIMIC is therefore shifting from a supportive to a primary function, and, consequently, CIMIC specialists are getting a different place in the decision making process. CIMIC gets a more central position and it is difficult to imagine that this will change in the near future. The interaction of the military with the population and many other parties is a fact and it will certainly not become less relevant.

Due to its more central position CIMIC is becoming a task that must be embedded in all aspects and levels of the unit. In Kosovo this implied that the primary staff officers were much more involved in the CIMIC aspect of the decision making than they had been during previous training. The S3 as well as the S4 officers spent a substantial amount of time on the civilian aspects of the mission and, after the arrival of IOs and NGOs, also on the contact with civilians and officials of many different organisations. Partly because the Dutch Battalion had only two CIMIC officers (and not a single specialist) the staff officers and NCOs were given secondary tasks. The signals officer, for example, maintained contact with ICTY and the various forensic teams, and the S3 officer with UNHCR and OSCE. Usually the two CIMIC officers kept contact with the local population. In some cases ordinary soldiers were used as liaison officers. Thus, one of the members of the Signals troop, together with some Americans, distributed warm clothing in remote villages. CIMIC, therefore, is no longer the field of activities for a few specialists but an essential aspect in the work of many officials.

The third and possibly most fundamental reason for making the definition of CIMIC broader, lies in the execution or taking over of elements of administrative authority. Whether or not the formal decision has been made to execute military rule is not so important. The Australian military jurist Michael J. Kelly argues convincingly that when the military operate in an area

where there is no functional administration left, they are the 'de facto' authority, anyhow (Kelly, 1999). At least in Kosovo there was not the slightest room for doubt that the local population, certainly in the first few months, considered KFOR as the authority, and even more important, accepted it as such. This implies that there is a need for specialists who are able to support the process of re-establishing the most fundamental aspects of a functioning administration. This goes beyond the classic notion of CIMIC and requires a much broader approach.

In essence the main task for all units in Kosovo was to lay a foundation on which to build a more or less normal civilian structure. This can only be done if everyone is aware of this task and when all efforts are focussed on it. Although the term CIMIC in the case of the Gele Rijders did not fully cover the actions, the Battalion laid its main effort precisely in this field. In other words, it may not have been fully according to doctrine, but the ethical awareness and the will to help were obvious. The German Brigade formulated it, quite to the point, as follows, "es gibt viel zu tun, packen wir es an".

11.   Conclusions

Eventually the Dutch soldiers left Orahovac. As a desired 'endstate' 11 Battalion Horse Artillery wanted to lay a foundation for organisations to build on. This was achieved, as UNMIK-POL, UNHCR and many other IOs, GOs and NGOs have stated. In the words of the UNHCR representative from Djakovica (responsible for Orahovac):

> In the early days when the main humanitarian actors were not yet on the ground, Dutch KFOR stepped in where the need was high, impartial, down to earth and very efficient. In the absence of main UN actors, your men took over functions of which they were only partly relieved months after the first troops entered Kosovo. From my experience over the past months I am convinced that no better foundation could have been laid for our humanitarian work in Orahovac municipality than was done by your men.

In many modern operations CIMIC plays a dominant role, and the cooperation between military and civilian organisations is of crucial importance for the success of an operation. CIMIC, therefore, is too important to be left exclusively to specialists. CIMIC is increasingly becoming one of the key principles of modern operations, and must be embedded as such in the training of soldiers and particularly commanders.

Especially in difficult conditions CIMIC is also a way of thinking that every soldier must have. The individual soldier on patrol can do a lot of good or harm by a single remark or simple gesture. CIMIC, therefore, is for every soldier and not the exclusive domain of a few specialists.

Winning the confidence and respect of the population is a condition for creating a safe environment and certainly also for the rebuilding of a functioning administration. The military can and must play a crucial role in the transitional phase. The better the military are prepared for this aspect of their task, the better the foundation they can lay will be. Therefore, preparation, not only for the military aspects of an operation, but also the administrative aspects, deserves maximum attention. CIMIC is increasingly becoming a full-fledged aspect of military operations, and this implies a professional approach in all respects. A structured CIMIC officer training and the creation of an adequate pool of specialists are as essential as the full embedding in military training of officers and NCOs, in particular.

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Notes

[1] KFOR (Kosovo Force) is the name of the military component of the international mission in Kosovo.

[2] Letter of the Secretary of Defence to the Speaker of the Second Chamber of the States General of 30 June 2000

[3] See amongst others: Th. J. Clarenbeek, *Netherlands War Law*, Doctoral Thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1978, and J.C.E. van den Brandhof, *The Decision Making in the De Geer and Gerbrandy Cabinets*, Doctoral Thesis University of Amsterdam, 1986

[4] For further background information on this subject, see: A.J.H. van Loon, 'Mededelingen van het militair gezag' [Communications from the Military Rule], *Militaire Spectator*, December 2000

[5] During the preparations the situation in Bosnia was too often referred to, without bearing in mind the essentially different situation the Battalion would face in Kosovo. Whereas, on the one hand, using lessons learned is essential in making professional progress, it is wrong to assume that all experiences can be matched one on one.

[6] In the French town of Rambouillet near Paris the negotiations on the cessation of the violence in Kosovo were conducted. After a hopeful start it proved to be impossible to reach any results here. For the Serb government of Milosovic the stationing of a NATO-led peace force, in particular, was a prohibitive objection. After the failure of the talks and the continuation of the violence against the Albanian Kosovars, NATO began its discriminate air raids to force the Serb government into submission.

[7] Resolution 1244 explicitly states: "Ensuring public safety and order until the international presence can take responsibility for this task".

[8] In Resolution 1244 one of the responsibilities of the 'civil presence' is defined in paragraph 12: "Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo".

[9] In connection with this it must be realised that the carrying of arms is a sign of manliness in Albanian culture.

[10] The order to make more direct contact with the population was especially prompted by the exceedingly rapidly changing circumstances. Hardly a month after the arrival of KFOR there was actually no threat from the Yugoslav army left anymore, but maintaining public law and order had become extremely important. Just like policemen, the soldiers would have to leave their armoured (vehicles) and make contact with the local population.

[11] On the Albanian side this recognition was almost always there. Not so for the Serbs, where especially the discussion about whether to leave or not was always problematic. Nevertheless, the established group of spokespersons was capable enough to speak on behalf of the majority of Serbs and to make binding agreements.

[12] UNMIK uses the term 'administrator' for the interim administrators. In fact the term only partially covers the work of these functionaries. Their tasks lies in the administrative and administration support domain. In fact they combine the mayor's and town clerk's tasks.

[13]   It should be noted here that during the Milosovic' regime the so-called Albanian 'shadow government' had set up a completely separate health system. Albanians and Serbs had got used to segregation rather that mutual support.

[14]   The plan was first conceived during one of the regular meetings between the commander of 13 NL Brigade and the mayors in the region.

[15]   Every Dutch contingent always has a military police officer to deal with national policing business.

CIMIC from the point of view of NECBAT – UNMEE

(**No peacekeeping without peacebuilding**)

[*NL-ARMS*, 2002: Chapter 11]

J. Rijken

## 1.	Introduction

From 30 November 2000 until 18 June 2001 the Netherlands took part in the UN-mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). What made this mission special was that it was the first time that SHIRBRIG (Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade) was deployed operationally. Under the leadership of the UNMEE Force Commander, who was also the SHIRBRIG commander, the Netherlands, together with other SHIRBRIG countries like Canada and Denmark gave the mission a flying start, in accordance with the SHIRBRIG deployment concept, and subsequently carried it out almost without any problems for six months. Through this way of operating a very useful footprint was left behind for a smooth take-over by subsequent relief units. On 11 June 2001 the Netherlands/Canada battalion (NECBAT) handed over its task to an Indian battalion. From the Dutch point of view the mission was very special and instructive because of the joint-combined composition of the battalion under Dutch command.

This contribution will first present a brief description of the organisation and the mandate of NECBAT, after which a more general picture is given of the special entourage and civil-military situation in the central sector of the border area between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the AOR of NECBAT. Subsequently, there will be a more detailed discussion of three CIMIC aspects of the UNMEE mission, viz.
-	'Hearts and Minds' projects;
-	Quick-impact projects;
-	Host Nation Support.
Finally, a conclusion is presented.

## 2.	Organisation of the Dutch contingent

### 2.1	Structure

The Dutch contingent consisted of a reinforced Marine Corps battalion, supplemented by a helicopter detachment of the RNLAF of four Chinook transport helicopters and a Canadian motorized infantry company group. Furthermore, the RNLA supplied a unit of 80 engineers and some twenty drivers for specialist vehicles. In addition, there was the contingent commander with his staff (a national command element of approximately 30 personnel) and a detachment of the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary of about 15 persons. Finally, the Landing Platform Dock HMS Rotterdam was employed during the deployment and redeployment phases. The contingent as described above, including HMS Rotterdam, totalled roughly 1,500 personnel.

### 2.2	Activities

The Marine Corps battalion formed the core of the Dutch UNMEE contribution and carried out its tasks, laid down in the framework of the UN mandate, in the central sector (300 kilometres) of the 900-kilometre border area between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The helicopter detachment's main task was to provide a day-and-night, 24-hour air medevac helicopter, and it had a great variety of additional transport tasks. The engineer unit lent its support during the

deployment phase by building the company locations and the Logbase. Apart from that it was employed to improve a number of unmetalled roads that suffered badly from the heavy supply convoys. The Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary was charged with police tasks and movement control of large logistic convoys. The national command element consisted of a very mixed staff of personnel from the four Services and it functioned as the eyes and ears in the mission area for the Chief of the Defence Staff. HMS Rotterdam fulfilled two important tasks during the deployment and redeployment phases by transporting vehicles and by acting as the 'primary casualty receiving ship' when the FDS (field dressing station), which was part of the Logbase, was not yet operational.

3.   Mandate and task of NECBAT

The UN mandate for UNMEE was laid down in Resolution 1320, which was passed unanimously by the Security Council on 15 September 2000. The mandate is based on Chapter VI (peacekeeping missions) of the UN Charter. The military operational mission as specified in the mandate, is concrete. The mission for UNMEE is that of a 'monitoring force', with as its main task the monitoring of the Temporary Security Zone in the 300-kilometer central sector. An important task for NECBAT in the initial phases of the mission (prior even to the establishing of the Temporary Security Zone) was monitoring the withdrawal of the Ethiopian and Eritrean forces and creating a secure environment for UN activity. NECBAT had various additional tasks which are less relevant here and will therefore be left out of consideration.

An important factor for the 'mindset' during the execution of the mission was the fact that UNMEE was not a humanitarian mission. The Dutch Parliamentary Letter of 9 October 2000 was clear about this: 'For the reception and protection of refugees UNMEE has neither the mandate nor the means. The same applies to the provision of medical aid to the local population. It must be emphasised that UNMEE does not have a humanitarian task; that is the responsibility of other UN organisations and NGOs'.

The mandate did give NECBAT the task to fulfil a coordinating role with regard to the activities of the various aid organisations operating inside the Temporary Security Zone from the moment this zone was established by the Force Commander. At the outset, however, it was not quite clear yet what this coordinating role meant, but as the mission progressed and eventually the safety zone was established, it became apparent what NECBAT could do for the NGOs. The Eritrean government did not allow the NGOs to move inside the border area before the Temporary Security Zone had been established, which hindered them in their relief activities in preparation of the return of the displaced people to the area. As NECBAT knew its way about very well in its AOR, this coordination and assisting role could be realised concretely by informing the relief workers about the current situation in the area, such as the location of the armed forces, police and militias, villages and hamlets that did not show on the map, supplying road maps with the latest information on mine threat and the situation of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). In the following section the refugee situation and the coordinating role of NECBAT will be viewed in closer detail.

4.   General refugee situation

The Temporary Security Zone was established by the Force Commander on 18 April 2001. Before that time, the Eritrean government did not allow relief organisations to enter or set themselves up in the border area. This also applied to the tens of thousands of Eritrean IDPs who had been accommodated in a large number of refugee camps.

Before the repatriation got under way in late April and early May 2001 an estimated 75,000 Eritrean refugees found shelter in camps and approximately 250,000 were spread out over the country, many having found a roof over their heads with relatives or host families. Although there were some Ethiopian camps south of the safety zone, the IDP problem mainly manifested itself in the north, in Eritrea. The reason for this is the fact that during a final offensive in May 2000 Ethiopia penetrated deeply into Eritrean territory, causing the great numbers of Eritrean refugees. The Eritrean government considered the IDP problem as its

own problem, and not that of the NGOs or UNHCR. Relief was accepted, but all coordination had to go through the Eritrean Refugee and Relief Committee (ERREC). Thanks to this strong governmental grip on the IDP situation no uncontrolled refugee deluge occurred in the border area after the establishment of the Temporary Security Zone. ERREC had an effective instrument of control to keep the refugees in the camps through the system of food distribution there. Only in the camps food would be given on production of vouchers. Outside the camps no food was available.

4.1   Concerns about harvest and mines

The possibility of a massive refugee deluge did cause UNMEE some serious concerns. First, there was a growing impatience among the IDPs to return to their homes, after the Temporary Security Zone had been established. The IDPs were mainly farmers and their families who wanted nothing more than to return, in order to till and sow their fields before the rainy season set in. If they stayed on too long, it would mean a third consecutive crop failure. This urge to return could cause a refugee deluge.

A second concern was founded on the fact that there were still many mine-dangerous areas and battlefields littered with unexploded ordnance (UXOs) inside the safety zone.

An uncontrolled return on routes that had not been cleared yet could cause many civilian casualties. UNMEE and several NGOs, therefore, offered mine awareness courses, but, nevertheless, mine accidents were reported, as adults and children sometimes walked seemingly mindlessly into marked minefields. A directly related worry of NECBAT concerned the risks involved in giving emergency aid to casualties in a minefield. This is an exceptionally dangerous and complex operation. All efforts, therefore, were directed at prevention and charting the mine threat as clearly as possible for the NGOs, and, in doing so, indirectly for the IDPs as well.

4.2   Familiarity with the situation

Already during the deployment phase NECBAT began undertaking reconnaissance patrols. In addition to this, the CIMIC section of the battalion staff carried out activities in their terrain.

> *Composition and task S5 CIMIC.*
> The Staff section consisted of eight persons, including a staff element with a major and a captain. In a later phase during the mission the section was reinforced with a number of French service personnel, mainly coming from Djibouti
> The section was divided into Tactical Support Teams (TSTs) of two persons each. The section head and his adjutant had followed relevant training in Ankara and Sarajevo.

The TST personnel was not specifically trained for CIMIC, but by on-the-job training, common sense and flexibility, this hiatus was soon overcome.

The main tasks of the TSTs consisted of mapping the area, making contact with the local administrators and establishing their identity. It was tried to ascertain the correct names, locations and the numbers of inhabitants of all living areas and camps. Simultaneously, an

assessment was made of the housing/living conditions and the food situation, in order to be able to indicate where the most pressing humanitarian problems occurred. Naturally, contact was established with the humanitarian organisations. In anticipation of the coordinating task with regard to the activities of the NGOs and the refugee deluge ensuing from the establishment of the Temporary Security Zone, the CIMIC section built up a clear picture of the refugee situation in the central sector. It contained the locations of the IDP camps in Eritrea, their sizes and the effects of the repatriation of the IDPs (numbers, from which direction, which destination and which routes) on the execution of the battalion tasks from the moment the Eritrean government would allow the IDPs to return. Once the refugee deluge began from the north, NECBAT, and in its wake the NGOs, had an up-to-date picture.

When on 10 May 2001 the return of Eritrean refugees, coordinated by ERREC, began, the NGOs were not prepared, as they had not been informed by the Eritrean government. Many thousands of refugees were transported by government buses to the Senafe land corridor and dropped there, after which they continued their journey on foot. In and near Senafe temporary camps sprung up, where water, food and sanitary provisions were very poor indeed in the beginning. The CIMIC section had already a work location in Senafe, located in a derelict hotel (the CIMIC house). In this location the representatives of the various NGOs were briefed about the current situation in the area.

5. 'Hearts and Minds' projects

By the end of January 2001 the deployment phase of the battalion had come to an end, which meant that all supplies, matériel and vehicles had been transported from the port of Massawa to the deployment area and the company locations and Logbase had been set up. The

deployment phases seamlessly went over into the employment phase, the phase in which the battalion could fully concentrate on its primary tasks in the AOR. This phase was characterised by intensive foot and mounted patrolling by day an night and the establishment of patrols staying in one place for a couple of hours or bivouacking during the night and observation posts. Apart from that much time was spent on making and maintaining contacts with the military and civilian authorities. Simultaneously, the CIMIC section of the battalion staff, as described above, began to build up its picture of the civilian military situation. Because of this work a good idea began to emerge of the generally very poor circumstances in which the local population were living.

From the start of the operation it was clear that UNMEE was not a humanitarian operation, and as a consequence of that structured help to the population (for instance, repairing war damage) was not an issue, with the exception of emergency aid. It was UNMEE's policy, anyway, to limit contact with the population to the necessary functional level, in order to avoid any appearance of partiality or prejudice for either Eritreans or Ethiopeans. UNMEE's position would become completely untenable if its neutrality became an issue. To minimise that risk the personnel was not given permission to leave the company location, except on military business. Sports and relaxation had to be found inside the compounds.

5.1   Doing something for the population

Through the many patrols and frequent contacts with the local administrators a picture began to emerge of the deplorable state of maintenance of the public services, schools, hospitals, water supply and overall hygiene. For many Marines this situation was very similar to the ones they had experienced during peace missions in Cambodia and Haiti. There, small projects had been set up with the help of the so-called 'Potje Pronk'(the Pronk Money Box), named after the then Minister of Development Cooperation. In the following paragraph the 'Potje Pronk' construction is described by the example of how a Marine Corps Detachment worked when it was part of the United Nations Mission in Haiti from February 1995 until February 1996.

> *CIMIC-Haiti.*
> The detachment was given ƒ 100,000 by the Ministry and a Development Cooperation specialist was detached to the unit to assist the detachment commander. An inventory of possible projects was made by the patrol commanders. Subsequently, the platoon commanders made a project plan in which a number of Wh–questions ('what, where, why and with what?') were worked out. Per project the necessary money was made available and then the unit went about purchasing the required materials and carrying out the construction work. It was important to do something in a thorough, but pragmatic manner for the population. This kind of small-scale project can quickly make a considerable positive contribution to the execution of the mission, whereas a bureaucratic approach can be disastrous in situations like these.

With this experience in mind the battalion command felt the need to carry out small-scale CIMIC projects for the population. An extra argument was that it would enable them to do something in compensation for the inconvenience caused by the UNMEE presence. The large number of UNMEE vehicles led to a considerable extra traffic pressure on the narrow, unmetalled and very dusty roads. Pedestrians and cattle making use of the same roads had to make way for the many vehicles that would pass them in great clouds of dust. Nevertheless, the friendliness and hospitality of the population, in Ethiopia as well as in Eritrea, was overwhelming from the beginning and it remained so until the last day. This positive attitude of the population was one of the success factors of the mission. It was desirable, indeed

necessary, therefore, to do something to keep their hearts and minds.

At the same time it was of importance to do something for the population from the perspective of good management of the own unit. Carrying out such projects was extremely motivating for the personnel, on the one hand, because it meant a welcome change from the long patrols, and because it gave a great deal of pleasure from a human perspective to be able to do something for the poor population with relatively few means, on the other.

5.2 Preconditions

On the initiative of Commander of NECBAT an inventory was made of possible projects that were submitted by the company commanders and the Logbase commander. This yielded a total of twenty possible projects, more or less equally divided over Ethiopia and Eritrea. This inventory and a motivated request for funding were submitted in the middle of February 2001 through the national command element to the Defence Crisis Response Cell in The Hague. The proposals by NECBAT to carry out 20 small-scale projects in the Temporary Security Zone were approved by the Defence Secretary, after consultation with the Minister of Development Cooperation.

The following conditions were set for the carrying out of the projects:

- The primary goal was winning/keeping the 'hearts and minds'.
- The projects had to be divided as much as possible equally over Ethiopia and Eritrea.
- There was to be no direct relation with war damage.
- They should be small-scale and terminated before 11 June 2001.
- The Addis Abeba and Asmara Embassies had to monitor the projects.
- A project bookkeeping had to be set up for the money spent.
- The budget was ƒ 250,000.
- There were to be periodical progress reports.

5.3 Organisation and execution of the projects

The entire coordination and monitoring of the execution of the 'hearts and minds' projects was given to the CIMIC section by the Commander of NECBAT. Subsequently, a budget for each of the projects was set up and an assessment was made whether the job could be done within the available time. A detailed project list and budget was then presented for approval to both Embassies, after which the work could begin in early April 2001. For each project a project leader was appointed who was responsible for monitoring the progress, employing, if necessary, own personnel and the budgetary control. There were frequent coordination meetings between the CIMIC section and the project leaders in order to solve any problems that might come up and the Commander of NECBAT sent fortnightly reports to both Embassies. The work was partly put out to local contractors, and although that was not the primary objective of the 'hearts and minds' projects, it did give an impulse to the local economy and employment.

In some projects the own per-sonnel did the work with locally purchased building materials, such as wood, corrugated iron and paint. The building of the school in Adaito, a hamlet in the Danakil Depression, is an example of a project that was carried out completely on their own

by two Marine rifle groups. As indicated above, it was a welcome change from the daily routine, and very rewarding, also because of the sincere gratitude of the population.

On a small scale, even individual Marines and their families took the initiative to buy toys, sports gear and books, which were presented to libraries, orphanages and hospitals. The population often showed their gratitude in a cultural fashion by inviting the Marines to their traditional coffee ceremonies, which might last up to one and half hours. On 9 June 2001 the last four projects in Dekemhare were completed over two coffee ceremonies and a big lunch.

5.4   Mereb Bridge

A special CIMIC project, initiated by the UNMEE Force Commander himself, was repairing the Bailey bridge across the Mereb river, between the towns of Rama (Ethiopa) and Adi Quala (Eritrea). This bridge is the second important land corridor, beside the one at Senafe, in the central sector. It had been partially destroyed during the conflict and was impassable for traffic. Near the bridge there was a ford that could be used by pedestrians and terrain vehicles in the dry season. During the NECBAT period the crossing at Mereb was quite frequently used by the Eritrean authorities to extradite interned Ethiopians. With the approach of the great rainy season that would become impossible. In order to ensure the passage across the Mereb, the Netherlands gave a Bailey bridge in April 2001, at the request of the UNMEE Force Commander. This bridge was then constructed by an Indian UNMEE engineer construction company. Two Dutch engineers gave advice and assistance during the construction works. Shortly after the departure of NECBAT the bridge was officially opened by the Force Commander.

6.   Quick-Impact Projects

For the sake of completeness the so-called Quick-Impact Projects (QIPs), initiated and managed by the UNMEE HQ in Asmara itself, are worth mentioning as CIMIC activities. QIPs funded from UNMEE's budget are intended to provide a flexible disbursement option to support small-scale quick-impact projects on short notice in the Temporary Security Zone and adjacent areas. QIPs are implemented under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). A committee representing the SRSG approves and subsequently authorizes expenditure for such projects, up to a ceiling of US $ 15,000 per project. Suggestions for potential QIPs can be submitted from the Force, from UNMOs, from NGOs, from diplomatic sources, etc. All requests should be channeled through the local Senior Sector UNMO, via the battalion level S-5, who will process the request through G5-CIMIC Force HQ.

Each project proposal has a Project Officer to provide a point of contact for the Secretary of the Committee. QIPs are undertaken with the close consultation and consent of the local parties and benefiting communities concerned. For each project, a Memorandum of Understanding and other appropriate agreements are concluded between the SRSG and the organisation or agency (where possible a national or international NGO) undertaking the project.

Potential QIPs include but are not limited to the activities listed below:
- restoration/enhancement of water services and water purification facilities;
- provision of public sanitation and rubble clearance;
- acquisition of basic medical equipment and medical supplies;
- repair of school buildings and provision of basic school furniture and materials;
- repair of hospitals/medical facilities;
- repair of basic community infrastructure and municipalities;
- assistance in the establishment of housing for returning IDPs;
- training programmes for demobilized soldiers;
- restoration of electricity supply at critical points/areas.

7.   Host Nation Support

The second CIMIC aspect during the Dutch contribution to UNMEE was the Host Nation Support (HNS), an essential and widely known logistic concept in crisis situations. UNMEE's operational concept dictated a forward deployment of the battalion in, or in as close proximity as possible to, the intended Temporary Security Zone. Besides, the company and platoon locations were chosen in places which were politically and strategically sensitive, near the fronts where the heaviest fighting had taken place, the border areas, therefore, the most hotly disputed territories by both parties. This meant deployment in a very thinly populated area, making use of existing infrastructure impossible. All operational and logistic units, including the helicopter detachment, therefore, built up their compounds from scratch.

During the deployment phase of the Contingent a great number of very labour-intensive logistic and construction activities had to be carried out. Without HNS the execution of all these activities could not have been completed within the given time frame. Below, a number of situations, involving HNS, will be discussed.

7.1 Third line transport

The transport of 750 containers and 400 organic vehicles during the deployment as well as the redeployment phases by the Massawa (seaport of debarkation) to Dekemhare (location of the Logbase) route may well be called the greatest logistic challenge (including the risks) of the Dutch UNMEE mission. It was estimated that this 'container push' between Massawa and Dekemhare, bridging a difference in height of more than 2,000 metres, would take several weeks, in view of the narrow winding roads and early indications of available civilian transport.

Thanks to the influence of the Eritrean Secretary of Transport a great number of trucks suitable for container transport were made available. The Eritrean drivers clearly were not bound by any national regulations for driving hours or work and rest times (they slept in their trucks). They managed to bring up the initial shipment of 500 containers in a record 30 hours. Without the enormous Eritrean civilian transport capacity the deployment of NECBAT would not have been so swift. It was an extraordinary logistic operation and it was carried out without any accidents. It was a true example of how effective civil-military cooperation can be, but it also illustrates the vulnerability of operational logistics during crisis missions. For the redeployment another successful appeal was made on third line transport, although this time a more gradual time schedule was used.

7.2 Construction of camps

For the construction of four camps a period of eight weeks had been estimated. As said before, a considerable part of the work was done by the engineer detachment, but there was also extensive use of Host Nation Support. The huge quantities of gravel for the construction of roads and paths in the camps are still vivid memories for the participants in the mission. The gravel was purchased from civilian suppliers in Asmara, Mendefera and Adrigat and it was used to limit dust formation from the heavy traffic in and around the camps. Apart from gravel, asphalt was used for the heli platform in the Logbase. This, too, came from a large

asphalt factory in Asmara. For reasons of hygiene the compound kitchens were placed on concrete floors, which were built by local contractors.

7.3 Other local facilities

Contracts with local bakeries were concluded for the delivery of bread to the entire contingent. Bottled drinking water for the entire contingent was purchased centrally by UN and delivered at the Logbase in Dekemhare. From there the units were supplied weekly by unit-owned transport. The camp in Adrigat (Ethiopia), where sector HQ and B Company were located, was connected to the local power net. Bulk water for the laundry and toilets and shower facilities was daily transported from Adrigat. In most other camps similar arrangements were made with local suppliers. Logbase (because of its size) and the location of C Company at May Mine (because of its remoteness) had their own supply of energy with the help of generators. Logbase was the only location that was connected to the local telephone net of Dekemhare. Finally, all camps hired tens of local employees for cleaning work and the laundries.

8. Conclusion

The experiences with CIMIC during UNMEE can be called very positive. By making use of Host Nation Support an important financial injection was given to the poor economies of both countries. Carrying out 'Hearts and Minds' projects not only proved to be a very effective way in maintaining a positive attitude of the population towards UNMEE, the projects also brought about a larger commitment and motivation of the personnel for the UNMEE mission. A good execution of CIMIC tasks and handling of CIMIC responsibilities by NECBAT, beside the carrying out of their primary tasks, added another success factor to the Netherlands/Canadian UNMEE contribution. CIMIC helps to influence the political, civilian and military situation in such a positive manner that optimal conditions and a maximum

support are created for the military-operational execution of the mission. In other words, *no peace keeping without peace building.*

Disaster Assistance Response Teams

[*NL-ARMS*, 2002: Chapter 12]

A. van den Boogaard

1.   Introduction

In this article it is my intention to acquaint the reader with Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART). After a short sketch of its origin, the organisation, mission, way of operating and manner of deployment will be discussed. The possible deployment of Military Emergency Aid Units will briefly be touched upon, after which the relation between DART and Non-Governmental Organisations will be looked into. Finally, there will be a short description of the various missions in which DART took part.

2.   History

DART was formally established in 1996. Before 1996 the Royal Netherlands Army already had a reconnaissance unit that could be deployed in areas stricken by humanitarian disasters. But an evaluation of the deployment of armed forces elements in Ghoma showed that there had not been any real structural thinking about it. On 17 May 1995 the then Minister of Defence reported to the States General that he intended to have a Military Emergency Aid Reconnaissance Team per 1 October 1996 in readiness.

3.   Mission

The task of DART can best be described by a literal translation of the Dutch word *noodhulpverkenningsteam* (disaster assistance reconnaissance team). A further elaboration of this term produces the following description of the mission: 'By order of the Dutch government, to carry out a reconnaissance in an area struck by a humanitarian disaster, aimed at an assessment of the damage and to report this damage to the Dutch government'. The assessment of the damage also includes an estimation of deployable means still available to and present in the stricken area. The reconnaissance specifically concerns the immediately required disaster assistance, which can best be described as the assistance a community immediately needs after a disaster has struck, to relieve the primary needs of the people: survival, food, drinking water, medical supplies, emergency accommodation and relief. For planning purposes a period of six weeks of disaster assistance following the disaster is assumed.
It is clearly stated that DART will be deployed in disaster circumstances, which means natural disasters, but also in case of a great deluge of refugees resulting from war situations or life threatening circumstances. When strength, mission and armament of the team are considered, it is not very likely that DART will be deployed in actual war zones.
Should the Dutch government decide to send Military Emergency Aid units to a stricken area, DART will form the nucleus of the staff that manages these units on the spot. This is the follow-up mission for DART.
Apart from carrying out reconnaissance missions, DART can also be employed to reinforce the Embassy personnel already on the spot, to support specific aid units by carrying out C3 (Command, Control and Communication) activities or to support the already operable

coordination cell of the United Nations or local authorities. A DART mission can be carried out by the whole team all over the globe, with the exception of arctic areas.

4.   DART personnel

There is no fixed composition of DART, which will be manned completely dependent on the scenario. The lightest team consists of two men, whereas the heaviest deployment mode uses ten military and one civilian employee from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their functions are as follows:

1.   The commander, whose main task is leading the team and editing the final version of the reconnaissance report. When emergency aid units are deployed he commands these units (rank: lieutenant colonel).
2.   The team's sergeant major is responsible for the administrative and operational tasks in case of the team's deployment. Apart from that he is responsible for the maintenance and usability of the material (rank: sergeant major).
3.   The signals NCO has to make all internal and external communication operable and maintain it. He is also the ICT specialist (rank: sergeant major 1st class/warrant officer).
4.   The engineer officer is responsible for the infrastructure and facilities chapter in the reconnaissance report (rank: major).
5.   The transport officer takes care of the transport issues in the reconnaissance report (sea/airports/rail and road traffic) and arranges all DART transport requirements inside the area of operations. When Dutch units are deployed in a stricken area the transport officer sees to the transport of these units (rank: major).
    6. The legal officer deals with the legal aspects of deployment and coordinates the calamity plan (rank: major).
7.   The press officer is responsible for all media issues relating to the deployment of the team (rank: lieutenant/captain).
8.   The security officer has to assess the safety situation and take measures directed at optimising the safety of the team in the area of operations. He co-writes the calamity plan. When security units are deployed in the area he commands them (rank: captain or major).
9.   The contract manager controls and manages the financial affairs and he provides any material needs the team may have. In case of deployment he conducts the contract negotiations (rank: lieutenant/captain).
10.   The medical officer takes care of the health situation in the team and contributes to the reconnaissance report his estimation of the medical situation in the stricken area. In case of deployment he will act as senior medical advisor (rank: major/lieutenant colonel).
11.   The Foreign Affairs representative, when attached to the team, will be responsible for liaising with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in situ with the representative of the Netherlands in that country and the (local) administrators.

As DART is on standby 24 hours a day, the total DART pool consists of three times ten functionaries. Per function in the team three persons are required, allowing one to be on exercise and one on holiday. These three men/women make their own availability schedule. This means there is always one full team available, but it is never a fixed team: when there is an alert, those on duty simply show up.

The functions are filled by RNLN, RNLA and RNLAF personnel. Being a member of DART partially comes with the job in that it is an integral part of someone's job description. The vast majority of DART personnel are volunteers, though, who are available for service with DART beside their normal jobs.

When deployed in the stricken area, DART will be supported by Netherlands Embassy personnel. The foreign affairs representative, when attached, has a task in this. When DART is deployed without its vehicles, there will be a request to the Netherlands Embassy for means of transport, prior to departure. And last but not least the requirement for interpreters will also be directed to the Embassy.

5. DART equipment

As with the personnel, the material composition of the team is dependent on the situation on the spot. In the lightest mode of the deployment the team members have their own bergens, a portable aggregate (1kW), and communication equipment (the so-called 'fast kit'). Means of transport have to be hired on site.

In the heavy option the team have three all-terrain vehicles and one trailer. There is enough food and water for seven days and the team have their own limited supply of fuel and an aggregate. For communication purposes the team have at their disposal the latest state-of-the-art equipment for communication within the unit as well as with the Netherlands. The team is able to establish and operate its own command post without the help of others. It has its own accommodation.

For a speedy processing of reconnaissance data portable ICT-equipment is used. When on a reconnaissance, the team members can make use of digital recording equipment. Dependent on the threat, a choice can be made for armed deployment, exclusively for self-defence.

The whole team is air-portable with an C-130 or KDC-10 or any comparable plane. All the equipment is transported in accordance with the IATA regulations (International Air Transport Association).

6. DART deployment requirements

DART is only deployed on request of the stricken country. The members always wear military uniform. In case of armed deployment, the commander can decide to wear arms openly, or keep them in the vehicles.

Deployment of Military Emergency Aid Units is realised with units from the regular defence organisation, as the Netherlands Armed Forces do not have any specific units for humanitarian operations.

In DART as well as Military Emergency Aid Units deployment the execution of the necessary work is handed over as soon as possible to regular aid organisations or NGOs. In principle the duration of the deployment is estimated at six weeks, after which the emergency aid stops and the rehabilitation phase begins. In the rehabilitation phase (estimated at six months) the area is brought back to the level prior to the disaster. Deployment of military units in this phase is considered to be contribution to a humanitarian operation. Obviously, the terms mentioned here are theoretical, as practice may show a different picture.

In principle, the material used is taken back to the Netherlands, but this, too, has to be considered in the light of practicability: the cost of returning them may be higher than purchasing the used material anew.

7. Requirements for DART personnel

In spite of the fact that DART is mostly manned by volunteers, taking additional training is mandatory for the members. Every prospective DART member is given an additional training of one week in the Netherlands on the organisation and mode of operating in an area of operations. Besides, the aspirant member learns to handle the specific DART equipment.

There are plans to stage an annual follow-up course in a country with an unfamiliar language. During this exercise two teams will be deployed consecutively, while the third team trains them. In this manner DART conducted a large-scale exercise in Rumania in September of 2001. In the vicinity of Timisoara it was deployed to support to the already present Rumanian emergency aid units. The scenario presented a series of major earthquakes which proved too much for the Rumanian capacity.

Apart from these exercises there are workshops of a day and a half twice a year, where the latest developments in equipment are presented, the lessons learned of exercises are discussed, and representatives of NGOs are invited to exchange experiences.

Annually various DART members follow international courses, in order to exchange experiences and to build up a network. The latter is one of the critical success factors in actual operational deployment: in operational circumstances there is hardly any time for getting to know the other aid agencies. Being familiar with various organisations active in the area, or even with the aid workers themselves, will enhance the successful execution of the mission.

The availability of the various team members is of the utmost importance, as each of them has a specific experience and know-how. If one or more members drop out, this will endanger the mission. In an area stricken by a disaster all sorts of diseases may emerge and because of that all DART members have been fully immunised.

8.   The decision making for DART deployment

The request for emergency aid is made by the stricken country and it is directed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Whether or not DART will be deployed is a political decision. In case the giving of emergency aid is considered, the Crisis Control and Humanitarian Aid Directorate (DCH) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will contact the Defence Crisis Control Centre (DCBC). When it is considered to give emergency aid, a reconnaissance unit is first deployed. The DCBC has the Crisis Staff of the CiC of the Land Forces alert the DART commander, who in turn alerts the Head of Administration, who subsequently calls up the rest of the team. Within six hours after the DART commander has been alerted every member on duty, equipped with a pager for the purpose, has to report at the Crisis Staff. During the decision making meeting at the DCBC, at which the DART commander is present, the composition of the team to be deployed is discussed. Simultaneously, the press statement is worked out.

When it concerns the deployment of a team with the 'fast kit', the moment of departure is in theory six hours after the first alert. All this is of course dependent on mode of transport to the mission area. For this purpose planes of civilian air companies can be used. If the heaviest team is chosen, it has to be loaded and ready for departure within 24 hours after the alert has first come in. Here, too, the choice may be for transport in a civilian carrier.

Although it is not official doctrine, it is worth considering to increase the rapidity of DART by dispatching a light team ahead of the heavy team. Flexibility and speed are two characteristics of DART.

9.   Operating in a stricken area

There are no standard procedures for deployment in a stricken area. Because of the multitude of factors of influence, every mission will be different from the previous or following one, which means that it is not feasible to lay down fixed procedures for every possible mission. Some important factors of influence are:

- DART will only be deployed in circumstances in which the demand for aid exceeds the supply. The capacity for aid in the immediately neighbouring areas is not sufficient to cope with that mismatch, which makes third world countries the most likely options for DART deployment. Every country in the world, and indeed every part of a country, has its own characteristics, culture, and level of development. It has its own problems and specific political situation. More often than not, DART will have no actual experience with these features of the area of operations.
- Depending on the level of disaster aid and the means present, a stricken country will request help through the UN, other countries or NGOs, and each of them will send their own organisational elements. Apart from these international actors there are also national and local organisations active. This diversity demands a coordinated employment of means, which in actual fact is one of the greatest challenges of deployment in disaster circumstances. It is never clear beforehand which organisations are going to be active in the area and what the level of coordination is going to be.
- Every type of humanitarian disaster creates its own specific situation. The various phases following a disaster also determine the need for help. The moment of entry of DART is dependent on the moment at which the country made the request for international support and the pace of the subsequent political decision making.
- Generally speaking, CIMIC will be part of the mission in a (crisis control) situation, where it plays a supporting role in achieving the military mission. For DART CIMIC is the mission, as there is no situation thinkable in which DART would be able to operate within a humanitarian aid context without cooperation with civilian authorities. This cooperation of the military with NGOs lends a special dimension to being a member of a DART team. After the fall of the Berlin Wall both groups were confronted with each other. Their combat fatigue makes soldiers suspect in third world countries, as often the local population has bad experiences with uniformed organisations. What remains is a natural distrust of the military by the population as well as the NGOs. Deployment in crisis control and humanitarian operations of military units steadily increased over the years, instigated by an increasing demand or help and a change in the nature of conflicts. A decade or so later it is possible to discern more and more overtures between the two groups. Courses are taken together, and several missions have been set up in cooperation and carried out successfully. The sharp edges have disappeared and there is mutual profiting of each other's strong points. An important principle in the cooperation is the realisation that the military have no intention of taking over from the NGOs. The right stance for the DART commander is, 'tell us what we can do for you'. When it is possible for the civilian authorities or NGOs to take over, DART should leave the area as soon as possible.
- The operational circumstances in which DART has to act determine its operating mode, up to an extent. Immediately after the disaster chaos will reign. Still, DART will have to attempt to acquire a clear picture of the situation: what has happened, what is the still available capacity, which NGOs will do what, what help is under way, etc. A first requirement for answering these questions is operating in a coordinated manner. There will certainly be attempts at coordination within the elements of the (local) authorities involved in supplying aid or managing the administering of aid. Such a coordinating body is indicated by UN with the acronym LEMA (Local Emergency Management Authorities). The UN are often active in third world countries and after a disaster has taken place elements of the already present UN organisations will try to coordinate their collective efforts (UN Disaster Management Team: UNDMT). This UNDMT will maintain a close cooperation with the local authorities; after all, these organisations are already familiar to the authorities, which will make working together all the more

smooth. An element of the Disaster Response Branch of the UN is the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, with its office in Geneva). Requests for aid by the stricken country, if directed through the UN, will be passed on by OCHA, which has no means of its own, with the exception of the so-called UNDAC teams: UN Disaster Assessment Coordination. These are groups of volunteers who, on request of the UN, may carry out a brief reconnaissance mission and/or set up a coordination cell, the OSOCC (On-Site Operations and Coordination Centre). OCHA has no command authority over these volunteers.

- In the stricken area soon many aid agencies will be present, and it is not always clear who they are and what resources they have. They are not under anyone's command, not even the UN's. Everyone realises that coordination is necessary, but there is also some reluctance towards undergoing it.

- Coordination presupposes a certain power of decision, which is not always there. The civilian and military aid agencies on the spot have different interests. A certain reputation of the NGOs will be a supporting factor in the acquisition of funds. For the politicians it is important to be able to show their own countries and the world that the military units are doing a good job. So, it is not unthinkable that a dispute on competence among the various aid agencies may develop.

- It is a real challenge to get a good picture of what constitutes real information and what not, and OSOCC or LEMA will be able to supply it, if they are there and operational. OCHA process the information they get on reliefweb (reliefweb.int), which considerably increases the availability of the most current information.

- Naturally, the composition of the team influences the way of operating. So if no fixed procedures can be given, it is left to DART itself to determine the most appropriate operating mode after a quick on site assessment of the situation. The experiences of previous missions and a further analysis of the assignment have led to guidelines for the team to follow.

- Speed is of great importance: in crisis situations quick communication can save lives. Thus, the first 72 hours after an earthquake are decisive, and a speedy deployment of emergency aid units is essential then. Besides, a rapid reaction can prevent a situation in which public opinion presses for the undertaking of well-meaning initiatives, without a sound inventory of actual needs. When there is a large demand for aid the still available infrastructure or means of transport can become overtaxed, whereas aid goods that are unnecessary or not removed in time may obstruct the supply of aid rather than enhance it. Not only the depth of the humanitarian catastrophe has an impact on the problem of making a speedy evaluation of the situation. Also the size of the disaster and the accessibility of the area strongly determine the time needed for this evaluation. Thus, the area flooded in Mozambique in 2000 was approximately as large as the former West Germany. On the other hand, there is the pressure from public opinion that, reinforced as it may be by the reports of the omnipresent media, demands a quick response. In case of slow political decision making, the pressure from public opinion will have made itself felt already at the moment that DART is alerted. Still, DART will have to take the time to make a good reconnaissance, which, after all, is the basis for a good administering of aid. On its reconnaissance, DART will make use of its own observation, data derived from interviews with NGOs, the UN, the local authorities and the people that have been affected themselves.

- Accuracy in the collecting of the reconnaissance data is a prerequisite for a correct definition of the need for emergency aid, and it can only be obtained by verifying the collected information. Immediately after a disaster has struck there will be absolutely no coordination. After the latest earthquake in India there was heavy criticism on the time

needed to set up a coordinated and structured action. Even in countries with a well-pre-pared contingency plan, the damage to the emergency services organisation in the area itself can increase the chaos, as was the case in the most recent earthquakes in Turkey in 1999, where the extent of the damage was such that it seriously degraded the emergency services organisations.

-   Low-profile action is the only way to guarantee that there is not going to be rivalry immediately after arrival. One of the characteristics of a military organisation is a standardised, thorough and quick decision making process, followed by a rather directive style of command. As time pressure increases and crisis circumstances develop, this command style will become more directive. This approach is fully accepted in a military environment, which has a hierarchical build-up and whose personnel are familiar with this way of command and control. The aid organisations involved in humanitarian disasters are often not military in character. Within the civilian organisations people have different ways of working together. Acting as if they are military personnel will have a contrary effect. This may at times affect the cooperation with the military, which may become difficult, and the stricken population may be the worse off because of it. In our western world time is money. Matters must be dealt with quickly and as efficiently as possible. There is often hardly any room for interpersonal contact. In other cultures this is totally different. If the wish to make time for a proper greeting and exchange of courtesies is ignored, it will quickly lead to a cultural clash. Not observing customs will affect the cooperation, or make it even impossible. In such a situation it is wise to try to find a balance between respect for the other, on the one hand, and the execution of the mission, on the other.

The different factors of influence sometimes are at odds with each other. Verification of the data costs time, in particular when chaos reigns and emotions take over. Thus, in military eyes, the less rigid way of decision making and managing by NGOs will take much time. There are no guidelines here. It is DART itself that determines when a reliable reconnaissance report can be written on the basis of the available material. It is even possible to choose for a phased reconnaissance: first a superficial reconnaissance after which a first concise report will be produced; then, further reconnaissance data will provide more detailed information.

10.   The composition of the reconnaissance report

After a brief description of the actual events, an assessment per sector will have to be supplied of the damage, the relief resources present (personnel, material and processes), the short-term employable material resources, the aid that has already been requested/offered and the means present in the area to administer the aid that has arrived. Apart from that, DART is expected to work out a short-term expectation. Thus, the doctor of the team will not only have to indicate the present medical situation, but he will also have to make an assessment of the future situation in terms of weather influences, shortage of care, the present health situation and other factors. DART will also advise as to which units of the Netherlands armed forces, or parts of units, are most suitable for deployment in the stricken area. DART functionaries, of course, have an insight in the possibilities in their speciality. Thus, the engineer officer has access to the capacities of the various engineer units within the Royal Netherlands Army, and he will make pertinent recommendations to deploy these units.

11. Political decision making after reporting

On the basis of, amongst others, the DART reconnaissance report the Dutch political authorities will decide whether our country will make aid available and in what form. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is leading in this process. For that reason the report is forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Embassy in the stricken country) as well as the Defence Crisis Control Centre. Giving aid can be realised in various forms: money, the sending of equipment or (military) aid units. In the case of the Turkish earthquake the Dutch government sent money. Personnel of the Department of Public Works were deployed during the floods in Poland. In case of actual deployment of Military Emergency Aid Units the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence will coordinate the help, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs leading.

12. Opplan 15

The Netherlands armed forces have no longer earmarked certain units of the four Services as Military Emergency Aid Units. All regular units that can temporarily be taken off their normal tasks can be deployed for a short period as aid units. There is no need for the units to be deployed as a whole. When needed, specific elements can be flown in within 72 hours after alerting the unit. This prepared deployment is described in Operation Plan 15 of the CiC of the Land Forces. The medical elements of these emergency aid units can serve as an example of such flexible, tailor-made units.

13. Medical Humanitarian Emergency Aid Units

The military medical evacuation system is divided into so-called roles. A role is a level or echelon of medical care. A higher role has more medical capacity than a lower one. For emergency aid only roles 1 through 3 are applicable.

Role-1
> The care given at the beginning of the medical treatment and evacuation chain (care system); it is characterised by non-specialist treatment primarily aimed at saving life and limb and the immediate evacuation to a higher level of care. This is the first care station where a doctor is present.

Role-2
> The care that is given in addition to role-1 and which is mainly directed at saving life and/or limb, as well as further care with a view to restoring employability (with limited nursing) and the evacuation to role-3.

Role-3
> The specialist care, in addition to role-1 and role-2, as well as care aimed at employability and evacuation to role-4.

Role-4
> The care characterised by full (specialist) end care, directed at reaching the medical end state, if necessary after convalescence.

The higher the role, the more medical capacities there are and the greater the size of the unit becomes. After all, a medical facility with an operating theatre requires more personnel, equipment and infrastructure than a facility that only offers urgent treatment. A heavier unit leads to more problems when it has to be moved. A regular tented hospital has three operating theatres and transporting it requires 40 20ft containers. As the Netherlands only has 4 heavy

or medium heavy transport carriers, this capacity will often be insufficient. At a moment at which the world responds to a humanitarian catastrophe the availability of strategic airlift will be strongly limited as well. On top of that, there is the transport problem on arrival. More often than not the infrastructure in the direct vicinity of the disaster area will also have been affected or be overtaxed. Planes will be overloaded, transport by water will take relatively long, and the local means of transport will not be able to meet the demand.

A tailor-made unit is the answer to this logistic problem. It is for this reason that medical emergency aid is staged in four steps.

Step 1

In this phase 7 teams can be deployed, each consisting of a doctor and 3 nurses. The personnel take their own personal equipment (in bergens). It can certainly depart within 72 hours. The equipment is supplemented by the New Emergency Health Kit of the World Health Organisation (WHO).

Step 2

Of the 7 teams of the first phase 4 teams can be expanded into an *aid station*. This aid station is a role-1 medical facility. In order to achieve this transfer, the 4 teams will be given 2 assistants each. Tents, additional medical equipment, 20 beds/mattresses, a limited power supply and water storage capacity are flown in for each of the aid stations. For this form of emergency aid a deployment within 72 hours is feasible. The teams that have not been expanded can be deployed independently from the aid stations. The remaining 3 teams from step-1 can be deployed apart from the aid station.

Step 3

The aid stations created in phase-2 can be merged into a *dressing station* (role-2). This station will have 18 or 24 tents. The nursing capacity is 100 stretchers/mattresses. The personnel capacity is increased by a command and control group, a logistic group and a laboratory group. The dressing station has limited surgical capacity.

Step 4

The deployed dressing station is transferred into a role-3 *hospital*, for which modules are added to set up a limited operating theatre (including a specialist group, a specialist support group, a sterilisation group and a radiology group).

In this mode of operating it is not necessary to start with step-1 and then to go through each consecutive step. The personnel and equipment come from regular units of the RNLN, RNLA, and RNLAF and in fact a choice is made of the available resources. It is clear this way of deployment is flexible and fast, indeed. In the build-up from step-1 through the following steps to step-4 it should be realised that once committed and operable, medical facilities cannot easily be withdrawn. In a disaster area a natural flow of casualties will occur spontaneously. It is hardly feasible to close a facility and open it elsewhere when there is already an influx of casualties. The suffering population will not understand this (linguistic problems). The most obvious deployment, therefore, is step-1 followed by the desired end step, without any other steps in between (for instance, moving from step-1 to step-3).

Logistic problems and other infrastructural provisions, such as personnel accommodation, are expected to have been dealt with by DART. Of course it can be said that this sounds very easy, but the answer would be that it is impossible to react fast, on the one hand, and to have everything arranged for the complete unit, on the other. A quick reaction on a humanitarian catastrophe requires open-ended decisions. Besides, the military may be expected to be able to function in difficult circumstances.

14.   Why deploy DART ?

If there are so many NGOs and UN can deploy UNDAC teams, why should DART teams be deployed at all? As has been indicated before, speed is a decisive factor in a humanitarian catastrophe. NGOs will be present but not in sufficient numbers, and they too lack the necessary capacity. Many NGOs are budget dependent and as far as the UNDAC teams are concerned, a team can only be deployed after a search has been conducted among the members on duty.

For example, during the humanitarian disaster in East Timor it proved to be quite difficult for OCHA to find enough UNDAC members that could be deployed immediately. As has been mentioned above, there is no command authority from OCHA over the UNDAC members. DART, on the other hand, is fast and reachable 24 hours per day. It can be deployed completely independently within a 24-hour period, which makes it an instrument of great readiness. A few other strong points are:

- a guaranteed availability of a well-equipped DART team;
- flexibility with regard to tasking as well as composition;
- a guaranteed communication from the deployment area;
- a structured and impartial reporting of the situation;
- tailor-made aid of a limited duration;
- an existing and well-trained instrument of deployment.

15.   Missions

Since its formation in 1996 DART has been active in a number of occasions:
- On 26 September 1998 the Windward Islands of St. Maarten, St. Eustasius and Saba were struck by **hurricane *George***. On the same day it was decided to deploy DART. At four o'clock a.m. the team was flown to Curacao by KDC-10. On 27 September the team arrived in Saba and that same night a report was sent on the required emergency aid. The following day was used to normalise the situation and the Marine Corps restored the power supply in large parts of the island. On Thursday the damage and emergency aid requirement was assessed for St. Eustasius. On Saturday DART received a request to make a report on the emergency aid and rebuilding of Saba and St. Eustasius. It took four days to write the report and it showed that the data gathered about Saba and St. Eustasius that were sent to the Netherlands were still correct. The report contained three parts: immediate emergency aid, rebuilding and prevention.
  A year later it appeared that the rebuilding and preventive measures in the residential area of Golden Rock had been carried out well as the hurricanes 'José' and 'Lenny' had not damaged the houses.
- In November 1999 Honduras was struck by **hurricane *Mitch***. The extent of the disaster led to DART being alerted on 5 November. The same day DART left with a boat detachment of the Marine Corps to Curacao. Together with the Marines stationed in the Caribbean DART was deployed in Honduras, where it engaged in transporting food by boat and making a reconnaissance of the roads, to see if the boat transports could be replaced by wheeled transport. The mission was adequately carried out and handed over. At the same time DART was tasked to assess the damage in the vicinity of the capital. It left Honduras on 22 November.
- On 19 October 1999 DART was alerted and flown in before **hurricane *Jose*** was to hit the island of St. Maarten. The advantage of this action was that the presence of a DART team in case of a disaster was assured. DART arrived on 20 October and prior to the landfall of the hurricane it made a quick reconnaissance of the island. The landfall was

in the night of 20 October and at dawn DART made a reconnaissance of St. Maarten. Quickly it became clear that there was no need for emergency aid as the hurricane had been one in the lightest category F-1. On 23 October DART was back again in the Netherlands.

- **Hurricane *Lenny*** quickly grew from a tropical storm into a category F-5 (the heaviest category) hurricane. On 16 November 1999 DART was alerted and departed in the early morning of 17 November. As the hurricane only moved slowly DART could not reach the Windward Islands before the 19th. A reconnaissance indicated that there was a limited need for emergency aid. DART arranged the request for and transport of water pumps to pump the flooded St. Maarten dry again. For Saba a new water purification plant was flown in and transported by naval vessel from St. Maarten to Saba.

  An additional assignment, on request of the Minister of the Interior, for DART was to set up a plan together with the local authorities for the rebuilding of the island. DART also made recommendations for weathering future hurricanes better. DART left St. Maarten on December 1.

- In February 2001 **Mozambique** was struck by heavy rainfall. DART was alerted on 2 March and its commander left on 3 March together with a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On 4 March 50 rubber boats arrived in Mozambique. The Embassy had already prepared many things but they had no experience with giving logistic support to a military detachment. Later on 12 engineers arrived, who were going to teach the Mozambicans how to handle the boats. An NGO gave DART food to help the isolated population. OSOCC only works with large quantities of food and is mainly interested in air lift, so the Dutch capacity was hardly relevant for them. DART, therefore, went to look for its own assignments within the disaster area. For logistic support the team's sergeant major and the signals NCO were also flown in. After about 100 people had been trained on the boats and the 50 boats handed over to the local authorities, the mission ended after 30 days.

16. Conclusion

DART mainly consists of volunteers, people who accept that they are on immediate call, and when that call comes that there is no other object but to carry out the assignment quickly and adequately. The motivation of the people grows with every successful mission, and if there is to remain a basis for DART, the teams will have to be deployed. It will not be for want of effort by the personnel. They are ready for it.

Epilogue

CIMIC as complex international Military-Civilian Intervention for Conflict Solution and Relief

[*NL-ARMS*, 2002: Chapter 13]

R.V.A. Janssens

While NATO's definition of CIMIC would suggest an unambiguous concept, the essays in this volume make clear how complicated it can be and how it defies simple categorization. CIMIC takes place both during disaster relief and during peacekeeping operations. It takes place after military conflicts as well as during civil wars. CIMIC means military officers and enlisted men dealing with local government, if any is present, or else establish a local government. It also means dealing with local and international NGOs, and international government organizations. CIMIC is about maintaining peace and order and bringing relief to people who need it desperately, about rebuilding - often literally - societies, but sometimes it can also lead to entanglement in local conflict and result in 'mission creep' with detrimental results.

All of these aspects have been addressed by the essays in this collection. The discourse on CIMIC has been set by Michael C. Williams[1] and Thomas G. Weiss.[2] Their studies have provided an overview of the issues involved with CIMIC.[3] They discussed topics ranging from the moral question of intervention during humanitarian crises to the roles of NGOs and of military forces in the operational area. Many of the issues mentioned in their works have been studied in detail by others, including the authors in this volume.

It is remarkable that there are many studies about war, yet few about ending wars. Most of the studies about ending wars focus on diplomatic settlements and international conferences.[4] Few of these works deal with the role of the military in ending conflicts (with the exception of describing decisive battles). The historical context of CIMIC is therefore rarely covered.[5] Most of the works concerned with CIMIC treat only peace support operations or humanitarian aid during the 1990s. Consequently, the majority of the works deal with UN peace operations, describing the complications of multi-national military operations under the precondition of non-intervention.[6]

Janssens and **Teitler** offer their view on earlier forms of civil-military cooperation. They see the origins of CIMIC in World War II operations, both in liberated nations and in the Allied occupation of enemy territory. Another dimension was added to CIMIC by counter-guerilla warfare at the end of the colonial period, notably in Asia, where winning the 'hearts and minds' of the local population was crucial to the success of these military operations. The Cold War period in Europe led to an experience that can be seen as the mirror opposite of contemporary CIMIC: civilian administration was to facilitate military operations. Yet, this notion of CIMIC –'host nation support'- still falls within the context of civil-military co-operation. It is interesting to note that the key aspect of these (proto-)CIMIC operations during the period 1943-1989 was the way in which the armed forces dealt with local government and the local population.

In the years since 1990 the changes in CIMIC operations have been rapid. In this context, we can note *two crucial developments* in peacekeeping operations. *First*, as UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali encouraged a new kind of peace support operations, in which United Nations armed forces tried to diffuse conflicts within states. *Second*, and probably in line with interference in these intra-state conflicts, the armed forces began to take notice of

the role of NGOs. Often these NGOs were already present in failing states, trying to improve living conditions.

The role of these NGOs had been neglected for a long time in the study of international relations. Most of these NGOs have been set up by individual citizens who distrusted national governments. While national governments focus on national interests first and foremost, as Akira Iriye has shown in his excellent study of NGOs, most of these organizations think more in terms of international cooperation, human compassion, and civil society.[7] To many NGOs, national governments - and as a representative of them, the armed forces - stand for the opposite of what they believe in.

This distrust of national governments by NGOs can be a complicating factor in disaster relief and peace support operations, as noted in many of the essays in this collection. Much of the debate on CIMIC is dominated by the issue of antagonism between NGOs and the military forces. In this volume these ideas are best expressed by **De Wolf.** In his analysis of different approaches of military forces and NGOs toward relief and peace support operations, he states that a key difference is that "aid organizations are demand-driven" and "the military are supply-driven". It is interesting to note that **Van den Bogaard** in his essay on DART teams shows that this perception is not always true. In the case of natural disasters, the government of the stricken nation has to request aid. If a DART team is sent out, they also take local resources into consideration in their recommendations. In that way, they have exactly the same approach as NGOs.

This is true not only in the case of disaster aid. As **Homan** shows in his analysis of the operation in Bosnia, to the Dutch forces the role of the local community in creating and continuing economic and social projects is crucial. **Rijken**, in his analysis of the UNMEE mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia, also stresses the cooperation with local government and local organizations. CIMIC during UNMEE included host nation support and helping out the local population in areas of shortage and need.

This is not to say that **De Wolf's** observations are incorrect. I believe it is important to see his remarks as an expression of, in **Winslow's** words: the "differences in organizational goals (including values and basic assumptions), organizational composition (gender, age, ethnicity), and actual organizational structure". **Bollen** and **Beeres** take this observation one step further when they state that "aid organizations have expressed their fear that in collaborating with the military, the latter may try take over control".

This sentiment is not always unfounded. **Rappard** in his article on CIMIC Group North sees as part of the CIMIC tasks: "economic policy, public finance, spatial and environmental policy, education and culture policy, social policy, movement and transport policy, public health policy, security policy, media and communications policy and agriculture and nature policy". Thus, it seems that CIMIC has acquired a political component. In any case, it is telling that it is the armed forces that want to set up CIMIC and regulate matters. CIMIC is, after all, a military concept.

Apparently, NGOs do not always see the need to organize all efforts centrally. Again, this difference in perception of the need for central planning can probably be explained by looking at the organizational goals of both armed forces and NGOs. NGOs are often focused on making local enterprises self-sufficient and are therefore more oriented toward local efforts, while NATO forces see CIMIC as part of their overall mission in their operational area.

Yet, there is another perspective to this lack of cooperation. **Bollen** and **Beeres** in their essays try to analyze the different attitudes of NGOs and armed forces. They use the *viable system model* to show what and where cooperation works or does not work. Through concepts such as 'antagonistic cooperation' and 'resource dependency perspective' they try to explain why civilian and military organizations cooperate in spite of all the differences. Their research results, however, also point in a different direction. Their assumption is, as in most of the

literature, that all these organizations have the same goal in mind: to improve local conditions. In general terms that is true, but there is no consensus on specifics. Disagreement about method or even goals is not limited to military officers, on the one hand, and NGOs, on the other. There is already a substantial body of literature about the intricacies of multi-national military operations. Less attention has been given to the differences among the NGOs and the lack of cooperation among them.[8] In her essay **Winslow** quotes a Canadian officer who states that "sometimes NGOs don't want to talk to each other". **Oostendorp** makes, implicitly, the same observation when he writes about his SFOR experiences. He welcomed NGOs who wanted to cooperate, and he respected NGOs that went their own way. It would be incorrect to presume that these latter NGOs want to be independent only of military forces, they often also do not want any other NGO in their way.[9]

This need for independent identities for all parties involved in both disaster relief and peace support operations becomes also clear in their attitude toward the media. They all want to get attention, in order for the 'home front' to see what important tasks they are executing. As **Winslow** points out in the case of negative news, the consequences for NGOs are even worse than for military officers. Bad news might end the career of an officer, but bad news for an NGO might mean the end of funding.

Just as one should not assume that military forces and NGOs are two unified blocks during CIMIC, it would also be a simplification to state that the armed forces should take care of security, and that the NGOs should coordinate the relief effort. As **Winslow** points out, there has been an increasing demand on the military for humanitarian aid. **Van den Bogaard**, in his essay on the DART teams, explains why national CIMIC efforts are necessary. Many of the reasons he mentions have to do with the fact that, especially in the early stages of a relief effort, a national military force is just simply one of the few organizations which can offer the necessary aid: military forces can be deployed quickly (a first group within 24 hours), they have the needed capacity, and they are less budget-restrained. During peace operations, military forces sometimes need to provide both security and aid. In Kosovo, as shown by **Van Loon**, there was no local government and there were no NGOs present when the NATO forces went in. **Rijken** points out that in Eritrea the government did not coordinate with NGOs, which were consequently unprepared. On top of that, he states that it is hard to keep the soldiers and officers from taking initiative themselves, since they too are moved by the living conditions of the local people, and want to offer aid as well.

Again, CIMIC, and the debate on how best to provide aid to people in need, can be very complex since we are speaking of so many different types of operations: relief aid, peace-keeping (as in SFOR and UNMEE), and peace enforcing (as in Kosovo).

The debate about the intricacies of cooperation between military forces and NGOs seems to have overshadowed most other key CIMIC issues. Only **Van den Bogaard** points to the importance of (local) *culture* during CIMIC. As **Janssens** and **Teitler** note in their historical introduction, CIMIC used to be about military forces and local government, which meant that local culture was a crucial element in CIMIC. In the various case studies presented in this volume, the importance of cooperation with local government for the military forces is mentioned. There is no mention, however, of the role of culture in these dealings. It is hard to believe that cultural differences would be of no consequence. Maybe one reason for the absence of culture from the discussion is that most of the case studies in this volume, with the exception of the Dutch Marines in UNMEE, concern operations in Europe. It is a pity that earlier peace support operations or disaster relief by the Dutch Marines are not dealt with here. In the 1990s they participated in peace operations in Cambodia, northern Iraq, Haiti, and in disaster relief in the Caribbean. Their experience with non-Western cultures in these regions might have shed a different light on the role of culture during CIMIC.

Another way to contribute to better CIMIC is through the study of the colonial period. During the nineteenth century and earlier, military forces of European nations often had to execute military government or deal with local government (and not only by fighting them). Regularly, social scientists were used to explain local culture and win, in modern words, the 'hearts and minds' of at least the local rulers. Although the goal during the colonial period was to keep control over the colony, while CIMIC is directed at making people self-reliant, the experience of the earlier period related to the importance of culture and how to deal with it could still be of interest.

An even broader topic that in general has been ignored, but begs for more attention, is how to give people, or sometimes even nations, *a better future*. Often peace support operations take place in so-called 'failed states', where local government has completely collapsed (if it ever worked), and where living conditions are appalling. Of course, there has been and continues to be a serious debate in the field of development studies on how to address these issues. It seems unlikely that military interventions are the solution to these problems. Yet the choice that is made by doing CIMIC is never debated.[10] European nations have decided that they do not want to interfere in the political situation in a country, but only restore peace and order (unlike the United States military forces, where Civil Affairs includes a political role). NGOs and European governments alike want the initiative for aid to remain with the NGOs. The suggestion seems to be that the development of a local capacity for economic and societal growth is the key goal. However, one should also wonder about the origins of a particular 'failed state' or why people are poor in some countries. Maybe the way power is divided in a society will keep on creating problems, unless the political structure of that country is changed, and a beginning of a civil society can be made.[11]

This might mean commitment of armed forces to a peace support operation for a longer period than most governments are willing to make (or some armies are capable of making because they have been downsized after the end of the Cold War). These are political issues. This volume was about CIMIC officers and researchers sharing their observations on the development of CIMIC, asking challenging questions, and offering interesting answers to some of those questions.

CIMIC, in its present shape, is a relatively new topic. As has been demonstrated here, it is a complex topic to study, and it is a complex way to solve problems. CIMIC is used in very different circumstances and is about dealing with very different parties, who sometimes do not even want to cooperate. In the end, it is fascinating to see how in recent years, it is not only NGOs who have thought in terms of human compassion, but national governments have, in addition to national interest, paid more attention to moral issues in international politics as well, and committed more military forces to peace support operations and disaster relief. It can hardly be expected that such a relative recent practice can immediately be implemented flawlessly, and consequently many adjustments and attempts at improvement have taken, and will take, place. CIMIC is a challenging way of trying to ameliorate the conditions of people in terrible circumstances, and though it might seem idealistic to some, it is a positive and important contribution to a more stable and peaceful international society.

Notes

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[1]   Michael C. Williams, *Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, Adelphi Paper 321 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998).

2   Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, *Humanitarian Challenge & Intervention*, (2nd edition, Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000); Th. G. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999).

3   The standard works on the American approach to CIMIC - called Civil Affairs - are John T. Fishel, *Civil Military Operations in the New World* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997) and Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000).

4   See for instance: Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, *How Nations Make Peace* (New York: Worth Publishers, 1999), John G. Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000), and A.J.P. Taylor, *How Wars End* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1985). An interesting study of the concept of peace is Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2000).

5   There are individual studies of wartime or postwar occupations of territory, especially in connection with World War II. These are mostly historical studies that do not specifically focus on civil-military relations.

6   See for instance: Christopher Bellamy, *Knights in White Armour: The New Art of War and Peace*, (3rd edition, London: Pimlico, 1997). More specific studies of the United Nations peace operations are John Whitman (ed.), *Peacekeeping and the UN Agencies* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), and Wolfgang Biermann and Martin Vadset (eds.), *UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998). An exception are the studies published by the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center. Their titles include S. Neil MacFarlane and Hans-Georg Ehrhart (eds.), *Peacekeeping at a Crossroads* (Cornwallis Park: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), Alex Morrison, Douglas A. Fraser and James D. Kiras (eds.), *Peacekeeping With Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution* (Cornwallis Park: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), and David M. Last, *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Cornwallis Park, Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997).

7   Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

8   NGOs can be competitive amongst themselves, since they all try to raise money from the public in their home countries. It is essential for an NGO not only to achieve its humanitarian goals, but also to get attention for its achievements as an individual organization in order to be able to raise more money.

9   See, for example, the contradictory actions of the Red Cross and US CARE in their food relief programs in Somalia (Andrew S. Nastios, 'Humanitarian Relief Interventions in Somalia: the Economics of Chaos', in: *International Peacekeeping*, 3 (1996) 1: 82-83.)

10   An interesting discussion of the negative results of humanitarian aid is offered by Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montelos in his *L'Aide humanitaire, aide à la guerre?* (Brussels: Edition Complexe, 2001). Edward Luttwak, in a notorious essay in *Foreign Affairs*, suggested that peace support operations only prolong the misery of civil war and should be stopped (Edward Luttwak, 'Give War A Chance', in: *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1999).

11   A much more bleak view on the origins of conflict is also possible. The military historian John Keegan co-authored with Andrew Wheatcroft a study entitled *Zones of Conflict: An Atlas of Future Wars* (Simon & Schuster; New York, 1986) in which they stated that war will continue to erupt in certain places in the world no matter what because of physical, climatic, logistic, and economic reasons.

    It must be said that Keegan expressed in more recent books the hope that violence and war would eventually disappear. See, for instance, John Keegan, *War and Our World*: Chapter 5, 'Can there be an end to War?', pp. 61-74 (Pimlico; London, 1999).

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